Vol. 79 June 1985 No. 2

The American Political Science Review

Published Quarterly by
The American Political Science Association

Princeton

Constitutional Conflicts between Congress and the President

Louis Fisher

"Nothing in the field is as good an introduction to the key constitutional issues between President and Congress as *Constitutional Conflicts.* Fisher covers the ground expertly, from the Neutrality Acts through Nicaragua, and gives answers to the questions my students are asking."
—Richard M. Pious, Columbia University
P:$8.95. C:$40.00

Power in Numbers

The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion

James DeNardo

From the Foreword by Philip E. Converse:
"... James DeNardo has done here for the logic of protest what Anthony Downs did a quarter of a century ago for the logic of candidate strategies in voting systems."

This book explores the logic of struggle between radical movements and incumbent regimes, and develops a general theory of strategy in protests, uprisings and rebellions. The congruence between positions taken by inhabitants of his abstract model world and those of preeminent radical thinkers like Marx, Lenin, Bernstein, Luxemburg, Mao, and the Russian terrorists will be striking to political scientists, historians and sociologists alike. $25.00

The Rise and Fall of Chilean Christian Democracy

Michael Fleet

Today, more than a decade after Eduardo Frei relinquished power in Chile, Christian Democracy is again being heralded as a "moderate alternative" in Latin America. Michael Fleet presents a balanced picture of the Chilean Christian Democratic party, explaining the dramatic changes it has undergone during the twenty-five years since its emergence as a significant political force. P:$14.50. C:$35.00

At your bookstore or
Princeton University Press
41 William Street, Princeton, NJ 08540

The American Political Science Review

Vol. 79 June 1985 No. 2

CONTENTS

Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science .... Herbert A. Simon 293

Partisan Intentions and Election Day Realities in the Congressional Redistricting Process .... Richard Born 305

Assessing the Partisan Effects of Redistricting .... Bruce E. Cain 320

Promise and Performance: A Dynamic Model of Presidential Popularity .... Charles W. Ostrom, Jr. & Dennis M. Simon 334

Throwing the Rascals Out: Policy and Performance Evaluations of Presidential Candidates, 1952-1980 .... Arthur H. Miller & Martin P. Wattenberg 359

Ideology, Party, and Voting in the U.S. Congress, 1959-1980 .... Keith T. Poole & R. Steven Daniels 373

PACs, Contributions, and Roll Calls: An Organizational Perspective .... John R. Wright 400

Woman Suffrage in the Progressive Era: Patterns of Opposition and Support in Referenda Voting, 1910-1918 .... Eileen L. McDonagh & H. Douglas Price 415

Rights, Boundaries, and the Bonds of Community: A Qualified Defense of Moral Parochialism .... Richard Dagger 436

A Biochemical Property Relating to Power Seeking in Humans .... Douglas Madsen 448

A Politicoeconomic Theory of Income Redistribution .... Robert D. Plotnick & Richard F. Winters 458

Modernization and Traditionality in a Multiethnic Society: The Soviet Case .... Ellen Jones & Fred W. Grupp 474

War Making and State Making: Governmental Expenditures, Tax Revenues, and Global Wars .... Karen A. Rasler & William R. Thompson 491

Communications
- *Comment on Katz, Mahler, & Franz* .... Adam Przeworski & Michael Wallerstein 508
- *Reply to Douglas D. Rose* .... Donald D. Searing 510

Book Reviews
- Review Essays 513
- American Government and Politics 517
- Comparative and Other Area Studies 545
- International Relations 571
- Normative Theory 599
- Empirical Theory and Methodology 614
- Annotations 616

The American Political Science Review appears in March, June, September, and December of each year. It is published by the American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, and sent to all members. Dues: Regular Members with income: under $20,000, $40; $20,000-$29,999; $50; $30,000-$39,999, $65; $40,000 and over, $75; Student Members (limited to 5 years), $15; Retired Members, $20; Life Members, $1,000; Institutional Members, $75. Dues allocated for a subscription to the *APSR*: $10. Changes of address sent to the Membership Secretary of the APSA. Postmaster: Please send notification regarding undelivered journals to address above. Second-class postage paid at Washington, D.C. and at additional mailing offices.

Copyright © 1985 by The American Political Science Association (ISSN-0003-0554).

BOOK REVIEWS

Review Essays

Hammergren, Linn A. *Development and the Politics of Administrative Reform: Lessons from Latin America.*
Hyden, Goran. *No Shortcuts to Progress: African Development Management in Perspective.*
Rondinelli, Dennis A. *Development Projects as Policy Experiments: An Adaptive Approach to Development Administration.* .... Robert LaPorte, Jr. 513
Arterton, F. Christopher. *Media Politics: The News Strategies of Presidential Campaigns.*
Ranney, Austin. *Channels of Power: The Impact of Television on American Politics.*
Robinson, Michael J., & Margaret A. Sheehan. *Over the Wire and On TV: CBS and UPI in Campaign '80.* .... Jan P. Vermeer 515

American Government and Politics

Bacchus, William I. *Inside the Legislative Process: The Passage of the Foreign Service Act of 1980.* .... Henry B. Sirgo 517
Baker, Tod A., Robert P. Steed, & Lawrence Moreland, eds. *Religion and Politics in the South: Mass and Elite Perspectives.* .... Darryl Paulson 518
Bensel, Richard Franklin. *Sectionalism and American Political Development, 1880-1980.* .... Patrick A. Pierce 518
Bickel, Alexander M., & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr. *History of the Supreme Court of the United States:* Vol. 9, *The Judiciary and Responsible Government, 1910-21.* .... Gregory A. Caldeira 519
Browning, Rufus P., Dale Rogers Marshall, & David H. Tabb. *Protest Is Not Enough: The Struggle of Blacks and Hispanics for Equality in Urban Politics.* .... Ronald Kahn 520
Bullock, Charles S., III, & Charles M. Lamb, eds. *Implementation of Civil Rights Policy.* .... David Adamany 521
Cain, Bruce. *The Reapportionment Puzzle.* .... Barbara Burrell 522
Carballo, Manuel, & Mary Jo Bane, eds. *The State and the Poor in the 1980s.* .... Richard L. Engstrom 523
Diamond, Edwin, & Stephen Bates. *The Spot: The Rise of Political Advertising on Television.* .... Gene Weinstein 524
Dunn, Charles W., ed. *American Political Theology: Historical Perspective and Theoretical Analysis.* .... Robert Booth Fowler 525
Eads, George C., & Michael Fix. *Relief or Reform: Reagan's Regulatory Dilemma.* .... Craig A. Rimmerman 525
Francis, John G., & Richard Ganzel. *Western Public Lands: The Management of Natural Resources in a Time of Declining Federalism.* .... Daniel Sloan 526
Gertzog, Irwin N. *Congressional Women: Their Recruitment, Treatment, and Behavior.* .... Wilma Rule 527
Graber, Doris A. *Processing the News: How People Tame the Information Tide.* .... Michael Baruch Grossman 528
Graham, Hugh Davis. *The Uncertain Triumph: Federal Education Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Years.* .... Terry W. Hartle 529
Holzer, Marc, & Stuart S. Nagel, eds. *Productivity and Public Policy.* .... Craig Ramsay 530
Ingraham, Patricia W., & Carolyn Ban, eds. *Legislating Bureaucratic Change: The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.* .... A. B. Villanueva 530

Lammers, William W. *Public Policy and the Aging.* .... Gayle R. Avant 531
Litman, Theodor P., & Leonard S. Robins, eds. *Health Politics and Policy.* .... John T. Tierney 532
Magleby, David B. *Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot Propositions in the United States.* .... Jong O. Ra 532
Mann, Thomas E., & Norman J. Ornstein, eds. *The American Elections of 1982.* .... Pat Dunham 534
Miller, Stephen. *Special Interest Groups in American Politics.* .... Timothy J. O'Brien 534
Miller, Trudi G., ed. *Public Sector Performance: A Conceptual Turning Point.* .... James E. Swiss 535
Naison, Mark. *Communists in Harlem during the Depression.* .... Huey L. Perry 536
Noble, David F. *Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation.* .... Leon Grunberg 537
Petersen, James C., ed. *Citizen Participation in Science Policy.* .... T. Wayne Parent 538
Rockman, Bert A. *The Leadership Question: The Presidency and the American System.* .... Steven A. Shull 539
Rockoff, Hugh. *Drastic Measures: A History of Wage and Price Controls in the United States.* .... Gordon P. Henderson 540
Sabato, Larry J. *PAC Power: Inside the World of Political Action Committees.* .... John C. Green 541
Schwarz, John E. *America's Hidden Success: A Reassessment of Twenty Years of Public Policy.* .... Michael T. Gibbons 542
Wattenberg, Martin P. *The Decline of American Political Parties, 1952-1980.* .... Roger G. Brown 543
West, Darrell M. *Making Campaigns Count: Leadership and Coalition-Building in 1980.* .... Patrick J. Kenney 544

Comparative and Other Area Studies

Apter, David E., & Nagayo Sawa. *Against the State: Politics and Social Protest in Japan.* .... L. Jerold Adams 545
Arian, Asher, ed. *Elections in Israel—1981.* .... Donna Robinson Divine 546
Blank, David Eugene. *Venezuela: Politics in a Petroleum Republic.* .... Diego Abente 546
Bogdanor, Vernon, ed. *Parties and Democracy in Britain and America.* .... Christopher S. Allen 547
Camilleri, J. A. *The State and Nuclear Power: Conflict and Control in the Western World.* .... Paul F. Power 548
Cantori, Louis J., & Iliya Harik, eds. *Local Politics and Development in the Middle East.* .... Joseph A. Kechichian 549
Caspi, Dan, Abraham Diskin, & Emanuel Guttman, eds. *The Roots of Begin's Success.* .... Martin Slann 550
Caviedes, Cesar. *The Southern Cone: Realities of the Authoritarian State in South America.* .... Michael A. Morris 551
Cohen, Lenard, & Paul Warwick. *Political Cohesion in a Fragile Mosaic: The Yugoslav Experience.* .... Karen Rosenblum-Cale 551
Coleman, William D. *The Independence Movement in Quebec 1945-1980.* .... Richard Handler 552
Duncan, Graeme, ed. *Democratic Theory and Practice.* .... Gregory Leyh 553
Eidlin, Fred, ed. *Constitutional Democracy: Essays in Comparative Politics.* .... Jutta A. Helm 554
Esman, Milton J., & Norman T. Uphoff. *Local Organizations: Intermediaries in Rural Development.* .... Lawrence S. Graham 555
Etzioni-Halevy, Eva. *Bureaucracy and Democracy: A Political Dilemma.* .... Kenneth M. Gibbons 556

Freedman, Robert O., ed. *Soviet Jewry in the Decisive Decade, 1971-1980.* .... Gordon B. Smith 557
Goldstein, Robert J. *Political Repression in Nineteenth Century Europe.* .... Paschalis M. Kitromilides 557
Goodman, David S. G., ed. *Groups and Politics in the People's Republic of China.* .... Jean C. Oi 558
Gourevitch, Peter, et al. *Unions and Economic Crisis: Britain, West Germany and Sweden.* .... Alan Draper 559
Hermet, Guy, ed. *Totalitarismes.* .... André Liebich 560
Hindess, Barry. *Parliamentary Democracy and Socialist Politics.* .... Eleanor E. Zeff 561
Hurwitz, Leon, ed. *The Harmonization of European Public Policy: Regional Responses to Transnational Challenges.* .... Arthur B. Gunlicks 562
Krieger, Joel. *Undermining Capitalism: State Ownership and the Dialectic of Control in the British Coal Industry.* .... William D. Muller 563
Joseph, William A. *The Critique of Ultra-Leftism in China.* .... Frankie Fook-Lun Leung 564
Kim, Chong Lim, et al. *The Legislative Connection: The Politics of Representation in Kenya, Korea and Turkey.* .... Michael L. Mezey 564
Merkl, Peter H., & Ninian Smart, eds. *Religion and Politics in the Modern World.* .... John R. Pottenger 565
Rigby, T. H., & Bohdan Harasymiw, eds. *Leadership Selection and Patron-Client Relations in the USSR and Yugoslavia.* .... Nicolai N. Petro 566
Shepherd, Geoffrey, Francois Duchene, & Christopher Saunders, eds. *Europe's Industries: Public and Private Strategies for Change.* .... G. John Ikenberry 567
Von Beyme, Klaus, & Hartmut Zimmerman, eds. *Policy Making in the German Democratic Republic.* .... Henry Krisch 567
Voslensky, Michael. *Nomenklatura: The Soviet Ruling Class, an Insider's Report.* .... Rolf H. W. Theen 568
Wald, Kenneth D. *Crosses on the Ballot: Patterns of British Voter Alignment since 1885.* .... Ian McAllister 569
Warberg, G. R., & U. M. Kupferschmidt, eds. *Islam, Nationalism, and Radicalism in Egypt and the Sudan.* .... Richard H. Pfaff 570

International Relations

Adeniran, Tunde, & Yonah Alexander, eds. *International Violence.* .... Ilan Peleg 571
Berman, Edward H. *The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations on American Foreign Policy: The Ideology of Philanthropy.* .... Keith S. Petersen 572
Bracken, Paul. *The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces.* .... Barclay Ward 572
Carrère d'Encausse, Hélène. *Le Grand Frère: L'Union Sovietique et l'Europe Soviétisée.* .... Roger E. Kanet 573
Cooney, James A., ed. *The Federal Republic of Germany and the United States: Changing Political, Social, and Economic Relations.* .... Joyce Marie Mushaben 574
Dallek, Robert. *The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs.* .... Brian E. Klunk 575
Destler, I. M., Leslie H. Gelb, & Anthony Lake. *Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy.* .... Bernd W. Kubbig 576
Doran, Charles F. *Forgotten Partnership: U.S.-Canada Relations Today.* .... Richard Henry Foster 576

Dorfer, Ingemar. *Arms Deal: The Selling of the F-16.* .... Aaron Karp 577
El-Ayouty, Yassin, & I. William Zartman, eds. *The OAU after Twenty Years.* .... Steven Metz 578
George, Alexander L., ed. *Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention.* .... Patrick Drinan 579
Hacke, Christian. *Die Ära Nixon-Kissinger, 1969-1974: Konservative Reform der Weltpolitik.* .... James Clyde Sperling 580
Heller, Mark A. *A Palestinian State: The Implications for Israel.* .... Augustus Richard Norton 581
Holsti, Ole R., & James N. Rosenau. *American Leadership in World Affairs: Vietnam and the Breakdown of Consensus.* .... Jerel A. Rosati 582
Johnson, James Turner. *Can Modern War Be Just?* .... James A. Stegenga 583
Leiken, Robert S., ed. *Central America: Anatomy of Conflict.* .... Albert P. Vannucci 584
Lieber, Robert J. *The Oil Decade: Conflict and Cooperation in the West.* .... M. E. Ahrari 585
Litwak, Robert S. *Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969-1976.* .... James Clyde Sperling 586
Lomperis, Timothy J. *The War Everyone Lost—and Won: America's Intervention in Vietnam's Twin Struggles.* .... John James MacDougall 587
Luck, Edward C., ed. *Arms Control: The Multilateral Alternative.* .... Ralph M. Goldman 588
Mearsheimer, John J. *Conventional Deterrence.* .... Michael A. Preda 589
Meyer, Stephen M. *The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation.* .... Bennett Ramberg 590
Morris, Michael A., & Victor Millan, eds. *Controlling Latin American Conflicts: Ten Approaches.* .... David Lewis Feldman 590
Nelson, Daniel N., ed. *Soviet Allies: The Warsaw Pact and the Issue of Reliability.* .... Anthony Trawick Bouscaren 591
Ruggie, John Gerard, ed. *The Antimonies of Interdependence: National Welfare and the International Division of Labor.* .... Richard Higgott 592
Schwartz, David N. *NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas.* .... Mark D. Mandeles 593
Sen, Gautam. *The Military Origins of Industrialisation and International Trade Rivalry.* .... M. Mark Amen 593
Stover, William James. *Information Technology in the Third World: Can I.T. Lead to Humane National Development?* .... Eric J. Novotny 594
Terry, Sarah Meiklejohn, ed. *Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe.* .... Josef Kalvoda 595
Valenta, Jiri, & William C. Potter, eds. *Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security.* .... Jaroslaw Bilocerkowycz 596
Weiss, Thomas G., & Anthony Jennings. *More for the Least: Prospects for Poorest Countries in the Eighties.* .... Keith S. Petersen 597
Yoshitsu, Michael. *Caught in the Middle East: Japan's Diplomacy in Transition.* .... Theodore McNelly 598

Normative Theory

Beiner, Ronald. *Political Judgement.* .... Ken Masugi 599
Carnoy, Martin. *The State and Political Theory.* .... Steven D. Ealy 600
Debnam, Geoffrey. *The Analysis of Power: Core Elements and Structure.* .... Edward S. Malecki 600
Ferguson, Kathy E. *The Feminist Case against Bureaucracy.* .... Thomas L. Dumm 601
Fishkin, James S. *Beyond Subjective Morality: Ethical Reasoning and Political Philosophy.* .... Christopher W. Morris 602
Gould, Carol C., ed. *Beyond Domination: New Perspectives on Women and Philosophy.* .... Sarah Slavin 603

Hont, Istvan, & Michael Ignatieff, eds. *Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment.* .... Nicholas Xenos 604
Janowitz, Morris. *The Reconstruction of Patriotism: Education for Civic Consciousness.* .... W. Wesley McDonald 605
Jay, Martin. *Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukâcs to Habermas.* .... Steven B. Smith 606
Keane, John. *Public Life and Late Capitalism: Toward a Socialist Theory of Democracy.* .... Charles E. Ellison 607
Miller, Richard W. *Analyzing Marx: Morality, Power and History.* .... Charles E. Ellison 608
Ricci, David M. *The Tragedy of Political Science: Politics, Scholarship, and Democracy.* .... Neal Riemer 609
Shklar, Judith N. *Ordinary Vices.* .... Patrick Riley 610
Smith, Steven B. *Reading Althusser: An Essay on Structural Marxism.* .... John Bokina 611
Turner, Stephen P., & Regis A. Factor. *Max Weber and the Dispute over Reason and Value: A Study in Philosophy, Ethics, and Politics.* .... Ronald E. Puhek 612
Villey, Michel. *Le droit et les droits de l'homme.* .... Zdenek Krystufek 612
Warren, Scott. *The Emergence of Dialectical Theory: Philosophy and Political Inquiry.* .... C. Fred Alford 613

Empirical Theory and Methodology

Brenner, Reuven. *History—The Human Gamble.* .... Steven M. Maser 614
Hunter, Douglas E. *Political/Military Applications of Bayesian Analysis: Methodological Issues.* .... Walter W. Hill, Jr. 615

Annotations

Aday, Lu Ann, Gretchen V. Fleming, & Ronald Andersen. *Access to Medical Care in the U.S.: Who Has It, Who Doesn't.* 616
Archambeault, William G., & Betty J. Archambeault. *Computers in Criminal Justice Administration and Management: Introduction to Emerging Issues and Applications.* 616
Bacharach, Jere L. *A Middle East Studies Handbook.* 616
Bateson, Nicholas. *Data Construction in Social Surveys.* 616
Benardete, Seth, trans. *The Being of the Beautiful: Plato's* Theaetetus, Sophist, *and* Statesman. 616
Bowering, David J., ed. *Secondary Analysis of Available Data Bases.* 616
Brewer, Anthony. *A Guide to Marx's* Capital. 617
Brown, Clifford W., Jr. & Robert J. Walker, comps. *A Campaign of Ideas: The 1980 Anderson/Lucey Platform.* 617
Burns, Richard Dean, comp. *Harry S. Truman: A Bibliography of His Times and Presidency.* 617
Carley, Michael J., & Eduardo S. Bustelo. *Social Impact Assessment and Monitoring: A Guide to the Literature.* 617
Cheng, Lucie, Charlotte Furth, & Hon-ming Yip, comps. *Women in China: Bibliography of Available English Language Materials.* 617
Countries of the World and Their Leaders Yearbook 1985: Vol. 1, *Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments; Status of the World's Nations; U.S. Embassies, Consulates, and Foreign Service Posts; Background Notes: Afghanistan-Luxembourg;* Vol. 2,

Macau-Zimbabwe; Foreign Travel; International Treaty Organizations; Climates of the World. . . . 617
Day, Alan J., & Henry W. Degenhardt, comps. & eds. *Political Parties of the World,* 2nd ed. . . . 618
Englefield, Dermot, & Gavin Drewry, eds. *Information Sources in Politics and Political Science: A Survey Worldwide.* . . . 618
The Europa Year Book, 1984: A World Survey: Vol. 1, *International Organizations, Europe, Afghanistan-Burundi:* Vol. 2, *October 1948-April 1949.* . . . 618
Freundlich, Yehoshua, ed. *Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel:* Vol. 2, *October 1948-April 1949.* . . . 618
Galambos, Louis, ed. *The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower:* Vol. 10, *Columbia University;* Vol. 11, *Columbia University.* . . . 618
Glennon, John P., ed. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954:* Vol. 12, Part 1: *East Asia and the Pacific.* . . . 618
Glennon, John P., ed. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954:* Vol. 15, Part 1 and Part 2: *Korea.* . . . 619
Graham, Norman A., & Keith L. Edwards. *The Caribbean Basin to the Year 2000: Demographic, Economic, and Resource-Use Trends in Seventeen Countries, a Compendium of Statistics and Projections.* . . . 619
Green, James R., & Brent Scowcroft, eds. *Western Interests and U.S. Policy Options in the Caribbean Basin: Report of the Atlantic Council's Working Group on the Caribbean Basin.* . . . 619
Greene, Jack P., ed. *Encyclopedia of American Political History: Studies of the Principal Movements and Ideas,* 3 vols. . . . 619
Greevy, David U., Chadwick R. Gore, & Marvin I. Weinberger, eds. *The PAC Directory:* Vol. 2, *The Federal Committees.* . . . 619
Gruber, Katherine, ed. *Encyclopedia of Associations, 1985:* Vol. 4, *International Organizations.* . . . 619
Hargrove, Erwin C., & Samuel A. Morley, eds. *The President and the Council of Economic Advisers: Interviews with CEA Chairmen.* . . . 620
Hellevik, Ottar. *Introduction to Causal Analysis: Exploring Survey Data by Crosstabulation.* . . . 620
Hinsley, F. H. et al. *British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations:* Vol. 3, Part 1. . . . 620
Hodson, H. V., ed. *The Annual Register: A Record of World Events, 1983.* . . . 620
Hudson, Ray, David Rhind, & Helen Mounsey. *An Atlas of EEC Affairs.* . . . 620
Kalvelage, Carl, Albert P. Melone, & Morley Segal. *Bridges to Knowledge in Political Science: A Handbook for Research.* . . . 620
Kieberman, Jethro K., ed. *The Role of Courts in American Society: The Final Report of the Council on the Role of Courts.* . . . 621
Kimball, Warren F., ed. *Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence:* Vol. 1, *Alliance Emerging, October 1933-November 1942*; Vol. 2, *Alliance Forged, November 1942-February 1944*; Vol. 3, *Alliance Declining, February 1944-April 1945.* . . . 621

October 1933-November 1942; Vol. 2, *Alliance Declining, February 1944-April 1945.* 621
Kupperman, Robert H., & William J. Taylor, Jr., eds. *Strategic Requirements for the Army to the Year 2000.* 621
Lord, Carnes, trans. *Aristotle:* The Politics. 621
MacKenzie, Norman, & Jeanne MacKenzie, eds. *The Diary of Beatrice Webb:* Vol. 3, *1905-1924, "The Power to Alter Things."* 621
Mansfield, Harvey C., Jr., ed. *Selected Letters of Edmund Burke.* 621
Middle East and North Africa 1984-85, 31st ed. 621
Morgan, Robin, comp. & ed. *Sisterhood Is Global: The International Women's Movement Anthology.* 622
National Foreign Assessment Center, comp. *Handbook of the Nations,* 4th ed.: *A Brief Guide to the Economy, Government, Land, Demographics, Communications, and National Defense Establishment of Each of 191 Nations and Other Political Entities.* 622
Palmer, John L., & Isabel V. Sawhill, eds. *The Reagan Record: An Assessment of America's Changing Domestic Priorities.* 622
Ross, Graham, ed. *The Foreign Office and the Kremlin: British Documents on Anglo-Soviet Relations 1941-45.* 622
Schweitzer, Carl-Christoph et al., eds. *Politics and Government in the Federal Republic of Germany: Basic Documents.* 622
Slazny, William Z., ed. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954:* Vol. 2, Part 1 and Part 2: *National Security Affairs.* 622
Sloan, Irving J., ed. *American Landmark Legislation: The Railway Labor Act of 1926,* Vol. 1. 623
Smirnov, L. N., ed. *Legislative Acts of the USSR,* Book 3. 623
Smooha, Sammy, ed. *Social Research on Arabs in Israel, 1977-1982: A Bibliography.* 623
Staar, Richard F., ed. *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1984: Parties and Revolutionary Movements.* 623
Tufte, Edward R. *The Visual Display of Quantitative Information.* 623
The Use of Public Services by Undocumented Aliens in Texas: A Study of State Costs and Revenues. 623
Weston, Rae. *Strategic Materials: A World Survey.* 624
Wren, Christopher G., & Jill Robinson Wren, eds. *The Legal Research Manual: A Game Plan for Legal Research and Analysis.* 624

The American Political Science Association

1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

PRESIDENT: Richard F. Fenno, Jr., *University of Rochester;* PRESIDENT-ELECT: Aaron Wildavsky, *University of California, Berkeley;* VICE-PRESIDENTS: Robert Gilpin, *Princeton University;* Samuel P. Huntington, *Harvard University;* Donna E. Shalala, *Hunter College, CUNY;* TREASURER: Susan Welch, *University of Nebraska, Lincoln;* EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: Thomas E. Mann; PROGRAM CHAIRPERSON: Joseph Cooper, *Rice University;* MANAGING EDITOR, *APSR:* Dina A. Zinnes, *University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.*

COUNCIL (Above-named officers ex officiis), *1983-85:* Charles W. Anderson, *University of Wisconsin at Madison;* Morris P. Fiorina, *Harvard University;* Helen Ingram, *University of Arizona;* Nannerl Keohane, *Wellesley College;* Michael B. Preston, *University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign;* Arlene W. Saxonhouse, *University of Michigan;* W. Phillips Shively, *University of Minnesota;* Gerald Wright, *Indiana University. 1984-86:* Brian Barry, *California Institute of Technology;* F. Chris Garcia, *University of New Mexico;* William R. Keech, *University of North Carolina;* J. Donald Moon, *Wesleyan University;* Victor Olorunsola, *Iowa State University;* Norman J. Ornstein, *American Enterprise Institute;* Benjamin I. Page, *University of Texas at Austin;* Bruce Russett, *Yale University.*

The American Political Science Review

Department of Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign,
Urbana, Illinois 61801

EDITORIAL BOARD: Dina A. Zinnes, *Managing Editor, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign;* John H. Aldrich, *University of Minnesota;* G. Robert Boynton, *University of Iowa;* Naomi Caiden, *California State College;* David Cameron, *Yale University;* John Ferejohn, *Center for Advanced Studies;* John R. Freeman, *University of Minnesota;* Sheldon Goldman, *University of Massachusetts;* Russell L. Hanson, *Indiana University;* Ruth Jones, *Arizona State University;* James H. Kuklinski, *University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign;* Mary P. Nichols, *Catholic University of America;* Jerrold Rusk, *University of Arizona;* Barbara Salert, *Washington University.*

BOOK REVIEW EDITORIAL BOARD: Steven Thomas Seitz, *Book Review Editor, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign;* Ina A. Jeffery, *Florida A&M University;* William C. Mitchell, *University of Oregon;* Lawrence B. Mohr, *University of Michigan;* W. Phillips Shively, *University of Minnesota.*

MANUSCRIPT EDITORS: Mary L. Giles, Merle L. Levy.

EDITORIAL INTERNS: Bradley Gitz, John Brian Mount, Bruce Nesmith.

INDEXING: Articles and notes appearing in the *Review* before the June 1953 issue were indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature.* Current issues are indexed by The International Political Science Abstracts, the *United States Political Science Documents,* and the *Social Sciences and Humanities Index.* Microfilm of the *Review,* beginning with Volume 1, may be obtained from University Microfilms, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. A *Cumulative Index of the Review,* Volumes 1-62, 1906-1968, may also be obtained from University Microfilms. Articles appearing in the *Review* are listed regularly in *ABC Pol Sci* and *Current Contents: Behavioral, Social & Management Sciences.* Book reviews are indexed in *Book Review Index.*

The American Political Science Review

Instructions to Contributors

Address correspondence about contributions to the *Review* to:

Professor Samuel C. Patterson, Managing Editor
American Political Science Review
Department of Political Science
University of Iowa
Iowa City, IA 52242

Please submit *five* copies of a manuscript to be considered for publication. *Unfortunately, due to increased postage costs, we can no longer return manuscripts to the author.* Manuscripts must be typed on one side of the paper only and mimeographed or photocopied, with all written material *double-spaced* (including quotations, references, and footnotes). Use standard typewriter paper—avoid colored and light-weight stock. The typewritten lines should not exceed 5½ or 6 inches in length. Since manuscripts are sent out anonymously for evaluation, the author's name and affiliation should appear only on a separate covering sheet. An abstract of *less than 150 words* should accompany the manuscript. *APSR will not consider articles submitted to other publications.*

Beginning with the June 1983 issue, the reference form is that prescribed by the *Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association,* 2nd ed.; brief parenthetical references are included in the text, and all sources are listed alphabetically at the end of the article. The work of classical authors such as Aristotle or Plato may be cited by the standardized code familiar to scholars in the field, and passing allusions to such authors do not require mention in the list of references. Conventional foot-of-column notes are used only for explanatory comments or in unusual cases to avoid lengthy in-text references.

Articles that draw on survey data not documented through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research should include the following information in an appendix: (1) a description of the population sampled, including definition of the geographical area covered, and details about how the sample was drawn sufficient to permit fairly exact replication; (2) response rate (for quota designs, the number of refusals); (3) exact question wordings; and (4) interviewer characteristics.

Manuscripts over 30 pages will be reviewed with particular care to determine if such length is warranted. Those over 50 pages will be returned to the author. Resubmission may follow compliance with the page limit. Tables, charts, footnotes, and references will be included in the page count.

Figures should be professionally presented: use high-quality white paper and India ink for maximum sharpness and clarity of line. Copies only should accompany the submitted manuscript, original art work being retained until requested by the editorial office. Tables should be typed on separate pages, with guides, e.g., "Table 1 about here" at the proper places in the manuscript.

Communications must follow the form of regular manuscripts, including reference listings where appropriate. They must not exceed five double-spaced pages, including references, footnotes, and tables. All but the briefest letters will be refereed.

Book Reviews

Books intended for review should be sent to:

Professor Robert Salisbury, Book Review Editor
Department of Political Science, Box 1063
Washington University
St. Louis, MO 63130

Authors are urged to call their books to the attention of the Editor to insure that books will be considered for review. Those interested in reviewing books should submit a current vita.

Other Correspondence

Information, including News and Notes, for the Association's news-journal, *PS,* should be sent to 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Advertising, reprint, and circulation correspondence should be sent to the Executive Director and the Washington office. Domestic claims for nonreceipt of issues must be made within four months of the month of publication; overseas claims, eight months. Advertising information and rates are available from Norinne Hessman, Advertising Manager, APSA, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

EFFECTIVE JUNE 1

All new manuscripts should be sent to:

Samuel C. Patterson, Managing Editor
American Political Science Review
Department of Political Science
The University of Iowa
Iowa City, Iowa 52242

Correspondence about articles to be published in 1985 should be addressed to:

Professor Dina A. Zinnes, Managing Editor
American Political Science Review
50C Lincoln Hall
The University of Illinois
702 S. Wright Street
Urbana, Illinois 61801

All new books for review should be sent to:

Robert Salisbury, Book Review Editor
American Political Science Review
Department of Political Science
Box 1063
Washington University
St. Louis, Missouri 63130

Offer Your Students a First-hand View of Congress in Action

Congress:
WE THE PEOPLE

For more information about how you might use **Congress: We The People** call 1-800-LEARNER. For review copies of the Study Guide and Faculty Guide which have been designed to accompany the series call the American Political Science Association, 1-202-483-2512.

Educational Excellence
Through Telecommunications

An Annenberg/CPB Project

Congress: We The People is an exciting new resource for political science courses on Congress and the legislative process.

The series includes 26 half-hour video cassettes that show the day-to-day activities of Congress and provide analysis and commentary by leading political scientists.

Faculty are finding that **Congress: We The People** is an excellent supplement to existing courses. Among the topics addressed are: congressional elections; committee leadership; lobbying; constituent relations; lawmaking; budgeting; ethics; and congressional relations with the President, courts and the media.

The series is also being used as a complete broadcast telecourse for students who complete most of their study off-campus, and as a resource for noncredit and informal study.

Congress: We The People is hosted by Norman Ornstein, Catholic University, and Edwin Newman, noted journalist. It was produced by the American Political Science Association and WETA, the public television station in Washington, D.C.

A special feature of **Congress: We The People** is its adaptation for use with any of following three commonly used textbooks:

- **Congress and Its Members** by *Roger H. Davidson and Walter J.* Oleszek, Congressional Quarterly Press, Washington, D.C., 1981.
- **The United State Congress: People, Places and Policy** by Charles O. Jones, the Dorsey Press, Homewood, Illinois, 1982.
- **Congress: Process and Policy** by Randall B. Ripley, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, 1983.

Human Nature in Politics:
The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science

HERBERT A. SIMON
Carnegie-Mellon University

This article compares two theories of human rationality that have found application in political science: procedural, bounded rationality from contemporary cognitive psychology, and global, substantive rationality from economics. Using examples drawn from the recent literature of political science, it examines the relative roles played by the rationality principle and by auxiliary assumptions (e.g., assumptions about the content of actors' goals) in explaining human behavior in political contexts, and concludes that the model predictions rest primarily on the auxiliary assumptions rather than deriving from the rationality principle.

The analysis implies that the principle of rationality, unless accompanied by extensive empirical research to identify the correct auxiliary assumptions, has little power to make valid predictions about political phenomena.

This article is concerned with the nature of human reason and the implications of contemporary cognitive psychology for political science research that employs the concept of rational behavior. I shall begin with a bit of history, written from a rather personal viewpoint, to provide a setting for the discussion.

The older and/or more scholarly among you will recognize the essay's title as having been plagiarized from Graham Wallas, whose seminal book, *Human Nature in Politics,* appeared in 1908. When I began graduate study, in the middle 1930s, that book, along with Walter Lippmann's *Public Opinion,* was still wholly fresh, and both stood out as harbingers of the "behavioral revolution" that was then just getting under way at the University of Chicago.

Not that we graduate students thought of ourselves as participants in a scientific revolution. The realities of the political process had long since replaced the formal legal structure of political institutions as the main subject for study in political science—at least at the University of Chicago. Merriam's studies of power, Gosnell's quantitative methods, Lasswell's psychoanalytic probes seemed to us merely (paraphrasing Clausewitz) "the continuation of political realism by other means."[1]

I was little prepared, therefore, for the violence of the polemic pro and con "behavioralism" that echoed over the land in the first two decades after World War II. Nowadays, my periodic soundings in *The American Political Science Review* reassure me that this civil strife in the profession is largely over, and that the behavioral revolution is now seen as continuity rather than discontinuity in the development of political science. I am not sure it would even qualify, in today's revisionist view, as one of Thomas Kuhn's major paradigm shifts. Perhaps what we were doing was not revolutionary science at all, but just everyday normal science.

This is probably the right moment, while I am alluding to behavioralism, to record a *culpa mea* for my part in popularizing that awkward and somewhat misleading term. It appeared, of course, in the title of *Administrative Behavior* (Simon, 1947/1976a), and also in the title of my chief epistle to the economists, "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice," published in the *Quarterly Journal of Economics* in 1955. However, I doubt that I was the main culprit. That honor belongs to the Ford Foundation, which at that same time introduced and diligently popularized the phrase "behavioral sciences."

Whatever its origins, the term was picked up with enthusiasm—as an epithet—by the opponents of behavioralism, who frequently employed it as though it were synonymous with the Behaviorism then rampant in the discipline of psychology. In fact, there was never any substantive connection between the two labels, and much of what went on in political science, sociology, economics, and anthropology under the heading of behavioralism would have been anathematized

---

The present essay is a slightly revised version of the James Madison lecture presented by the author at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Washington, D.C., 1984.

[1] See David Eastman's perceptive account of this history in his article on political science in the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (1968).

by the psychological Behaviorists if they had been aware of it—which they mainly weren't.

However, my aim here is not to reminisce about old battles. We should rejoice that political scientists are devoting all their efforts to advancing the science, and we should do nothing to encourage a renewal of the Methodenstreit. Instead, I shall offer a commentary on the role of the rationality principle in recent political science research.

I emphasize that this is a commentary and not a new piece of substantive research. The basic values for political science to which I and my contemporaries were and are committed include sound empirical data as the foundation for theory and for normative recommendations; new sources of data including polls, structured interviews, and systematic samples; the use of statistics, mathematics, and computer simulation where appropriate as tools for data analysis and theory construction; and the analysis of phenomena in terms of basic categories like power, decision making, rationality, and systems.

The research on which I shall comment exemplifies those values: it is empirically based, employing many different kinds of data-gathering methods, often uses mathematical and other formal techniques, and is sophisticated in its use of theory. My commentary will not touch on any of those aspects of the work except the last, and in particular its employment of ideas derived from the theory of human rationality.

The commentary will take us through three main topics. First, I shall have to say something about the two main forms of theories of human rationality that prevail in social science today—the one of them having its center in cognitive psychology, the other in economics. Next, I shall consider the implications, for the balance in political science between rationalism (or a priorism) and empiricism, of adopting one or the other of these two paradigms of rationality. In particular, I will argue that there is a natural alliance between empiricism and the psychological version of rationality, on the one hand, and an alliance between rationalism and the economic version of rationality, on the other. Finally, I will comment on the balance between reason and passion—"radical" irrationality—in political affairs.

The Forms of Rationality

The term "rational" denotes behavior that is appropriate to specified goals in the context of a given situation.[2] If the characteristics of the choosing organism are ignored, and we consider only those constraints that arise from the external situation, then we may speak of substantive or objective rationality, that is, behavior that can be adjudged objectively to be optimally adapted to the situation.

On the other hand, if we take into account the limitations of knowledge and computing power of the choosing organism, then we may find it incapable of making objectively optimal choices. If, however, it uses methods of choice that are as effective as its decision-making and problem-solving means permit, we may speak of procedural or bounded rationality, that is, behavior that is adaptive within the constraints imposed *both* by the external situation and by the capacities of the decision maker.

The terms "procedural" and "substantive" were, of course, borrowed from constitutional law, in analogy with the concepts of procedural and substantive due process, the former judging fairness by the procedure used to reach a result, the latter by the substance of the result itself. In the same way, we can judge a person to be rational who uses a reasonable process for choosing; or, alternatively, we can judge a person to be rational who arrives at a reasonable choice.

There is a fundamental difference between substantive and procedural rationality. To deduce the substantively, or objectively, rational choice in a given situation, we need to know only the choosing organism's goals and the objective characteristics of the situation. We need to know absolutely nothing else about the organism, nor would such additional knowledge be of any use to us, for it could not affect the objectively rational behavior in any way.

To deduce the procedurally or boundedly rational choice in a situation, we must know the choosing organism's goals, the information and conceptualization it has of the situation, and its abilities to draw inferences from the information it possesses. We need know nothing about the objective situation in which the organism finds itself, except insofar as that situation influences the subjective representation.

If we review the history of political science over the past 40 years, I believe we will see that it was mainly the procedural view of rationality that was embraced by behavioralism, but that during the past two decades this view has received growing competition from the substantive view. Anthony Downs's *Economic Theory of Democracy*, published in 1957, may be used to date the first nudgings of this new camel into the tent.

I should now like to develop a little further the fundamental characteristics and theoretical structures of the two views of rationality, and then consider the implications of employing them, separately or jointly, in the study of political behavior.

---

[2] For a more extensive discussion of the concepts of substantive and procedural rationality, see Simon (1976b), reprinted as chap. 8.3 in Simon (1982).

Procedural Rationality and Cognitive Psychology

A central theme for Graham Wallas in *Human Nature in Politics* was the interplay of the rational and nonrational components of human behavior in politics. That, of course, was also a central theme for Harold Lasswell in *Psychopathology and Politics* (1934) and *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (1935). But while Lasswell's psychological apparatus comes largely from Freud, Wallas acknowledges as his principal mentor William James. Although Lasswell was concerned with borderline and not-so-borderline pathology, Wallas was interested in the ubiquitous workings of instinct, ignorance, and emotion in normal behavior. Wallas, like his mentor William James, is the more closely attuned to the contemporary orientation in psychology.

What is that orientation? I expressed skepticism, earlier, that political science has experienced, since World War II, any change that deserves being called a revolution. I have no such doubts about the field of psychology. Cognitive psychology, in the past 30 years, has undergone a radical restructuring, from a severe Behaviorism (no relation, I remind you, to behavioralism) to a framework that views thinking as information processing.

In psychology, Behaviorism carefully avoided speaking about what went on inside the head—it preferred to stick to the observable facts of stimuli and responses. It preferred rats to humans as subjects in its experiments, presumably because rats could not be induced to give unacceptable introspective accounts of their mental experiences. Even the term "cognitive" was eschewed, as implying an illicit mentalism.

Today, all of these barriers are down. The term "cognition" is uttered openly and proudly to refer to the human thought processes and to distinguish them from the processes of sensation and emotion. Most experiments use human subjects, and many instruct the subjects to speak aloud as they perform the experimental tasks, the tape-recorded protocols from such sessions being now regarded as wholly objective and analyzable data.[3] Theories, in modern cognitive psychology, are expected to provide detailed descriptions of the information processes that go on in the human head when it is performing problem solving and other tasks in the laboratory.[4]

Within this new paradigm, cognitive psychology has made great strides toward understanding how an information processing system like the human brain solves problems, makes decisions, remembers, and learns. That understanding has advanced so far that psychology is no longer limited to dealing with "toy" tasks—puzzles and nonsense syllables—in the laboratory, but can give rather impressive accounts of adult performance in professional-level tasks: making medical diagnoses, solving physics and mathematics problems at high school and college level, learning new mathematics and chemistry, and even making new scientific discoveries, to mention just a few examples.

As examples of explicit applications of the new theories to political science, I can mention the models of public budget-making behavior constructed by Crecine (1969) and Gerwin (1969) and their students, and Carbonell's (1979) ingenious "Goldwater machine," which predicts the response of an appropriately specified political figure to a situation or set of events. Later, I will cite a number of other accounts of procedural rationality at work in the political process, but in most of these the appeal to cognitive theory and research is only implicit.

The human capabilities for rational behavior that are described by contemporary cognitive psychology are very congenial to the paradigm of bounded rationality as that is described in *Administrative Behavior.* The models of problem solving describe a person who is limited in computational capacity, and who searches very selectively through large realms of possibilities in order to discover what alternatives of action are available, and what the consequences of each of these alternatives are. The search is incomplete, often inadequate, based on uncertain information and partial ignorance, and usually terminated with the discovery of satisfactory, not optimal, courses of action.

To understand the behavior of this kind of problem solver, who is provided in advance with a knowledge of neither alternatives nor consequences—and who may even discover what his or her goals are in the course of the problem-solving process—it is necessary to specify what the problem solver wants, knows, and can compute. Within the framework of these conditionalities, the mere assumption of rationality provides little basis for the prediction of behavior. To be of much use, that assumption must be supplemented by considerable empirical knowledge about the decision maker.

Substantive Rationality and Economics

Just as procedural, bounded rationality is most extensively developed in modern cognitive psychology, so substantive, objective rationality finds its principal base in neoclassical economics and statistical decision theory.[5] The two conceptions of rationality are radically different. The foundation for the theory of objective rationality is the assumption that every actor possesses a utility function that induces a consistent ordering among all alternative choices that the actor faces, and, indeed, that he or she always chooses the alternative with the highest utility.

---

[3] See Ericsson and Simon (1984).

[4] See, for example, Newell and Simon (1972), Simon (1979) and Anderson (1983).

If the choice situation involves uncertainties, the theory further assumes that the actor will choose the alternative for which the expected utility is the highest. By expected utility of an alternative is meant the average of the utilities of the different possible outcomes, each weighted by the probability that the outcome will ensue if the alternative in question is chosen.

The theory of objective rationality assumes nothing about the actor's goals. The utility function can take any form that defines a consistent ordering of preferences. Nor does the theory postulate anything about the way in which the actor makes probability estimates of uncertain events; in fact one version of the theory, the so-called subjective expected utility, or SEU, theory, explicitly denies that these probabilities are to be identified with objective probabilities of the events, determined by some outside observer. In this one respect, the label "objective" for this version of the theory must be qualified.

In principle (i.e., in a wholly idealized laboratory setting), it should be possible to obtain independent evidence about the nature and shape of any particular person's utility function, as well as evidence of the probabilities that person assigns to events. In practice, this is completely infeasible. In fact, when such experiments have been run, it has generally been found that human subjects do not possess consistent utility functions or probability assignments.[6]

In application, therefore, auxiliary assumptions about utility and expectations must usually be supplied before the theory of objective rationality can be applied to real situations. In economic applications, for example, it is customary to identify the utility function of a firm with its profit, and to assume that actors generally are trying to maximize economic well-being—perhaps some weighted average of income and leisure. In applications to political science, it may be assumed that the goal is to maximize power, or to maximize economic well-being as a function of the policies pursued by the government. (I will have more to say later about the assumptions that are made regarding political "utility" in applying the principle of rationality to problems in political science.)

In the same way, in applying the theory of objective rationality to real-world behavior, either uncertainty must be ignored, or auxiliary postulates must be provided to define the expectation-forming process. In contemporary economics, for example, the very lively "rational expectations" school, whose leaders include such figures as Robert Lucas and Thomas Sargent, assumes that each economic actor has a more or less accurate model of the economic system, and expects that system to proceed toward its equilibrium in the near future. Of course, there is much doubt whether this particular assumption about the formation of expectations bears any close resemblance to the reality, and a majority of neoclassical economists have different, and simpler, beliefs about how economic actors cope with uncertainty.

When neoclassical economics in its purest form addresses itself exclusively to questions of the existence, stability, and Pareto optimality of equilibrium, it can generally get along without introducing auxiliary assumptions about the utility function or the nature of the expectation-forming processes. In fact, it usually finesses the latter by ignoring uncertainty. The price that is paid is that the conclusions reached by this kind of analysis are extremely general and abstract: roughly, that under conditions of perfect competition, the economic system has a stable equilibrium, and that this equilibrium is, indeed, Pareto optimal (not everyone can simultaneously be made better off than the equilibrium).

When economists want to draw conclusions about nonequilibrium phenomena, matters get stickier. The theory of business cycles provides an important illustration of the difficulties.[7] The economic theory of Keynes and that of neoclassical economists like Friedman or Lucas are only inches, not miles, apart. Most of Keynes's general theory can be (and has been) interpreted as an exercise in quite orthodox neoclassical reasoning—except at one or two critical points, the most important being the supply of labor. At these points economic actors depart from objective rationality and suffer from persistent illusions or confusions. The assumption in Keynes's theory that produces a business cycle and the possibility of long-continuing unemployment is that labor mistakes its money wage for its real (purchasing power) wage. It is not human rationality, but the limits on that rationality and its breakdown, that accounts for Keynes's important predictions.

---

[5] A classical treatment is Savage (1954).

[6] For a number of examples and references to the literature, see Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982).

[7] This account is based on Simon (1984).

But the same thing can be said of the other, non-Keynesian, theories of the business cycle. (I must except Milton Friedman (1968), who essentially denies that there is such a phenomenon as real unemployment.) For example, Lucas (1981), among the most orthodox of neoclassical economists, attributes the business cycle to a different limit on human rationality. In his theory, it is not labor but businessmen who behave irrationally. When general price changes occur (e.g., inflation), they mistake these changes for *relative* changes affecting only prices in their own industry. It is this departure from objective rationality that produces the cycle in Lucas's model.

I have developed this example at some length because it is perhaps the most dramatic illustration of a widespread phenomenon that is not well understood outside the profession of economics, and perhaps not even within the profession: A large part of the "action" of economic models—the strong conclusions they support—does not derive from the assumptions of objective rationality at all, but depends on auxiliary assumptions that are introduced to provide limits to that rationality, assumptions about the process of decision.

This being the case, one would suppose that a great deal of attention would be devoted to the empirical validity or plausibility of the auxiliary assumptions—in the examples just cited, the assumptions that labor or business, as the case may be, suffers from a money illusion. However, this is not the way the practices and traditions of economics have developed. Instead, there is a tradition that is often referred to, within economics itself, as "casual empiricism." Assumptions about the shape of the utility function or the limits on the rationality of economic actors are commonly made in an armchair, on the basis of feelings of "plausibility" or "reasonableness," and without systematic support from empirical evidence. The assumptions are never tested directly, but only in the context of the models in which they are embedded. The goodness of fit of a model, usually to aggregate data, is regarded as the best justification for the assumptions embedded in that model, whatever their source.[8]

Bounded Rationality Is Not Irrationality

Skepticism about substituting a priori postulates about rationality for factual knowledge of human behavior should not be mistaken for a claim that people are generally "irrational." On the contrary, I think there is plenty of evidence that people are generally quite rational; that is to say, they usually have reasons for what they do. Even in madness, there is almost always method, as Freud was at great pains to point out. And putting madness aside for a moment, almost all human behavior consists of sequences of goal-oriented actions.

When, in spite of the evidence for this goal-oriented character of human behavior, we call some of that behavior "irrational," we may mean any one of several things. We may deem behavior irrational because, although it serves some particular impulse, it is inconsistent with other goals that seem to us more important. We may deem it irrational because the actor is proceeding on incorrect facts or ignoring whole areas of relevant fact. We may deem it irrational because the actor has not drawn the correct conclusions from the facts. We may deem it irrational because the actor has failed to consider important alternative courses of action. If the action involves the future, as most action does, we may deem it irrational because we don't think the actor uses the best methods for forming expectations or for adapting to uncertainty. All of these forms of "irrationality" play important roles in the lives of every one of us, but I think it is misleading to call them "irrationality." They are better viewed as forms of bounded rationality.

To understand and predict human behavior, we have to deal with the realities of human rationality, that is, with bounded rationality. There is nothing obvious about these boundaries; there is no way to predict, a priori, just where they lie.

The Rationality Principle in Politics

After this long excursion into the views of human rationality that are commonly held in psychology and economics, let me come back now to the subject of political science. What kind of rationality does *Homo politicus* exhibit? Is he or she a creature of objective, substantive rationality; or instead, one of subjective, procedural rationality? But I am afraid that I have already tipped my hand and made it quite clear that I believe the latter to be the case.

If that is true, the rationality principle, as it is incorporated in theories of substantive rationality, will provide us with only limited help in understanding political phenomena. Before we apply the methods of economic reasoning to political behavior, we must characterize the political situation, not as it appears "objectively" to the analyst, but as it appears subjectively to the actors. We can only select the appropriate model of adaptation after we undertake the requisite empirical study to determine this subjective representation both of goals and of the situation or draw upon research in cognitive psychology to tell us about the nature of that representation. A few examples drawn from the political science literature will show what is involved.

---

[8] Friedman's well-known methodological essay transforms these methodological practices into a strongly defended doctrine. Friedman argues that direct tests of the behavioral assumptions underlying an economic model are superfluous at best, and positively misleading at the worst.

An Example: Duverger's Law

Recently, William Riker (1982) provided us with an instructive account of a descriptive generalization that usually goes by the name of Duverger's Law. In its roughest form, the law asserts that plurality election rules bring about and maintain two-party, rather than multi-party, competition. In an informative way, Riker takes us through the history of the empirical research that has been done to test, to confirm, refute, or amend, this law. He also shows that political scientists have not been content simply to assert the law, or to test it empirically; they have also sought to "explain" it. He says

> From the first enunciation by Droop, the law has been implicitly embedded in a rational choice theory about the behavior of politicians and voters. This theory has been rendered more and more explicit, especially in the last two decades, so that recent empirical work consciously invokes the rational choice model. (1982, p. 766)

The so-called rational choice argument for Duverger's Law goes something like this. If a number of candidates are running for office under a plurality election rule, and if candidates A and B are well ahead of the pack so that it is unreasonable to suppose that any other candidate will win, then it is rational to limit your vote to your preference between A and B. The argument has to be elaborated somewhat to account for two-party configurations that are stable over time, but I think that I have conveyed the general idea.

What assumptions does this argument make about you, the voter. First, it assumes that you have a preference ranking among candidates and wish to vote so as to secure the election of a candidate who is as high as possible on your ranking. Second, it assumes that you believe that one vote may decide the election (otherwise it is indifferent, in terms of the stated goal to whom the vote goes). Third, it assumes that you have an assessment of the relative prospects of the candidates, and a considerable confidence in that assessment (e.g., you do *not* believe that one more vote could bring success to any but one of the two candidates judged to have the most support). Fourth, it assumes that you do not attach a large value to providing public evidence that your most preferred candidate has extensive, even if not pluralistic, public support.

Since I have not tried to construct a formal axiomization of this choice, perhaps there are other assumptions that must be made, in addition to those listed above. For the purposes of the present argument, however, my inventory of assumptions will suffice. What the assumptions show is that only a small part of the work of explaining Duverger's Law is being done by the rationality principle. Most of the work is being done by propositions that characterize the utility function of the voter and his or her beliefs, expectations, and calculations—that is to say, the limits of rationality. These propositions are subject to empirical test.

Perhaps the key assumption here is the postulate of "sophisticated voting," that a rational voter believes "his vote should be expended as part of a selection process, not as an expression of preference" (Downs, 1957, p. 48). But this postulate is wholly independent of the usual definition of objective rationality. There is no irrationality in a utility function that regards a vote as an expression of preference rather than an attempt to influence the selection. In fact, it is realistic to believe that one can express a preference (i.e., change the numerical result of the vote, if only by a unit), but seldom realistic to believe that one can affect the outcome of an election. Moreover, a voter might correctly (or incorrectly, but certainly not irrationally) believe that expression of preference for a party could increase the chances of that party's succeeding in subsequent elections.

There are many more changes we can ring on the possible beliefs of voters without impugning their (subjective) rationality. With these alternative sets of beliefs are associated different voting behaviors. It is not at all hard to build a rational model of the voter who stays home from the polls and does not vote at all. Hence, we get very little understanding or explanation of voting behavior simply from invoking the principle of utility maximization. That principle does not exempt us from the arduous task of testing all the auxiliary empirical assumptions about voters' values, beliefs, and expectations. And, as Riker shows us, when we subject an auxiliary assumption like the postulate of sophisticated voting to empirical test, we discover that the actual pattern of human response can be very complex indeed. We are then constructing and testing theories of bounded rationality, not theories of substantive rationality.

Additional Examples

It should not be thought that Duverger's Law is an isolated case and that rational choice theories derived from the assumption of utility maximization and unalloyed with auxiliary assumptions about preferences and beliefs have much more predictive and explanatory power in most other cases. Recent issues of the *American Political Science Review* provide a rich mine of examples that support our analysis of the respective roles of reason and fact. One can stumble upon such examples by opening the pages almost at random, and it appears to make little difference whether the author is a behavioralist or an economic rationalist by persuasion. (Or if there is a difference, it is that the behavioralist makes fewer explicit claims for rationality as the source of his or her conclusions than does the rational choice theorist.)

My next example is a study by Hibbs (1982) of "Economic Outcomes and Political Support for British Governments among Occupational Classes." Hibbs demonstrates that various indicators of the health of the British economy are related to voting preferences. Score one for the objective rationality principle. Presumably voters vote for the party that they think will enhance their economic well-being. But how do we get from that general proposition to a prediction of their vote? We can make the leap only if we can discover how voters *judge* which party will do the better job of managing the economy. There are many ways in which that judgment could be made, none of them, probably, having high objective validity.

Hence, the interesting and significant finding of Hibbs's study is not that people employ a rationality principle. The interesting finding, which does not follow from such a principle, is that "voters evaluate the cumulative performance of the governing party relative to the prior performance of the current opposition," weighting current performance more heavily than past performance (p. 259).

Now I don't know if Hibbs's model will hold up under further analysis or will apply equally well to other times and places. However valid or invalid the model, its powerful motor is not a theory of objectively rational choice but a very specific empirical assumption, based on notions of bounded rationality, about how voters form their beliefs regarding the connections between the economy and government. If Hibbs's model is correct, voters do this not by solving a maximization problem but by setting an aspiration level (the opposition's past performance) against which to measure the performance of the incumbents. This is what modern cognitive theory would lead us to expect, but not what would be predicted by a theory of utility maximization.

A third example has to do with the application of rationality principles to a game resembling the prisoners' dilemma, but allowing the players the additional alternative of exiting from the situation (Orbell, Schwartz-Shea, & Simmons, 1984). In their abstract, the authors, using the usual distinction between defectors and cooperators in the prisoners' dilemma, sum up the matter very well:

> We derive the prediction that the exit option will drain the community or group more of cooperators than of defectors.
>
> But experimental data do not support this prediction; cooperators do not leave more frequently than defectors. . . . [We] present data supporting the hypothesis that cooperators often stay when their personal interest is with exiting because of the same ethical or group-regarding impulse that (presumably) led them to cooperate in the first place.

In this experiment, again, the principle of objective rationality contributes little to predicting or explaining the findings. Everything rests, instead, on the assumptions that are made about the utility functions of two classes of players, those who are prepared to cooperate with the other players and those who are prepared to betray them. What is more, to explain the behavior of the cooperators, a strong component of altruism must be introduced into their utility functions.[9]

Other research within a game-theoretical framework shares many of the characteristics of this study. The predicted outcome depends sensitively upon assumptions not derivable from the principle of objective rationality, about participants' beliefs and values. For example, in a study involving the conditions under which subjects would contribute to the provision of public goods, the authors summarize their findings thus (van de Kragt, Orbell, & Dawes, 1983, p. 112):

> We present hypotheses about why designating a minimal contributing set works. . . . The essential property of the minimal contributing set . . . is *criticalness*: the contributions of the members of the minimal contributing set are each critical to obtaining the public good the members desire, and they know it. It is reasonable (albeit not a dominant strategy) to contribute because reasonable behavior can be expected from other minimal contributing set members who are in the same situation.

---

[9] For a discussion of the problems of reconciling altruism with rationality in systems subject to evolutionary selection, see Simon (1983, chap. 2).

What is called reasonable behavior here is clearly the behavior we might expect of a creature of bounded rationality. And its reasonableness depends on expectations about the behavior of others.

Perhaps the major contribution of game theory to political science has been to demonstrate how rare and unusual the situations are where a game has a stable equilibrium solution consistent with the principle of objectively rational choice. Under these circumstances, the task of determining how people actually do behave in situations having game-like characteristics must be turned over to empirical research: research that seeks to determine what values people actually act on, and how they form their expectations and beliefs.

My final example concerns considerations of economic advantage in voting decisions. Weatherford (1983) points out that the concept of economic voting is ambiguous. It may mean voting in response to perceptions of one's own economic well-being, or voting in response to perceptions of the health of the economy. But this distinction is itself ambiguous, for it may refer to differences in utility functions or to differences in the voter's model of reality.

You, the voter, may want to vote for the candidate who will do best for you (for example, support the "right" kinds of tax laws, impose or remove the "right" kinds of regulations), or for the candidate who will best foster the vigor of the whole economy, even if it costs you, personally, a loss of income or of a job. Put in these terms, the difference lies in the structure of your utility function.

But we can look at the matter in a different way. How do you judge the state of the economy or your well-being? You can use the immediate evidence of your personal situation—your employment or unemployment, your salary, your taxes. Or you can look at published economic indexes. And, because the question before you is not the current state of the economy, but how it is likely to be affected if one candidate or another is elected, there are still other kinds of evidence that may influence you. You may consider the candidates' past voting records or the economic predispositions of the parties to which they belong.

Differences in the kinds of evidence you respond to may have nothing to do with your utility function. Instead, they may reflect the model you have of the world, the beliefs you have formed about the meanings and predictive value of different kinds of available information, and what information has come to your attention.

All of these examples teach us the same lesson: the actors in the political drama do appear to behave in a rational manner—they have reasons for what they do, and a clever researcher can usually obtain data that give good clues as to what those reasons are. But this is very different from claiming that we can predict the behavior of these rational actors by application of the objective rationality principle to the situations in which they find themselves. Such prediction is impossible, both because, even within the framework of the SEU theory of substantive rationality, behavior depends on the structure of the actors' utility functions, and because it depends on their representation of the world in which they live, what they attend to in that world, and what beliefs they have about its nature.

The obvious corollary is that rationalism can carry us only a little way in political analysis, even in the analysis of the behavior of boundedly rational people. The rest of the path requires continuing, painstaking empirical investigation within the framework of modern cognitive theories of human behavior.

Rationalism and Empiricism

I should not like my comments to be interpreted as a complaint that political science worships at the altar of rational choice theory. On the contrary, I think we political scientists have generally been behaving quite well in this respect. If I take the pages of the *American Political Science Review* as representing the attitudes and methods of our discipline, then I observe that there is a healthy respect for sophisticated empirical research. Assumptions of rationality are used to provide a framework for analyzing behavior, but they are generally used tentatively, and with a sensitivity to the assumptions of value, expectation, and belief that have to be added to the models before they can yield predictions of behavior.

Authors who use rational choice models are not always conscious of the extent to which their conclusions are independent of the assumptions of those models, but depend, instead, mainly upon auxiliary assumptions. Nor is advantage taken as often as it could be of the knowledge of cognitive mechanisms to be found in the psychological literature. But these defects, if defects they be, are easily remedied.

It is also a good omen for the future of our science that empirical work means both the study of social aggregates, whose behavior is recorded in public statistics, and the study of the individual actors at the microscopic and face-to-face level of the interview and the poll. The graduate training we provide our students gives them opportunities to acquire skill in both kinds of empirical methodology, and others (e.g., historical inquiry) as well. In this respect, we are better off than our brethren in economics, who are seldom trained in the skills of observing economic phenomena at first hand.

We sometimes, perhaps, experience a mild malaise in that our research does not seem to be taking us in the direction of a few sweeping generalizations that encompass the whole of political behavior. A hope of finding our "three laws of motion" was probably a major part of the appeal of rational choice theory in its purer forms. But a more careful look at the natural sciences would show us that they, too, get only a little mileage from their general laws. Those laws have to be fleshed out by a myriad of facts, all of which must be harvested by laborious empirical research. Perhaps our aspirations for lawfulness should be modeled upon the complexities of molecular biology—surely a successful science, but hardly a neat one—rather than upon the simplicities of classical mechanics.

Radical Irrationality

Thus far, I have dealt with the picture of procedural rationality that emerges from modern cognitive psychology and the relation between that picture and the economist's notion of substantive rationality. My main conclusion is that the key premises in any theory that purports to explain the real phenomena of politics are the empirical assumptions about goals and, even more important, about the ways in which people characterize the choice situations that face them. These goals and characterizations do not rest on immutable first principles, but are functions of time and place that can only be ascertained by empirical inquiry. In this sense, political science is necessarily a historical science, in the same way and for the same reason that astronomy is. What will happen next is not independent of where the system is right now. And a description of where it is right now must include a description of the subjective view of the situation that informs the choices of the actors.

But you may feel that I have not gone far enough in my skepticism about reason in political behavior. Surely even the concept of bounded rationality does not capture the whole role of passion and unreason in human affairs. Don't we need to listen to Lasswell and Freud as well as to Wallas and James?

Assuredly we do. From the earliest times it has been seen that human behavior is not always the result of deliberate calculation, even of a boundedly rational kind. Sometimes it must be attributed to passion, to the capture of the decision process by powerful impulses that do not permit the mediation of thought. The criminal law takes explicit account of passion in assigning different penalties to deliberate and impulsive acts.

In psychoanalytic theory, passion takes mainly the form of unconscious drives, largely unknown to the actor, that provide the "real" wellsprings of action. This approach, whether it be correct or false, has always been troublesome for empirical research, because it makes suspect human testimony about motives.[10] If we don't know why we act, if our motives are unconscious, then we can't report them, no matter how much we wish to cooperate with the researcher.

Let me take a more conservative approach, which accords well with what we know about the mechanisms that link emotions to reason (Simon, 1978, chap. 1.3). People are endowed with very large long-term memories, but with very narrow capacities for simultaneous attention to different pieces of information. At any given moment, only a little information, drawn from the senses and from long-term memory, can be held in the focus of attention. This information is not static; it is continuously being processed and transformed, with one item being replaced by another as new aspects of a stimulus are sensed, new inferences drawn, or new bits of information retrieved from long-term memory. Nevertheless, of all the things we know, or can see or hear around us, only a tiny fraction influences our behavior over any short interval of time.

If a particular strong drive takes control of our attention, determining not only our goals of the moment but also selecting out the sensory and memory facts that we will consider, then behavior can be determined by that drive or passion as long as its control persists. But passionate behavior in this extreme form is exceptional and not common in human behavior. The control process is usually more complex.

Even in the case of a person like Hitler, whose behavior might be interpreted by some clinicians as a pure instance of an all-consuming hatred or self-hatred, a large cognitive element intrudes into the behavior. Hitler was not just angry; he directed his hatred toward a particular group of people, Jews, and he made decisions that were arguably rational on the premise that the Jewish people were to be extirpated to satisfy that hatred. For some purposes of political analysis, it may be enough to postulate the overtly expressed values and goals without seeking their deeper roots in the unconscious, or at least without trying to explain how they arrived there.

The methodological lesson I would draw is that we need to understand passion and to provide for it in our political models, but we need particularly to provide in those models for the limited span of attention that governs *what* considerations, out of a whole host of possible ones, will actually influence the deliberations that precede action. In particular, we need to understand the conditions that predispose human beings to impulsive action that disregards much of the potentially relevant reality. I would like to comment on three aspects of this question: the nature of the attention mechanism, the role of uncertainty, and the process whereby novel ways of viewing situations are evoked or generated.

---

[10] For a review of some reasons why we should suspect testimony about motives, see Nisbett and Wilson (1977). The authors of that study draw conclusions that are rather too broad for their evidence, but their main point about reports of motivation are well taken. See also Ericsson and Simon (1984).

Attention

The human eye and ear are highly parallel devices, capable of extracting many pieces of information simultaneously from the environment and decoding them into their significant features. Before this information can be used by the deliberative mind, however, it must proceed through the bottleneck of attention—a serial, not parallel, process whose information capacity is exceedingly small. Psychologists usually call this bottleneck short-term memory, and measurements show reliably that it can hold only about six chunks (that is to say, six familiar items) of information.

The details of short-term memory and the bottleneck of attention are not important for our purposes. What is important is that only one or a very few things can be attended to simultaneously. The limits can be broadened a bit, but only modestly, by "time-sharing"—switching attention periodically. The narrowness of the span of attention accounts for a great deal of human unreason that considers only one facet of a multifaceted matter before a decision is reached.

For example, it has been hypothesized that the art of campaign oratory is much more an art of directing attention (to the issues on which the candidate believes himself or herself to have the broadest support) than an art of persuading people to change their minds on issues.[11] Similarly, shifts in expressed voting intentions during the course of an election campaign have been explained as caused by evocation of beliefs and attitudes already latent in voters' minds (e.g., party loyalties) (Lazarsfeld et al., 1948, chap. 9). Another example, highly characteristic of the political process, was the shift of attention from environmental problems to problems of energy supply that took place immediately after the Oil Shock, and that greatly altered public priorities for a number of years.

The unreason associated with attention focusing has no necessary connection with passion—cold reasoning can be as narrow and one-sided as hot reasoning. But the existence of these narrow limits on the span of human attention is a principal reason why we must distinguish between the "real" situation and the situation as perceived by the political actors when we try to apply the rationality principle to make predictions of behavior. People are, at best, rational in terms of what they are aware of, and they can be aware of only tiny, disjointed facets of reality.

Uncertainty

Lack of reliable knowledge and information is a major factor in almost all real-life decision making. In our soberer moments, we realize how little we know and can predict about the decision-making premises and processes of the rulers of the USSR. Yet the content of a rational foreign policy is highly sensitive to our hypotheses about these matters. The effects of the policies of the president upon the well-being of the American economy are only slightly less uncertain. At least there is often little consensus in the economics profession about these effects.

Wherever such uncertainties are present, an enhanced opportunity is provided for unconscious, or only partly conscious, drives and wishes to influence deliberation. Where the facts are clear (to the actors as well as to us), we have some chance, by application of the principles of reason, to calculate what the choice will be. Where evidence is weak and conflicting, a rationality principle has little independent predictive power.

Evocation

Finally, to understand political choices, we need to understand where the frame of reference for the actors' thinking comes from—how it is evoked. An important component of the frame of reference is the set of alternatives that are given consideration in the choice process. We need to understand not only how people reason about alternatives, but where the alternatives come from in the first place. The process whereby alternatives are generated has been somewhat ignored as an object of research.

But not wholly ignored! Turning again to my favorite source of information on the state of the profession, I find in a recent issue of *The American Political Science Review* another imaginative paper by William Riker, in fact his 1983 Presidential Address to the Association, on precisely this issue. (I could wish that he had not invented the word "heresthetics" to conceal the heresies he is propagating.) Riker traces the history of proposals in the Constitutional Convention for electing the President, with particular concern for the generation of new alternatives, and for the shifts in attention and emphasis on issues that accompanied their introduction.

---

[11] For a classic statement of this hypothesis, see Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet (1948, chap. 8).

Riker speaks of these matters in terms of "artistry within the rational choice context." I think that the generation of alternatives is much more than that: that it is an integral component of any veridical account of human decision making, or of human bounded rationality generally. The theory of the generation of alternatives deserves, and requires, a treatment that is just as definitive and thorough as the treatment we give to the theory of choice among prespecified alternatives.

But is such a treatment possible? Are we not treading upon the sacred precincts of creativity? Indeed we are; but I think the precincts are no longer sacrosanct. The same cognitive psychology that has been elaborating the theory of human bounded rationality has made considerable progress toward constructing models of the processes of discovery and creativity that can account for these processes in terms quite akin to those it uses to account for ordinary problem solving. Again, I cannot tell that story here but must limit myself to pointers to the literature (Bradshaw, Langley, & Simon, 1983; Lenat, 1983).

Conclusion

In this essay I have tried to provide an overview —a very general one—of our current knowledge of human nature in politics. I first undertook to compare the two principal theories of human rationality that have found application in political research: the procedural bounded rationality theory that has its origins in contemporary cognitive psychology, and the substantive global rationality theory that has been nurtured chiefly in economics. Then, by means of a series of examples, I examined the relative roles played by rationality principles and by the auxiliary assumptions that accompany them, respectively, in predicting and explaining human behavior in political contexts. Finally, I commented on the more extreme deviations from the objective rationality model that exhibit themselves in political affairs, and showed how they could be explained, in considerable measure, in terms of the mechanisms of attention and the severe limits that the architecture of the mind places on the span of human attention.

My overview, if it is even partly valid, carries a number of implications for research in political science. First, it dissipates the illusion, if anyone holds it, that an application of principles of rationality can discharge us, to any considerable degree, from the need to carry on painstaking empirical research at both macro and micro levels. It is far easier (for the political scientist and for the political actor) to calculate the rational response to a fully specified situation than it is to arrive at a reasonable specification of the situation. And there is no way, without empirical study, to predict which of innumerable reasonable specifications the actors will adopt.

Second, my overview suggests that the study of the mechanisms of attention directing, situation defining, and evoking are among the most promising targets of political research. In particular, the question of where political ideas come from is not only highly deserving of study, but also within the competence of our contemporary research techniques. I join Bill Riker in commending it to you as one of the truly exciting and significant areas of investigation in our field.

Nothing is more fundamental in setting our research agenda and informing our research methods than our view of the nature of the human beings whose behavior we are studying. It makes a difference, a very large difference, to our research strategy whether we are studying the nearly omniscient *Homo economicus* of rational choice theory or the boundedly rational *Homo psychologicus* of cognitive psychology. It makes a difference to research, but it also makes a difference for the proper design of political institutions. James Madison[12] was well aware of that, and in the pages of the *Federalist Papers* he opted for this view of the human condition (*Federalist,* No. 55):

> As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are other qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence.

—a balanced and realistic view, we may concede, of bounded human rationality and its accompanying frailties of motive and reason.

References

Anderson, J. *The architecture of cognition.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983.

Bradshaw, G. F., Langley, P. W., & Simon, H. A. Studying scientific discovery by computer simulation. *Science,* 1983, *222* (Dec. 2), 971-975.

Carbonell, J. G. *Subjective understanding: Computer*

---

[12] Or was it Hamilton? Mosteller and Wallace (1964) attribute No. 55 of *The Federalist* to Madison, but it is the least certain of their attributions of the numbers whose authorship has been disputed. Since the sentiment quoted here is certainly consistent with the beliefs of both authors, we need not be too concerned with the uncertainty of authorship.

models of belief systems. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Dept. of Computer Science, 1979.

Crecine, J. P. *Governmental problem solving: A computer simulation of municipal budgeting.* Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969.

Downs, A. *An economic theory of democracy.* New York: Harper & Row, 1957.

Eastman, D. Political science. In D. L. Sills (Ed.). *International encyclopedia of the social sciences* (vol. 12). New York: Macmillan, 1968, pp. 282-298.

Ericsson, K., & Simon, H. A. *Protocol analysis: Verbal reports as data.* Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984.

Friedman, M. The methodology of positive economics. In *Essays in positive economics.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953.

Friedman, M. The role of monetary policy. *American Economic Review,* 1968, *58,* 1-17.

Gerwin, B. *Budgeting public funds: The decision process in an urban school district.* Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969.

Hibbs, D. A., Jr. Economic outcomes and political support for British governments among occupational classes: A dynamic analysis. *American Political Science Review,* 1982, *76,* 259-279.

Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (Eds.). *Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

Keynes, J. M. *The general theory of employment, interest and money.* London: Macmillan, 1936.

van de Kragt, A. J. C., Orbell, J. M., & Dawes, R. M. The minimal contributing set as a solution to public goods problems. *American Political Science Review,* 1983, *77,* 112-122.

Lasswell, H. *Psychopathology and politics.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934.

Lasswell, H. *World politics and personal insecurity.* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1935.

Lazarsfeld, P. S., Berelson, B., & Gaudet, H. *The people's choice* (2nd ed.). New York: Columbia University Press, 1948.

Lenat, D. B. EURISKO. A program that learns new heuristics and domain concepts. *Artificial Intelligence,* 1983, *21,* 61-98.

Lippmann, W. *Public opinion.* New York: Macmillan (1922/1944).

Lucas, R. E., Jr. *Studies in business cycle theory.* Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981.

Lucas, R. E., Jr., & Sargent, T. J. (Eds.). *Rational expectation and economic practice.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981.

Mosteller, F., & Wallace, D. W. *Influence and disputed authorship: The Federalist.* Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1964.

Newell, A., & Simon, H. A. *Human problem solving.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1972.

Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. Telling more than we know: Verbal reports on mental processes. *Psychological Review,* 1977, *84,* 231-259.

Orbell, J. M., Schwartz-Shea, P., & Simmons, R. T. Do cooperators exit more readily than defectors. *American Political Science Review,* 1984, *76,* 753-766.

Riker, W. H. The heresthetics of constitution-making. The presidency in 1787, with comments on determinism and rational choice. *American Political Science Review,* 1984, *78,* 1-16.

Riker, W. H. The two-party system and Duverger's Law: An essay on the history of political science. *American Political Science Review,* 1982, *76,* 753-766.

Savage, L. J. *The foundation of statistics.* New York: Wiley, 1954.

Simon, H. A. *Administrative behavior.* New York: Free Press, 1947/1976. (a)

Simon, H. A. A behavioral model of rational choice. *Quarterly Journal of Economics,* 1955, *69,* 99-118. Reprinted in H. A. Simon. *Models of bounded rationality* (vol. 2, chap. 7.2). Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982.

Simon, H. A. From substantive to procedural rationality. In S. J. Latsis (Ed.). *Method and appraisal in Economics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976, pp. 129-148. (b)

Simon, H. A. *Models of bounded rationality.* Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982.

Simon, H. A. *Models of thought.* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979.

Simon, H. A. Motivational and emotional controls of cognition. In *Models of thought.* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979, chap. 1.3.

Simon, H. A. On the behavioral and rational foundation of economic dynamics. *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,* 1984, *5,* 35-55.

Simon, H. A. *Reason in human affairs.* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1983.

Wallas, G. Human nature in politics (4th ed.). Gloucester, Mass.: Smith, 1906/1944.

Weatherford, M. S. Economic voting and the "symbolic politics" argument: A reinterpretation and synthesis. *American Political Science Review,* 1983, *77,* 158-174.

Partisan Intentions and Election Day Realities in the Congressional Redistricting Process

RICHARD BORN
Vassar College

Political scientists have done little to resolve the question of whether or not a state party's command of congressional redistricting leads to payoffs in its share of delegation seats. Studies on the topic differ in their conclusions while being marred by methodological shortcomings. In analyzing districting plans from 1952 to 1982, one finds that partisan control of redistricting does have the expected effect on seat outcomes, but only modestly. This relationship, though, has become even more tenuous over time. Since the imposition of the Supreme Court's "one man, one vote" mandates, the partisan gains intended by redistricting schemes have come to depend less heavily on the identity of the controlling party. And regardless of what is intended by redistricting architects, the electorate has become less willing to conform to their expectations, quite plausibly because of incumbents' growing ability to add residents of the new areas to their supporting coalition by election day.

> The people of Pennsylvania are about one-third Federalist, yet all their new members of Congress are Democrats; the legislature took great care in laying out the districts, to make the elections as sure for the Democrats as if they had voted by a ticket at large.
>
> *The Salem Gazette,* 1802

> In 1868 the voice of the people of the State of New York was stifled by the glaring frauds that were committed in the great city bearing that name. . . . And over all was the slimy trail of the serpent of the gerrymander, slowly but surely strangling the right of suffrage to death.
>
> U.S. Congress, House 1893, p. 195

> When Bill Brock assumed chairmanship of the Republican National Committee (RNC) in 1977, he placed a high priority on winning state legislative elections. With Democrats in control of so many legislatures, Brock said, the GOP faced the threat of being "gerrymandered out of existence" in 1981.
>
> Buchanan (1979, p. 1751)

Politicians and political activists in the minority never have been loath to blame gerrymandering for many of their party's misfortunes, but during the late 1970s, alarm over the perceived dangers of gerrymandering went well beyond mere ritualistic denunciation. In an unprecedented move by a national party, the Republican National Committee (RNC) in 1978 launched a $2 million drive to increase Republican control over the upcoming congressional redistricting by capturing additional state legislative chambers (Buchanan, 1979, p. 1751). Spurred by the successes of that year, a second, $2.9 million campaign was initiated in 1980, accompanied by the efforts of a new political action committee (GOPAC) established expressly for this purpose (Buchanan, 1980, p. 3188).

In devising a route to Washington success which wound through the state capitals, however, GOP strategists evidently were not being guided by the findings of political science research. Even though the study of congressional elections has become a major growth industry, the discipline has said little about the partisan effects of House redistricting, and the infrequent explorations of this topic provide mixed signals to those who believe that a state party in charge of redistricting machinery can make a real electoral difference. In research done more than a decade ago, Mayhew (1971, pp. 276-278) did infer the existence of a purposeful 1950s Republican gerrymander in large northern states. However, subsequent analysis conducted by Erikson (1972, pp. 1241-1244), even though not specifically done with Mayhew in mind, suggests that most northern pro-Republican bias before the mid-1960s was the accidental result of Democratic voters being concentrated in constituencies that delivered "excessive" majorities for their party. The partisan gerrymander explanation, in contrast, is rejected because of Erikson's discovery of only a weak tendency for state parties controlling redistricting in 1962, 1966, and 1970 to increase their share of seats above 1960-base levels. A further study of the 1960s that draws similar conclusions

---

Received: August 24, 1983
Revision received: September 17, 1984
Accepted for publication: October 8, 1984

I am grateful to the anonymous referees for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this manuscript and to my research assistant, Laura Mills.

is by Noragon (1973, pp. 324-326), who finds, with regard to seats changing party hands after redistricting, a tenuous relationship between the party that devised the plan and the direction of the partisan shift.

But although Mayhew indeed can be faulted for failing to employ a longitudinal perspective (i.e., not determining whether *changes* in party control of redistricting produce parallel shifts in partisan seat advantage),[1] the latter two studies themselves are flawed by not controlling for the possibly confounding effects of statewide voting trends.[2] A newly minted Democratic gerrymander may be frustrated come the following election, for example, because of the emergence of an unforeseen GOP electoral surge.

Two studies sensitive to the importance of the statewide vote, as well as the need to examine party advantage across a range of districting schemes, have reached very different conclusions from those of Erikson and Noragon. Sickels (1966, pp. 1302-1303) shows that state parties with narrow vote majorities from 1964-1964 won substantially more seats when they had written existing districting plans. Similarly, Elliott (1974, pp. 227-232) observes that among parties winning the popular vote in large northern states from 1966 to 1972, the degree to which their seat percentage exceeded their vote percentage is much greater when they controlled redistricting.

Here too, however, there are grounds for questioning the significance of the results. Although Sickels does attempt to control for the statewide vote by analyzing marginally victorious parties only, it still appears even within his 50-55% vote range that parties in charge of redistricting do somewhat better in the popular vote. This fact is hardly surprising since a party dominating state government also is likely to be stronger in congressional elections and thus by itself may provide the redistricting party with a large share of seats. Elliott's analysis, on the other hand, controls more precisely for the statewide vote by subtracting from a party's seat share its exact vote proportion. But because a system of single-member districts tends to award the majority more than a 1% seat gain for each 1% increment in votes (Grofman & Scarrow, 1982, p. 452; Scarrow, 1981, p. 8; Tufte, 1973, pp. 542-544), the excess of seats over votes for parties dominating redistricting—because of their normally greater electoral strength—is likely to be inflated (e.g., if each 1% vote gain produced a 2% jump in seats, the seat-vote differential at 55% of the vote would be 4% more positive than the difference at 51%). So both Sickels and Elliott might well overstate the true degree to which party control of redistricting matters.

There is, however, a further problem common to *all* five studies that have been discussed here. No matter how closely their conclusions approximate reality, it is impossible to determine the causal mechanisms that link party control of redistricting to seat outcomes. In fact, this linkage is more complex than previously conceptualized, even when the complications posed by biennial vote shifts are taken into account. Two stages must be traversed if a party is to realize gains: first, it must draft a plan intended to yield a greater haul of seats, and second, voters must then behave at the polls according to that plan.

The importance of the first stage as the explanation for party failure largely has been ignored by researchers, but there is no good reason to implicitly assume as they have that a party in control of state government will be willing or able to devise a scheme enhancing its own partisan self-interest. Mayhew himself suggests, for instance, that in states dominated by a single, weakly organized party, redistricting decisions often take the form of concessions to its congressmen, even if safeguarding their seats should negate any possibility of picking up minority districts (1971, pp. 280-284). Alternatively, a redistricting party may be quite happy to accept a net reduction in its representation, if this is the price to be paid for purging a disfavored incumbent.[3] Finally, it is conceivable that since strict standards of district population equality have been imposed by Supreme Court rulings in the mid- and late 1960s, parties whose congressmen disproportionately represent underpopulated districts may be resigned merely to holding their losses down rather than pursuing chimerical dreams of maintaining or increasing party strength.[4]

---

[1] In a research note also not adopting a longitudinal perspective, Abramowitz (1983, pp. 767-770) finds that the 1980-1982 swing ratio (i.e., the increase in the Democratic seat percentage divided by the increase in the Democratic vote percentage) is larger when Democrats control both legislative chambers and the governorship than in states with weaker Democratic strength. Within each partisan category, however, this ratio is computed on the basis of votes and seats *aggregated* across states, rather than calculated as the average of the individual state swing ratios. Thus, his estimates may be skewed in the direction of redistricting effects obtaining in only a handful of large states; for example, of the additional 15 Democratic seats won from 1980-1982 in the 17 states with total Democratic control of redistricting, fully 40% came solely from California.

[2] Erikson (1972, p. 1242), though, does briefly consider the interaction between the partisanship of a plan and vote shifts when he singles out a handful of specific redistrictings for more extended discussion.

[3] A celebrated example from the 1981-1982 round of redistricting concerned the efforts of Massachusetts Democratic leaders to eliminate maverick liberal Barney Frank by merging his district with that of adjoining Republican Margaret Heckler (Congressional Quarterly, 1982, p. 20). Despite the fact that the new district contained far fewer of his constituents, Frank easily won in the fall.

All in all, then, having carte blanche over redistricting does not guarantee that a party will intend partisan gains in the first place, let alone realize any such gains on election day. Both stages of the process outlined above are examined, as I investigate how state parties have fared under various districting plans. Following this, I switch from states to House districts as the units of analysis, focusing on the relationship between the intended outcomes of redistricting decisions and the actual results themselves. Here, attention is devoted to the ability of incumbents to cultivate support from areas newly appended to their districts.

Data and Methods

A total of 91 congressional districting plans employed in 20 states from 1952-1982 are considered in this study. Because a single seat shifting party hands can unduly affect calculations of partisan change for very small delegations, a state is selected for analysis only if it had at least four representatives throughout this period.

The party authorship of each redistricting is fixed by modifying a categorization scheme initially put forth by Erikson (1972, p. 1242). Like Erikson, I define a plan as Democratic or Republican if a single party controlled both state legislative houses as well as the governorship, or if a party controlling both chambers overrode the veto of an opposition governor. Similarly, I call bipartisan a plan drawn by a legislature with divided party control, or one devised by a legislature under single-party domination and then signed into law by an opposition governor.

I differ from Erikson, though, in not excluding from my study those plans ordered by federal courts. In almost all such cases, a Democratic or Republican classification readily can be made, since the judges have approved with minor changes an already existing proposal initiated by a legislative party. But where courts themselves have altered significantly a legislative scheme (e.g., Maryland in 1966) or delegated the redistricting task to special "masters" (e.g., California in 1973), I classify the plan as bipartisan.

One other way that I differ from Erikson is in not eliminating redistricting carried out by nonpartisan state legislatures. It seems clear that the two such cases analyzed—Minnesota in 1961 and 1971—should be regarded as bipartisan, in that the first represented a compromise between the "liberal" controlled House and "conservative" dominated Senate (Minnesota—one seat loss, 1961), whereas the second was negotiated between the "conservative" faction controlling both houses and the Democratic governor (Redistricting in Texas. . . , 1971). Table 1 presents the partisanship assigned to each districting.[5]

The Effect of Districting Partisanship on Election Outcomes: A State-Level Perspective

Within states experiencing at least two of the three kinds of districting partisanship from 1952 to 1982, time series analysis is performed, regressing the Democratic proportion of seats on the Democratic share of the statewide two-party vote (*VOTE*) and a variable (*PART*) representing the partisanship of the current plan. (*PART* is 1 for Democratic, 0 for bipartisan, and -1 for Republican districtings.) Besides providing an overview of the consequences of partisanship, this analysis also has the virtue mentioned above of contrasting a given party's success in winning seats across different state districting schemes. By treating each state as its own control, I thus can avoid a potential problem faced by those who attempt to measure redistricting effects one election at a time —biased estimates in years when states with seat-vote ratios historically favoring one party for reasons other than gerrymandering happen to fall disproportionately within the ranks of a particular districting partisanship category.

Because too many uncontested seats held by one party could lead to a deceptively large calculation of its statewide vote proportion, the only elections included in a state's regression are those in which at least 75% of the seats have major-party competition.[6] Furthermore, I do not

---

[4] For a similar argument, see Ayres and Whiteman (1982, p. 6).

[5] Because only four Brooklyn districts were reconstructed in 1974 in response to a court finding of racial gerrymandering in New York's 1972 plan, the more recent scheme is not considered a separate redistricting.

[6] Although the percentage of contested seats in Oklahoma falls below the acceptable level only in 1962, the prior years as well are dropped so that the series has no gap. Also, even though the Republican plans used in Kansas across the entire 1952-1980 period were succeeded by a Democratic plan in 1982, this state had to be totally excluded from the analysis here because it had too few contested seats in 1978. It was thus impossible to consider the lone Democratic districting year, lest the series be noncontinuous.

Table 1. Partisan Classification of 91 Districting Plans, 1952-1982

Election Years in which Plan was Used	State	Partisanship of Plan	Election Years in which Plan was Used	State	Partisanship of Plan
1952-1960	California	Republican	1968-1970	Oklahoma	Bipartisan
1952-1960	Illinois	Bipartisan	1968-1970	Washington	Democratic
1952-1964	Indiana	Bipartisan	1968-1970	West Virginia	Democratic
1952-1960	Iowa	Republican	1970	Missouri	Democratic
1952-1960	Kansas	Republican	1970	New York	Republican
1952-1964	Maryland	Democratic	1972	California	Democratic
1952-1962	Michigan	Bipartisan	1972-1980	Colorado	Republican
1952-1960	Missouri	Democratic	1972-1980	Connecticut	Democratic
1952-1960	New York	Republican	1972-1980	Illinois	Republican
1952-1964	Ohio	Bipartisan	1972-1980	Indiana	Republican
1952-1966	Oklahoma	Democratic	1972-1980	Iowa	Republican
1952-1964	Oregon	Republican	1972-1980	Kansas	Republican
1952-1960	Pennsylvania	Republican	1972-1980	Maryland	Democratic
1952-1960	West Virginia	Democratic	1972-1980	Michigan	Democratic
1958	Washington	Democratic	1972-1980	Minnesota	Bipartisan
1960-1966	Washington	Democratic	1972-1980	Missouri	Democratic
1962-1966	California	Democratic	1972-1980	New Jersey	Republican
1962-1964	Illinois	Bipartisan	1972-1980	New York	Republican
1962-1970	Iowa	Republican	1972-1980	Ohio	Bipartisan
1962-1964	Kansas	Republican	1972-1980	Oklahoma	Democratic
1962-1970	Minnesota	Bipartisan	1972-1980	Oregon	Bipartisan
1962-1964	Missouri	Democratic	1972-1980	Pennsylvania	Democratic
1962-1964	New Jersey	Bipartisan	1972-1980	Washington	Bipartisan
1962-1966	New York	Republican	1972-1980	West Virginia	Bipartisan
1962-1964	Pennsylvania	Bipartisan	1972-1980	Wisconsin	Bipartisan
1962-1966	West Virginia	Democratic	1974-1980	California	Bipartisan
1964-1970	Colorado	Republican	1982	California	Democratic
1964-1970	Connecticut	Bipartisan	1982	Colorado	Bipartisan
1964-1970	Michigan	Republican	1982	Connecticut	Democratic
1964-1970	Wisconsin	Bipartisan	1982	Illinois	Democratic
1966-1970	Illinois	Bipartisan	1982	Indiana	Republican
1966	Indiana	Democratic	1982	Iowa	Republican
1966-1970	Kansas	Republican	1982	Kansas	Democratic
1966-1970	Maryland	Bipartisan	1982	Maryland	Democratic
1966	Missouri	Democratic	1982	Michigan	Democratic
1966	New Jersey	Democratic	1982	Minnesota	Democratic
1966	Ohio	Republican	1982	Missouri	Democratic
1966-1970	Oregon	Bipartisan	1982	New Jersey	Democratic
1966-1970	Pennsylvania	Bipartisan	1982	New York	Bipartisan
1968-1970	California	Bipartisan	1982	Ohio	Bipartisan
1968-1970	Indiana	Bipartisan	1982	Oklahoma	Democratic
1968	Missouri	Democratic	1982	Oregon	Bipartisan
1968-1970	New Jersey	Republican	1982	Pennsylvania	Republican
1968	New York	Bipartisan	1982	Washington	Republican
1968-1970	Ohio	Republican	1982	West Virginia	Democratic
			1982	Wisconsin	Bipartisan

Note: New York is not considered to have implemented a separate additional redistricting in 1974, because the Court-imposed boundary alterations that year only affected four Brooklyn districts.

analyze years in which the current districting plan had been drawn up 20 or more years earlier. A minimum of nine consecutive elections must meet these criteria in order for a regression to be done.[7]

Table 2 presents the regression results, which were generated by the Cochrane-Orcutt technique. Overall, redistricting does seem to benefit the controlling party, but not impressively; 10 of the 16 coefficients (62.5%) for districting partisanship have the hypothesized positive sign, and four are significant at the .05 level.[8] The .024 average coefficient value indicates that moving from a Republican to bipartisan or bipartisan to Democratic plan can be expected to yield a 2.4% Democratic seat gain.[9]

I also examined whether or not any partisan profits achieved through imposition of redistricting might dissipate over time owing to population migration. In my test, performed within states whether or not they underwent a change in districting partisanship, I applied a simple dummy coding scheme differentiating each specific districting to a time series regression of seats on votes, and I included a trend variable for each plan lasting four elections or longer. The results, however, suggested no systematic tendency for party fortunes to wane or wax across the course of a districting. Election returns from the initial year a plan is used, therefore, seem representative of the overall partisan impact across the entire period it remains in effect.[10]

The analysis so far, of course, says nothing about the causal process linking partisan control of redistricting to a certain share of delegation seats. As argued before, a two-equation model must be developed which differentiates intended partisan advantage from actual voter behavior in November.

To gauge the partisan intent of a particular scheme, I aggregate the total pre-districting House vote received in all areas later included within the new district boundaries by the various Democratic and Republican candidates who campaigned there. These recomputations—which estimate what Democratic and Republican vote totals would have been before redistricting had the new lines been in effect—can then be compared with actual pre-redistricting results to determine the changes intended in a party's share of delegation seats. Certainly performing such analysis for each districting blueprint considered in a state—facilitated by sophisticated computer technology—is standard practice for drafters themselves.[11]

My specific measure of partisan intentions represents a compromise between using all possible House election data from a state's previous districting and ensuring that the number of past elections used in the computation is comparable among states.[12] When retabulations exist for two

---

[7] In this analysis and those to come, all calculations of state votes and seats exclude from consideration at-large seats, such as Michigan's in 1962.

[8] Because, as noted above, a state's majority party is likely to write most redistricting plans as well as to receive a majority of the statewide vote, it is not surprising to find a positive correlation between the districting partisanship and vote variables across most of the 16 regressions in Table 2. The average R^2 value, though, is only .126—far too weak to create a collinearity problem of inflated standard errors for the regression coefficients.

[9] Although the argument has been made above in favor of using time series analysis to compute the overall partisan effect of redistricting, I also performed an alternative cross-sectional regression of Democratic seat proportions on the statewide vote, districting partisanship, and the 15 dummy variables needed to differentiate the 16 election years from 1952-1982. Here, data came from the states experiencing changes in districting partisanship which were analyzed in Table 2, as well as the four others considered in this study (Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and Wisconsin); the only criteria for inclusion were that at least 75% of seats were contested, and the districting plan in effect was no more than 20 years old. The resulting coefficient of *PART*—.032 (s.e. = .010)—indicated a somewhat stronger partisan effect of redistricting than that gauged above.

[10] Specific results of this analysis are available by request.

[11] Recomputed data from previous House elections are not the only kind that can be used. Two recent studies focusing on how individual incumbents were affected by redistricting decisions in 1981-1982 have measured district partisan change, respectively, with retabulated presidential election data (Gopoian & West, 1984) and retabulated party registration figures (Cain, 1983). Although such statistics do not require aggregating data for different House candidates of a party who may vary with respect to the personal component of their vote, they are not nearly as available, especially for the earlier period of my analysis. For example, recomputed presidential data can be found for all districts in a state (or computed from county-level returns when districts before and after redistricting consist solely of intact counties) only in 39% of the 1952-1964 redistrictings considered here. And these presidential statistics are by far the most common of any recomputations with non-House data. Furthermore, a substantive question exists concerning the legitimacy of using retabulations based on statewide candidates to make inferences about redistricting changes intended at the House level of competition. For instance, removing a conservative blue-collar area from the district of a mainstream California Democrat in 1973 might well make his constituency *more* Democratic in terms of the 1972 McGovern vote, while still eliminating a part of his own customary supporting coalition.

[12] Recompiled House election data were gathered from a number of sources. Statistics for 1981-1982 redistrictings were taken from Congressional Quarterly (1983) whereas Congressional Quarterly (1973) as well as the

Table 2. Measuring the Effect of Districting Partisanship on Seat Outcomes—Time Series Regressions for States Districting under Plans of at Least Two Different Kinds of Partisanship

State	Election Years in Series	Coefficient		Constant	R^2
		PART	*VOTE*		
California	1954-1982	.035 (.020) .335	.821* (.332) .404	.147	.429
Colorado	1964-1982	−.086 (.108) −.161	.332 (1.164) .082	.327	.099
Connecticut	1964-1982	−.083 (.063) −.312	1.794* (.580) .558	−.225	.630
Illinois	1952-1982	.022 (.016) .224	.818* (.204) .570	.091	.704
Indiana	1952-1982	−.017 (.045) −.048	4.457* (.702) .812	−1.744	.794
Maryland	1952-1982	−.048 (.080) −.121	1.998* (.537) .766	−.435	.548
Michigan	1952-1982	.032 (.024) .181	2.378* (.341) .687	−.788	.806
Minnesota	1962-1982	.084* (.015) .262	2.262* (.104) .946	−.707	.987
New Jersey	1962-1982	.000 (.019) .000	1.852* (.410) .741	−.345	.745
New York	1952-1982	.001 (.027) .004	1.163* (.270) .500	−.033	.615
Ohio	1952-1982	.055 (.042) .266	1.052* (.304) .474	−.123	.614
Oklahoma	1964-1982	.155* (.064) .621	1.148 (.750) .496	.007	.691
Oregon	1952-1982	−.042 (.052) −.079	2.782* (.357) .864	−.907	.843
Pennsylvania	1952-1982	.036* (.014) .434	.945* (.423) .411	.040	.603
Washington	1958-1982	.092 (.067) .224	2.474* (.576) .680	−.624	.672
West Virginia	1952-1982	.141* (.058) .455	2.306* (.506) .959	−.617	.657
Averages		.024	1.786	−.371	.652

*Significant at the .05 level, two-tail *t* test.

Note: Entries appearing on first line of each row are unstandardized regression coefficients and their associated standard errors (in parentheses); entries on second line are standardized regression coefficients. All regression values have been computed with the Cochrane-Orcutt technique. Years eliminated from regressions because districting plan in effect was 20 or more years old are Colorado (1952-1962), Connecticut (1952-1962), Minnesota (1952-1960), New Jersey (1952-1960), and Washington (1952-1956); those dropped because less than 75% of seats were contested are California (1952) and Oklahoma (1962). (The 1952-1960 elections also are not analyzed for Oklahoma to keep its series continuous.)

or more elections held under the old plan, the intended Democratic vote proportion in each new district is calculated as the average Democratic share of the recomputed two-party vote across the two most recent elections. Otherwise, the calculation is based upon the immediately preceding election only. The intended Democratic seat proportion, then, becomes the share with an intended Democratic vote above 50%.

The first of the two equations to be estimated, with each observation corresponding to a distinct 1952-1982 state redistricting, is:

$$INSTS = a_1 + b_1 PART + b_2 POP + b_3 STS + b_4 TIME_1 + b_{10} TIME_7 + u. \qquad (1)$$

The partisanship of a plan (*PART*) already has been defined; in addition:

INSTS is the intended change in the Democratic share of delegation seats, that is, the intended post-redistricting Democratic proportion minus the actual pre-redistricting proportion.[13]

POP is the average population, under the previous plan, of a state's Democratic districts divided by the average population of Republican districts.

STS is the actual pre-redistricting Democratic seat proportion.

TIME$_1$ . . . *TIME*$_7$ differentiate the years when the plans first were used: *TIME*$_1$ is 1 for 1960-1962 plans and 0 otherwise, *TIME*$_2$ is 1 for 1964 plans and 0 otherwise, *TIME*$_3$ is 1 for 1966 plans and 0 otherwise, *TIME*$_4$ is 1 for 1968 plans and 0 otherwise, *TIME*$_5$ is 1 for 1970 plans and 0 otherwise, *TIME*$_6$ is 1 for 1972-1974 plans and 0 otherwise, and *TIME*$_7$ is 1 for 1982 plans and 0 otherwise (1952 plans serve as the reference group)[14] and

u is the error term.

Besides the partisanship of the plan, the population discrepancy variable is entered into the equation under the assumption mentioned above that intended party gains may be circumscribed to the extent that its districts before redistricting are relatively underpopulated. This is more likely to be true since the Supreme Court's "one man, one vote" mandates, but a de facto policy of achieving greater population equality seems to have operated even earlier; that is, in the plans antedating the 1964 *Wesberry v. Sanders* decision, interdistrict variation always was reduced. In addition, *STS* is included because an intended partisan increment of given size likely will become harder to fashion as the pre-redistricting number of seats held by the party becomes larger. Finally, the seven dummy time variables control for any remaining influences on intended seat change which are unique to particular elections.

To analyze the second step of the process, the following equation is estimated:

$$ACSTS = a_2 + b_{11} INSTS + b_{12} ACVT + b_{13} TIME_1 + \ldots b_{19} TIME_7 + u.^{15} \qquad (2)$$

U.S. Dept. of Commerce Census Bureau (1971, 1973, 1975) supplied the data for early 1970s and some late 1960s redistrictings. With regard to other 1960s redistrictings, the U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1963) and its supplements include the necessary computations when new districts consisted only of intact counties. Fortunately, the remaining 1960s data, as well as those for the 1950s, can be acquired from *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,* which would generate estimates of the recomputed vote soon after a redistricting bill became law. (On the infrequent occasions when *CQWR* did not present precise quantitative estimates, I used its judgment of the general partisan disposition of the new districts to determine the intent of the plan.)

[13] When retabulated data from the two most recent elections were used to compute the intended Democratic seat proportion, the actual pre-redistricting proportion was calculated as the share of seats in which the average Democratic vote across these elections exceeded 50%. If only the immediately preceding election was used to calculate the intended proportion, the pre-redistricting share simply was the actual proportion won by the Democrats that year. Similarly, when I later calculate the Democratic pre-redistricting proportion of the statewide vote, I figure the average vote proportion across the two most recent past elections if both elections have been used to compute the intended seat share, and the vote proportion in the single most recent past election otherwise.

[14] Because there was only one redistricting each in 1960 (Washington) and 1974 (California), they were included with those in 1962 and 1972, respectively.

[15] Although a total of 91 different districting plans form the data base for this study, only 79 redistrictings are employed here. Six of the redistrictings that established the 91 plans had to be dropped because before redrawing lines the controlling party held every delegation seat; that is, it was impossible for such a party to attempt any increase in its share of seats, or for any increase actually to materialize. Four others could not be used because they were written in 1941-1942; that is, my analysis here of seat outcomes that occurred in the initial year of a districting plan begins with 1952. California's 1951 redistricting is not included because less than 75% of its seats were contested in the initial year it went into effect (i.e., 1952). Finally, Washington's 1982 plan is excluded as a consequence of its extreme *INSTS* value (the largest for any redistricting); the intended pro-Republican change here is misleadingly high, because of the statistical quirk that two of its eight new districts have recomputed vote proportions falling only

Only *ACSTS* and *ACVT* remain to be defined:

ACSTS is the actual change in the Democratic share of delegation seats; that is, the actual Democratic proportion in the first election after redistricting minus the actual pre-redistricting proportion, and

ACVT is the actual change in the Democratic share of the statewide two-party vote; that is, the actual Democratic proportion in the first election after redistricting minus the actual pre-redistricting proportion.

Here, I expect that the actual seat shift (*ACSTS*) will be positively related to the intended seat change (*INSTS*) and the statewide vote change (*ACVT*); in addition, I allow for any period effects by including $TIME_1$ to $TIME_7$.

Because all independent variables in equation (1) are assumed to be predetermined, estimation is performed with ordinary least squares (*OLS*). Because *INSTS* on the right side of equation (2) is conceptualized as endogenous, however, OLS estimation may yield a biased coefficient for this variable owing to correlation with the error term. Hence, two-stage least squares (*2SLS*) is used to generate the regression coefficients (with *INSTS* regressed on *PART, POP, STS*, $TIME_1$ . . . $TIME_7$, and *ACVT* to form $\widehat{INSTS}$). The results of these two regressions appear in Table 3.

Districting partisanship is shown in equation (1) to be a significant predictor of redistricting intentions. Its understandardized coefficient indicates

Table 3. A Two-Equation Model of the Redistricting Process: A Full Analysis of Redistrictings Implemented from 1952-1982

Coefficient	Equation (1)		Equation (2)	
PART	.045* .420	(.013)	–	
POP	.112 .173	(.076)	–	
STS	–.028 –.059	(.062)	–	
INSTS	–		.771* .542	(.277)
ACVT	–		1.372* .533	(.359)
TIME$_1$	–.030 –.121	(.038)	.088* .251	(.037)
TIME$_2$	–.207 –.069	(.053)	.226* .409	(.059)
TIME$_3$	–.035 –.125	(.042)	.054 .134	(.045)
TIME$_4$	–.053 –.196	(.041)	.079 .206	(.042)
TIME$_5$	.004 .007	(.067)	–.020 –.026	(.064)
TIME$_6$	–.051 –.259	(.034)	.049 .174	(.040)
TIME$_7$	–.067 –.329	(.035)	.015 .053	(.045)
Constant	–.079		–.036	
R^2	.217		.649	

*Significant at .05 level.

Note: Entries appearing on first line of each row are unstandardized regression coefficients and their associated standard errors (in parentheses); entries on second line are standardized regression coefficients. First equation has been estimated with OLS, second equation with 2SLS. Number of redistrictings analyzed is 79.

.002 or less below the .5 cutoff point used to differentiate Democratic from Republican seats.

Table 4. A Two-Equation Model of the Redistricting Process: An Analysis of Redistrictings Implemented from 1966-1982 Only

Coefficient	Equation (1)		Equation (2)	
PART	.031* .295	(.014)	–	
POP	.310* .395	(.100)	–	
STS	–.025 –.049	(.072)	–	
INSTS	–		.668* .531	(.282)
ACVT	–		1.319* .637	(.350)
$TIME_4$	–.020 –.091	(.038)	.026 .093	(.047)
$TIME_5$	.030 .067	(.063)	–.066 –.118	(.068)
$TIME_6$	–.014 –.078	(.033)	–.002 –.010	(.049)
$TIME_7$	–.026 –.146	(.033)	–.035 –.156	(.056)
Constant	–.299		.012	
R^2	.245		.523	

*Significant at .05 level according to two-tail *t*-test.

Note: Entries appearing on first line of each row are unstandardized regression coefficients and their associated standard errors (in parentheses); entries on second line are standardized regression coefficients. First equation has been estimated with OLS, second equation with 2SLS. Number of redistrictings analyzed is 56.

that a shift of one step toward a Democratic plan will increment the intended gain in Democratic seats by 4.5%. Furthermore, the coefficient of intended seat gain in the second equation suggests that these intentions, in turn, are translated into actual results; on the average, 77.1% of what is intended will be achieved on election day.

More daunting prospects for adding seats, however, have been faced by parties controlling redistricting since the mid-1960s. In Table 4, I estimate the same two equations as before (minus $TIME_1$ to $TIME_3$), now including only redistrictings after the 1964 *Wesberry* decision.[16] The most striking feature of equation (1) is that the population discrepancy variable—not significant in the preceding full analysis—has sharply risen in magnitude, whereas partisanship has a considerably reduced effect. Comparison of the standardized regression coefficients shows, in fact, that population discrepancy has the single most important impact. In addition, the partisan intention coefficient in the second equation has declined to .668 from the .771 value reached before. Clearly, then, the legal obligation to establish equal-size districts makes it harder today for parties disproportionately controlling underpopulated districts to devise more favorable plans, but even when such plans are invented, the odds are reduced that implementation will lead to the desired gains.

Estimation of equation (2) has been carried out so far only for the first post-redistricting election, but the earlier failure to uncover any tendency for partisan effects to vary over the life of a plan suggests here as well that partisan intentions would not have very different impacts on seat outcomes if subsequent elections were analyzed. I did explore the possibility, though, by modifying *ACSTS* and *ACVT* so that they were based on the average actual Democratic seat and vote shares during the lifetime of a districting, but the results differed little from those reported in Tables 3 and 4.

---

[16] Even though final enactment of 1964 plans for Colorado, Connecticut, Michigan, and Wisconsin did not occur until after the Court's February 17 *Wesberry* edict, I do not analyze these redistrictings in Table 4 because the actual drafting processes themselves were initiated earlier.

Examining the Electoral Effects of Redistricting on Individual Districts

A limitation of all work done up to now has been the focus on the state as the unit of analysis. This approach may have been somewhat too narrow in inferring the desired share of delegation seats simply from the proportion with a recomputed vote in excess of 50% for the controlling party and then judging the success of the plan in terms of whether the intended share actually materializes. Opposition seats, which are made more marginal but not quite to the 50% point and which then turn over in the fall, will attenuate the state-level relationship between intended and actual seat change, even though a major reason for this turnover obviously would lie in the handiwork of the redistricting architects. Thus, an alternative evaluation of redistricting effectiveness can be achieved by adopting the perspective of individual districts and determining how well intended shifts in the vote correspond to actual shifts.

Toward this end, I originally attempted to devise a two-equation model analogous to the state-level model just estimated. Ultimately, however, it proved impossible to develop an intended-vote-shift equation with anything like the explanatory power of its state-level counterpart. Because a strong *2SLS* instrument for intended-vote change consequently could not be created, I am limited to estimating the actual vote change equation only, treating intended changes as exogenous and applying OLS.

The following equation is estimated (a separate regression is done for each year, because performing district-level analysis provides an adequate number of cases per election):[17]

$$\begin{aligned} ACVT = a_1 &+ b_1 INVT + b_2 DVET \\ &+ b_3 DFR + b_4 DOPEN + b_5 RFR \\ &+ b_6 ROPEN + b_7 ST_1 \\ &+ \ldots b_{7+(k-2)} ST_{k-1} + u. \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

As before, *ACVT* is the actual pre- to post-redistricting change in the Democratic two-party vote share, now computed, though, for districts.

INVT is the intended change in the Democratic share of the district two-party vote; that is, the intended post-redistricting proportion minus the actual pre-redistricting proportion.

DVET is 1 if a Democratic incumbent wins reelection before redistricting and runs again afterward, and 0 otherwise.

DFR is 1 if a Democratic nonincumbent wins the seat before redistricting and runs again afterward, and 0 otherwise.

DOPEN is 1 if there is an open-seat election after the redistricting produced by the retirement of a Democratic incumbent, and 0 otherwise.

RFR is 1 if a Republican nonincumbent wins the seat before redistricting and runs again afterward, and 0 otherwise.

ROPEN is 1 if there is an open-seat election after the redistricting produced by the retirement of a Republican incumbent, and 0 otherwise.

$ST_1 \ldots ST_{k-1}$ are dummy variables differentiating the *k* states implementing plans in the year being analyzed.

The dummy variables *DVET* and *ROPEN* control for actual vote changes which can be expected to result from combinations of incumbency status and party membership. For Democratic veterans, this simply is the national partisan shift, whereas for the remaining four groups, the changes are those relative to the national shift caused either by acquisition of a first term of incumbency (pro-Democratic for Democratic freshmen, and pro-Republican for Republican freshmen) or incumbent retirement (pro-Republican in seats with departing Democratic members, and pro-Democratic in seats with departing Republican members). Districts with Republican veterans serve as the reference group. Finally, $ST_1 \ldots ST_{k-1}$ control for any unique state influences on actual vote change.

Because the pre-redistricting vote forms the base from which to compute actual and intended vote change, only seats with identifiable predecessors are analyzed. When opposite-party incumbents thrown together by redistricting face off in November, I always define this base as the vote received by the Democrat and assign the district a value of 1 on *DOPEN* (i.e., treat it like a Democratic open seat, where neither candidate has a net benefit from incumbency). But because new districts originating in a redistricting have no antecedents, they fall outside our purview.

In all regressions contained in Table 5, the intended vote shift has a significant impact on actual change; overall, its coefficient averages .847 in magnitude. Standing out, however, is the way in which actual vote shifts over time have become less responsive to intentions. The mean coefficient has declined from 1.172 over the first three elections to .684 afterward, and furthermore no post-1964 coefficient looms as large as any of

---

[17] No analysis is done for 1958 or 1960, however, because only a handful of districts in each year (all of them in Washington) were redistricted.

Table 5. Measuring the Correspondence between Redistricting Intentions and Actual Electoral Results at the District Level

Year Implemented	Coefficient						Constant	R^2	N
	INVT	DVET	DFR	DOPEN	RFR	ROPEN			
1952	1.497* (.322) .443	.025 (.014) .181	.020 (.025) .073	.047 (.026) .182	–.013 (.016) –.073	.040 (.026) .143	–.102	.344	112
1962	1.130* (.121) .618	.016 (.011) .109	.064* (.023) .189	.011 (.023) .032	.004 (.017) .016	.023 (.020) .075	–.034	.493	149
1964	.890* (.079) .889	.038* (.016) .215	.071 (.042) .147	–.090* (.027) –.258	.051 (.029) .147	–	.043	.866	32
1966	.495* (.139) .278	.051* (.012) .371	.063* (.016) .318	–.074* (.035) –.171	–.088* (.025) –.285	.092* (.041) .176	–.115	.453	116
1968	.730* (.240) .268	.005 (.020) .026	–.148* (.064) –.193	–.053 (.037) –.127	–.069* (.030) –.204	.096* (.048) .175	.010	.300	125
1970	.684* (.322) .307	.130* (.051) .444	.181* (.065) .462	.069 (.078) .143	–.032 (.088) –.053	–	–.111	.255	49
1972	.602* (.112) .331	.047* (.017) .201	.062* (.027) .146	–.017 (.040) –.026	.019 (.028) .041	.100* (.027) .224	–.026	.238	259
1974	.881* (.235) .547	.087* (.043) .333	.124* (.061) .290	–.151 (.080) –.256	.027 (.060) .062	.080 (.059) .187	.020	.490	41
1982	.711* (.102) .423	.038* (.016) .164	.075* (.027) .157	–.086* (.029) –.182	–.048* (.022) –.135	.129* (.036) .196	–.009	.418	250
Averages									
1952-1964	1.172	.026	.052	–.011	.014	.032	–.031	.568	
1966-1982	.684	.060	.060	–.052	–.032	.099	–.039	.359	
1952-1982	.847	.049	.057	–.038	–.017	.080	–.036	.429	

*Significant at .05 level according to two-tailed *t*-test.

Note: State dummy variable coefficients have been omitted to enhance readability. Entries appearing on first line of each row are unstandardized regression coefficients and their associated standard errors (in parentheses); entries on second line are standardized regression coefficients. Equations have been estimated with OLS. ROPEN does not appear in the 1964 or 1970 equations because there were no cases of Republican incumbent retirement there.

those earlier. These findings thus reinforce the inference drawn above from the state-level regressions that whatever the partisan intent of a redistricting scheme, voters have become less inclined to follow the electoral course charted for them.

The Growth of Incumbents' Electoral Advantages as a Cause of the Declining Effectiveness of Partisan Gerrymandering

What, though, accounts for this increasing voter noncompliance? I suggest that just as with so many other recent changes in electoral behavior (e.g., greater split-ticket voting for Congress and the presidency), the responsible cause can be linked in good part to the rise of incumbents' electoral advantages. Congressional scholars have spent a prodigious amount of time studying how the growing numbers of official perquisites have been applied over two-year terms of office to solicit support from those actually represented. But to my knowledge, no one has ever considered the advantages that perquisite expansion might have afforded, between the time a redistricting law is enacted and the general election, to incumbents seeking votes from nonconstituents residing within the newly attached areas. For example, more reimbursable trips home provide more opportunities to campaign in these new locales during regular weekend district visits. Likewise, a common legislative practice today—facilitated by the expanded numbers of staff—is for members to begin handling casework from their appended territory immediately after redistricting (Ehrenhalt, 1982, p. 1499). Finally, since 1973 members have had the authority to send franked mailings to their new areas (Congressional Mail. . . , 1973, pp. 1024-1026). I expect, therefore, that incumbents nowadays can more rapidly convert constituents-to-be into part of their reelection coalition, possibly upsetting the expectations of a redistricting plan.

Because the county is the smallest unit within a district for which comprehensive election data exist, this expectation must be tested at the county level. The universe of cases thus includes only counties that are shifted intact from one district to another. Incumbents' success in mobilizing constituents-to-be is evaluated by contrasting the electoral impact of transferring counties between incumbents against that produced by transferring counties from incumbent districts to open seats. Even though the party giving up counties will likely suffer a retirement loss in both instances, that is, transplanted residents no longer can vote for the member who had represented them, I still expect that the substitution of a fellow party incumbent running for reelection will minimize these losses, whereas a successor incumbent of the opposition should make the losses even worse.

The equation to be estimated in each election is:

$$ACVT = a_1 + b_1 DIOP + b_2 RIRI + b_3 RIDI + b_4 DIDI + b_5 DIRI + b_6 ST_1 + \ldots b_{6+(k-2)} ST_{k-1} + u. \quad (4)$$

Actual vote change *ACVT* (now computed at the county level) and the state dummy variables $ST_1 \ldots ST_{k-1}$ (needed, as before, to control for state effects) already have been defined. In addition:

DIOP is 1 if the county shifts from a Democratic incumbent district to an open seat district, and 0 otherwise.

RIRI is 1 if the county shifts from a Republican incumbent district to one with another Republican incumbent seeking reelection, and 0 otherwise.

RIDI is 1 if the county shifts from a Republican incumbent district to one with a Democratic incumbent seeking reelection, and 0 otherwise.

DIDI is 1 if the county shifts from a Democratic incumbent district to one with another Democratic incumbent seeking reelection, and 0 otherwise.

DIRI is 1 if the county shifts from a Democratic incumbent district to one with a Republican incumbent seeking reelection, and 0 otherwise.

Counties transferred to open districts from those with Republican incumbents form the reference group.

Once the equations are estimated, $-b_2$ and $b_4 - b_1$ will represent, respectively, the extent to which Republican and Democratic members inheriting territory from fellow party congressmen can limit losses to their party relative to the "pure" retirement losses which instead would result were such territory transferred to a seat without any incumbent. Similarly, $b_1 - b_5$ and b_3 measure how much Republican and Democratic members who inherit counties from opposition officeholders add on to their party's vote relative to the gains that otherwise would occur were these counties shifted to an open seat.[18]

So that all comparisons involve an adequate number of cases, whenever a particular group of counties transferred from one incumbent to another is smaller than 10 in size, its counties and the corresponding variable (*RIRI, RIDI, DIDI,* or *DIRI*) are eliminated from the analysis. In addition, because fewer than 10 cases in 1966 existed in the *DIOP* baseline comparison group of counties shifting from Democratic incumbents to open seats, all groups of counties removed from Democratic incumbent districts and their associated variables (*DIOP, DIDI,* and *DIRI*) are excluded from the regression. Finally, it is impossible to do any analysis in 1964 (because neither baseline comparison group of counties transferred to open seats contained the minimum number of cases) or in 1958, 1960, 1970, or 1974 (because no group at all had the minimum number).

---

[18] Because *ACVT* is defined in terms of change in the Democratic share of the vote, below-zero values of b_2 and $b_5 - b_1$ support the hypothesis that the post-redistricting Republican vote will be improved if a Republican incumbent, rather than no incumbent, gains the new areas; thus, presenting these two comparisons in the bottom part of Table 6 as $-b_2$ and $b_1 - b_5$ allows positive entries for both parties to be interpreted as consistent with expectations.

Table 6 reports the results of the analysis. It is clear that incumbents have become more successful over time in rallying voters in the new counties to their side. As indicated in columns 7-8 of the third row of summary statistics, a party's advantage in having counties transferred from one of its incumbents to another rather than to an open seat district averaged 4.9% in 1952 and 1962; the comparable benefit from 1966-1982 has risen to 7%. Even more dramatic results emerge when I consider incumbents receiving counties taken from the opposition (see row 6, columns 7-8 of summary statistics). These members, who were disproportionately targeted for defeat by hostile redistricting decisions, have been able since 1966 to boost their party's vote by an average of 2.8% more than if the opposition county instead were moved into an open district; before 1966, the corresponding figure of -3.4% signifies that a party's gains actually were larger when opposition counties were thrown into a district with no incumbent than into one of its own. The increased electoral power of incumbency thus seems to have paid dividends even over the relatively brief time available for campaigning in territory not previously represented, better insulating members, as a consequence, from any depredation desired by a partisan gerrymander.

Conclusions

What, then, may be concluded about the concern that prompted this study: whether, as the Republican National Committee so avidly believed in the late 1970s, control of redistricting by a state party leads to partisan gains in its House representation? In general, of course, the answer is affirmative, but since being compelled to adhere to strict standards of equal population districting by the Supreme Court, parties have found it harder to implement successfully partisan gerrymandering. As I showed, the partisan advantage bestowed by post-1964 schemes has come to depend more on which party's districts before redistricting were relatively underpopulated and less on the identity of the party drawing the lines. Furthermore, whatever the partisan intent of redistrictings, voters have become less inclined to behave as desired by the drafters.

These findings run counter to many predictions during the middle and late 1960s. As argued by Justice White in his dissent to the *Wells v. Rockefeller* and *Kirkpatrick v. Preisler* decisions of 1969, for example, a fixation on eliminating minor disparities among districts

> downgrades a restraint on a far greater potential threat to equality of representation, the gerrymander. Legislatures intent on minimizing the representation of selected political or racial groups are invited to ignore political boundaries and compact districts as long as they adhere to population equality among districts. (Baker, 1982, p. 26)

According to my results, that partisan gerrymandering has become *less* pervasive thus suggests that freedom to disregard municipal and county boundaries, even when combined with computer technology able to generate dozens of equal population schemes for partisan benefit appraisal, can only partly compensate for the abolition of past opportunities to concentrate minority party voters in overpopulated districts and for the greater ability of incumbents *today* to work themselves out of an unfavorable redistricting situation.[19]

For the future, therefore, the indirect strategy aimed at capture of the House through control of state legislatures seems a less productive use of party funds than directly aiding congressional candidates themselves. Similarly, state legislators might be advised to reconsider their longstanding unwillingness to establish bipartisan commissions with binding redistricting authority. Divesting themselves of the fading potential for achieving gerrymander gains may not be an unreasonable price to pay in order to avoid the squandering of time and frayed inter-party relations that so often have accompanied the redrawing of district lines.

References

Abramowitz, A. I. Partisan redistricting and the 1982 congressional elections. *Journal of Politics,* 1983, *45,* 767-770.

Ayres, Q. W., & Whiteman, D. Congressional reapportionment in the 1980s: Types and determinants of policy outcomes. Presented at the Annual Meeting

---

[19] For a similar argument, see Barone and Ujifusa (1982, p. xlii).

Table 6. Support Gained by Redistricted Incumbents in New Areas of Their Districts (County Level)

	Year Implemented						Averages		
	1952	1962	1966	1968	1972	1982	1952-1962	1966-1982	1952-1982
Regression Equations									
DIOP	−.089* (.018) .671	−.145* (.028) −.537	–	−.156* (.027) −.588	−.249* (.030) −.574	−.291* (.068) −.655	−.117	−.232	−.186
RIRI	−.058 (.030) −.364	−.033 (.024) −.114	−.059* (.017) −.417	−.091* (.042) −.241	−.082* (.026) −.193	−.112* (.031) −.281	−.046	−.086	−.073
RIDI	–	–	.035 (.022) .189	–	.057* (.027) .105	–	–	.046	.046
DIDI	−.114* (.027) −.819	−.017 (.023) −.074	–	−.157* (.032) −.397	−.189* (.029) −.414	−.197* (.042) −.336	−.066	−.181	−.135
DIRI	−.099* (.029) −.460	−.067* (.029) −.251	–	−.148* (.035) −.359	−.283* (.037) −.431	−.329* (.035) −.821	−.083	−.253	−.185
Constant	.046	.062	.015	.067	.260	.203	.054	.136	.109
R^2	.303	.408	.322	.587	.602	.723	.356	.559	.491
N	175	153	82	96	295	163			
Summary of regression equation results									
$-b_2$	.058	.033	.059	.091	.082	.112	.046	.086	.073
b_4-b_1	−.025	.128	–	−.001	.060	.094	.052	.051	.051
Average of									
$-b_2$ and b_4-b_1	.017	.081	.059	.045	.071	.103	.049	.070	.063
b_1-b_5	.010	−.078	–	−.008	.034	.038	−.034	.021	−.001
b_3	–	–	.035	–	.057	–	–	.046	.046
Average of									
b_1-b_5 and b_3	.010	−.078	.035	−.008	.046	.038	−.034	.028	.007

*Significant at the .05 level according to two-tail t-test.

Note: State dummy variable coefficients have been omitted to enhance readability of table. Entries appearing on first line of each row in presentation of regression equations are unstandardized regression coefficients and their associated standard errors (in parentheses); entries on second line are standardized regression coefficients. Equations have been estimated with OLS.

of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta, October 28-30, 1982.

Baker, G. E. Threading the political thicket by tracing the steps of the late Robert G. Dixon, Jr.: An appraisal and appreciation. In B. Grofman, A. Lijphart, R. B. McKay, and H. A. Scarrow (Eds.). *Representation and redistricting issues.* Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1982, pp. 21-34.

Barone, M., & Ujifusa, G. *The almanac of American politics 1982.* Washington, D.C.: Barone, 1981.

Buchanan, C. National GOP pushing hard to capture state legislatures. *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,* October 25, 1980, pp. 3188-3192.

Buchanan, C. State legislatures: Congressional redistricting at stake as Republicans fight to win increased influence. *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,* August 25, 1979, pp. 1751-1754.

Cain, B. E. Assessing the partisan effects of redistricting. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1-4, 1983.

Congressional mail: What is official business? *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,* April 28, 1973, pp. 1024-1026.

Congressional Quarterly. *Congressional districts in the 1980s.* Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1983.

Congressional Quarterly. *Congressional districts in the 1970s.* Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1973, 1975.

Congressional Quarterly. Massachusetts. In *State politics and redistricting,* Part 1. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1982, pp. 17-26.

Ehrenhalt, A. Incumbency insurance: The extended frank. *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,* June 19, 1982, p. 1499.

Elliott, W. E. Y. *The rise of guardian democracy: The Supreme Court's role in voting rights disputes, 1845-1969.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974.

Erikson, R. Malapportionment, gerrymandering, and party fortunes in congressional elections. *American Political Science Review,* 1972, *66,* 1234-1245.

Gopoian, J. D., & West, D. M. Trading security for seats: Strategic considerations in the redistricting process. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 11-15, 1984.

Grofman, B., & Scarrow, H. A. Current issues in reapportionment. *Law and Policy Quarterly,* 1982, *4,* 435-474.

Mayhew, D. R. Congressional representation: Theory and practice in drawing the districts. In N .W. Polsby (Ed.). *Reapportionment in the 1970s.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971, pp. 249-285.

Minnesota—one seat loss. *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,* December 22, 1961, pp. 1970-1973.

Noragon, J. L. Redistricting, political outcomes, and gerrymandering in the 1960s. *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences,* 1973, *219,* 314-333.

Redistricting in Texas, Minnesota, Oregon, Montana. *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,* August 6, 1971, pp. 1676-1679.

The Salem Gazette, November 19, 1802. Cited in E. C. Griffith, *The rise and development of the gerrymander.* Chicago: Scott, Foresman, 1907, p. 53.

Scarrow, H. A. Partisan gerrymandering—invidious or benevolent? *Gaffney v. Cummings* and its aftermath. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Cincinnati, April 15-18, 1981.

Sickels, R. J. Dragons, bacon strips and dumbbells—who's afraid of reapportionment? *Yale Law Journal,* 1966, *75,* 1300-1308.

Tufte, E. R. The relationship between seats and votes in two party systems. *American Political Science Review,* 1973, *67,* 540-554.

U.S. Congress, House. Remarks of Representative Henry U. Johnson. *Congressional Record* Appendix, vol. 25, 53rd Congress, 1st Session, September 28, 1893.

U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. *Congressional district data book (districts of the 88th Congress).* Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963.

U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. *Congressional district data: Districts of the 92nd Congress.* Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971.

U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. *Congressional district data book: 93rd Congress.* Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973.

Assessing the Partisan Effects of Redistricting

BRUCE E. CAIN
California Institute of Technology

The purpose of this article is to assess the reality behind the politician's perception that redistricting matters. There are, of course, many dimensions to that perception, because redistricting has many effects. This articles focuses on the impact of boundary changes on the partisan composition of seats. In order to do this, it will be necessary to specify what the expected partisan effects of redistricting are and how they can be measured. Thus, I first explain how the impact of redistricting will vary with the strategy of particular plans and then explore some techniques for measuring the partisan impact of boundary changes. I conclude with a detailed analysis of the most important congressional redistricting in 1982—the Burton plan in California.

Most politicians and political insiders believe that redistricting is politically crucial. Although boundary disputes are somewhat esoteric by the standards of normal political discourse, the potential for causing widespread political change by redesigning district lines is great. It is curious, therefore, that the political science evidence about redistricting effects is so undramatic. Early studies indicated that the first reapportionments after *Baker* v. *Carr* advantaged Democrats, especially in urban areas (Erikson, 1972). However, attempts to link boundary with policy changes uncovered nothing striking (Bicker, 1972; O'Rourke, 1980; Saffel, 1983). Other studies seemed to imply that the major effect of redistricting was to aid incumbents (Mayhew, 1971; Tufte, 1973), but to date there has been very little evidence in support of that thesis either (Bullock, 1975; Ferejohn, 1977). Could it be then that redistricting really does not have any important impact upon the political system?

The purpose of this article is to assess the reality behind the politician's perception that redistricting matters. There are, of course, many dimensions to that perception, because redistricting has many effects. This article focuses on the impact of boundary changes on the political control of districts. Since the impact of redistricting varies with the strategy of particular plans, I begin by specifying what the expected political effects of redistricting will be under different strategies, and how these effects can be measured. Then I explore some techniques for measuring the partisan impact of boundary changes and offer a detailed analysis of a major congressional redistricting plan—the 1981 remapping of the California seats.

A major theme of this article is that redistricting effects are tied closely to incumbency effects. Political scientists have for some time recognized the importance of incumbency in congressional races and the declining relevance of the voter's partisan identification. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that incumbency removal can be more important in determining who wins a redistricted seat than changes in district partisanship per se.

Predicting the Effects of Redistricting

One of the reasons that it has been so difficult to find any systematic or striking redistricting effects is that the types of redistrictings undertaken have varied significantly across states and periods of time. In particular, the way that a plan affects electoral outcomes depends upon the line drawers' strategy and the nature of the demographic constraints they face. As to the first, a redistricting plan can be either partisan or bipartisan in its impact. A partisan effect is one that favors a particular party (usually the majority) over the other, and a bipartisan one favors neither. To be sure, a redistricting plan will have other goals as well, such as the preservation of cities and the protection of minorities, but the political impact is the sole concern of this study.

It is also important to recognize that a plan's effect may be different from its intent. A nonpartisan commission might try to ignore partisan considerations, but any plan that it implements will have them nonetheless (Cain, 1984; Dixon, 1968).

Assume that the strategy of a plan is partisan and that the party controlling reapportionment is the one with a majority in both houses of the state legislature, how can the number of majority party seats be maximized, and what will the predicted pattern of changes be? A redistricting strategy has

Received: October 11, 1983
Revision received: April 9, 1984
Accepted for publication: October 3, 1984

two components: partisan reconstruction and incumbency removal. Partisan reconstruction is defined as changes in the balance of party identifiers in a given seat (often measured in terms of party registration in states where such information is available). The aim of partisan reconstruction in this instance is to maximize majority party seats by minimizing its electoral inefficiency to the extent demographically possible. The electoral inefficiency of a particular seat is defined as the amount of excess party support enjoyed by the winning candidate. If there is a registration level *r* that guarantees that a party will win almost any contest (within some reasonable range of candidate strength), then any level of strength above *r* is wasted. For example, if the Democrats can win any seat above 60% Democrat in registration, then a 70% seat is inefficient by 10 percentage points. From a partisan gerrymandering point of view, if that excess partisan strength could be traded to a 50% Democratic seat, then the party would have two sure seats instead of one. Classic examples of inefficiently distributed Democratic areas are inner-city minority seats and of inefficiently distributed Republican areas are white, upper-income suburban seats.

Leaving aside for the moment the demographic and bargaining constraints that might obstruct the construction of a partisan gerrymander, what pattern of territorial trades should be observed? To begin with, some number of previously inefficient majority party seats will acquire less favorable territory and experience a drop in partisan strength. To compensate, a certain number of marginal majority party seats will receive favorable areas and so increase their partisan strength. In short, there should be an inverse correlation between the previous level of partisan strength and the reapportionment gain for majority party incumbents.

Just the reverse should apply to minority party seats. The most marginal minority party seats should experience a loss in party strength, and the strongest should experience the gains. Minority party strength is in effect distributed as inefficiently as possible. Hence, the correlation between previous party strength and reapportionment gain should be positive for minority party incumbents.

The second part of a partisan plan is incumbent removal. One common form of this is to parcel the territory of a targeted incumbent into several districts in order to deny the natural advantages of incumbency such as higher name recognition and a good district reputation. By itself, this tactic will not usually be sufficient, since incumbents can use their franking privileges and resource advantages to mail into the new territory to make up some of the difference in the period before the election. Consequently, severe displacement is often used in tandem with partisan reconstruction to undercut party strength and incumbency advantage simultaneously. A more subtle but equally effective strategy is to use displacement to induce a minority party incumbent to give up a seat that could be won by the majority party in order to run for a neighboring seat that could not be won by the majority party. Some specific examples of this will be discussed later. A partisan plan will attempt to remove, or to induce the removal of, minority party incumbents from as many potentially winnable seats as possible.

The key then to the partisan gerrymander is that incumbents in the party controlling redistricting will be treated differently from those in the party that does not. The average level of electoral safety might actually increase more among incumbents in the noncontrolling party than among those in the controlling party, since greater safety is a by-product of higher electoral inefficiency. If one were to consider the average gain or loss of incumbents by party, one might mistakenly conclude that the noncontrolling party was better off. The point is that many of the individual incumbents in the noncontrolling party will be better off, but if the gerrymander is effective, the party as a whole will be worse off. Indeed, one of the great difficulties for leaders in the noncontrolling party during redistricting is to get individual incumbents to forsake their short-term self-interests (i.e., whether their particular districts are to their liking) for the interest of the party (i.e., whether the plan is good or bad for the party as a whole).

The bipartisan gerrymander is much simpler. In this case, neither party gains an advantage from reapportionment without the consent of the other. Whereas the goal of the partisan gerrymander is to make one party's support more electorally efficient than another's, the object of the bipartisan gerrymander is to protect incumbents in both parties—in short, to make the partisan strength of both parties inefficient wherever there is an incumbent (for this reason, it can also be called an incumbents' gerrymander). From the self-interested perspective of the incumbents, the bipartisan gerrymander has much appeal. Incumbents who want to get stronger will seek to dispose of their least desirable areas. Because one party's undesirables are usually the other's most loyal supporters, Democrats will trade Republicans to Republican incumbents, and Republicans will trade Democrats to Democratic incumbents. Because incumbents tend to be risk averse —no margin of safety is ever too much—the result is greater electoral inefficiency and more noncompetitive seats.

In the bipartisan gerrymander, no incumbent who wants to return will be forced, unless demographically necessary, to run against any other incumbent. Moreover, the pattern of incumbency removal should be unbiased. If incumbents must be removed for demographic reasons, the burden will be more or less evenly shared under a bipartisan plan.

The strategies of partisan and bipartisan plans as outlined will not necessarily be implemented as they are intended. Various considerations will compromise the best laid plans of reapportioning men. To start with, population needs will constrain the set of feasible trades. It will, for instance, be easier to make a trade when one of the two adjoining seats is overpopulated and the other underpopulated than it will be when both are overpopulated or underpopulated. Trades between seats with noncomplementary population needs only compound initial population deficits and surpluses and cause more difficult adjustment problems in the rest of the state. Secondly, although trades between members of different parties can often be complementary because both want the other's weakest areas, trades between members of the same party will often be conflictual because both will want each other's strongest areas. This means that some strong incumbents will resist sharing their "wealth" with weaker members of their own party, further distorting the logic of the plan. Finally, there are the idiosyncratic concerns of incumbents. Incumbents will in many instances forego the partisan advantages of trades in order to keep amusement parks, fund-raising locations, favorite donors, their residences, and the like in their districts. So even if partisan malice is in the hearts and minds of the line drawers, the pure patterns of the partisan and bipartisan gerrymanders will be blurred by the noise of bargaining and demographic constraints.

Measuring the Partisan Effects of Reapportionment

Having considered the expected patterns of change associated with various types of redistricting strategies, the question is whether or not it is possible to measure the specific effects of various plans in order to determine whether a given plan is partisan or bipartisan in its impact.[1] The tech-

---

[1] There are several alternative ways to measure the political effects of reapportionment. The simplest class of methods compare district registrations or vote totals before and after the territorial changes caused by redistricting. For example, in states where the registration figures are published, it is possible to determine whether and by what amount the Democratic or Republican registration increased:

$$r_{d,o} - r_{d,n} \tag{1}$$

where $r_{d,o}$ and $r_{d,n}$ are the Democratic registrations in the old and new districts

Another popular method is to take the vote totals for candidate *j* in the last election, subtract the votes *j* won in the areas *j* loses in reapportionment, and add the votes for candidate *k* who ran for the same legislative office in the same election in the areas that have been transferred from *k* to *j*:

$$v_{j,n} = v_{j,o} - v_{j,l} + v_{k,a} \tag{2}$$

where

$v_{j,n}$ is the predicted vote for candidate *j* in the new district

$v_{j,o}$ is the vote for candidate *j* in the old district

$v_{j,l}$ is the vote for candidate *j* in the lost areas

$v_{k,a}$ is the vote for candidate *k* in the newly added areas where candidates *j* and *k* ran for the same legislative office in different districts in some year before redistricting.

Finally, where the data are available, it is instructive to compare the totals received by some statewide candidate under the various proposed boundary changes.

$$v_{s,n} = v_{s,o} - v_{s,l} + v_{s,a} \tag{3}$$

where

$v_{s,n}$ is the vote received by a state wide candidate in the new district

o, *l* and *a* have the meanings previously defined.

All of these methods have their particular flaws, but more generally, the difficulty with this class of methods is that it does not fully and efficiently use all the available information. For instance, two districts with the same Democratic registrations might have different Republican or minority party registrations. Moreover, since redistricting affects incumbency status as well as the underlying partisan strength of a district, merely looking at the registration figures does not give an accurate estimate of the political impact of a proposed plan.

The second class of methods, therefore, tries to eliminate this flaw by utilizing a multivariate estimation procedure to combine several pieces of information. One such technique, for instance, is to develop an expected vote model in which a candidate's vote at time *t* is regressed on various demographic data and on a statewide candidate's vote. This technique yields a set of estimated parameters that can be multiplied by the post redistricting political and demographic data to yield new district totals:

$$v_p = a + \mathbf{B}Z_p + c_1 s_p + u \tag{4}$$

where

v_p is the vote for relevant district race in precinct *p*

B is a vector of coefficients

Z is a vector of demographic variables for precinct *p*

c_1 is a coefficient

s_p is the vote for a statewide candidate running in the same election in precinct *p*

u is the error term.

This is a particularly useful technique for redistricting nique developed for the present analysis is to try to estimate the probabilities of the Democrats and Republicans winning various seats, given information about changes in registration and incumbency status as a result of the plan. The model is thus:

$$Pr(v_j = 1) = F(a + BR_j + c_1 d + c_2 r) \qquad (5)$$

where

$Pr(v_j = 1)$ is the probability of a Democrat winning congressional seat j
R is a vector of registration data for various parties in seat j
d is a dummy for a Democratic incumbent in seat j
r is a dummy for a Republican incumbent in seat j
B is a vector of coefficients
c_1, c_2 are coefficients relating the incumbency dummies to the vote

The model is estimated with a probit procedure using the registration, incumbency, and outcome data from the 1980 election that preceded the 1981 reapportionment in California. The new registration and incumbency data resulting from the new boundaries are then inserted into the estimated equation, yielding probit scores that can be converted into probability estimates.[2]

The actual estimated parameters were as follows:

$$Pr(v_j = 1) = -9.43 + \underset{(.004)}{.016\,Demreg}$$
$$- \underset{(.083)}{.017\,Aipreg} + \underset{(.036)}{.007\,Libreg} - \underset{(.136)}{.045\,Pfreg}$$
$$+ \underset{(.012)}{.015\,Dec} + \underset{(.460)}{.822\,Dinc} - \underset{(.55)}{1.60\,Rinc} \qquad (6)$$
$$R^2 = .83 \qquad \text{Chi square} = 32$$

where

Demreg is the percentage Democratic registration
Aipreg is the percentage American Independent party registration
Libreg is the percentage Libertarian party registration
Pfreg is the Peace and Freedom party registration
Dec is the Decline to State (i.e., Independent)
Dinc is the dummy for Democratic incumbent
Rinc is the dummy for Republican incumbent.

The signs of the estimated coefficients on the incumbency and Democratic registration variables are significant and in the proper direction. The minor party coefficients are not, but are left in since they improve the fit marginally. The purpose of this model is predictive and not structural. Clearly, the large estimated incumbency effect is picking up a variety of phenomena related to holding office—for example, spending advantages and resource advantages. The point is to show what the effects of partisan reconstruction and incumbency removal are, not to show the causal routes that lead from incumbency or registration to electoral advantage. The equation is in this sense the most parsimonious reduced form.

The pre-redistricting probabilities referred to in the ensuing discussions are obtained from these estimated parameters by inserting the pre-redistricting registration and incumbency data into the model, taking the predicted score and converting it into a probability number. The post-redistricting probabilities are obtained in the same way using the same estimated parameters and the post-redistricting registration and incumbency data.

Assessing the Burton Plan

The 1981 California congressional redistricting was one of the most important and controversial redistricting plans in the country. Its significance lies partly in the size of the California congressional delegation, which grew in 1982 from 43 to 45, but also in the intense partisan battle it

---

negotiations because it tells an incumbent how he or she specifically would have run in the proposed new district in an election at time *t*. However, its advantage as a bargaining tool is also its liability as a method for analyzing the general partisan impact of a plan: it is highly candidate specific in its predictions and does not provide a convenient basis for comparing results in open seats with results in seats with incumbents.

[2] The virtue of this model is that it provides a nice, out-of-sample predictive procedure for assessing the political effects of a redistricting plan. Its chief limitation is that it cannot measure the effect of displacement upon incumbency. In other words, incumbents who acquire a lot of new territory might have less incumbency advantage than the fortunate few who retain their old seats intact. To estimate gradations in the incumbency advantage would require abandoning the out-of-sample framework. As it was, only one incumbent who ran for reelection in 1982 lost his seat (Clausen), and his displacement was not great. The primary displacement effect is on the cost of reelection, since its electoral significance is mitigated by the incumbent's ability to mail into and get acquainted with the new areas a full year before the election. In the model as specified, displacement and the removal of the incumbent's home are part of an implicit equation that influences the incumbent's decision to run for a given seat.

touched off. The plan was authorized by Phil Burton with the technical assistance of Michael Berman—a brother of an assemblyman who won one of the newly created Los Angeles congressional seats in 1982—and Leroy Hardy, a political scientist at Long Beach State who had worked on redistrictings since the sixties. The California delegation had been split 22-21 after the 1980 election and before the redistricting. In 1982, the Democrats held 28 seats and the Republicans held 17, a dramatic shift in power that many Republicans attributed to redistricting. This plan—Burton I—was subsequently rejected by the voters in a Republican sponsored referendum and was replaced in 1982 with a new plan—Burton II. My remarks are directed solely to the now-defunct Burton I plan.

I examine this plan utilizing the framework of expectations discussed earlier to test whether it had the pattern of a partisan strategy. Applying those propositions to California, we get the following:

1) Some number of marginal Democratic seats should have been strengthened.
2) Some number of marginal Republicans should have been weakened.
3) Some number of strong Democrats should have been weakened to assist marginal Democrats.
4) Some number of strong Republicans should have been made even stronger.

The question is, do these expected patterns appear in the data? The evidence for these patterns will consist of 1) simple registration data, 2) the estimated probabilities of a Democrat winning the seat under the assumption that all the seats are open, and 3) the estimated probabilities given information about which incumbents actually ran in 1982 and which seats were open.

The first sign of a partisan plan is that some number of marginal seats in the controlling party should have been strengthened. Table 1 shows the four Democratic incumbents who gained the most from the Burton plan. The first is Phil Burton's brother, John, who represented a district in Marin and areas to the north of San Francisco. Burton had received a strong challenge in the 1980 election and the 52.5% registration in his district was by California standards marginal for a Democrat. Typically, the seats with the highest probability of changing hands fall into the 50 to 55% Democratic registration category, and so it was clear that without assistance, Burton's district would remain marginal throughout the eighties. The solution to Burton's electoral insecurity was a highly controversial district that meandered from Vallejo in Solano County, across the water to Marin, through a narrow corridor on the east side of the San Francisco County, and down into Daly City in San Mateo County. This, more than any of Burton's other districts, brought a great deal of criticism from the press and the public.

The effect of this contorted district was to increase Burton's Democratic registration by about five points to 57.5%. The estimated probability of a Democrat winning John Burton's 5th district in an open race was 83% in 1980. After reapportionment, it was 91%. Adding in the effect of incumbency, the model projects that John Burton, had he run for reelection, would have been elected with a 99% probability, up three points from 1980.

As said before, it is important to note the importance of an incumbent running, a fact that has been much heralded in recent political science research. This analysis clearly shows that the displacement of incumbents is even more important to the outcome of the first post-redistricting election than are any changes in the underlying partisan composition caused by redistricting. (This is quite evident from the size of the estimated coefficients in Table 6.) Democratic incumbency is "worth" an additional 51% Democratic registration (.822/.016), whereas Republican incumbency has the advantage equivalent to a 100% shift in registration (-1.60/.016). The value of incumbency, particularly to Republicans, is clearly enormous.

Many of the changes made in John Burton's seat in 1981 were taken back in 1982. The 1981 plan was rejected by the voters in a June, 1982 referendum, and new lines were redrawn in December. When John Burton chose not to contest the seat in 1982, it was won by Barbara Boxer. In the subsequent redistricting, Boxer's district was neatly shaped into a more marginal seat.

The only other Democrat to receive a boost in 1981 comparable to John Burton's 5th district was George Brown's 36th district. The Mineta and Panetta seats, by comparison, got almost trivial increases that really did not improve their marginal status much. So one can say that in two instances primarily, marginal Democrats were strengthened by the redistricting plan, whereas in the other instances, including some that are not included in this table, the changes were insignificant and did not change the status of the seat.

The second expectation of a partisan plan is that some number of marginal noncontrolling party incumbents—in this case, Republicans—should have been partisanly weakened by the redistricting plan, which appears to be where the Burton plan had its major effect. In several instances, the strategy followed was more subtle than a straight collapse of the Republican incumbent's seat. Rather, the best Democratic portions

Table 1. California Democratic Incumbents Who Benefitted the Most from 1981 Reapportionment (%)

Congressional District	Incumbent	Registration 1980	Registration 1982	Probability Open 1980	Probability Open 1982	Probability Democratic Incumbent 1980	Probability Democratic Incumbent 1982
5th	Burton	52.5	57.5	83	91	96	99
36th	Brown	51.4	57.7	73	81	92	95
13th	Mineta	49.7	51.5	48	63	78	87
16th	Panetta	49.2	50.0	39	48	71	78

were retained in the old district while the most Republican areas were used to create a new seat for the Republican incumbent. By inducing the Republican incumbent to run for the new seat, Burton was able to create an open seat with favorable registration for the Democrats. This was essentially the procedure used in the Hunter and Feidler seats. Both of these incumbents were sitting in seats with dangerously high Democratic registrations, and so it did not take a great deal of inducement—for example, putting their house in the new district—to get them to move into the safer seat. A glance at Table 2 shows that the partisan composition changed slightly in the case of the old Hunter seat and negatively in the case of the old Feidler seat: the key to winning both seats was the removal of the incumbent, which, as the data show, dramatically altered the chances of a Democrat winning in both instances.

The old Dornan seat is a good example of a district created by both partisan reconstruction and incumbent removal. Dornan, the Republican incumbent, did not have to be given an alternative seat to run in, because he had declared himself a candidate for statewide office. Since the seat was strengthened by 9 points in registration and no longer had an incumbent, it changed from one in which the Democrat had a 1% chance of winning to one in which he or she had a 95% chance. The old Rousselot seat was also dismantled, and he was given no alternative open seat to run in. Portions of his old district were parceled off to various surrounding Republicans, but none of the portions was sufficiently large to give Rousselot a base from which to run. The largest overlap between his old district and the Burton-created districts was the highly Hispanic 33rd, previously represented by George Danielson and then by Marty Martinez after a special election in July, 1982. Rousselot chose to contest the Democrat, Martinez, as a nonincumbent rather than face his Republican colleagues in an expensive primary, and was defeated in the November, 1982 election (Cain & Kiewiet, 1984).

The other two gains by the Democrats in 1982 did not involve the weakening of Republican seats. The 18th congressional district was a newly created central valley district made possible by the allocation of two new districts to California and the rapid population growth in that area. As Table 2 shows, the Clausen seat did not change much in the redistricting plan, and the gain by the Democrats seems to have been the result of the challenger's strength and popularity in the area. So five of the six gains appear to have been reapportionment related, and four of those five involved the forced or induced removal of Republican incumbents.

Although certain Democratic incumbents benefited from the redistricting in 1981, not all of them

Table 2. Gains by Democrats in Congress (%)

Congressional District	Incumbent 1980	Registration 1980	Registration 1982	Probability Open 1980	Probability Open 1982	Probability Incumbent Republican 1980	Probability Incumbent Democratic 1982
2nd	Clausen	51.6	51.2	54	53	7	81
34th	Rousselot	44.8	65.1	8	96	0	99
18th	New Seat	–	61.3	–	87	–	98
44th	Hunter	54.9	58.0	80	91	23	98
26th	Fiedler/Goldwater	60.3	59.3	85	82	28	96
27th	Dornan	46.8	55.9	25	79	1	95

did. In particular, a few had to give up prime areas or had to take unfavorable areas because they were underpopulated. As a result, some Democrats were made worse off by the Burton plan, including Phil Burton himself. Burton's seat, the 6th, gave up some of the "best" areas in San Francisco County to help boost his brother's seat. Indeed, when the Republicans ran a popular moderate Republican state senator against him in the November, 1982 election, there was an enormous amount of speculation in the California press that Burton might have been too cute and left himself vulnerable to a challenge. My model indicates otherwise. The probability of Burton losing was unaffected by redistricting. Given that the seat had a 62.8% Democratic registration, a large, liberal Independent vote and a well-known incumbent, the sacrifice that he made was by no means extravagant.

In fact, one of the most striking things about Table 3 is the high degree of electoral security enjoyed by all the Democratic "martyrs." All had Democratic registrations above 55%, and with the added advantage of incumbency, they all had a greater than a 95% chance of being reelected even after their districts were altered. Nonetheless, redistricting did affect the result in these seats in the subsequent election. Even though 1982 was a more favorable year for Democrats than 1980, all of them suffered a drop in their margin of victory.

The partisan reconstruction of these seats (holding constant the incumbency status) can be viewed in the aggregate as they are in Figures 1 and 2. The vertical axis of these charts shows the computed probability of a Democrat winning the seat in an open race in 1982 and the horizontal axis shows the corresponding probability in 1980. The line at the 45-degree angle indicates points of no change: that is, where the probabilities in 1980 and 1982 were the same. Points above the line indicate seats that were made more Democratic by redistricting and those below it were made less Democratic. The data are stratified by the party of the incumbent in 1980 so that Figure 1 displays the data for the Democratic seats and Figure 2 the data for Republican seats.

Translating the expectations of a partisan plan as discussed earlier into predicted points on the graph, the pattern in the Democratic seats should be that: 1) some points in the upper right-hand corner, representing the safest Democratic seats in 1980, should fall below the line since they are sharing their partisan wealth in the interests of greater Democratic efficiency; 2) some points in the lower left-hand corner, representing the most marginal Democratic seats, should fall above the line because they would be the natural beneficiaries of Burton's largesse; and 3) most incumbents should stay pretty close to the line because demographic, bargaining, and geographical constraints put severe limits on partisan efficiency. A perusal of Figure 1 would seem to confirm our expectations. The four points furthest above the lines are those discussed in Table 1.

Figure 2 is no less revealing. Once again, our expectations are that: 1) some number of points in the upper right-hand corner, representing the most marginal Republicans, should fall above the line because they are the natural candidates for partisan conversion; 2) some number of those in the lower left-hand corner should fall below the line because the Democrats would like them to be as inefficiently strong as possible; and 3) most points, once again, should cluster fairly close to the line because of demographic, bargaining, and geographical constraints. The data do not conform quite as closely in Figure 2 as they do in Figure 1. To begin with, the three points above the line are scattered across the horizontal axis, implying that the Democrats did not simply target the weakest seats. However, the reader should note that all the points above the 51% category on the vertical axis were won by the Democrats, including all but one of the points to the right of the 51% category on the horizontal axis. In short, the

Table 3. The Democratic "Martyrs" (%)

		Registration		Probability				Margin	
				Open		Democratic Incumbent			
	Incumbent	1980	1982	1980	1982	1980	1982	1980	1982
30th	Danielson/ Martinez	69.8	62.8	99	93	100	99	48	8
4th	Fazio	58.5	56.1	86	79	97	95	44	28
6th	Burton	62.8	60.7	99	97	100	100	44	18
23rd	Beilenson	59.6	57.1	88	79	98	95	32	20
32nd	Anderson	62.2	60.3	92	87	99	97	35	18

Figure 1. Changes in Democratic Seats (Congress)



Democrats won all the marginal seats even without changing the composition of some. The reason, which will be seen even more graphically in a moment, is that the Democrats made effective use of incumbent displacement: that is, they kept the registration the same, but moved the incumbent out in order to open up the seat. The three seats that fall above the line in Figure 2 are the Hunter (extreme right), Dornan (middle), and Rousselot (extreme left) seats.

The increased inefficiency of the Republican seats as a result of Burton I is evident in the cluster of points below the line in the lower left-hand corner. These are seats that are already strongly Republican and are made even more so by the plan. Notice also that the deviations from the line are somewhat larger, reflecting the likelihood that Burton felt more constrained by the wishes of his fellow Democrats than by those of the Republicans. This can be taken as support for the position I have argued elsewhere that the risk averse, idiosyncratic preferences of legislators form a moderating influence on partisan designs (Cain, 1984). One suspects that because Burton felt a greater need to accommodate the Democratic incumbents, this inertial force minimized changes in their districts to some degree.

Reapportionment and Electoral Competition

There has been a great deal of academic and popular discussion in recent years about the decline of competition in congressional races (Ferejohn, 1977; Fiorina, 1977a, b; Mayhew, 1974). One particular aspect of this debate is whether redistricting has contributed to the decline of competition in congressional races. Ferejohn and others have expressed doubts about this, and as the hypothesis is stated, these doubts are correct. If the question is whether all incumbents are indiscriminately aided by reapportionment, the answer is, not in all states, and maybe not all incumbents in any state. Not in all states, because some states will have more partisan plans than others; not all incumbents, because geographical, personal, and idiosyncratic considerations will sometimes be more important. However, the hypothesis that reapportionment affects electoral competition may still be accurate in the sense that how it affects electoral competition will vary with the intent of the plan as well as the degree to which geographical, personal, and idiosyncratic considerations introduce random noise into the final outcome.

Reapportionment affects electoral competition in two ways. First, it helps to determine the odds of a Democrat or Republican winning by restructuring the underlying partisan composition of a seat (i.e., partisan reconstruction). Second, it affects the incumbency factor by removing or keeping incumbents in their territory. The model developed earlier can be used to illustrate both of these effects separately and conjointly. Much of the dialogue about the decline of competition begins with the so-called Mayhew diagrams, which are histograms that display the electoral

Figure 2. Changes in Republican Seats (Congress)



Figure 3. Comparison of Congressional Seats Before and After Reapportionment (Open)



margins of incumbents at various intervals during the postwar period. A variant of this idea is to create a histogram of the estimated probabilities from the probit model and show what happens to electoral competition at various stages in the reapportionment process. This of course leaves unanswered questions about the duration of reapportionment effects and the role that it may have played in the overall trend toward declining competition, but it does at least give us a glimpse of the immediate impact in one state at one period of time.

First, consider the impact of partisan reconstruction. Redistricting changes the competitiveness of seats by increasing the Democratic registration in seats that lean Democratic and the Republican registration in seats that lean Republican. Figure 3 shows the effect of the Burton I on all 45 seats under the assumption that no incumbents would be allowed to run. As the figure demonstrates, the consequence is some visible shrinking of the distribution in the middle. However, the results are not dramatic. There are still some seats left in the most competitive range and the rest are not simply bunched on the ends. Geographic constraints—for example, not being able to use inefficient inner-city Democratic strength to help out weaker Democratic seats in the rural and suburban areas—and the desire of incumbents to minimize displacement—that is, the acquisition of new constituents and the loss of former ones—explains why we do not observe more radical partisan reconstruction.

What about the separate effect of removing the incumbent? This is shown in Figure 4, which compares the distribution of seat safety in 1980 under the assumption that the seats were all open and versus the assumption that all incumbents ran. Here the effect of incumbency on the distribution in the most competitive, middle range is striking. Large numbers of seats cluster on the ends of the distribution, and no seats fall in the 50% range. Of course the reader should bear in mind that the model assumes the average incumbent, whereas in reality there will be enormous variation in the strength of both the incumbent and challenger. To some extent, this may be better modeled with campaign expenditure data, but the quality of the candidates will in any case remain difficult to capture.

The next three figures show the progression of changes in the distribution brought about by redistricting, including both incumbency removal and partisan reconstruction. Figure 5 compares the distribution of seat safety right after the 1980 election and then after the 1981 reapportionment. The post-reapportionment distribution assumes that the incumbents who held the seats in 1980 would run in what most closely approximated their old seat in 1982. Thus, for example, it was assumed that Dornan would run again in the 27th. Even with this strong assumption, the distribution has been changed some by movement to the extremes on both sides of the distribution. However, as was discussed before, the redistricting plan induced some incumbents to abandon their old seats to run for new ones and caused others to lose in the November election. With the new incumbents in place, the situation displayed in Figure 6 shows the almost perfect inefficiency of the Republicans. Even though the Democrats were less clumped on the end of the distribution, only a few of their seats were left in the 75% to 90% area. In short, most incumbents in both parties are in safe positions, but the Democrats are somewhat less inefficiently distributed than the Republicans.

What then has been the total change from 1980 to 1982? The last figure compares the two distributions. The answer would appear to be that

Figure 4. Distribution of Congressional Seats With and Without Incumbents



Figure 5.



the combination of partisan reconstruction and the artful removal of inconveniently placed incumbents can alter the seat distribution and make the majority party more efficiently distributed than the minority party. In the case of California, it was enough to help swing five seats to the Democrats.

Conclusion

Are the partisan effects of redistricting important? The answer would seem to be that they are. By changing the partisan composition in a district and removing or retaining the incumbent's base, a reapportionment plan can alter the odds of a party winning a particular seat. The key to a partisan plan is not simply increasing the average margin of victory or even the underlying partisan strength of all majority party legislators. Rather, the key is increasing the efficiency of majority party strength, which will mean a redistribution of electoral strength for the purpose of maximizing the number of winnable seats. Some majority incumbents will get stronger and others weaker in inverse relation to their initial vulnerability. Simply looking at the average registration or vote margin may be misleading.

A second conclusion from this research is that a proper assessment of the partisan effects of redistricting cannot overlook its impact on incumbency. To be sure, the post-redistricting election will introduce a new set of incumbents who will presumably also enjoy the electoral advantages of holding office. However, the temporary scrambling of incumbents can have momentous importance for the election that follows the redistricting. This should not be too surprising to political scientists since it seems logical that in an era when party loyalty counts for less and incumbency counts for more, redistricting tactics should include incumbent considerations. Indeed, if recent trends toward independence from the parties continue, redistrictings in the future could come to focus more on displacement issues and less on the partisan makeup of districts.

References

Bicker, W. The effects of malapportionment in the states: A mistrial. In N. Polsby (Ed.). *Reapportionment in the 1970's.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971.

Bullock, C. Redistricting and congressional stability, 1962-72. *Journal of Politics,* 1975, *37,* 569-575.

Cain, B. E. *The reapportionment puzzle.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.

Cain, B. E., & Kiewiet, D. R. Ethnicity and electoral choice: Mexican-American voting behavior in the California 30th congressional district. *Social Science Quarterly,* 1984, *65,* 315-327.

Dixon, R. G., Jr. *Democratic representation and reapportionment in law and politics.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1968.

Erikson, R. Malapportionment, gerrymandering and party fortunes in congressional elections. *American Political Science Review,* 1972, *66,* 1234-1245.

Ferejohn, J. The decline of competition in congressional elections. *American Political Science Review,* 1977, *71,* 166-176.

Fiorina, M. *Congress: Keystone of the Washington establishment.* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977.

Fiorina, M. The case of the vanishing marginals: The bureaucracy did it. *American Political Science Review,* 1977, 71, 177-181.

Mayhew, D. Congressional elections—the case of the vanishing marginals. *Polity,* 1974, *6,* 295-317.

Mayhew, D. Congressional representation: Theory and practice in drawing the districts. In N. Polsby (Ed.). *Reapportionment in the seventies.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971.

O'Rourke, T. C. *The impact of reapportionment.* New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1980.

Saffel, D. The policy consequences of reapportionment. In B. Grofman, R. McKay, & H. Scarrow (Eds.). *Representation and redistricting issues in the 1980's.* Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982.

Tufte, E. R. The relationship between seats and votes in two-party systems. *American Political Science Review,* 1973, *67,* 540-554.

Figure 6.



Figure 7. Comparison of Congressional Seats



Promise and Performance
A Dynamic Model of Presidential Popularity

CHARLES W. OSTROM, JR.
Michigan State University

DENNIS M. SIMON
University of Minnesota

The growth of public opinion measurement in the last 40 years has added a new dimension to the study of presidential behavior. Not only have public evaluations become more newsworthy, but the importance of public support as a resource and determinant of political survival has been enhanced. Recent scholarship on the presidency has documented the value of public support, attempted to identify its major determinants, and speculated about the manner in which presidents might influence these evaluations.

This research is designed to integrate these concerns into a single model and thereby to examine the interdependence between public support as a product of citizen decisions and as a political resource. First, a characterization of the citizen as an evaluator of the president is developed and used to construct an equation of presidential approval. Next, we develop an equation that explains presidential effectiveness in the legislative arena and illustrates the operation of public support as a presidential resource. The public support and legislative effectiveness equations are specified as a simultaneous equation system, estimated, and evaluated. The results of the model are then used to expand the conventional wisdom about the determinants of public support, to examine the consequences of the reciprocal relationship between public support and legislative success, and to generate ex post forecasts of President Reagan's support from 1981 through 1983.

Unlike their predecessors, occupants of the Oval Office since Eisenhower have been subject to almost continuous evaluation via the public opinion poll. Between 1953 and 1980 the Gallup organization has posed the following general performance question to cross-sections of the American public 538 times: "Do you approve or disapprove of the way (*name of the incumbent*) is handling his job as president?" The average number of such Gallup presidential performance polls has grown from 12 per year during the Eisenhower administration to roughly 24 per year during the Carter presidency.[1]

Analyses of public support (e.g., Mueller, 1970; Stimson, 1976) have shown that there is an unmistakable pattern in these evaluations. With the exception of the Eisenhower administration, public support has declined regularly over the course of a presidential term. This pattern of erosion has received substantial attention and comment in the literature on presidential government. The expectation that public support will decline over the course of the term is strongly emphasized in textbook descriptions of the president and public opinion (e.g., Cronin, 1980, pp. 15-16), employed as a basic premise in analyses of presidential policy making (e.g., Light, 1982), and cited as evidence that the demands and problems facing the president have grown increasingly complex and unmanageable (e.g., Cronin, 1980; Hodgson, 1980). In sum, the decline in public support has become an integral part of the conventional wisdom about modern presidential government.

The acceptance of inevitable erosion into the conventional wisdom raises a serious question about the vitality of the institution. Must a president be a passive observer of his declining support

---

Received: November 18, 1982
Revision received: April 12, 1983
Accepted for publication: December 8, 1984

We wish to thank Kriss Ostrom for clarifying our thinking about presidential popularity and for making our writing more coherent. We also wish to thank Paul Abramson, John Aldrich, David Rohde, Peter Paluch, Robin Marra, and John Williams. Finally, we would like to acknowledge our immense debt to three reviewers who—over the course of two years—provided encouragement and numerous helpful criticisms and suggestions.

[1] These and all subsequent references to Gallup Poll results have been gathered from the *Gallup Opinion Index* (1-183) and the three-volume anthology entitled *The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935-1971*. The Gallup question was asked from 1938 to 1952 as well. We have chosen to ignore this period because the question was asked less frequently (averaging approximately five times per year).

or can he, through the prerogatives at his disposal, influence his public standing? If not, a fundamental question arises about a president's ability to lead or influence public opinion. In order to investigate this question, this article seeks to bring together four heretofore separate research questions.

The first pertains to the value of public support. Research has shown that public support exerts a substantial impact on 1) the results of both congressional (e.g., Kernell, 1977; Tufte, 1975) and presidential elections (e.g., Abramson, Aldrich, & Rohde, 1982), 2) the willingness of legislators to support presidential policy initiatives (Edwards, 1980; Rivers & Rose, 1981), and 3) the congressional response to presidential vetoes (Rohde & Simon, 1983). These results underlie the more general conclusion that public support is central to the day-to-day operations of the presidency. In effect, the opinion polls provide a relatively continuous referendum on the president and thereby determine his current power situation As Hodgson (1980, pp. 210-211) argues, the president's standing in the "perpetual election" provides one piece of information that shapes the perceptions of those decision makers who are potential targets of presidential persuasion. Public support thus provides an indication of whether "it is wise or foolish to resist presidential persuasion" (Brody & Page, 1975, p. 136). In short, the need for public support never abates. This creates an incentive for the president to manage public support and thereby maintain the influence necessary to achieve the objectives of his administration.

The second research concern pertains to the determinants of public support. This literature (e.g., Brody & Page, 1975; Hibbs, 1982a, b; Kernell, 1978; MacKuen, 1983; Mueller, 1970; Stimson, 1976) offers several plausible explanations for the aggregate pattern in public support and demonstrates that declines in support are, in part, tied to the environment. This suggests that a president can influence his standing to the extent he is able to affect the salient environmental events and conditions. As such, these events and conditions constitute levers which, if pulled at the appropriate time, can influence popular support.

Underlying the consensus on this general point, however, is considerable disagreement. One point of contention focuses on the relative importance of environmental events and conditions. Throughout the historical development of the literature, energies have typically been directed to specifying and assessing the impact of the economy on public support (e.g., Hibbs & Fassbender, 1981; Kenski, 1977a, b; Monroe, 1981). This research stresses, either implicitly or explicitly, that the economy constitutes the most important influence on public support. Others, however, have focused more closely on the impact of events (e.g., Brody, 1983; Brody & Page, 1975; Haight & Brody, 1977) and recent results (e.g., MacKuen, 1983) suggest a relative equality between the economy and political events. Because there is substantial disparity in the ease with which these levers can be manipulated (e.g., Ostrom & Simon, 1984), this issue is vital to understanding whether and how presidents can influence their public standing.

An even more fundamental and elusive issue concerns the characterization of the citizen-as-evaluator. Existing approaches appear to fall into two camps. There are analyses that are firmly anchored in the rational choice tradition. Citizens are assumed to be purposive actors who continuously monitor the environment, draw fine distinctions, and possess substantial political memories (e.g., Hibbs, 1982a, b). Other analyses proceed in the tradition of cognitive psychology and reject the rational choice characterization of the citizen. Such explanations generally rest on the premises that citizens regard politics as a distant concern and thus are seldom motivated to gather information or to monitor presidential behavior. They stress that evaluations of presidential performance may be rather visceral reactions (Stimson, 1976), largely symbolic in nature (MacKuen, 1983), and based upon limited and cheaply acquired information (Brody & Page, 1975). As with the issue of the economy versus events, the characterization of the citizen-as-evaluator is critical to the question of presidential influence on popular support. Essentially, the manner in which citizens acquire information about the environment and react to these stimuli will determine the effectiveness of presidential "pulls" on the levers.

The third research concern focuses on the ability of presidents to pull the levers. Its genesis is based upon the assertion, first articulated by Neustadt (1980), that the existing level of public support will determine a president's ability to influence other decision makers, the political environment, and therefore his future levels of support. This observation introduces the possibility of a *reciprocal* relationship between public support and some of its determinants and suggests that a president's ability to influence the conditions that determine his public support will depend upon his current resource level (Ostrom & Simon, 1984). This reciprocal relationship implies that an ability to influence public support is a necessity; without it, a president may be confronted by a vicious circle of eroding public support and declining influence over both decision makers and the environment which in turn may lead to institutional deadlock, ineffective policy making, and ultimately to the throwaway president (Greenstein, 1982).

The fourth research concern focuses on the generalizability of the causes of presidential approval. Existing research has utilized a number of factors unrelated to the environment to explain the individual character of presidential support ranging from separate intercepts (e.g., Mueller, 1970) to separate coefficients for one or more variables (e.g., MacKuen, 1983). Although this special tailoring enhances the empirical support for a given model in the sample period, it undermines the ability of the models to forecast into nonsample (e.g., future) periods. Lacking this ability, it is difficult to use the model to formulate general principles about popular support.

In sum, prior research on the presidency has at least implicitly identified the potential levers of influence, established a motive for using the levers, and speculated about the president's ability to use them. The objective of this article is to integrate these concerns into a single model and thereby to examine the nature of the interdependence between public support as a product of citizen decisions and as a presidential resource. We pursue this objective in five steps. First, a characterization of the citizen-as-evaluator is developed and used to specify a public support equation. Second, we formulate an equation that explains presidential effectiveness in the legislative arena and thus illustrates the operation of public support as a resource. Third, the support and effectiveness equations will be specified as a simultaneous equation system, estimated, and evaluated. Fourth, the estimates will be used to draw conclusions about the capacity of a president to influence public support and the likelihood of vicious circles. Finally, the model will be used to forecast the popular support of President Reagan from 1981 through 1983.

Citizen Evaluations of Presidential Performance

The model of the citizen-as-evaluator is based upon the assumption that citizens evaluate the president in light of their own preferences and that such decisions are a function of a comparison between expected and actual presidential performance.

Public Expectations

To begin, we assume that there exists a set of public expectations that identify those outcomes in the environment that are used to evaluate presidential performance and serve as standards for assessing the quality of the outcomes. These expectations can be arrayed as a J-dimensional vector

$$O^e_{it} = (o_{i1t}, \ldots, o_{ijt}, \ldots o_{iJt}) \qquad (1)$$

such that O^e_{it} represents the preferred outcome of citizen i on dimension j at time t. Thus, these expectations are analogous to ideal points (e.g., Davis, Hinich, & Ordeshook, 1970; Riker & Ordeshook, 1973) and summarize the standards that citizens will employ in assessing presidential performance.

Both the genesis and substance of these standards revolves about the fundamental distinction between institution-based and occupant-based expectations. First of all, there are particular expectations that are directed not at the specific occupant of the White House but rather toward the institution of the presidency itself. More specifically, all presidents are expected to maintain peace, prosperity, domestic tranquility, and both the authority and integrity of the office itself. Regardless of the president's stated philosophy, party identification, or prior experience, these institution-based expectations are imposed by the public because it is believed that the office provides *any* president with the necessary means to ensure that these desirable conditions are maintained. Thus, institution-based expectations are constant and cannot be altered by a president. In this sense these expectations are imposed as the givens of presidential politics.

Presidents themselves create the second type of performance expectations. These occupant-based expectations are initially formed during a specific incumbent's campaign for office. It is during the campaign that a preliminary agenda for action is put forth; attention and debate are directed toward particular problems, and alternative proposals for solving these problems are presented. Aside from their value as political currency for attracting votes, a candidate's selection of issues and stated positions on these issues lead the public to expect certain policies from the president-elect. In this manner, the winning candidate assumes office with a number of specific policy commitments. The campaign is but a point of departure and, over the course of a term, this initial agenda is likely to be clarified and revised. In contrast to institution-based expectations, then, occupant-based expectations are variable; their substantive content will vary across specific presidents as well as the arena in which each pressident chooses to act. In general, however, a president will be evaluated according to what he sets out to do and his effectiveness in accomplishing these tasks.

Presidentially Relevant Outcomes

Each month a tremendous amount of information that might be associated with a president's performance is reported by the national media.

This information covers a wide range of circumstances that can be referred to as outcomes. These outcomes can be divided into two sets on the basis of whether or not they are relevant to citizen evaluations of the president. The presidentially relevant outcome (PRO) set consists of all the outcomes associated with either type of citizen expectation; as such, there is a shared public perception that the president is at least partially responsible for (or has some control over) the outcome (for a similar argument, see Brody & Page, 1975, p. 141). These expectations, in effect, operate as filters, which allow citizens to simplify the rather complex political environment surrounding the president. In this sense, each PRO represents a promise upon which the president's performance may be monitored. To represent this component of the calculus, let

$$O_t = (o_{1t}, \ldots, o_{jt}, \ldots, o_{Jt}) \qquad (2)$$

denote the outcomes that prevail on the J performance dimensions at time t.

Both the outcomes and their associated expectations can be further divided on the basis of their domain, or the arena of presidential government to which they apply. This distinction focuses upon whether an outcome occurs in the international (e.g., peace), domestic (e.g., prosperity), or personal (e.g., integrity) realm of politics. From the standpoint of how a president might influence public support, this distinction is critical. Research on the presidency has convincingly argued, for example, that the prerogatives of the president in international politics differ from those in the domestic realm (Cronin, 1980; Wildavsky, 1966). Additionally, the personal realm is important because the office provides a president with a variety of symbolic mechanisms that might be used to enhance the perception of his authority or the integrity of his actions.

Given these definitions, the environmental events and conditions that prevail at time t can be equated with either the satisfaction of expectations or with a perceived deviation from what is expected. The magnitude of the discrepancy is given by the difference between the O^e_{it} and O_t vectors.

Citizen Awareness and Concern

Next, it is assumed that citizens are cybernetic decision makers. In this regard we depart from the conventional rational choice approach, which depicts the citizen as equally aware and constantly monitoring the outcomes on all performance dimensions. Instead, we argue that a given performance dimension will enter into the calculus of support only if there is some reason for citizens to notice it (e.g., substantial deviations from expectations, a sudden and dramatic change in an outcome, growing media coverage of the dimension, presidential efforts to focus attention on the dimension). Further, this observation implies that the degree of citizen awareness and concern may vary across the J performance dimensions. To capture these notions, define N_{it} as a $1 \times J$ vector which summarizes the degree of awareness and relative concern of citizen i with the J performance dimensions at time t.

Given these raw materials of choice, it is then assumed that citizen decisions are a function of the valuations attached to the weighted discrepancy between expectation and performance. To represent this valuation, define L_{it} as the loss that citizen i attaches to the environmental outcomes and events at time t. This loss function can be written as

$$L_{it} = f\{(O_t - O^e_{it})N_{it}\}. \qquad (3)$$

In effect, the loss function can be interpreted as a measure of the perceived benefit that the citizen derives from the president's performance. Loss will be at a minimum when either all outcomes coincide with expectations or when the citizen occupies a state of blissful ignorance (i.e., all elements of N are equal to zero). The expression also implies that the impact of a dimension in the loss function will be proportional to both the outcome-expectation discrepancy and to the degree of citizen concern with the dimension assuming, of course, that the threshold of awareness has been crossed.

Acknowledging that the media play a critical role in transmitting the information necessary to cross such thresholds (e.g., Brody & Page, 1975, p. 140), a final distinction among the performance dimensions pertains to the manner in which information about an outcome is generated. The distinction involves whether news coverage of the outcome could have been anticipated. The primary characteristic of an anticipated outcome (e.g., economic conditions, congressional action on presidential proposals) is that information about the outcome is provided to the public as part of the regular news dissemination process. On the other hand, unanticipated outcomes (e.g., foreign policy crises, scandals) require a stimulus to trigger the attention and reportage of the news media. Consequently, unanticipated PROs are truly protean; their occurrence and impact upon presidential approval is dependent upon the pulse of history.

Table 1. The Presidentially Relevant Outcome (PRO) Types

	Anticipated			Unanticipated		
	International	Domestic	Personal	International	Domestic	Personal
Institution Based	Peace	Prosperity	Presidential succession	Crises	Social unrest	Presidential integrity
Occupant Based	Superpower foreign policy	Legislative activity	Legislative success	Diplomatic activities	Domestic policy	Personal hardship

The Citizen-as-Evaluator

When the two types of expectations are combined with the domain and news coverage distinctions, it is possible to divide all environmental events and conditions that impinge on citizen evaluations of the president into 12 mutually exclusive sets, which results in the 12 types of outcomes displayed in Table 1. As Table 1 illustrates, we have provided a generic descriptor for each of the PRO types. With respect to the institutional category, the president's perceived responsibility includes the outcomes of peace, prosperity, and presidential succession (anticipated) as well as international crises, social unrest, and personal integrity (unanticipated).

In the occupant-based subset, a president is likewise held accountable for anticipated and unanticipated outcomes. In terms of the anticipated distinction, emphasis is placed on the president's foreign policy, domestic policy, and effectiveness as a policy initiator. Finally, the unanticipated occupant-based outcomes include foreign and domestic policy initiatives as well as the personal fortunes of the president.

Letting $\Pr(A_{it} = 1)$ denote the probability that individual i supports the president at time t, the individual decision model can now be summarized via the following expression:

$$\Pr(A_{it} = 1) = b_{i0} + \Sigma\, b_{ij} \{(O_{jt} - O^{e}_{ijt})N_{ijt}\} + e_{it}. \qquad (4)$$

The equation asserts that the probability of approval is a linear and additive function of the weighted comparison between expectation and performance in 12 distinct types of environmental outcomes and events.

Explaining Aggregate Opinion

Given our concern with explaining the movement of approval over time, it is necessary to augment the individual-level model with an additional set of assumptions. As specified, the model in equation (4) is basically unworkable in an over-time context because it requires rather detailed panel data. What is required, then, is a set of auxiliary assumptions that allow us to specify an aggregate-level model that is consistent with our characterization of the citizen as a cybernetic decision maker. We wish to stress that these assumptions are necessary owing to limited data availability.

Accordingly, it is assumed that all citizens have similar expectations about presidential performance and hold the president responsible for the same outcomes. With respect to anticipated outcomes, it is assumed that awareness or notice is proportional to the number of people who identify the outcome as a source of concern or view the institutions of government as nonresponsive. In the case of unanticipated outcomes, it is assumed that awareness is a function of the extensiveness of the media coverage given to an outcome. Once noticed, citizen evaluations of promise and performance are presumed to be similar and proportional to the discrepancy between expected and actual outcomes. Finally, the impact of the performance discrepancies are assumed to be constant across the public. This assumption implies that a single coefficient can be estimated for each factor and that the predicted aggregate level of support is obtained in a linear and additive manner. Essentially, these assumptions imply that individual reactions to the environment are homogeneous and are, implicitly or explicitly (Hibbs, 1982a), employed as necessary ingredients in all aggregate analyses of presidential support.

Given these assumptions, the aggregate-level version of equation (4) can be written as:

$$A_t = b_0 + \Sigma\; b_j \{(O_{jt} - O^{e}_{jt})N_{jt}\} + e_t. \qquad (5)$$

Thus, presidential approval is specified to be a function of weighted deviations of outcomes from expectations, a constant term, and a random error component.

It is worth noting that this formulation builds upon and extends previous research on public support in three ways. First, it not only incorporates many of the same types of influences found in existing models (e.g., prosperity and peace), but also identifies several outcome-types that have not been considered (e.g., social unrest, actions toward the USSR, and legislative effectiveness of the president). Second, the underlying model of the citizen-as-evaluator offers a plausible compromise between the characterizations embedded in existing research. Observe as well that the expectation-performance component is similar in logic to the "good news/bad news" explanation offered by Brody and Page (1975). In effect, both models rest upon the assumption that citizen choice is based upon the monthly balance of good and bad news. In the promise and performance model, the balance (i.e., L_{it} in expression (3)) arises from a comparison of expectation and performance weighted by attention. Third, the basic model applies to all presidents regardless of party, era, or personal characteristics. There is no attempt to argue that different factors apply to different presidents or to estimate a different set of coefficients for each president or presidential term. This approach results in a general model that can be used as both a forecasting tool and an inference generator. In sum, the model both adds to existing research and integrates it into a general and comprehensive framework.

Operationalizing the Promise and Performance Model

Although the individual PROs could be operationalized in many ways, at least one presidentially relevant variable is provided for each PRO-type displayed in Table 1. A major advantage of the promise and performance model is that it provides explicit directions about the manner in which the concepts are to be measured. According to the logic of the explanation, each variable, X_{Jt}, is to be constructed in the following fashion:

$$X_{Jt} = (O_{Jt} - O^{e}_{Jt})N_{Jt}. \qquad (6)$$

Consequently, each variable consists of the following raw materials: 1) an outcome or an action; 2) an expectation for the outcome; and 3) awareness of the outcome or action. These elements will be combined to construct a measure for each of the 12 types of PROs discussed in the previous section. Although in each case we are constrained by the available data, all of the measures are plausible approximations for each type of variable.

Monthly Approval

A monthly approval variable, A_t, was developed to meet the general linear model's underlying assumption of equal time intervals between observations. We determine A_t, for a given month by applying the following coding rules to the Gallup general performance questions: 1) if one and only one opinion poll was conducted during a month, A_t is equal to the approval percentage for that month; 2) if the question was not asked during a month, A_t is interpolated by averaging the approval percentage on both sides of the gap; 3) if the question was asked more than once during a month, A_t is the average of all approval percentages for that month; and 4) when the sampling period encompassed two different months, that approval percentage is used for both months.[2] Following these rules and collecting the data from January, 1953 to December, 1980 yields 336 monthly A_t values covering the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations.

Anticipated/Occupant-Based Variables

To assess the relationship between the level of public approval and the occupant-based expectations, three variables have been formulated.

Legislative Success and Activity—Domestic Policy. In general, occupant-based expectations focus on the twin standards of action and effectiveness. To measure the president's activity in the realm of policy initiation and the effectiveness of these efforts, we have developed two indexes based upon roll-call voting on domestic issues in Congress. This arena is important primarily because many of the policy appeals that the president directs at particular groups and organized interests pertain to the domestic realm and involve a legislative remedy.

Our measure of activity, X_{2t}, is defined as the sum, to each point in the term, of congressional roll-call votes involving domestic policy on which

---

[2] The unequal interval phenomenon is a problem because in those months in which there are multiple polls, support can change while the explanatory variables cannot. It is also possible that no poll was administered during a particular month. In such instances, support will remain constant while the explanatory variables may change. Hence, there are monthly changes in the exogenous variables with no corresponding changes in the endogenous variable. Our reliance on interpolation does not substantially alter the approval series. There are 26 interpolated approval scores which represent approximately 8% of the 336 time points in the data set.

the president took a clearly identifiable position. This variable serves two purposes. First, given the time span of our analysis and the paucity of available data on presidential policy initiation, it is expected that differences in activity across administrations will reflect variations in the size and ambitiousness of each president's agenda.[3] Second, the variable also provides a test of the coalition-of-minorities hypothesis (Mueller, 1970, p. 20). According to Mueller, this hypothesis asserts that any presidential initiative is destined to alienate some segment of the president's support coalition. Because the effect is triggered by presidential actions, it is a dynamic property of presidential governance—grievances are likely to accumulate as the number of presidential initiatives and decisions increase. Consequently, public support will decline over the course of a term. Even though the operationalization used by Mueller has been criticized (Kernell, 1978), the logic of Mueller's argument leads us to expect that the level of public support will decline as activity increases.[4]

However, unlike Mueller, our explanation also asserts that there is a reward associated with domestic policy making. Our second occupant-based measure, D_t, is designed to reflect effectiveness in the legislative arena. It is defined as the cumulative proportion of the domestic policy votes included in the activity index in which the position advocated by the president was victorious.

With respect to public expectations, the measure of legislative activity is based on the proposition that position-taking per se leads to defections. Although presidential rhetoric does foster a general expectation of action, the translation of general policy pronouncements into specific proposals is accompanied by opportunity costs; the decision to address a problem in one manner implies that the president must forego other approaches and remedies. Recognition of these costs suggests that, in theory, the impact of any given initiative is likely to be negative. Thus, presidential initiatives are associated with an immediate penalty; the reward depends upon the passage of the initiative. In this manner, it is hypothesized that public support will decline with the number of legislative initiatives.

A similar logic underlies the expectation of legislative success. Research by Fishel (1979) and Light (1982) emphasizes the difficulty experienced by presidents in ushering their programs through Congress. They observe that the actual implementation of major initiatives outlined during the campaign is substantially below 50%, which suggests that the prior probability of success on any specific presidential proposal is likely to be quite small. Viewed in this light, any victory in the legislative domain represents a substantial presidential accomplishment, which in turn implies that presidents will be rewarded for legislative accomplishments and leads to the hypothesis that the reward will be proportional to our success-rate measure.

With respect to notice, it is assumed that awareness of both presidential activity and success is a function of the degree to which the public believes that government policy will resolve the major problems of the day. Research has shown that such beliefs are based upon long-term political attitudes such as external political efficacy (for an extensive overview, see Abramson, 1983). External political efficacy refers to the belief that government is responsive to public concerns about the problems of the day. Inefficacious attitudes thus reflect a general cynicism toward actions, processes, and institutions of government. This usage implies that this long-term attitude will precondition citizen responses to presidential policymaking; that is, inefficacious individuals will be less likely to notice the initiatives of the president and will, if they are passed, place little confidence or credibility in these remedies.

To incorporate this idea, we have chosen to rely upon an aggregate measure of external political efficacy. Our use of efficacy is due to its validity as an indicator of government responsiveness and the availability of data over the entire 1953-1980 period.[5] The measure is simply the percentage of respondents who gave efficacious answers to both external efficacy items contained in the biennial CPS surveys (see items 3 and 4, Abramson, 1983, p. 136). Thus, the proportion serves as the notice factor applied to the legislative indexes and will change every two years.

---

[3] For example, a comparison of the total number of support votes for each four-year term since 1952 produces the following rank order: Johnson, 1965-1968 (1065 votes), Carter (967), Kennedy/Johnson (709), Eisenhower, 1957-1960 (569), Nixon, 1969-1972 (495), Nixon/Ford (408), and Eisenhower, 1953-1956 (338).

[4] This variable was constructed as follows. First, we used the annual *Congressional Quarterly* reports to determine, on a monthly basis, the number of votes in which the president took a clearly identifiable position; similarly, the number of votes in which the president's position won was ascertained. Second, in working with such monthly measures, we periodically encountered the problem of an abnormally small number of roll-call votes in a given month. The problem caused by such occurrences is that the resulting monthly time series contains a number of "unrepresentative" peaks and troughs. To compensate for these distortions, we summed both the test votes and the presidential victories over the term. D_t, our proxy for the legislative effectiveness of the president, represents the ratio of cumulated victories to cumulated votes up to and including month t.

[5] It should be noted that there has been considerable discussion of the measurement and meaning of such long-term attitudes. There are two concerns that are pertinent to our choice of external political efficacy.

There is also evidence that suggests that domestic roll-call success is itself a function of the president's current public standing. The analysis of annual data by Edwards (1980), for example, has shown that the presidential roll-call support scores of congressional members varies with the level of public support. Using the now-defunct Congressional Quarterly Boxscores, Rivers and Rose (1981) show that the passage of presidential requests for legislation is also determined by public support. Thus, when coupled with the promise and performance argument, this evidence implies that presidential influence in Congress is reciprocally related to public support, which in turn requires us to include in the model a *legislative effectiveness equation* that explains the movement of D_t. Thus, in order to assess the impact of D_t on A_t, it is necessary to take the impact of A_t on D_t into account.

Our specification of the domestic legislative support equation is based upon the assumption that, in general, presidential fortunes in Congress are a function of presidential resources and the size of his legislative agenda. In addition to the president's current approval, A_t, the party control of Congress, Z_{2t}, is identified as a basic resource for generating outcomes favorable to the president. As Light (1982, p. 26) has observed, "The base of presidential capital is always the number of party seats the president has in Congress." This observation is supported by empirical studies which show that roll-call support for the president's legislative program is greater among members of his party (e.g., Edwards, 1980). Moreover, such control affords the president an opportunity to work with a set of chamber and committee leaders who are likely to be more receptive and less ideologically hostile than would be the case if the opposition party controlled Congress. Our measure is a binary variable which assumes a value of one if Congress is controlled by the president's party. It is expected that D_t will be positively related to Z_{2t}.

There are several arguments that suggest that the size of the president's domestic legislative program constitutes another determinant of effectiveness. First of all, large programs are likely to be both ambitious and controversial—characteristics that are likely to reduce the probability of success. Second, as the number of bills introduced and endorsed by the president increases, the consultation and planning on any given bill are likely to decline. Hence, many bills lack the groundwork necessary for constructing a winning coalition. To the extent that the attention and resources of the administration are dispersed over a variety of policy fronts, the president's program is likely to grow more vulnerable to congressional factions that concentrate their efforts on defeating specific measures. Accordingly, it is hypothesized that the legislative success rate will vary with the size of the president's agenda. To assess this proposition, Z_{3t} is defined as the sum, to each month in a given Congress, of domestic roll-call votes involving a test of the president's position. The summation of presidential support votes is started anew in January of odd-numbered years because the advent of a new Congress involves both changes in personnel and the resubmission of proposals rejected or ignored by the preceding Congress. As such, Z_{3t} reflects the relative size of each president's agenda in a given Congress and is sensitive to the cycle of legislative politics. It is expected that Z_{3t} will be negatively related to D_t.

This leads to the following legislative effectiveness equation:

$$D_t = a_0 + a_1 A_t + a_2 Z_{2t} + a_3 Z_{3t} + v_t. \qquad (7)$$

Given the level of aggregation employed,[6] this

These pertain to whether efficacy is merely a reflection of partisanship and whether public approval of the president operates as a determinant of external political efficacy. Recent research suggests that neither partisanship (Abramson, 1983, p. 177) nor approval (Iyengar, 1980) operates as the driving force of external efficacy. Rather, studies emphasize the importance of the spirit of the times (Zeitgeist) and the cumulative impact registered by the political turmoil of the 1960s and early 1970s (Lipset & Schneider, 1983; Searing, Wright, & Rabinowitz, 1976). This research leads us to believe that the efficacy index used in the analysis is not a redundant measure of popular support, not an artifact of partisanship, and not an attitude determined by public support.

[6] It must be emphasized that the specifications designed to explain congressional roll-call outcomes are extremely dependent upon the level of analysis used. For example, if the variable of interest is the support of individual members for a given initiative, the equation would include various personal characteristics of the members (e.g., ideology, electoral margin). Similarly, if the objective is to explain whether a given initiative passed or failed, then it is necessary to include indicators for the subject matter of the bill and how much effort the president devoted to lobbying for the bill. Given the level of aggregation employed, equation (7) represents a plausible specification which is consistent with the major research findings on the president's fortunes in Congress.

equation represents a plausible specification that is consistent with the major research findings on the president's fortunes in Congress.

Foreign Policy Decision Making. The final occupant-based variable, X_{3t}, focuses on the president as a foreign policy decision maker. One key campaign issue during the post-World War II period has centered on the conduct of foreign relations with the USSR. As George and Keohane (1980, p. 225) note, this has led to two conflicting promises. On one hand, presidents have promised to resist Communist aggression wherever it arises to prevent the further expansion of the USSR (the so-called domino effect). On the other hand, presidents have promised to exercise care to avoid a serious confrontation with the USSR because such confrontations could lead to World War III. As a result, a president must at various times be both aggressive and restrained in his reaction to the USSR.

To operationalize this concept we have utilized —and updated—the dyadic conflict-cooperation data from COPDAB (Azar, 1982). Specifically, we focus on the level of conflict and cooperation directed by the United States toward the USSR. It is important to note that this type of conflict is short of war. The variable, X_{3t}, takes on the value of -1 times the base 10 logarithm of the absolute value of the cumulative weighted conflict (Azar & Havener, 1976)—each term—when conflict dominates. The variable takes on the value of the logarithm of the cumulative weighted conflict whenever there is an exess of cooperation to that point in the term. The level of public attention is measured by the percentage of the population identifying foreign policy issues as the most important problem facing the country.[7]

It is our contention that U.S. foreign policy behavior, X_{3t}, will be negatively related to A_t; that is, conflict is expected to increase popular support for the president. The expected relationship between direct conflict or cooperation with the USSR and popular support is based upon the following logic. First, conflict, short of war, dichotomizes the world into we-they categories and hence produces a rally-type effect; thus there is no political capital to be made by political opponents from openly criticizing a president for adopting a tough stance toward the USSR. Combining the rally-type effect and the absence of outright criticism, conflict will generate a positive surge in presidential support. Second, a policy that emphasizes cooperation is divisive precisely because it diffuses the black-white or we-they view of the world. Presidents who seek accommodation are no longer protected by the unwritten rules of closing ranks during times of national peril. There is no immediate threat from the USSR, and hence it is possible for opponents of the president to question openly the president's foreign policy. In short, sabre rattling is likely to lead to an increase in popular support.

Anticipated/Institution-Based Variables

Economic Prosperity. With respect to the prosperity expectation, the popularity literature is rather ambiguous. On one hand, theoretical discussions generally agree that economic factors should operate as prominent determinants of public support (Hibbs, 1982a; Kenski, 1977a, b; Kernell, 1978; MacKuen, 1983; Monroe, 1981; Norpoth & Yantek, 1983). On the other hand, there is intense disagreement over the choice of indicators (e.g., inflation, unemployment), the measurement of short- and long-term effects (e.g., lag structure), and the empirical impact of the variables selected (symmetric vs. asymmetric impact, multicollinearity problems). The promise and performance explanation leads us to adopt a

---

Similarly, our discussion of public expectations and the impact of legislative activity and success are the most plausible and testable given the level of aggregation used. A more thorough examination of these issues requires disaggregation on two fronts. The first is a partition of the public into subsets based upon, for example, ideology and issue concerns. Second, the initiatives and successes of the president can be disaggregated along substantive lines parallel to the partition of the public. Given these divisions, specific measures of expectations can be developed and the impact of both initiation and success can be compared across the subsets.

[7] The "most important problem" item periodically administered by the Gallup organization provides the basis for several of the weighting factors used in our analysis. On 79 occasions during the 1953-1980 period, the Gallup Poll included the following question: "What do you think is the most important problem facing the country today?" To obtain the weighting for our notice measures, we grouped the responses into three more general categories: war (specific mentions of Korea and Vietnam), foreign affairs (specific mentions of the USSR, communism, general fear of war or nuclear war), and the economy (specific mentions of unemployment or inflation). Because the survey item is administered on an irregular basis (approximately 2-3 times per year), the percentages are set for the month of a given poll and remain at these levels until the next appearance of a poll containing the most important problem item. We realize that this may create problems. However, given existing data and the chosen level of analysis, it is the only workable strategy for incorporating notice.

more general but limited approach toward the economy.

First, like most previous researchers, we concentrate on both unemployment and inflation rates, which are routinely reported in the print and broadcast media. Further, information about jobs and prices is readily accessible to the public, and these outcomes have historically been the most frequently cited economic concerns of the public.

Second, we have chosen to concentrate on the current values of the variables and to avoid two of the complications associated with the use of an elaborate lag structure. Such a structure assumes that individuals monitor, remember, and discount past values of the economic variables. This type of evaluation is inconsistent with our characterization of the citizen-as-cybernetic-evaluator. Moreover, recent research by Norpoth and Yantek (1983) suggests that the presence of a lagged relationship between presidential support and the economy may be a function of the persistent autocorrelation in each series. Hence they warn that the evidence for lagged variable structures may be spurious.

Third, to deal with the persistent multicollinearity problem, we have constructed an index of economic misery similar to that used by Hibbs (1982c, p. 390);[8] specifically, we add the unemployment and inflation rates to obtain a misery index. The lack of any a priori weighting of the two components in the index, as Hibbs (1982c, p. 390) notes, can be justified because when individual weights are estimated, their impact on public support is both negative and of approximately equal magnitude (Hibbs, 1982a, see Table 1, pp. 438-439). Further, the additive combination of inflation and unemployment outperforms all other unlagged measures of economic prosperity that we tried.[9]

Fourth, to measure public expectations, we assume that the public has an expected value of no economic misery. In our preliminary analysis, we developed a measure of expectations based on a moving average that is similar in construction to those used by Hibbs (see Hibbs & Fassbender, 1981, pp. 31-47). We found two problems with this approach. First, the moving average rises to over 10 in 1975 and increases to over 15 in late 1980; it seems implausible that the public would ever view such outcomes as an acceptable level of performance. Lacking another compelling method to estimate expectations, we have relied on zero. Second, the measure that uses a zero expectation significantly outperforms the measure using the moving average expected value.

To capture the percentage of the population that notices the two economic concerns, we use the percentage of the population identifying inflation or unemployment or both as the most important problem facing the country (see Note 7). The discrepancy between actual and expected economic performance is then weighted by this proportion. The measure of economic misery, X_{4t}, introduces the idea that the impact of economic performance on public support is jointly dependent upon the quality of economic outcomes and the number of people paying attention to the prosperity issue.

War. Turning to the impact of war on public support, prior analyses (e.g., Kernell, 1978) have emphasized that battle deaths are the most fundamental outcome produced by war. The number of troops killed in action serves as a graphic indicator of both the magnitude and intensity of a war as well as the collective pain imposed on the public. The magnitude of both the Korean and Vietnam wars are measured by the base 10 logarithm of the sum of U.S. troops killed as a result of enemy action. The sum is used to capture the notion "that people react more to the cumulative human costs of war than to its duration" (Mueller, 1973, p. 59). The use of the sum rather than a monthly figure reflects our view that the pain of war cannot be reduced by short-term fluctuations in battle deaths. Our use of the logarithm acknowledges that, over the course of a war, the public is "sensitive to relatively small losses in the early stages, but only to large losses in later stages" (Mueller, 1973, p. 62).

Insofar as the president is concerned, it is questionable whether all wars and their accompanying casualties can be expected to exert a similar impact on public support. For example, it is conventionally argued that World War II was a "popular war" in the sense that Roosevelt and Truman were not severely punished for the loss of life that the conflict generated. It is also believed that both Korea and Vietnam evolved into unpopular wars and, as a result, exerted a strong negative effect on the public standing of Truman and Johnson. Therefore, what is needed for a more general treatment of war is a corrected measure of battle deaths which acknowledges these differences. One important distinction pertains to whether the public believes that the substantial costs of waging a war are worth the benefits. One reflection of such a judgment is the proportion of the public who believe that the war is a mistake.[10] Accordingly, our corrected measure weights the battle death index by this proportion. The resulting measure thus reflects both the costs of war and the beliefs about the necessity and importance of waging the conflict. In doing so, we are able to account for the supposed differential impacts on presidential support of Korea and Vietnam on one hand and World War II on the other hand.[11]

---

[8] Hibbs makes use of what he calls an $(R-P-U)$ index, where R is the real personal disposable income, P is the inflation rate, and U is the unemployment rate. Since R is only reported quarterly and does not receive the intensive coverage given to the other two indicators, we have chosen to rely on the $(-P-U)$ component. Also, the $(R-P-U)$ formulation does not work as well as the $(-P-U)$ form (cf. note 9).

[9] In developing our measure of economic prosperity, we investigated the following measures: 1) inflation and unemployment as separate measures, 2) $R-P-U$, and 3) misery index. The additive misery index outperformed the other two by a substantial margin. Note that the measure of real personal disposable income is only available on a quarterly basis.

Because most models exclude the first half of 1953 and the period from 1969 to 1972 in estimating the impact of battle deaths, existing research suggests that neither Eisenhower nor Nixon was punished to any measurable extent by the carnage of war. The identification of peace as an institution-based expectation imposed on all presidents leads us to reject this suggestion. It is our contention that although Eisenhower, Johnson, and Nixon were held accountable for the war, they were evaluated much differently for two reasons. First, there was a difference in the attention (or notice) which was focused on the war. By weighting the corrected battle death measure with the proportion of the population identifying war as the most important problem, the resulting measure, X_{5t}, implies that the impact of war varies with its intensity, perceived value, and public concern.

Second, both Eisenhower and Nixon inherited a war. Furthermore, ending the war was a major campaign issue in both 1952 and 1968. It seems plausible, therefore, that a president who starts a war will be held accountable to a different degree than a president who inherits a war. Although the president who inherits a war will be penalized, it seems reasonable to suppose that the magnitude of the penalty will be reduced sharply. In order to ascertain whether or not the change in administrations (e.g., Eisenhower in 1953, Nixon in 1969) during a war will alter the magnitude of the effect of X_{5t} on A_t, we include another variable X_{6t} defined as

$$X_{6t} = X_{5t} {}^{*} P_t,$$

where $P_t = 1$ during a new president's term and 0 otherwise. As such, the coefficient of X_{6t} represents the change in the impact of the war brought on by a change in presidential administrations. Thus, to obtain the impact of the inherited war, it is necessary to focus on the sum $(b_5 + b_6)$. We anticipate that b_6 will reduce the impact of the war on presidential support; that is, $(b_5 + b_6) < b_5$.

Sympathy. The final anticipated institution-based measure, X_{7t}, focuses on the sympathetic reaction that arises when a new president assumes office without being elected. Once elected, a president is expected to complete his term in office; hence, the expected value of this variable is zero. Whenever this expectation is not satisfied, this binary variable takes on a value of one during those months in which, because of the president's death or resignation, the vice president serves the remainder of his predecessor's term. Its inclusion is based upon the argument that citizens will rally around the accidental president. First, whether it results from assassination, resignation, or natural death, succession to office is a traumatic event that will generate a wave of sympathy and support for the new president during the times of crisis and uncertainty. Second, and more relevant to the characterization of this concern as an institution-based variable, the new president serves as a symbol of continuity and stability in government, regardless of party or ideology. His automatic assumption of authority provides an example and thus reaffirms the expectation that the institution of the presidency can withstand traumatic change. Consequently, it is hypothesized that, *ceteris paribus,* public support will be uniformly higher during these extraordinary periods than during the normal circumstances of politics as usual. Insofar as the public's attention is concerned, it is assumed that everyone will be aware of the transition in power and hence N_{7t} = 100% until a new term begins.

Unanticipated Variables

An unanticipated outcome involves factors that occur irregularly and must possess an identifiable stimulus that triggers a reaction and attracts the public's attention. The outcomes must also be newsworthy, so that the public will have enough information to make evaluative judgments. To incorporate such events into the analysis, therefore, we focus upon the issues of selection, hypothesized impact, and measurement.

---

[10] The data are the percentage of the people who answered yes to the following question: "In view of the developments since we entered the fighting in Vietnam, do you think the United States made a mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam?" The percentages range from 24% to 61% and are listed in Mueller (1973, pp. 54-55).

[11] Mueller (1973, p. 63) notes that the number of people identifying World War II as a mistake is very small. He observes that in 1944, after the war had been going on for three years, only 14% of the populace thought the war was a mistake. To compare World War II and Vietnam in terms of our corrected measure, consider the following. Even though there were eight times as many deaths in World War II as in Vietnam (400,000 to 55,000), the corrected measure for Vietnam was four times larger than the World War II measure.

Selection. Our first step was to define six kinds of events, each of which corresponds to a particular combination of the domain and expectation distinctions used in our typology of presidentially relevant outcomes. Thus, three kinds of events are institutional: The first kind involves threats to peace and includes international crises triggered by the use of military force and other aggressive actions by the United States, its allies, and adversaries. The next set, domestic disruptions, includes those that threaten the tranquility of domestic politics (e.g., major civil rights and anti-war demonstrations and the outbreak of urban violence). The third kind of institutional event challenges the integrity of the president and his administration.

Similarly, the occupant-based category includes three types of events. There is, first of all, a set that focuses on the conduct of diplomacy. This kind includes summit conferences, major travels abroad, and other highly publicized statements and actions that involve the president in the international arena. Second, there is a set of events associated with presidential policy initiatives. These initiatives either pertain to domestic concerns or are brought before the public by the president in order to build the congressional support necessary to translate proposals into policy. The third set of events is personal in character and involves incidents that focus attention on the personal and political health of the president.

The next step involves the choice of the events in each category. This was accomplished in the following manner. First, a preliminary list of events for each group was compiled by consulting prominent chronologies (e.g., *Encyclopedia Britannica*) and the public support literature (e.g., Lee, 1977; MacKuen, 1983; Mueller, 1973). Second, to eliminate the more obscure episodes, Mueller's (1973, p. 209) criteria that an event must be sharply focused and dramatic were applied. Third, these "candidate" events were included on our final list only if they were covered on the front page of *The New York Times.* This criterion was applied because such placement reflects an educated judgment by the editors about the comparative importance of the day's events and news stories. Reliance on *The New York Times* is also justified on the grounds that its national coverage is highly correlated with other types of media coverage. This procedure resulted in the 85 events listed in Table 2.

Hypothesized Impact. Because research has shown that the impact of unanticipated events is not uniformly positive (e.g., Lee, 1977; MacKuen, 1983), it is necessary to distinguish between outcomes that are approval-enhancing and those that are disapproval-enhancing. The set of international events, X_{8t}, is hypothesized to be approval-enhancing because of the perception of an external threat and rally-around-the-flag effect which such threats stimulate. The two remaining institutional and unanticipated sets of events, X_{9t} and X_{10t}, disruptions and scandals, are likely to be disapproval-enhancing because they represent violations of fundamental citizen expectations (domestic tranquility and integrity).

Two of the occupant-based sets are likely to be approval enhancing. The diplomatic actions of the president, X_{11t}, involve perhaps the most publicized uses of the political stage and permit the president to capitalize on his symbolic role of national leader. We expect the set of personal events, X_{13t}, to register a positive impact because of the sympathetic reaction that arises during times of personal difficulty. The final occupant-based set of events focuses on policy initiatives, X_{13t}. These are expected to be disapproval-enhancing because the issues involved are basically divisive and, quite often, a president must exacerbate these divisions to present his case.

Measurement. Our strategy is an adaptation of the news-based approach developed by Brody and his colleagues in their studies of public support (Brody, 1983; Brody & Page, 1975; Haight & Brody, 1977). First, to be selected, an outcome must fit into one of the six unanticipated outcome types and receive front-page coverage in *The New York Times.* If more than one outcome of a given type occurs during a given month, the relevant variable will reflect the coverage given to the event type. Second, the salience of the event is measured as the percentage of the month in which the outcome receives front-page coverage. Third, the expected value for each of the variables is 0; thus, even though experience demonstrates that such events will occur some time during the term, the expectation is that in any given month there will be no unanticipated events. Fourth, the duration of the outcome depends upon the length of time that an outcome remains newsworthy; in most instances, coverage does not extend beyond the initial 30-day base period. However, when events occur which generate outcomes over a more extended period of time (e.g., Iran, the Sherman Adams, Bert Lance, and Watergate scandals), they are treated as a series of unanticipated outcomes, and monthly values are calculated for the duration. After the end of an event, its salience is discounted in an exponential fashion over the four succeeding months reflecting the lingering

Table 2. The Unanticipated Events

Event Type	Date	Description
Crises	November 1956	Soviet forces invade Hungary (.93)
	October 1957	Soviets launch Sputnik I (.57)
	August 1958	Eisenhower sends marines to Lebanon (.63)
	April 1961	Bay of Pigs (.80)
	September 1961	Berlin Wall erected (.97)
	November 1961	U.S.-Soviet tank confrontation in Berlin (.87)
	November 1962	Cuban missile crisis (1.00)
	August 1964	Gulf of Tonkin incident (.60)
	May 1965	Johnson sends Marines to Dominican Republic (1.00)
	September 1968	Soviet forces invade Czechoslovakia (.97)
	May 1975	Mayaguez incident (.40)
	November 1979	Iran hostage crisis (1.00)
	January 1980	Soviets invade Afghanistan (1.00)
Diplomacy	August 1953	Korean Armistice signed (.67)
	December 1953	Eisenhower delivers "Atoms for Peace" Address (.43)
	July 1954	Indochina Peace Agreement (.37)
	July 1955	Big Four Summit in Geneva (.60)
	September 1959	Krushchev visits U.S. (.67)
	December 1959	Western Alliance summit in Paris (.67)
	May 1960	Paris summit/U-2 incident (.40)
	June 1960	Eisenhower tours Asian capitals (.47)
	March 1961	Kennedy announces "Peace Corps" Program (.27)
	June 1961	Kennedy-Khrushchev meet in Vienna (.40)
	June 1967	Johnson-Kosygin meet in Glassboro, N.J. (.30)
	March 1969	Nixon tours Europe (.33)
	August 1969	Nixon visits Romania/South Vietnam (.50)
	November 1969	Nixon announces "Vietnamization" Plan (.43)
	February 1972	Nixon visits People's Republic of China (.70)
	June 1972	Nixon visits Soviet Union (.60)
	February 1973	Vietnam ceasefire agreement signed (.70)
	July 1973	Brezhnev visits U.S. (.37)
	June 1974	Nixon visits USSR (.40)
	December 1974	Ford and Brezhnev confer in Vladivostok (.27)
	December 1975	Ford visits People's Republic of China (.27)
	September 1978	Camp David summit (1.00)
	March 1979	Begin and Sadat sign agreement in D.C. (.87)
Personal	October 1955	Eisenhower suffers heart attack (1.00)
	June 1956	Eisenhower undergoes surgery for ilietis (.83)
	December 1957	Eisenhower suffers minor stroke (.30)
	August 1963	Death of Kennedy's newborn son, Patrick (.13)
	December 1963	Kennedy assassinated; Johnson assumes office (1.00)
	October 1965	Johnson undergoes gall bladder surgery (.30)
	April 1968	Johnson withdraws from presidential race (.87)
	August 1974	Nixon resigns; Ford assumes office (1.00)
	September 1975	Attempted assassination of Ford (.07)
	October 1975	Attempted assassination of Ford (.13)
Scandals	February 1959	Sherman Adams (through January 1959)
	October 1964	Walter Jenkins (.41)
	March 1973	Watergate (through January 1975)
	July 1977	Bert Lance (through January 1978)
	August 1978	Peter Bourne (.36)
	July 1980	Billy Carter (.53)
Domestic unrest	March 1956	Montgomery bus boycott (.13)
	September 1957	Desegregation conflict in Little Rock (1.00)
	June 1961	Freedom Riders attacked in Alabama (.60)
	October 1962	James Meredith enters University of Mississippi (1.00)
	May 1963	Violence in Birmingham, Alabama (.37)

Table 2. (continued)

Event Type	Date	Description
Domestic unrest (continued)	June 1963	Wallace blocks doors to University of Alabama (.03)
	September 1963	Civil rights march in D.C./Violence in Birmingham (.16)
	April 1965	Selma to Montgomery march/Viola Liuzzo murdered (.33)
	August 1965	Violence in Watts (.27)
	August 1966	Outbreak of violence in major U.S. cities (.40)
	May 1967	100,000 demonstrate against Vietnam War (.03)
	August 1967	Outbreak of violence in major U.S. cities (.73)
	November 1967	Pentagon stormed by anti-war protestors (.10)
	April 1968	Martin Luther King assassinated (.33)
	June 1968	Poor People's march in Washington, D.C. (.33)
	August 1968	Violence at Democratic National Convention (.23)
	April 1969	Violence on anniversary of King assassination (.03)
	October 1969	First Vietnam moratorium (.13)
	November 1969	Second Vietnam moratorium (.20)
	May 1970	Violence at Kent State/Jackson State (.43)
	May 1971	Protests and mass arrests in Washington, D.C. (.20)
	June 1980	Violence erupts in Miami, Florida (.10)
Policy initiatives	January 1957	Eisenhower presents Middle East doctrine (.87)
	January 1963	Kennedy proposes tax cut (.43)
	January 1964	Johnson proposes War on Poverty (.17)
	March 1965	Johnson presents Voting Rights Bill (.33)
	May 1969	Nixon proposes lottery to replace draft (.10)
	August 1971	Nixon imposes wage-price controls (.93)
	July 1973	Nixon re-imposes wage-price controls (.93)
	May 1977	Carter proposes comprehensive energy program (.40)
	October 1979	Carter submits Panama Canal Treaty to Senate (.03)
	June 1979	Carter submits SALT II Treaty to Senate (.17)
	February 1980	Carter proposes draft registration system (.17)

impact that such outcomes are thought to have (e.g., Kernell, 1978; Mueller, 1970).

Model Specification

Based upon the discussion in this section, the operational version of the promise and performance explanation can be expressed as follows:

$$D_t = a_0 + a_1 A_t + \Sigma\, a_k Z_{kt} + f_t \qquad (8)$$

$$A_t = b_0 + b_1 D_t + \Sigma\, b_j X_{jt} + e_t. \qquad (9)$$

This specification produces a general, comprehensive model of legislative success and presidential approval.

Each of the four concerns raised in the Introduction can be investigated in the context of equations (8) and (9). First, the degree to which approval is a potent resource can be determined by assessing the magnitude of a_1. The value of a_1 provides an indication of the degree to which a president's current public standing affects his domestic legislative success.

Second, the causes of a president's approval level over time can be determined by assessing the magnitude of the b_j ($j = 1, 2, \ldots, 13$). These coefficients will provide an indication of the direct effect that each of the presidentially relevant variables has on the president's current public standing. Given the estimated coefficient set, it will also be possible to account for the varying texture (in terms of approval) of each of the post-1952 presidential administrations.

Third, the importance of the reciprocal relationship between A_t and D_t can be investigated to determine the extent to which it can lead to a vicious circle. One of the more interesting features of the simultaneous equation model specified earlier is that it provides a foundation from which it is possible to assess the degree to which declines in support fuel decreases in legislative support which, in turn, lead to further decreases in popular support. As a consequence of this relationship, each variable will have an indirect effect on A_t and D_t as well. The sum of the direct and indirect effects may create a vicious circle which may have a substantial impact on the ability of any president to maintain sufficient levels of popular support.

Finally, to address the generalizability issue, we will use the model to calculate a series of *ex post* forecasts of Reagan's 1981-1983 approval levels.

Table 3. 2SLS Estimates

Variable	Descriptor	Coefficient	S.E.	*t*-Ratio	Impact Range
D_t	Legislative success	.371	.060	6.21	[2.55, 23.37]
X_{2t}	Legislative activity	–.037	.006	–5.97	[–15.03, 0]
X_{3t}	Conflict/cooperation with USSR	–1.601	.694	–2.31	[–1.55, 3.14]
X_{4t}	Economic misery	–1.332	.138	–9.63	[–21.41, –.40]
X_{5t}	Cor. battle deaths	–18.065	1.781	–10.14	[–27.46, 0]
X_{6t}	Change in X_{5t} due to new president	14.745	2.328	6.33	[0, 15.78]
X_{7t}	Sympathy	3.515	1.374	2.56	[0, 3.52]
X_{8t}	Crisis	7.171	1.313	5.46	[0, 7.17]
X_{9t}	Social unrest	–5.703	2.072	–2.75	[–5.70, 0]
X_{10t}	Scandal	–13.618	2.116	–6.43	[–13.62, 0]
X_{11t}	International policy	9.385	1.796	5.22	[0, 9.34]
X_{12t}	Domestic policy	–3.313	2.056	–1.61	[–3.31, 0]
X_{13t}	Personal events	9.736	1.662	5.86	[0, 9.74]
Constant		52.106	3.118	16.71	
R^2		.815			
S.E.		5.825			
d		.530			
Legislative effectiveness equation					
A_t	Approval	.410	.045	9.17	
Z_{2t}	Control of Congress	20.623	1.037	19.59	
Z_{3t}	Biannual activity	–.003	.006	–.53	
Constant		–27.283	3.017	–9.04	
R^2		.641			
S.E.		8.932			
d		.330			

Parameter Estimation

In order to estimate equations (8) and (9), it is necessary to utilize a procedure that takes the interdependence of the two equations into account. Two stage least squares (2SLS) has been chosen as the estimation technique because it leads to consistent estimates of the structural coefficients. The results of the estimation are displayed in Table 3.

An examination of the 2SLS estimates for the approval equation indicates that all but one of the variables is statistically significant, in the predicted direction, at the .01 level. Although there are no standard goodness-of-fit measures for the 2SLS estimates, the predicted values of approval were compared to the actual values yielding a R^2 of .82 and a standard error of 5.83 rating points. This is a rather substantial accomplishment, given that there are no special variables (e.g., lag of aproval, time into term) in the model.

An examination of the legislative success equation indicates that all but one of the variables are significant, in the predicted direction, at the .01 level. The predicted values of success were compared to the actual values yielding an R^2 of .64 and a standard error of 8.93.

Note that in both equations the residuals exhibit positive serial correlation. Although this does not affect the consistency of the structural estimates, it does create problems for the estimates of the variance-covariance matrix (Kmenta, 1971). To deal with these problems it is necessary to examine the residuals and take the nature of the time-dependent error processes into account.

To accomplish this task, we have followed the three steps suggested by McCleary and Hay (1980). First, we estimated the autocorrelation (ACF) and partial autocorrelation (PACF) functions for the disturbances from each equation. The ACF of the approval series exhibits an exponential decay, and the PACF shows a single spike at lag one. We initially identify the approval residuals as a first-order autoregressive process. Following a similar procedure for the success residuals, we initially identify them as a third-order autoregressive process. In the second step the relevant parameters of the disturbance processes were estimated. After under- and overmodeling, the best characterization for each disturbance process, for the success and approval residuals respectively, is given by:

$$f_t = p_{11}f_{t-1} + p_{12}f_{t-2} + p_{13}f_{t-3} + w_t \qquad (10)$$

$$e_t = p_{21}e_{t-1} + v_t, \qquad (11)$$

where w_t and v_t are assumed to be white noise processes. All parameters in equations (10) and (11) were statistically significant in the predicted direction. In the final step, the estimated values of w_t and v_t were subjected to an ARIMA analysis. Each of the resulting noise series is in fact white noise. As a consequence, all of the systematic variation has been removed from the residuals. The reason for the persistent serial correlation is not dealt with in the context of our explanation. Instead, we seek to ensure that its presence does not confound the resulting estimates.

The previous analyses have provided information that can be used to obtain consistent estimates of both the structural coefficients and the variance-covariance matrix. We incorporated our model of the residuals process (equations (10) and (11)) directly into equations (8) and (9).[12] The estimates for the augmented set of equations (see equations (8*) and (9*) in note 12) will provide consistent estimates of the parameters and variances in equations (8) and (9).

Klein (1974, pp. 207-210) suggests three possible approaches to the estimation of systems similar to equation (8*) and (9*). The procedure we have chosen estimates both the structural and error-process coefficients simultaneously with the use of nonlinear 2SLS procedure (Amemiya, 1974). The nonlinear estimation process was initialized with parameter estimates from the previous two stages of the estimation procedure. The results of the nonlinear 2SLS are presented in Table 4.[13] As can be seen, the estimates are quite similar to those presented in Table 3.

Table 4 provides a picture of approval dynamics which is very similar to that in Table 3. Despite the relatively large value of p_{21}, all but two of the coefficients are statistically significant, in the predicted direction, at the .05 level. The two major types of changes in coefficient values are the drop in b_1 from .371 to .154 and the attenuation of several of the coefficients of the unanticipated variables. Note that the R^2 drops only slightly, and the standard error is of similar magnitude. The goodness-of-fit statistics in Table 4 have been calculated *without* p_{ij} and the lagged values of D_t and A_t. Consequently, they reflect the goodness of fit for equations (8) and (9) after the effects of serial correlation have been removed.

Turning to an examination of the legislative success equation, all of the variables are statistically significant in the predicted direction at the .01 level. Note that the a_3 coefficient is now statistically significant in the predicted direction once the serial correlation has been taken into account.

Assessing Model Implications

The four basic issues that were raised in the introduction will be investigated in order. To evaluate the substantive explanation offered by the estimated version of the promise and performance model, the impact of the individual variables on success and approval will be assessed. Partial regression coefficients will be examined as well as the impact range of each variable. The latter specifies the minimum and maximum values of the quantity—*b**variable—where *b* (or *a*) is the partial regression coefficient. The impact range indicates the magnitude of the direct effect that each variable, when weighted, has on success and approval.

Popular Support as a Presidential Resource

The parameter estimates for the legislative success equation confirm our initial observation that public approval operates as a vital presidential resource. As Table 4 shows, the approval coefficient is statistically significant and implies that the cumulative rate of roll-call victories will decline by three points for every ten-point drop in approval. This impact is quite substantial. The impact range

---

[12] This yields the following set of equations, which will be used for purposes of estimation:

$$\begin{aligned} D_t = {} & (1-p_{11}-p_{12}-p_{13})a_0 + p_{11}D_{t-1} \\ & + p_{12}D_{t-2} + p_{13}D_{t-3} \\ & + a_1(A_t - p_{11}A_{t-1}-p_{12}A_{t-2}-p_{13}A_{t-3}) \\ & + \Sigma\, a_k(Z_{kt} - p_{11}Z_{kt-1} - p_{12}Z_{kt-2} - p_{13}Z_{kt-3}) \\ & + w_t \qquad (8^*) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} A_t = {} & (1-p_{21})b_0 + p_{21}A_{t-1} + b_1(D_t - p_{21}D_{t-1}) \\ & + \Sigma b_j(X_{jt} - p_{21}X_{jt-1}) + v_t. \qquad (9^*) \end{aligned}$$

[13] The nonlinear estimation of the legislative success equation would not converge using the third order autoregressive specification for f_t. This is not unusual because convergence is not guaranteed (Amemiya, 1974). Convergence did occur for an *AR*(2) process specification. The results reported in Table 4 are for the latter specification. Even though there is some serial correlation in equation (8*), this will have no impact whatsoever on the nonlinear two-stage least squares estimates of the approval equation.

Table 4. Nonlinear 2SLS Estimates (with Correction for Autocorrelation)

Variable	Descriptor	Coefficient	S.E.	*t*-Ratio	Impact Range
Approval equation					
D_t	Legislative success	.154	.047	3.28	[1.06, 9.70]
X_{2t}	Legislative activity	–.032	.009	–3.45	[–13.00, 0]
X_{3t}	Conflict/cooperation with USSR	–1.627	.823	–1.98	[–1.58, 3.19]
X_{4t}	Economic misery	–1.849	.266	–6.95	[–29.71, –.55]
X_{5t}	Cor. battle deaths	–17.038	3.699	–4.61	[–21.01, 0]
X_{6t}	Change in X_{5t} due to new president	11.667	4.367	2.67	[0, 14.39]
X_{7t}	Sympathy	7.278	2.047	3.56	[0, 7.28]
X_{8t}	Crisis	5.640	1.168	4.83	[0, 5.64]
X_{9t}	Social unrest	–1.791	1.728	–1.04	[–1.79, 0]
X_{10t}	Scandal	–12.437	1.987	–6.26	[–12.44, 0]
X_{11t}	International policy	4.308	1.418	3.04	[0, 4.31]
X_{12t}	Domestic policy	–.699	1.664	–.42	[–.70, 0]
X_{13t}	Personal events	7.069	1.580	4.47	[0, 7.07]
Constant		61.109	2.974	20.53	
p_{21}		.802	.034	23.56	
R^2		.792			
S.E.		6.082			
d		1.962			
Legislative effectiveness equation					
A_t	Approval	.300	.068	4.30	
Z_{2t}	Control of Congress	18.863	2.332	8.09	
Z_{3t}	Biannual activity	–.018	.007	–2.68	
Constant	Constant	46.934	4.508	10.41	
p_{11}		.604	.054	11.18	
p_{12}		.159	.050	3.21	
R^2		.619			
S.E.		9.283			
d		1.745			

reported in Table 4 indicates that the difference between the success rates for the high (80.4%) and low (24.0%) values of approval in our sample is approximately 17 points (or 17 defeats for every 100 roll-call votes). A consideration of the last four presidential administrations in our sample (Johnson to Carter) further illustrates the value of public support in the legislative arena. Each of these presidents experienced at least a 30-point decline in approval during the course of their terms. The estimates in Table 4 imply that such drops in approval lowered the victory rate of each president by 9 points (taking notice into account). Assuming for the purposes of illustration that Z_{3t} is equal to 350, the 30-point decline in approval translates to roughly 31 additional roll-call defeats.

The estimates in Table 4 also show that the measures of party control and activity exert a significant impact on the success rate. Control of the Congress by the president's party will increase the average success rate by 18.9 points. Increases in activity will produce a decline in success at the rate of 1.8 points for every 100 presidential position votes.

These results not only corroborate but also extend the findings of previous research (e.g., Edwards, 1980; Rivers & Rose, 1981) on presidential success in the legislative arena. There are three noteworthy points in this regard. First, the estimates show that the "public" and "legislative" presidencies are linked via the reciprocal relationship between approval and success. Although prior research has emphasized the role of approval in legislative success, our results also show that presidential effectiveness in the legislative arena is an important component in maintaining public support. Second, the analysis demonstrates that the impact of actions in the legislative arena is twofold—the penalty of initiation and the reward of effectiveness. Third, this suggests that there is a strategic component in formulating the president's legislative agenda. The estimate for Z_{3t} implies that more ambitious legislative agendas demand higher levels of approval to sustain a given level of success. Thus submitting a laundry list of initiatives created to satisfy electoral constituencies is not cost free; unless the president can maintain his level of public support through other means, the list will stimulate the rate of defection and produce no offsetting reward.

The Determinants of Popular Support

The Individual Variables. Turning first to the anticipated, occupant-based variables, it is clear that they have a significant impact on presidential approval. A president's domestic legislative success has a consistent impact on presidential support. As estimated, b_1 implies that approval will decline 1 point for every 13-point drop in legislative success (assuming external efficacy is at 50%).[14] Presidential domestic activity has a significant and negative impact on the president's current approval rating. As estimated, approval drops one point for every 57 bills introduced in a term. Together these results imply that the penalty for policy initiation implied by the coalition-of-minorities can be counterbalanced by legislative success and thereby produce a net benefit for policymaking.

Turning to X_{3t}, it can be seen that the conflict or cooperation directed toward the USSR has a significant impact on popular support. In those instances in which the United States directs conflict toward the USSR, a president's approval will increase up to four points. Although it is possible for a similar decrease to occur whenever the president is cooperative toward the USSR, the 1953-1980 period suggests that a president is cooperative only when the public's attention is not focused on international problems. Thus, the penalty for cooperation is reduced.

This variable implies that presidential actions in the superpower arena do have an impact on approval, especially when foreign affairs dominate the public's awareness. Even though the maximum impact of directed behavior toward the USSR is not great, it does indicate that a president is better off acting in a truculent fashion than he is in developing a solid base for cooperation. Therefore, insofar as U.S. foreign policy is concerned, the public reacts most strongly and positively to confrontation with the USSR.

In terms of the anticipated and institutional variables, it is clear that the economy, war, and presidential succession have a substantial impact on popular support. The weighted misery index, X_{4t}, has a persistent impact on popular support. The coefficient implies that approval will decline by 1.85 rating points for each one point increase in the weighted misery index. The impact range of the variable indicates that the economy has, on occasion, cost the president over 29 rating points. These findings support the general conclusion that economic conditions are very important determinants of presidential approval.

It is noteworthy that high unemployment or inflation are not, in and of themselves, necessary conditions for the erosion of popular support, however. Instead, high levels of the two measures and a substantial degree of public concern with economic problems are required. According to the estimated version of the model, for example, the economic problems of the late 1950s (when the misery index exceeded 10) cost President Eisenhower significantly fewer points (7.3 maximum impact) than the penalty imposed on President Nixon for similar conditions in the 1970s (maximum impact of 21.5 rating points). These results suggest that, insofar as political economy is concerned, the president has at least one additional lever at his disposal. Namely, he can try to deflect attention away from the economy when things are bad. Although such a strategy is likely to be difficult, it does offer the president another option.

The two war variables provide an interesting picture of the impact of war on popular support for the president. The coefficient of X_{5t} indicates that war had a very substantial impact on President Johnson. The impact range suggests that the war cost him increasingly and finally culminated in a decline of 17 rating points during 1968. The direct impact of war on Eisenhower and Nixon was reduced according to the coefficient of X_{6t}. Because they inherited the war, the impact was reduced substantially so that its maximal impact on Eisenhower was 4.6 points and on Nixon was 5.3 rating points. There are two major implications of these results. First, unlike previous research, we are able to demonstrate that Eisenhower, Johnson, and Nixon were all adversely affected by war. Second, the results also demonstrate that these presidents were penalized differently, with the difference being attributable to both a reduction in the proportion of the public who noticed the war and the fact that both Eisenhower and Nixon inherited their wars.[15]

---

[14] It is important to remember that each of the presidentially relevant variables is weighted by a factor that accounts for the number of people who notice the factor. Therefore, when calculating the impact of a given change, the change must be discounted by the notice factor. In this particular instance, we are interpreting the impact under the assumption that 50% of the population notices the change.

The impact of X_{7t} suggests that the sympathy associated with presidential succession does have a sizable impact on the level of presidential approval. On average, the caretaker president is awarded an increase of 7.3 rating points until he fills out his predecessor's term. Consequently, the evaluation of the successor is substantially different from that of his predecessor.

Six variables constitute the unanticipated subset of the presidentially relevant variables set. The maximum value for each is 1.00, which occurs whenever the kind of outcome receives front-page coverage in *The New York Times* throughout the base period. In the case of continual coverage, an international crisis leads to a rise of over five points, domestic unrest leads to a drop of 1.7 points, a scandal leads to a drop of over 12 points, international policy announcements and changes generate an increase of about four points, domestic policy changes lead to an insignificant drop, and periods of personal hardship lead to increases of approximately seven points. It is noteworthy that the three approval-enhancing unanticipated variables have a similar order of magnitude impact on approval.

The impact of unanticipated events that receive less than continual coverage is reduced in proportion to the magnitude of the coverage. The strength of these estimates provides support for the proposition that irregular events have a substantial impact on the public's assessment of the president. Furthermore, the impact is similar across time. Nowhere is this more startling than in the case of the scandal variable. The results suggest that there is a commonality across all scandals; in this sense, Watergate was not a unique occurrence but, rather, a particular example of the general proposition that perceived violations of integrity will reduce the level of public support.

Insofar as the estimated impact of Watergate is concerned, two points are worth noting. First, many analysts of popular support have attributed the enormous drop in Nixon's approval to the Watergate scandal. The estimated version of our model indicates that the maximum direct penalty was 12.44 points. The reasonableness of this estimated coefficient is underscored, we think, by the fact that all subsequent presidents (i.e., Ford, Carter, and Reagan) have been within 12 points of Nixon's low point without a scandal. Second, because the economy accounts for a majority of the drop, our model suggests that Nixon's second-term popular support would have dropped dramatically without a hint of scandal.

The Overall Explanation. Using the structural estimates in Table 4, it is possible to account for the fact that the time path of approval during the 1964-1980 period is significantly different from the 1953-1963 period. During the 1953-1963 period both Eisenhower and Kennedy were able to maintain relatively high levels of public support over time with a relatively small amount of variation. The question is: How did these presidents accomplish such a feat?

The promise and performance explanation provides four answers. First, foreign policy issues were dominant. This configuration of public concerns was highly beneficial to Eisenhower and Kennedy for it not only diverted attention from the economy and divisive domestic problems, but it created a context in which the international arena would be noticed and evaluated in a favorable light. Second, the values of X_{3t} demonstrate that the actions and rhetoric that these administrations directed toward the USSR were, particularly when compared to later years, primarily conflictual in nature. This aggressive stance reinforced the prevailing structure of public concerns and increased the public support enjoyed by these presidents. Third, both presidents were the beneficiaries of the rally effect generated by approval-enhancing events. Crises, diplomatic activities, and personal events were quite frequent during this period and, as a result, the overall impact of unanticipated factors was positive in nature. Finally, the period from 1953 to 1963 is distinguished by relatively high levels of efficacy (Abramson, 1983). Both presidents were evaluated by a constituency that was substantially less cynical than those faced by their successors. For these reasons, we conclude that there is no "Eisenhower phenomenon" per se; rather, the Eisenhower and Kennedy popularity levels are a result of a relatively efficacious public primarily concerned with foreign policy issues, presidential behavior that reinforced these priorities, and the frequent occurrence of approval-enhancing events.

The dominant feature of the 1964-1980 approval levels is that they exhibit substantially more volatility than the 1953-1963 levels. This change is primarily attributable to the quality of the outcomes experienced by the public during this period. In rather rapid succession, the public endured a prolonged and indecisive war, a scandal of unprecedented magnitude and duration, and a period of substantial economic problems. The impact ranges presented in Table 4 graphically illustrate the penalty imposed on presidents for their failure to satisfy the institutional expectations of peace, prosperity, and integrity.

---

[15] It is interesting to consider the implications of these estimates for the impact of the Korean War on Truman. The estimated coefficient suggests that the maximal impact of the Korean battle deaths on Truman was 18 rating points. This is almost identical to the impact of the Vietnam War on Johnson.

The overlap of war, economic distress, and scandal during this period generated two additional consequences. First, public attention shifted from a consensual to a divisive set of concerns and thereby dissolved the favorable context in which Eisenhower and Kennedy had operated. Second, as several studies (e.g., Abramson, 1983) suggest, the dissatisfaction generated by war, scandal, unemployment, and inflation was generalized and led to the erosion of political efficacy. As a result, presidents since Kennedy have presented and defended their actions to an increasingly skeptical and less naive audience. Our model illustrates that prominent results of this change include a reduction in the net benefit (i.e., the reward for success less the penalty for action) of successful policy initiation and thus the value of being perceived as an effective policy maker.

The ability of the model to explain the pattern of public support in these two periods leads us to the conclusion that the "throwaway presidency" (Greenstein, 1982) is not an inevitable feature of modern government. Our results show that the dramatic erosion of support experienced by Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter was not generated by some inescapable dynamic; rather, it was a product of the interaction between outcomes and public attention.

A Potentially Vicious Circle

To assess the impact of the reciprocal relationship on presidential support, we turn to the derived reduced form equations. It is necessary, therefore, to solve the structural equations so that each endogenous variable is expressed as a function of the exogenous variables. Applying this procedure to equations (8) and (9) yields the following derived reduced form equations:

$$D_t = \{1/(1-a_1 b_1)\}\,[a_0 + a_1 b_0 + \Sigma\, a_k Z_{kt} + a_1\ \Sigma\, b_J X_{Jt} + a_1 e_t + f_t] \tag{12}$$

$$A_t = \{1/(1-a_1 b_1)\}\,[b_1 a_0\, \mathrm{b}_0 + \Sigma\, b_J X_{Jt} + b_1\ \Sigma\, a_k Z_{kt} + e_t + b_1 f_t]. \tag{13}$$

The reduced form coefficients are the impact multipliers, which indicate how the path of the exogenous variables influences the short-run behavior of the endogenous variables. The weight, $\{(1/(1-a_1 b_1)\}$, represents the amplification that results from the reciprocal relationship.

Substituting the estimated value of a_1 and b_1 into this expression shows that the impact of each exogenous variable is amplified by 5% as a result of the reciprocal relationship. Multiplying the structural coefficients for the exogenous variables in the approval equation by 1.05 thus provides a measure of their total (direct and indirect) effect on each of the endogenous variables. Such an exercise leads to three conclusions. First, the amplification created by the reciprocal relationship is rather modest: in other words, the circle is not particularly vicious. For example, the total impact of a 10-point change in the economic misery index will reduce the level of public support by 19.4 points (18.4 direct and 1 point via the indirect enhancement). The relatively small magnitude suggests that, in the short run, the reciprocal relationship will not create an irreversible downward momentum in public support. Second, it is possible to estimate the effect that the exogenous determinants of public support exert on the legislative success by combining the impact multiplier (1.05 × coefficient) with a_1, the approval coefficient. This procedure shows, for example, that a 10-point decline in economic misery will reduce legislative success by approximately 6 points. Third, although modest, the simultaneous relationship underscores the importance of approval as a resource. Drops in A_t will produce drops in D_t which, in turn, will fuel further declines in A_t. Thus, a period of adverse change in outcomes may produce a vicious circle in which both the support and presidential influence over decision makers declines and weakens the president's ability to influence the outcomes for which he is held accountable.

Simulating Popular Support

The estimated promise and performance model provides the base from which it is possible to use the model to generate inferences about the path of presidential approval outside the 1953-1980 sample period. In doing so, we have opted to use all of the information at our disposal. Specifically, we utilize a simulation procedure that uses information about both the structural and disturbance term relationships. Our goal is simply the most accurate forecasts possible. Therefore, the forecasts are generated from the derived reduced form equations associated with equations (12*) and (13*).[16]

The hallmark of any model is an ability to account for data that are not part of the sample used to estimate the model parameters. Accordingly, our empirical evaluation will be augmented by applying the model to the first three years of the Reagan administration and conducting a forecast evaluation. The Reagan term offers an especially rigorous test because the course of his popular support has been highly unusual, particularly when examined in light of the inevitable erosion theme. Reagan's initial approval level was 51%, the lowest starting level in the history of the Gallup poll. It rose steadily to 68% in May, 1981, and from that point fell steadily until it reached 36% in January, 1983. This decline was reversed as Reagan's support rose to 55% in December, 1983. This reversal is noteworthy for two reasons. First, no president since Eisenhower has earned a higher approval rating after three years in office. Second, Reagan was the first president in the history of the Gallup poll to drop below 40% and then sustain a 50% + level.

---

[16] This can be accomplished by taking the equations from note 12 and deriving the reduced form. As stated in note 13, an estimate for p_{13} could not be obtained; consequently, we have set $p_{13} = 0$ to derive the reduced form for the simulation.

As a first step in the forecast evaluation, the required monthly data were collected for the period from January, 1981, to December, 1983. All variables were calculated according to the same rules used in the estimation phase of the analysis. Thirty-six *ex post* forecasts were generated by combining coefficients displayed in Table 4 with monthly data from 1981-1983. The resulting forecasts are presented in Table 5. The results indicate that the ability of the model to track Reagan's level of approval is quite good. The model captures the early increase in approval which resulted from the attempted assassination as well as the general decline in support from late 1981 to January, 1983. The model does not predict the jump in approval recorded in the months before the assassination attempt and underpredicts the support levels between February and August, 1981. Most gratifying, however, is the ability of the model to predict the substantial rise in Reagan's support during 1983. There were three developments in 1983 which explain this recovery. The first is an improved economy. After an initial rise in 1983, the misery index declined from 15.4 in June to 11.8 in December. Second, the adverse impact of the economy was further reduced owing to a marked shift in public attention. Between March and December, 1983, the proportion of the public citing inflation or unemployment as the most important problem dropped from 79% to 43%, whereas the percentage identifying foreign affairs rose from 6% to 37%. Third, several crises in late 1983—the Soviet downing of KAL 007, the bombing of the Marine compound in Beirut, and U.S. military action in Grenada—triggered a substantial rally effect. The result of these developments was to create a political context more reminiscent of the Eisenhower-Kennedy years than the context that confronted Reagan's more immediate predecessors.

In sum, the model produces accurate *ex post* forecasts which offer a plausible explanation for the time path of Reagan's public support. This judgment is reinforced by the measures conventionally used to evaluate *ex post* forecasts. The .91 correlation between actual and predicted values and a root mean square error of 3.21 rating points provide strong grounds for concluding that the forecasting performance of the model is very good. The fact that the model is able to generate forecasts of approval outside of the sample period, coupled with the accuracy of these forecasts, suggests that the model has substantial potential for generalizing about future presidents. As such, it stands in marked contrast to previous models, which cannot forecast owing to the presence of term-specific variables and coefficients.

Conclusions and Implications for Subsequent Research

On the basis of this empirical investigation, the promise and performance model has been shown to 1) provide a very accurate explanation for public support during the 1953-1980 period, 2) account for the differences in texture from one administration to another, and 3) generate accurate *ex post* forecasts. Thus, the evaluation of the model offers reliable and extensive evidence in support of what Kernell (1978, p. 520) has termed the "conventional political wisdom." These results indicate that public assessments of presidential performance are anchored in the real world; that is, approval of the president depends upon the quality of social, economic, and international outcomes experienced by the public.

This research also leads to more elaborate and specific description of this conventional wisdom.

$$
\begin{aligned}
D_t = {} & \{1/(1-a_1b_1)\}\,[(1-p_{11}-p_{12})a_0 + (1-p_{21})a_1b_0 \\
& + (p_{11}-b_1a_1p_{21})D_{t-1} + p_{12}D_{t-2} \\
& - a_1(p_{21} - p_{11})A_{t-1} - a_1p_{12}A_{t-2} \\
& + \Sigma\, a_k(Z_{kt} - p_{11}Z_{kt-1} - p_{12}Z_{kt-2}) \\
& + a_1\, \Sigma\, b_j(X_{jt} - p_{21}X_{jt-1}) + a_1w_t + v_t\}] \qquad (12^*)
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
A_t = {} & \{1/(1-a_1b_1)\}\,\{(1-p_{11}-p_{12})a_0b_1 \\
& + (1-p_{21})b_0 + (p_{21}-b_1a_1p_{11})A_{t-1} \\
& - b_1a_1p_{12}A_{t-2} + b_1(p_{11}-p_{21})D_{t-1} - b_1p_{12}D_{t-2} \\
& + b_1\, \Sigma\, a_k(Z_{kt}-p_{11}Z_{kt-1}-p_{12}Z_{kt-2}) \\
& \Sigma\, b_j(X_{jt} - p_{21}X_{jt-1}) + b_1v_t + w_t\}. \qquad (13^*)
\end{aligned}
$$

Note that this procedure is similar to that suggested by Pindyck and Rubinfeld's (1981, pp. 593-605) discussion of transfer function models.

Table 5. Ex Post Forecasts, 1981-1983

		Actual A_t	Predicted A_t	Prediction Error
1981	January	51.0	52.0	−1.0
	February	53.0	46.2	6.8
	March	60.0	52.8	7.2
	April	67.0	61.9	5.1
	May	68.0	65.0	3.0
	June	58.7	57.6	1.1
	July	58.7	56.0	2.7
	August	60.0	57.0	3.0
	September	52.0	57.4	−5.4
	October	54.5	53.8	0.7
	November	52.0	55.4	−3.4
	December	49.0	49.2	−0.2
1982	January	48.0	51.1	−3.1
	February	47.0	47.9	−0.9
	March	46.0	45.5	0.5
	April	44.0	48.0	−4.0
	May	44.5	44.4	0.1
	June	44.5	47.1	−2.6
	July	41.5	43.8	−2.4
	August	41.3	43.2	−1.9
	September	42.0	45.7	−3.7
	October	42.0	42.0	0.0
	November	43.0	44.8	−1.8
	December	41.0	44.0	−3.0
1983	January	36.3	36.1	0.2
	February	40.0	44.1	−4.1
	March	41.0	40.5	0.5
	April	42.0	44.6	−2.6
	May	44.0	41.5	2.5
	June	45.0	43.9	−3.9
	July	43.0	46.9	−3.9
	August	43.5	44.1	−0.6
	September	47.5	47.5	0.0
	October	45.0	51.7	−6.7
	November	53.0	52.5	0.5
	December	55.0	59.4	−4.4

R (Actual with predicted) = .91
RMSE = 3.21

First, it illustrates that the president is held accountable for a broader range of outcomes than suggested in prior research. Although ignored in previous accounts, both the president's legislative performance and his actions toward the USSR operate as important determinants of public support. Additionally, personal setbacks, domestic unrest, diplomatic initiatives, and allegations of wrongdoing constitute general classes of events which can be expected to capture public attention and thus influence the path of public support. The discovery of a reciprocal relationship between public support and presidential fortunes in Congress also integrates two related branches of research. More important, this relationship means that studies of one can no longer ignore the other.

Further, the research demonstrates that the manner in which outcomes influence public support will depend upon the prevailing concerns and attitudes of the public. The results show that the manner in which political stimuli are perceived and filtered by the public is itself a dynamic component of the support decision. For example, the erosion of public support produced by departures from peace and prosperity will depend upon the degree to which public concern is concentrated upon these fundamental expectations; similarly, the reward that flows from an aggressive stance toward the USSR will be enhanced as public attention increasingly focuses on foreign affairs. With respect to public attitudes, the impact of both legislative activity and success will be enhanced or reduced as the level of efficacy changes. Most significantly, the various contexts created by configurations of these attitudes and concerns are not equally beneficial to the president. Our research suggests that the president's ability to maintain public support and the influence that it produces will be enhanced as the public grows more efficacious and preoccupied with foreign affairs.

Several implications follow from this elaboration of the conventional wisdom. From the perspective of democratic theory, we find that presidents are held accountable by the public. Because the PROs are linked to concerns that impinge upon citizen well-being, presidents must operate before a public that is quick to reward and to punish; it is not, as some accounts suggest, a constituency indifferent to politics or unaware of the political environment.

This accountability assumes a specific and limited form, however. The ability of the presidentially relevant variable set to explain the pattern of support suggests that accountability hinges primarily upon results.[17] This provides a president with certain advantages. The range of instruments available to a president does not appear to be severely constrained by this relationship and, therefore, presidential innovation and experimentation are not circumscribed. There are costs imposed on the president as well. To the extent that problems are intractable or disapproval-enhancing events uncontrollable, the president will be penalized by this accountability.

Perhaps most important, the results allow us to address a fundamental issue pertaining to public opinion and the presidency. The question revolves about the possibility and methods of presidential management. First of all, our results imply that management is possible. We have shown that the time path of public support is not governed by some repeatable and unalterable term-based dynamic. Rather, it is experiential and evolves from the president's track record in satisfying public expectations. Decay is not inevitable and any decline in public support can be reversed. Thus, we are led to the conclusion that public support is amenable to presidential management and influence.

To say that management is possible does not, however, imply that it is simple. Quite obviously, the president's fundamental task is to move the outcomes for which he is held accountable in a desirable direction. Contrary to the assumptions employed in some analyses, the task is more complex than choosing a lever and deciding when it will be pulled. The problem confronting the president, particularly in the realm of economic decision making, is that his authority to act is constrained by the control that Congress exercises over budgets and program authorization. In this sense, presidential attempts to influence outcomes will depend upon an ability to persuade, an ability that itself is tied to the prevailing level of public support.

The president is not without recourse, however. Although his ability to influence the determinants of public support is constrained in some areas, it is comparatively unconstrained in others. The president has a relatively free hand in the diplomatic and military agenda, and our results indicate that summitry as well as sabre rattling can be expected to enhance the president's public support. Although the political benefits of such actions are transitory, the president can engage in these forms of political drama (MacKuen, 1983) to create windows of opportunity for increasing his leverage over other decision makers and thereby influencing governmental actions under their control. Reliance on the political stage may also prove useful for presidential attempts to alter the concerns of the public, another strategy that is implied by our analysis. In this regard, the president's objective is to divert attention from divisive concerns and focus or reinforce attention on problems (e.g., the USSR) that produce a more benevolent context for evaluating the president's efforts.

In sum, our analysis emphasizes that presidents have a strong incentive to influence public support and feasible strategies for engaging in this task. It also suggests that public support will operate as a determinant of presidential decision making. The level of public support may not only expand or contract the range of decision alternatives available to a president (Light, 1982; Neustadt, 1980), but it also influences the president's choice and timing of alternatives (e.g., Ostrom & Job, 1982; Rohde & Simon, 1983). This, in turn, suggests that the study of public support is simultaneously a study of presidential decision making. Thus, it becomes important to study the manner in which public support influences the president's substantive goals, his agenda for action, and his choices to use the prerogatives of the office. It is our belief that such research will show more clearly that it is the interaction of citizen and presidential decisions which acts as the driving force underlying public support. As such, a growing concern with presidential decision making promises to extend the prevailing research agenda on modern presidential government.

---

[17] Our analysis also raises a question about the extent to which support may be a function of the methods and programs selected by a president to influence the environment. Essentially, this question revolves about the relative impact of outcomes versus ideology on public support. It is not possible, however, to address this concern in the context of an aggregate model. Yet, given suitable data, two possible effects of ideology can be investigated. First, ideology may influence the individual's propensity to support the president in an a priori sense. To use the Reagan case as an example, conservatives may be predisposed to support the president regardless of outcomes. Second, ideology may also mediate the impact of outcomes in the sense of reducing or enhancing their effects. Thus, we would expect the reaction coefficients for each PRO to be different for liberals and conservatives. In the Reagan case, we would anticipate that liberals will display a tendency to discount outcomes that are improving and to magnify those that grow worse. A research design for testing these propositions would require disaggregated data at the individual level for each ideological subset. Unfortunately, such data are not available at this time.

References

Abramson, P. *Political attitudes in America.* San Francisco: Freeman, 1983.

Abramson, P., Aldrich, J., & Rohde, D. *Continuity and change in the 1980 elections.* Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1982.

Amemiya, T. The non-linear two-stage least squares estimator. *Journal of Econometrics,* 1974, *2,* 105-110.

Azar, E. *Conflict and peace data bank (COPDAB), 1948-1978: Daily aggregation.* Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, ICPSR 7767, 1982.

Azar, E., & Havener, T. Discontinuities in the symbolic environment: A problem in scaling events. *International Interactions,* 1976, *2,* 231-246.

Brody, R. That special moment: The public response to international crises. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Seattle, Washington, 1983.

Brody, R., & Page, B. I. The impact of events on presidential popularity. In A. Wildavsky (Ed.). *Perspectives on the presidency.* Boston: Little, Brown, 1975.

Cronin, T. *The state of the presidency* (2nd ed.). Boston: Little, Brown, 1980.

Davis, O., Hinich, M., & Ordeshook, P. An expository development of a mathematical model of the electoral process. *American Political Science Review,* 1970, *64,* 426-448.

Fishel, J. From campaign promise to presidential performance. Presented at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., June 20, 1979.

George, A., & Keohane, F. The concept of national interest. In A. George (Ed.). *Presidential decision-making in foreign policy.* Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980, pp. 217-238.

Greenstein, F. *The hidden hand presidency.* New York: Basic Books, 1982.

Haight, T., & Brody, R. The mass media and presidential popularity. *Communications Research,* 1977, January, 41-60.

Hibbs, D. A., Jr. On the demands for economic outcomes: Macroeconomic performance and mass political support in the United States. *Journal of Politics,* 1982, *34,* 426-462. (a)

Hibbs, D. A., Jr. The dynamics of political support for American presidents among occupational and partisan groups. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1982, *26,* 312-332. (b)

Hibbs, D. A., Jr. President Reagan's mandate from the 1980 elections. *American Politics Quarterly,* 1982, *10,* 387-420. (c)

Hibbs, D. A., Jr., & Fassbender, H. (Eds.). *Contemporary political economy.* Amsterdam: North Holland, 1981.

Hodgson, G. *All things to all men.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980.

Iyengar, S. Subjective political efficacy as a measure of diffuse support. *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 1980, *44,* 249-256.

Kenski, H. The impact of economic conditions on presidential popularity. *Journal of Politics,* 1977, *39,* 764-773. (b)

Kenski, H. Inflation and presidential popularity. *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 1977, *41,* 86-90.

Kernell, S. Explaining presidential popularity. *American Political Science Review,* 1978, *72,* 506-522.

Kernell, S. Presidential popularity and negative voting. *American Political Science Review,* 1977, *71,* 44-66.

Klein, L. *A textbook of econometrics.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974.

Kmenta, J. *Elements of econometrics.* New York: Macmillan, 1971.

Lee, J. Rallying around the flag. *Presidential Studies Quarterly,* 1977, *7,* 252-256.

Light, P. *The president's agenda.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982.

Lipset, S. M., & Schneider, W. *The confidence gap.* New York: Free Press, 1983.

MacKuen, M. Political drama, economic conditions, and the dynamics of presidential popularity. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1983, *27,* 165-192.

McCleary, R., & Hay, R. Jr. *Applied time series analysis.* Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1980.

Monroe, K. Presidential popularity: An Almon distributed lag model. *Political Methodology,* 1981, *7,* 43-70.

Mueller, J. Presidential popularity from Truman to Johnson. *American Political Science Review,* 1970, *64,* 18-34.

Mueller, J. *War, presidents, and public opinion.* New York: Wiley, 1973.

Neustadt, R. *Presidential power.* New York: Wiley, 1980.

Norpoth, H., & Yantek, T. Macroeconomic conditions and fluctuations of presidential popularity. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1983, *27,* 785-807.

Ostrom, C., & Job, B. The president and the political use of force. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Denver, Colorado, 1982.

Ostrom, C., & Simon, D. Managing popular support. *Policy Studies Journal,* 1984, *12,* 677-690.

Pindyck, R., & Rubinfeld, D. *Econometric models and economic forecasts.* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1981.

Riker, W., & Ordeshook, P. *An introduction to positive political theory.* Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1973.

Rivers, D., & Rose, R. Passing the president's program. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Cincinnati, Ohio, 1981.

Rohde, D., & Simon, D. Presidential vetoes and the congressional response. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, 1983.

Searing, D., Wright, S., & Rabinowitz, G. The primacy principle: Attitude change and political socialization. *British Journal of Politics,* 1976, *6,* 83-113.

Stimson, J. Public support for American presidents. *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 1976, *40,* 1-21.

Tufte, E. Determinants of outcomes of midterm congressional elections. *American Political Science Review,* 1975, *69,* 812-826.

Wildavsky, A. The two presidencies. *Trans-Action,* *166*(4), 7-14.

Throwing the Rascals Out: Policy and Performance Evaluations of Presidential Candidates, 1952-1980

ARTHUR H. MILLER
University of Iowa

MARTIN P. WATTENBERG
University of California, Irvine

This article explores two dimensions of public evaluations of presidential candidates on the basis of open-ended survey questions from 1952 to 1980. The first dimension looks at whether citizens evaluate candidates on the basis of policies, performance, or strictly candidate attributes; the second examines the time perspective of these assessments, that is, whether they are retrospective or prospective. It is found that incumbents have been judged primarily on the basis of retrospective performance, challengers on prospective policy, and candidates running in nonincumbent races on prospective performance. Throughout the period from 1952 to 1980 both policy and performance considerations have become increasingly related to the vote. Except for 1964, performance has outweighed policy as a predictor of the vote, with an emphasis on retrospective evaluations whenever an incumbent runs for reelection and on prospective assessments in nonincumbent races. The 1964 case provides the best example of a policy mandate, with the 1972 election also fitting the pattern to a lesser degree. The data for the 1980 election, however, fail to support the claim of a mandate for Reagan's policy stands.

The topic of issue voting is one of the most important and widely researched subjects in the study of American political science. The extent to which issues affect electoral choices has been a controversial question for decades, and with the advent of an extended time series of adequate survey data, a heated debate has also arisen concerning whether the electorate is now more issue oriented than in the past (see Asher, 1980, chap. 4; Converse, 1975; Kessel, 1972 for insightful reviews of this literature).

One of many problems in the issue voting controversy is defining what we mean by issues in the first place. Virtually any topic that is discussed in a political campaign involves a debatable point between the candidates and can therefore be considered an issue. As Stokes (1966) has pointed out, even matters on which the candidates agree about basic goals such as peace and prosperity can be considered issues. These he termed "valence issues," in that they link the candidates with some condition that is either positively or negatively valued by the electorate. What is critical in this case is not the means by which a problem is solved (i.e., policy preferences), but rather whether or not the problem is solved (i.e., performance in office). Such a distinction is critical for drawing appropriate substantive interpretations from election outcomes as well as for evaluating the functioning of democratic systems. In the former, a policy mandate is conveyed by the voters; in the latter, voters merely reward or punish based on performance considerations.

Another crucial dimension underlying theoretical considerations of issue voting is the electorate's time perspective, as Fiorina (1981) and Abramson, Aldrich, and Rhode (1982) have recently reminded us. The concern here is whether voters make decisions retrospectively, looking to the past, or prospectively, holding expectations for the future. If voters focus solely on the past, then they can only ratify or reject, whereas if prospective voting occurs, then they can also guide in the form of a mandate.

These conceptual distinctions between retrospective versus prospective and policy versus performance voting are thus of great significance. At the individual level these dimensions hold implications for voter rationality and information availability (see Fiorina, 1981). For example, the information-seeking costs necessary to evaluate the past performance of an administration are far less than those needed to assess a set of future government policies. At the collective level, inter-

---

Received: November 4, 1983
Revision received: August 1, 1984
Accepted for publication: October 3, 1984

pretations of election outcomes often depend on whether people vote retrospectively or prospectively on the basis of policy or performance. These concerns loom particularly large after an incumbent is defeated and the victor inevitably claims a mandate to redirect government policy. But does the electorate really consider a challenger's program and promises for the future, or do voters merely throw the incumbent administration out if it is unable to produce satisfactory outcomes to the nation's problems? The major substantive works on the subject leave us with contradictory answers and a good measure of conceptual confusion.

V.O. Key's work on the subject has been profoundly influential and is usually interpreted as placing "primary emphasis on policy outcomes rather than the means that lead to those outcomes" (Fiorina, 1981, p. 194). Yet Key's writing at times suggests that the focus of issue voting could be either policy or performance. For example, he writes:

> If public opinion expresses itself with relative clarity in retrospective disapproval of performance or policy, it may also express itself in the same manner in confirmation or ratification of past policy or performance. Only infrequently is a new program or a new course of action advocated with such force and the attention it receives so widespread that the polling may be regarded as advance approval of a proposed course of action (1961, p. 474).

Downs (1957), on the other hand, gives greater weight to policy alternatives as the basis of the vote decision. Fiorina (1981, p. 13) summarizes the differences between Downs and Key by saying:

> Under the Downsian view, elections have policy implications. . . . The Downsian citizen compares the challenger's and the incumbent's platforms, interpreting the matter in light of the incumbent's past performance. But under the traditional theory (V.O. Key), elections have no policy implications other than a generalized acceptance or rejection of the status quo.

Fiorina's use of the term "performance," however, appears to correspond more closely with Key's meaning—how effectively a problem is being handled—than with the Downsian notion of performance. Indeed, although Downs's use of the term "performance" is less than totally unambiguous, it seems clear that performance evaluations deal with a comparison of the policies associated with different parties or candidates. In fact Downs (1957, p. 43) defines the term "performance rating" as involving a comparison of "the utility incomes (voters) are actually receiving with those they would be receiving if the *ideal* government were in power." Performance ratings, he suggests, are employed by voters when both parties *currently* have identical policies and platforms or the policies of different parties produce identical utility incomes.

Thus when Key and Downs use the term "performance," they obviously have different concepts in mind. Voting for a party because it has worked hard toward peace is not the same as supporting that party because its policies or programs are considered to be the best means of producing peace. Regardless of whether the comparison hinges on current platforms or the preferred positions of an ideal government, any vote decision based on consideration of alternative programs is policy rather than performance voting. Performance rating in the Downsian sense, therefore, seems to be a misnomer. For the purpose of conceptual clarity, Key's definition of performance assessments appears preferable in our judgment.

Turning to the time dimension, Key was a clear proponent of retrospective voting. According to Key the vote decision usually does not reflect a considered endorsement of a proposed set of policies nor does it typically suggest anticipated future performance. In contrast, using the past as a guide to future expectations is a feature of both Downs's and Fiorina's thinking on the subject. If incumbents are judged by the electorate to have done poorly in the past, then they will not be expected to perform well in the future. Of course the incumbent may still be preferred when compared with the expected future performance of the challenger. In short, the past performance of both competing parties is compared and projected onto what the parties can be expected to do in the future. In fact Fiorina (1981, p. 197) states that "In analysis after analysis, future expectations dwarfed the effects of retrospective judgments."

In summary, from V.O. Key's model of retrospective voting emerges an image of voters as an avenging lot who reward or punish the incumbent administration for its past performance. Downs, on the other hand, tends to emphasize policy instruments combined with a concern about which party will provide the maximum satisfaction in the future. Projections into the future, but regarding outcomes rather than the means to attaining those results, form the core of the vote decision for Fiorina.

Assessing the Validity of Available Measures

Despite the significant theoretical implications associated with the two dimensions differentiating retrospective from prospective and policy from performance voting, little attention has been devoted to ascertaining whether or not these distinctions are empirically verifiable. Although Fiorina and Abramson et al. are sensitive to the importance of adequately measuring this two-dimensional structure, they devote virtually no time to demonstrating the validity of the indicators used to operationalize these concepts. Face validity is surprisingly the only criterion used by these investigators to classify survey questions as measuring retrospective rather than prospective, or policy rather than performance assessments; the personal judgment of these social scientists and the language of the survey questions are the only evidence to support these important theoretical distinctions.

The weakness of this evidence is readily apparent from the lack of agreement in their respective classifications. For example, Fiorina (p. 138) concludes that the question about which party would best handle the most important problem facing the country is clearly prospective. Abramson et al. (p. 146), however, argue that this question could be either retrospective or prospective, and they caution that "some of the most important problems cited are less clearly retrospective than others. Comparability and interpretability problems thereby are raised." Similarly, these authors differ in their interpretations of the seven-point issues scales used in the election studies to measure proximity voting. Abramson et al. (chaps. 6 and 7) are quite emphatic in their use of these scales to measure prospective policy. Fiorina (p. 143), on the other hand, condemns the items noting that "the time perspective is hopelessly muddied. Thus use of the seven-point scales . . . confounds the attempt to analyze the comparative importance of retrospective judgments and future expectations."

Fiorina at least recognizes this validity problem. Throughout his book he tells us that available survey items seldom contain a clear time perspective or enable one to separate policy instruments from policy outcomes. Yet this apparent measurement confusion does not deter him from concluding that future expectations greatly outweigh the effects of retrospective evaluations. Likewise, acknowledged measurement problems do not prevent Abramson et al. from concluding that the 1980 election was evenly balanced between retrospective and prospective voting (p. 197). But how can we be at all certain that these conclusions are correct, given these measurement difficulties?

An initial step that can be taken in assessing the magnitude of these difficulties involves a more rigorous examination of the measurement properties and interrelationships among the available survey items. We therefore conducted a factor analysis of several items from the 1980 National Election Study that were thought to capture the two dimensions of Fiorina's retrospective voting model. From this we can learn much about the individual items and, furthermore, ascertain whether the public in fact comprehends the world of politics according to the hypothesized latent dimensions.

In general the results of the factor analysis provide support for the hypothesized distinctions between policy and performance and prospective versus retrospective evaluations, as a four-dimensional solution was uncovered. The factor loadings for the varimax rotated solution shown in Table 1 suggest factors representing retrospective performance, prospective performance, personal retrospective evaluations, and prospective policy considerations.

The first dimension consists heavily of retrospective assessments of how well President Carter was handling his job and several specific governmental problems such as inflation, unemployment, and the hostage crisis in Iran. In contrast, the second factor is defined primarily by prospective items which ask how well Reagan *would* do on the economy, providing strong leadership and developing good relations with other countries if he were president. A comparable set of items asking how Carter would do fell onto the first factor, however.[1] Despite the future orientation of these questions, people apparently responded to them in a retrospective fashion, thereby demonstrating the weakness of their face validity. There is some overlap, though, between the two factors on Reagan's expected performance, indicating that people make some comparison of the incumbent's past record to the future potential of the challenger. A similar overlap is also evident on the questions concerning Carter's handling of the Iran and Afghanistan crises. Nevertheless, the evidence is clear enough to conclude that the public does distinguish between retrospective and prospective performance assessments of the candidates.

Evaluations of one's personal financial situation form yet a third distinct factor. These items which tap direct experience with economic conditions are labeled simple retrospective evaluations by Fiorina (p. 80). In contrast, assessments of how a given political actor or agency is dealing with a

---

[1] The only difference between the Reagan and Carter items is that the former ask about how well the phrases describe "Reagan if he were president," whereas the latter ask about "Carter as president." Yet, work on survey research methodology shows that what is important is the direct question, which is clearly written in prospective terms, and not the introduction.

This illustrates how the election study often confuses the time dimension in its questions, although in this case respondents apparently sorted it out and focused on past performance.

Table 1. Factor Loadings for 1980 Survey Questions Presumed to Measure Issue Assessments[a]

	Retrospective Performance	Prospective Performance	Personal Retrospective Evaluations	Prospective Policy
Presidential job approval	.78			
Carter handling inflation	.71			
Carter handling unemployment	.61			
Carter handling Iran	.60	.26		
Carter handling Afghanistan	.30	.20		
Government job on most important problem	.27			
Which party would handle inflation	.43	.46		.45
Which party would handle unemployment	.36	.50		.35
Which party would handle most important problem	–.42	–.53		–.29
Carter would solve economic problems	.76			
Carter would provide strong leadership	.81			
Carter would develop foreign relations	.64	.21		
Reagan would solve economic problems	–.29	.73		
Reagan would provide strong leadership	–.30	–.63		
Personal finances last year			.68	
Personal finances next year			.45	
Income stayed ahead of inflation			.65	
Individual hurt by inflation			–.48	
Business conditions last year	.37			
Business conditions next year	.26		.33	–.21
Carter increases defense spending	–.37	–.21		.34
Reagan increases defense spending				.40
Carter decreases government services				.49
Reagan decreases government services		.27		–.38
Carter cut taxes	–.22			–.29
Reagan cut taxes				.31

[a] Only loadings of .20 or larger are presented.

problem he terms mediated retrospective evaluations. We prefer to call these latter judgments politicized evaluations in order to differentiate them from personal retrospective evaluations for which that connection is not salient, such as those in the third factor.

These results appear to confirm Kinder and Kiewiet's (1979) contention of a separation between self-interest and collective judgments. However, our interpretation of this phenomenon differs somewhat from theirs. The factor loadings of the personal economic concerns coincides with the argument that people generally do not connect their own situation with politics because they are self- rather than system-blaming (Brody & Sniderman, 1977; Kinder & Kiewiet, 1979). The difference in interpretation comes with regard to the items presumed to measure collective orientation. The types of measures used by Kinder and Kiewiet to represent collective judgments (including the question on the state of the national economy) all load on the retrospective performance factor in Table 1. In short, the presumed collective evaluations are more strongly correlated with the vote choice because they reflect *politicized* retrospective judgments, not because they are collective in content.

The final factor appears to reflect a concern with prospective policies. Contrary to Fiorina's contention, the seven-point scales are free of any contamination with evaluations of past candidate performance. Of course the results may have been different if the analysis had been based on proximity measures incorporating both the respondent's position and his or her placement of the candidates on the scale. However, the candidate placements alone are more theoretically appropriate to our concerns as the critical focus of prospective policy evaluations centers on the types of actions voters believe the candidates will take if elected. The factor loadings for these items suggest a set of citizen concerns focused on policy instruments in the future.

Much less clearly conveyed by the factor structure, however, is the reference for the set of items that ask which party would better handle various problems. Although Fiorina argues that these questions are future oriented, the factor analysis demonstrates that they are thoroughly confounded with both retrospective and prospective performance, as well as overlapping with concerns about future policy actions. Yet the results do provide some evidence for Fiorina's notion that judgments of political parties are reflections of the past projected onto the future. At the same time, the results also confirm the suggestion that beliefs about which party will best handle a particular problem are shaped partly by evaluations of the past and expected future performance of the current candidates for office (Kinder & Kiewiet, 1979, p. 519).

In summary, Table 1 provides evidence for the contention that the public both differentiates a time perspective and distinguishes between policy and performance when evaluating candidates for president. The results also show a common limitation in recent work on retrospective voting, namely that these studies are based on measures that are not well designed to distinguish either retrospective from prospective considerations or policy from performance concerns. Indeed, as Fiorina acknowledges, this problem plagues his whole project. Moreover, even the limited number of questions that can be shown to differentiate these dimensions properly occur primarily in only the very recent election studies, thereby preventing direct comparisons over an extended time span.

An Alternative Approach

In an attempt to overcome some of these limitations we use an alternative approach to the subject based on open-ended questions that ask respondents what they like and dislike about each of the presidential candidates. Because these questions have been asked in an identical fashion in all of the SRC/CPS studies since 1952, direct comparisons can be made across time. Furthermore, these questions are particularly useful for our purposes because they impose no constraints on how respondents conceptualize political issues.

There are, however, some limitations to the open-ended questions that we readily acknowledge. On each individual question many respondents fail to give any substantive response, and roughly 10% in any given year have nothing at all to say to any of the candidate questions. Thus our ability to investigate how people process information relevant to judgments of the candidates is constrained by the lack of articulateness among some respondents. Also, interviewers occasionally fail to probe sufficiently so as to code the answers properly according to our theoretical interests. For example, if someone simply says he likes Nixon because of Vietnam, we do not know whether this is a policy or performance statement unless the interviewer elicits a further response.

Despite these limitations, the open-ended questions provide the richest set of available evidence for investigating issue evaluations over time. Indeed, the fact that the same limitations hold true in each year provides a control for these shortcomings. Changes that may be evident in the preponderance of retrospective rather than prospective or policy versus performance responses at different time points should thus reflect real differences and not methodological artifacts created by new or revised survey questions.

The only major drawback we faced in utilizing the like/dislike questions was that the data were not suitably coded for our theoretical interests. As coded in the ICPSR released datasets, the responses do not contain a time perspective, nor do they consistently separate policy from performance. Therefore we returned to the original handwritten transcripts of the interviews in order to recode the data—a very substantial task given that over 13,000 respondents have been asked these questions since 1952.

The coding scheme was designed to differentiate retrospective from prospective comments and policy from performance for each of the like/dislike questions. Rather than attempting to code each individual remark, we chose simply to code the complete answer to each question. Because some of the answers contained a mix of comments, we used a multiple category code with varying gradations of certainty. The time dimension code, for example, ranged from clearly retrospective through mixed to clearly prospective. Similarly, the second dimension was coded with a five-point scale running from clearly performance to clearly policy oriented.

On the second dimension we also included a set of code categories that refer to candidate attributes without any obvious policy or performance content. Many candidates attributes, such as past political experience, decisiveness in making decisions, and the ability to follow through on promises clearly convey performance-relevant information. However, other personal attributes such as age, speaking style, and charisma hold less obvious implications. To avoid clouding the distinction between policy and performance, responses about candidate attributes were assigned a separate code unless they contained an unambiguous policy or performance reference.

The task of differentiating a time perspective or separating policy from performance judgments may seem rather difficult in the abstract; in reality, though, most of the comments were relatively easy to code. The examples presented below are taken from the 1964 and 1980 studies and illustrate the various categories:

Retrospective Performances

Dislike Carter: He didn't get the hostages out of Iran.

So many things—inflation, unemployment, Iran. The hostage situation is deplorable.

He just hasn't done anything right.

Dislike Goldwater: For dogcatcher he's okay. Can't see that he ever did anything good as senator.

Retrospective Policy

Dislike Carter: I don't understand why he cut back on food stamps. People in this country are still poor.

He used the surprise rescue attempt to get the hostages out when he said there'd be no military action. Why didn't he negotiate with them?

Dislike Reagan: I didn't like what he did as governor. His tax changes favored the super-rich not the middle class.

Like Johnson: His foreign policies are more American-oriented. He doesn't give those other countries so much money.

Prospective Performance

Like Reagan: He is the one man who can curb government deficits.

Dislike Reagan: The country will be at war with him as president.

Dislike Goldwater: He won't follow up on his promises.

Like Johnson: He's good with other countries. At least we won't have war with him.

Prospective Policy

Like Reagan: His plan for cutting taxes and reducing the size of government is a sure fire cure for inflation.

Like Carter: I hope he does something different if reelected. He says older people will be helped by increasing Medicare. I think he's going to get workers to pay more Social Security.

Of course all the responses did not fit as clearly into the code categories as those shown above. Nevertheless, an intercoder reliability check, determined by having different coders duplicate the coding of 625 cases, showed a reliability coefficient of .87 for the time dimension and .80 for the policy/performance distinction. Such a high level of reliability gives us confidence in the quality of the data and reassures us that the concepts are meaningful descriptions of how voters organize their cognitions of candidates and issues. (For further details on the coding procedures, as well as the procedure for the calculating intercoder reliability, please see the Coding Appendix.)

Issue Evaluations of the Candidates, 1952-1980

Initially these data can be utilized to determine the extent to which the policy/performance and retrospective/prospective dimensions are used to evaluate presidential candidates. By aggregating data from the eight presidential election studies between 1952 and 1980 we find that candidate performance assessments have outnumbered policy considerations by nearly two to one. Whereas 41.6% of the open-ended responses focused on performance, only 23.7% were about policy instruments. Another 4.5% of the comments were mixed between policy and performance, and the remaining 30.2% centered purely on candidate attributes. These latter comments were the most likely to be positive (58.7%), adding yet another piece of confirmatory evidence for Sears's (1969, 1983) positivity bias theory. Of the performance responses, 54.2% were positive compared to only 48.5% for the policy comments. Thus, all other things being equal, candidates for office have the most incentive to draw public attention to their personal characteristics and the least incentive to highlight policy matters—a strategy that many have followed in the past.

These categories vary greatly in terms of the time referent that people use with them. Overall, 67.0% of the open-ended responses were coded as retrospective, 29.4% as prospective, and 3.6% as mixed. Virtually all of the candidate-attribute responses were coded as retrospective, with the only major exceptions being comments about Eisenhower's health or Reagan's age, which imply that they might not be able to complete their terms. Retrospective judgments dominated the performance category by slightly over three to one, whereas the policy category was almost evenly divided between retrospective and prospective comments. One might expect retrospective responses to be more positive than prospective responses, as they are more likely to consist of attribute and performance references. However, this bias notwithstanding we find that only 50.4% of the retrospective comments were positive compared to 59.2% of the prospective comments. This finding is reflective of V.O. Key's notion that retrospective judgments often involve "throwing the rascals out." Looking to the future generally evokes more optimism.

Of course aggregating the data from all eight election studies hides many theoretically interesting differences concerning how individual candidates have been evaluated. On a general level, for example, one would expect that incumbents should be judged quite differently from challengers. Because they have a past record of achievement in office, incumbents are more likely to be evaluated on the basis of retrospective performance. Challengers have to be evaluated more prospectively, however, and with a less visible past performance record policy matters are more likely to be salient. More specifically, examining judgments of the individual candidates will shed light on a number of controversies concerning the role of issues in recent elections.

Table 2 displays the marginals on the policy/performance dimension for all presidential candidates from 1952 to 1980 according to whether they were incumbents, challengers, or candidates in a race without an incumbent. As hypothesized, performance evaluations have generally been more salient than policy considerations in public likes and dislikes of incumbents, whereas just the opposite is the case for their challengers. Interestingly, performance assessments also dominate candidate evaluations in races without an incumbent running for reelection. Three possible explanations seem most plausible to explain this. First, in open races such as these it may be that the past performance of the candidate's party shapes his public image. This would be especially likely to occur when a candidate is associated with the incumbent administration, such as Nixon in 1960. Second, there is somewhat less incentive for candidates in nonincumbent races to emphasize policies compared to challengers of incumbents, as the latter need such proposals to put themselves on a more equal footing with incumbents whereas the former do not. Finally, it could simply be that when forced to make a choice between two candidates without presidential experience, voters find it much easier to judge who would do a better job than which policy course to pursue. Comparing two new and untested policy programs may require too much information processing for the average voter.

Table 2. Performance, Policy, and Attribute Responses in Evaluations of Presidential Candidates (%)

		Performance	Mixed	Policy	Attribute
Incumbents					
Eisenhower	1956	27.8	7.9	9.2	55.1
Johnson	1964	32.7	6.5	26.4	34.4
Nixon	1972	39.7	4.6	32.7	23.1
Ford	1976	50.5	2.9	14.1	32.5
Carter	1980	42.9	4.8	15.5	36.8
Mean		38.7	5.3	19.6	36.4
Challengers					
Stevenson	1956	11.2	13.1	15.9	59.7
Goldwater	1964	15.0	5.6	38.9	40.5
McGovern	1972	11.6	2.5	45.7	40.2
Carter	1976	31.9	2.1	21.8	44.2
Reagan	1980	20.0	3.6	38.1	38.3
Mean		17.9	5.4	32.1	44.6
Nonincumbent Races					
Eisenhower	1952	32.4	5.1	5.7	56.7
Stevenson	1952	28.9	9.7	8.4	53.1
Kennedy	1960	19.2	2.8	9.5	68.5
Nixon	1960	35.3	4.2	10.0	50.4
Nixon	1968	31.3	2.1	18.9	47.7
Humphrey	1968	31.1	1.7	22.5	44.7
Mean		29.7	4.3	12.5	53.5

Given the unknown quality of nonincumbents and the fascination of the media with all aspects of the president's personality, one might expect incumbents to be evaluated more on the basis of personal attributes. However, both challengers of incumbents and candidates in nonincumbent races are more likely to evoke a strictly candidate attribute response. One interpretation for the emphasis on candidate attributes arises from previous work on schematic assessments of political leaders (Conover, 1981; Miller, Wattenberg, & Malanchuk, 1982). These studies demonstrate that people will make inferences about the potential performance of candidates from the candidates' personal attributes when there is little available information on the policy positions or past experience of those running for office. Thus the public places more emphasis on what is readily observable. For relatively less well-known candidates it can be expected that personal attributes form the primary focus of attention. In addition, the performance-relevant personal characteristics can be expected to be more apparent for incumbents. For example, in 1980 many respondents remarked about Carter's weakness and lack of decisiveness in a clearly performance-laden fashion. In other words, it may not be that personal attributes are less important in judging incumbents but rather that they are more politicized.

Turning to the individual candidates, it is clear that although Nie, Verba, and Petrocik (1976) failed to separate policy from performance, they were nevertheless correct in arguing that policy alternatives have become more prevalent in candidate evaluations since 1964. In all the possible comparisons candidates from the 1952-1960 period rank lowest in percentage of policy-related comments. Also confirmed is the conventional wisdom concerning the exceptionally high salience of policy questions in the elections of 1964 and 1972. In particular, 1972 stands out as the most policy-oriented election, because a greater percentage commented on Nixon's policies than about any other incumbent, and similarly McGovern was evaluated more on policy matters than any other challenger.

Somewhat less expected, however, is the increase over time in the percentage of performance responses for both incumbents and challengers, which reached its height in the 1976 contest. One explanation is that with the decline of political parties performance assessments are now much more clearly candidate-centered than in the past (see Wattenberg, 1984). Another possible factor is the tremendous growth in the power of the federal government during this period. As presidential performance has assumed greater significance in people's everyday lives, it seems logical that voters would be more likely to evaluate candidates on this basis.

Thus far we have yet to consider the time dimension of the open-ended responses for each particular candidate. From Table 3 it can be seen how the policy/performance dimension combines with the retrospective/prospective dimension for each. Because virtually all the candidate attribute responses were coded as retrospective, we have not incorporated them into Table 3 and will therefore forego any use of the time dimension with respect to attributes throughout the remainder of the analysis. Also, for the purpose of greater clarity, we have eliminated any response with a "mixed" code on either dimension in Table 3.

The prevalence of the joint categories displayed in Table 3 holds considerable theoretical interest. The differentiation between the issue voting models of Key and Downs, for example, depends largely on whether evaluations of the incumbent are mainly retrospective or projected into the future. It is clear that the data are more supportive of Key's model, because very few performance comments about incumbents were prospective in nature. Indeed, even assessments that focused on the incumbent's policies were largely retrospective. All told, 87% of the policy and performance responses regarding incumbents were coded as retrospective. Only in the cases of Johnson and Ford were more than 10% of the issue comments prospective. Having not been elected to the presidency and having served only about half a term, these two candidates had less of a past record and therefore were evaluated somewhat more prospectively.

For challengers of course the picture is vastly different. Performance judgments were split fairly evenly between retrospective and prospective comments, whereas policy responses were predominantly prospective. Thus citizens take into account the challenger's past record of performance (e.g., Carter or Reagan's service as a governor) as well as his or her promised future performance. Policies, however, present a clear case where the incumbent's past program is compared to the proposed program of the challenger.

Finally, in nonincumbent races prospective comments are slightly more prevalent than retrospective ones for both policy and performance. This differs, however, according to whether or not the candidate represents the same party as the outgoing president. Of the comments regarding candidates from the incumbent party, 52% were retrospective compared to only 35% for their opponents. Thus the former are apparently held at least somewhat responsible for the recent performance and policies of their party.

In sum, the data presented in this section sug-

Table 3. Combined Retrospective/Prospective, Performance/Policy Assessments of Candidates (%)

		Retrospective Performance	Prospective Performance	Retrospective Policy	Prospective Policy
Incumbents					
Eisenhower	1956	70.2	5.9	20.6	3.3
Johnson	1964	45.0	10.8	30.9	13.2
Nixon	1972	55.0	1.4	38.5	5.0
Ford	1976	67.1	11.2	15.7	6.1
Carter	1980	70.3	3.6	21.8	4.3
Mean		61.5	6.6	25.5	6.4
Challengers					
Stevenson	1956	29.5	29.9	12.1	28.5
Goldwater	1964	9.6	18.3	22.9	49.1
McGovern	1972	11.5	8.4	19.5	60.6
Carter	1976	27.0	32.8	12.0	28.2
Reagan	1980	15.7	18.6	11.3	54.4
Mean		18.7	21.6	15.6	44.2
Nonincumbent Races					
Eisenhower	1952	33.2	52.2	4.6	10.0
Stevenson	1952	42.1	35.6	9.1	13.2
Kennedy	1960	16.4	50.2	6.3	27.1
Nixon	1960	43.8	34.9	7.2	14.0
Nixon	1968	28.0	34.4	17.2	20.3
Humphrey	1968	29.3	29.0	25.1	16.7
Mean		32.1	39.4	11.6	16.9

gest that the issue voting models of V.O. Key and Anthony Downs were both partly correct and partly incorrect in describing how voters evaluate presidential candidates. Only incumbents appear to be judged as suggested by Key—mindful of the past but attentive primarily to outcomes rather than to policy instruments. The Downsian model, on the other hand, seems to fit best as a description of how citizens judge challengers, as they are assessed primarily in terms of the programs they promise to initiate if elected. The data appear to confirm a common sense notion of rational cognitive processes. When information on past performance is available voters readily form judgments based on this criteria. In this case there is less necessity for them to make inferences about the future. The absence of such concrete information for evaluating nonincumbents, however, allows for greater opportunity for policy innovation by the candidates and greater public concern over the direction of policy. In short, the public appears to act in a highly responsible fashion, basing their evaluations on the most reliable and concrete information available.

Issue Evaluations and the Vote

Having examined the relative preponderance of the substantive categories used by the public to evaluate candidates, we next turn to an assessment of how these evaluations have been translated into the vote. The first step in this investigation is to determine if particular candidates were advantaged or disadvantaged by judgments focused on either policy or performance, past or future. Clearly the categorization of assessments by behavioral focus (policy/performance) and a time perspective will be of little theoretical utility if there is no systematic variation in evaluations with respect to these categories. Table 4, therefore, presents summary figures representing the percentage of voters making positive comments minus the percentage making negative comments for each combination of the policy/performance and retrospective/prospective dimensions, as well as for the attribute dimension.

Clearly the most volatile of the issue categories is retrospective performance. This is largely the result of responses concerning incumbents running for reelection and is reflective of the great public approval of the performance in office of Eisenhower, Johnson, and Nixon, and the unprecedented disapproval of Carter's past performance. In contrast, prospective performance is more likely to yield a substantial partisan advantage in nonincumbent races. Indeed, this is the case in 1952 and 1968, when Eisenhower and Nixon respectively enjoyed an edge on this category.

However, the largest advantage on prospective performance went to Johnson over Goldwater in 1964, with Goldwater receiving the lowest score on this for any candidate in the time series and Johnson receiving the third highest.

The partisan advantage associated with retrospective policy evaluations is the most stable from 1952 to 1980, with the edge usually going to the Democratic candidate. This can be explained by the fact that Democratic candidates are more often positively associated with helping such groups as the working man or any of the variety of groups that made up the New Deal coalition, while Republican candidates are negatively associated with the interests of the rich and big business. Although such responses are sometimes vague, they generally connote helping one group rather than another, that is, a choice of policy directions. The greatest partisan advantage on retrospective policy, however, came as the result of policy regarding one particular individual. This was Ford's pardon of Nixon, which was the focus of many negative retrospective policy comments in 1976.

Only the ideological elections of 1964 and 1972 show much evidence of a substantial partisan advantage on prospective policy. Given a clear choice between future policies in these years, the public responded favorably to the policies they perceived Johnson and Nixon would pursue and negatively toward those of Goldwater and McGovern. Although prospective policy comments were somewhat more prevalent in 1972 (see Table 2), the advantage that Johnson enjoyed over his opponent was far greater than that of Nixon, thereby indicating a clearer policy mandate in 1964.

Finally, the attribute code displays a clear example of the incumbency advantage in presidential elections. In all five cases the incumbent was the recipient of more positive comments directed toward his personal attributes than the challenger. This is in large part because comments such as "he's more experienced" fall into this category, which is more likely to benefit the incumbent. Even Carter far outdistanced Reagan on this score in 1980, because many respondents complimented him for his experience and integrity whereas Reagan's advanced age and past movie career evoked numerous negative comments. This advantage may well also extend to the candidate of the incumbent party during nonincumbent races, as in each of these three contests the president's chosen successor had the edge.

Yet to be established, however, is whether or not these categories are related to the vote, and if so, to what degree. Taking just the four issue categories in which we are primarily interested and regressing them on the vote, it is clear that candidate policy and performance evaluations

Table 4. Positivity of Responses by Dimension

		Retrospective Performance	Prospective Performance	Retrospective Policy	Prospective Policy	Attribute
Incumbents						
Eisenhower	1956	15.0	1.2	−3.0	0.2	19.5
Johnson	1964	10.6	4.3	1.2	4.4	1.8
Nixon	1972	12.7	0.5	0.6	1.4	3.4
Ford	1976	−3.1	0.9	−5.0	−0.2	10.7
Carter	1980	−25.0	1.4	−2.6	0.9	10.8
Challengers						
Stevenson	1956	−2.0	0.6	0.4	−0.8	−7.6
Goldwater	1964	−3.0	−2.6	−2.2	−8.9	8.6
McGovern	1972	−3.4	−0.5	−1.0	−3.6	−18.6
Carter	1976	−10.8	2.0	1.3	2.1	8.5
Reagan	1980	6.2	1.6	−1.4	3.0	−20.6
Nonincumbent Races						
Eisenhower	1952	5.1	6.0	−1.1	0.1	7.2
Stevenson	1952	0.0	0.4	0.8	0.1	7.4
Kennedy	1960	−1.3	4.2	0.5	0.6	0.8
Nixon	1960	2.3	2.9	−1.4	−1.5	15.4
Nixon	1968	−3.4	6.4	0.0	3.2	−1.7
Humphrey	1968	−1.9	0.3	−0.9	1.8	0.7

Note. Cell entries are calculated by subtracting the percentage of voters offering negative comments on each dimension from the percentage offering positive comments. Thus a positive entry reflects a preponderance of favorable comments.

Table 5. Regression Equations Predicting the Vote: Standardized Coefficients

	1952	1956	1960	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980
Retrospective performance	.11	.17	.14	.20	.18	.24	.27	.22
Prospective performance	.15	.06	.20	.10	.23	.11	.19	.12
Retrospective policy	.04	.13	.04	.26	.10	.21	.13	.17
Prospective policy	.10	.08	.10	.24	.15	.24	.17	.18
Attribute	.21	.25	.31	.30	.23	.33	.27	.22
Party identification	.54	.53	.48	.41	.48	.27	.42	.47
R	.70	.73	.76	.74	.75	.68	.73	.73
N	1175	1249	879	1106	871	822	1253	873

have grown substantially as vote predictors in recent years. In the two Eisenhower-Stevenson races these variables explained only about 10% of the variance in the vote; by 1980 the comparable figure had nearly tripled to 30%. (The multiple *R*s are as follows: 1952, .33; 1956, .32; 1960, .40; 1964, .49; 1968, .46; 1972, .47; 1976, .49; 1980, .53.) Given the open-ended nature of the data, this is a substantial percentage of explained variance. Thus, although Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1960) may have been justified in paying scant attention to these factors in *The American Voter*, they have played a more substantial role in recent elections.

A more complete model of the voting decision is displayed in Tables 5 and 6, which incorporate the four issue categories, candidate attribute comments, and party identification for each election study.[2] We wish to answer two general questions with these regressions. First, what was the relative impact of policy versus performance and retrospective versus prospective evaluations on the vote? Or in other words, how much of the collective voting decision was the result of variations in assessments of such variables as the candidate's retrospective performance and retrospective policies? Second, to what extent did each variable influence the actual election outcome, given its relationship to the vote and advantage for one or the other candidate? Following Achen's (1982) guidelines for interpreting and using regression, we chose to use a measure of dispersion importance to address the first question and a measure of level importance to examine the second. The measure of dispersion importance is commonly known as a "standardized beta," which is the regression coefficient when all variables have been standardized to a mean of zero and a variance of one. For measuring level importance we simply multiplied the mean of each independent variable by its unstandardized coefficient, thereby producing the net contribution to the level of the dependent variable, that is, the vote. Thus if a variable has a level importance of 1.0 in Table 6, it means that the distribution on it resulted in a change of 1% of the vote in favor of the Republican candidate.

One general theme flowing through this article thus far is the difference in public evaluations of candidates according to incumbency status. Following this, one would expect to find the structure of the vote decision, as measured by the standardized betas, to differ according to whether or not the incumbent was a candidate for reelection. Indeed, the three nonincumbent races of 1952, 1960, and 1968 stand out as the only elections in which prospective performance outweighs the other three issue variables in terms of dispersion importance (see Table 5). Yet as can be seen from the level importance coefficients in Table 6, prospective performance has not been a major factor in shifting the outcome of elections one way or the other. The largest net gain from prospective performance evaluations was only slightly more than 1% by Richard Nixon in 1968.

For races with incumbents, retrospective performance clearly plays a much greater role. In the two most recent elections for which we have data—1976 and 1980—its importance in explaining variance in the vote exceeds not only all the other issue variables but the candidate attribute variable as well. Furthermore, the effect on shifts in the two-party vote has been substantial, averaging 2.9% in the five elections with incumbent presidents seeking reelection. Most notably, the difference between assessments of Carter's and Reagan's past performance in 1980 can be estimated to have cost Carter 5.2% of the vote.

In only two elections, 1964 and 1972, can we conclude that policy considerations exerted more influence over the collective voting decision than performance assessments. The large standardized

---

[2] Because of the problems associated with using OLS regression with a dichotomous dependent variable, we also conducted a probit analysis for each year. The results were virtually identical from a substantive perspective, and therefore we present the regression results for their greater ease of interpretability.

Table 6. Regression Equations Predicting the Vote:
Importance Level Coefficients for Short-Term Variables (Positive values are pro-Republican)

	1952	1956	1960	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980
Retrospective performance	.58	2.51	.51	−2.22	−.24	3.09	1.37	5.19
Prospective performance	.76	.08	−.24	−.80	1.16	.25	−.19	.02
Retrospective policy	−.18	−.56	−.16	−.68	.09	.28	−.91	.19
Prospective policy	.00	.15	−.26	−2.51	.22	.96	−.44	.34
Attribute	.00	2.69	3.54	−1.78	−.47	4.91	.35	−4.23

Note. The entries are computed by multiplying the mean of each independent variable by the unstandardized regression coefficient. The regression equation is identical in form to that used for Table 5.

betas for both retrospective and prospective policy in 1964 combined with the substantial advantage Johnson enjoyed over Goldwater in positive versus negative policy comments (see Table 4) lends strong support for interpreting the 1964 election as a policy mandate for Lyndon Johnson. To a lesser degree the 1972 election also fits the requirements for a policy mandate. As noted earlier, the frequency of policy responses was even higher in the Nixon-McGovern contest. However, the beta weight for retrospective policy is somewhat lower in 1972, and comments about Nixon's policy stands were not as positive as those for Johnson, nor were McGovern's policies seen as negatively as Goldwater's. Thus although the two policy categories combined contributed 3.2% to Johnson's victory, they only gave Nixon about 1.3%. Finally, the 1980 election outcome, for which a policy mandate has also sometimes been claimed (cf., Miller & Shanks, 1982) shows even less evidence of being determined by policy factors. The comparative lack of policy responses and the absence of any sizeable candidate advantage resulting from these comments, plus the much lower policy coefficients shown in Table 5 all work to dissuade us from interpreting the 1980 result as a policy mandate. While evaluations of Reagan were as policy laden as those for Goldwater, evaluations of Carter were far more performance oriented than those of either Johnson or Nixon (see Table 2). Furthermore, these comments about Carter's performance provided Reagan with virtually all of his advantage on issues. As can be seen in Table 5, Reagan gained only .5% because of policy evaluations in 1980 compared to more than 5% from performance evaluations.

Conclusion

The work reported above begins to provide some empirical support for a theory of issue voting. Despite data limitations, respondents could be classified by applying a two-dimensional retrospective/prospective, policy/performance coding scheme to their verbal assessments of the candidates. In addition, a factor analysis of available closed-ended items from the 1980 election study showed a similar structure of voter cognitions. These two very different approaches both show that assessments of Carter primarily reflected concern about his past performance, whereas evaluations of Reagan focused on future policy actions as well as expected performance. This striking similarity helps assure us that our results are valid.

The data demonstrate that people are not only capable of judging the past performance of incumbents, but they frequently become concerned about the future application of policy instruments. Historically, neither retrospective nor prospective policy considerations have been the dominant focus of thinking about politics. Nevertheless, when candidates articulate discernible policy positions, the public can incorporate this information into their electoral decision. When this information is available, citizens can vote in a manner that indicates a policy mandate for future government actions. Such cases have been historically rare, however.

The data suggest that under varying circumstances the voting theories of Key, Downs, and Fiorina each have substantial merit. Key's emphasis on retrospective performance applies best to public assessments of incumbents running for reelection. The Downsian model, in contrast, seems best to fit challengers, whom are often evaluated on the basis of their proposed future policies. Finally, Fiorina's concentration on prospective performance provides the best description of public judgments of candidates running in nonincumbent races.

Our ability in this article to test such a variety of theories throughout the entire 1952-1980 period demonstrates the great utility of open-ended questions in electoral research. It is extremely difficult to test models or theories if measures of critical concepts are developed ad hoc and with little guidance from the theory itself, as has all too often been the case in the election studies. Over the years, however, diverse use has been made of the open-ended questions, which can be reanalyzed with different theories in mind. The richness of the open-ended questions suggests that more of these questions should be asked in future studies, and a means of making the verbatim responses more accessible should be sought.

Coding Appendix

Coding of the distinction between retrospective/prospective and policy/performance utilized the responses to the eight candidate and party likes/dislikes questions which have been asked in every presidential election survey conducted by the University of Michigan since 1952.

The coding of the open-ended responses was done from the original protocols on file at the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan. For the surveys conducted before 1968 those materials are on microfilm; whereas the actual interview schedules are still available for the more recent years. We wish to thank CPS for making these materials available to us.

Some 30 different individuals were engaged in the coding project, which took one and a half years to complete. The average number of interviews coded per person was approximately 435. Each coder was trained with a set of 50 selected interviews before they began their production coding.

The training procedure was as follows. Before coding we met with the coders to discuss the project and to specify the concepts of policy, performance, retrospective, and prospective. The coders were then asked to read Fiorina (1981, pp. 1-16) and Abramson et al. (1982, chaps. 6 and 7) as a further overview of the theoretical dimensions we wished to differentiate. Next the coders were assigned to code 50 interviews which had been systematically selected for the purposes of coder training. Each of these examples was then discussed in depth, and any discrepancies were clarified and resolved. After training each coder was assigned a designated set of interviews to complete. Coders were instructed to discuss ambiguous statements with the coding supervisor (a coder trained on the first study coded) and to bring only unresolvable coding problems to the principal investigators. This procedure was followed in order to avoid the unwitting introduction of a coding bias by the investigators.

The studies were also coded in a particular order in an effort to avoid the artifactual introduction of a trend. First the 1980 study was coded, followed by 1956, 1964, and 1972. Next the 1976, 1960, 1952, and 1968 studies were coded in that order. Given this sequence for coding the studies, as well as the large number of coders, it is highly unlikely that any of the results arose because of systematic coder bias.

The coding scheme was designed to allow for gradations of clarity in the respondents' statements, thereby reducing the difficulty of the coding task. The policy-performance dimension, for example, ranged from "clearly policy" to "clearly performance" with a "mixed" or combination policy and performance category in the middle of the scale. In addition the code categories allowed for candidate attributes and any performance comments that had no issue content (e.g., "he can't get things done," "he is doing a good job"). The values assigned in the coding and the code categories are summarized below.

Retrospective/Prospective

1. Pure retrospective
2. Emphasis on retrospective
3. Mixed
4. Emphasis on prospective
5. Pure prospective
9. Inapplicable

Performance/Policy

1. Performance with respect to issues
2. Emphasis on performance
3. Mixed
4. Emphasis on policy position
5. Pure policy position
6. Candidate attribute
7. Emphasis on candidate attribute
8. Performance with no issue focus
9. Inapplicable.

A sample of 625 of the interviews coded were coded again by a second person to obtain reliability coefficients. Intercoder reliability was calculated with the formula: 1.0 - (total disagreements/total entries), where an entry was a codable response, that is, other than missing data, for each variable. A disagreement occurred whenever the two coders had a discrepancy that indicated a difference in the direction of the result; that is, where one coded retrospective and the other prospective or mixed, or one coded policy and the other coded performance or mixed or candidate attribute. It should be noted that many of the coding errors were found to be related to the difficulty of reading the questionnaire responses from microfilm. When the actual questionnaires were available, as they were for the 1968-1980 studies, the reliability coefficients were well over .90.

References

Abramson, P. R., Aldrich, J. H., & Rhode, R. W. *Change and continuity in the 1980 elections.* Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1982.

Achen, C. *Interpreting and using regression.* Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1982.

Asher, B. *Presidential elections and American politics, 1952-1980.* Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1980.

Brody, R. A., & Sniderman, P. M. From life space to polling place: The relevance of personal concerns for voting behavior. *British Journal of Political Science,* 1977, *7,* 337-360.

Campbell, A., Converse, P. E., Miller, W. E., & Stokes, D. E. *The American Voter.* New York: Wiley, 1960.

Conover, P. J. Political cues and perception of candidates. *American Politics Quarterly,* 1981, *9,* 427-448.

Converse, P. E. Public opinion and voting behavior. In F. I. Greenstein & N. W. Polsby (Eds.) *Handbook of political science* (vol. 4). Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975.

Downs, A. *An economic theory of democracy,* New York: Harper and Row, 1957.

Fiorina, M. P. Retrospective voting in American national elections. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981.

Kessel, J. H. The issues in issue voting. *American Political Science Review,* 1972, *66,* 459-465.

Key, V. O. *Public opinion and American democracy.* New York: Knopf, 1961.

Kinder, D. R., & Kiewiet, D. R. Economic discontent and political behavior: The role of personal grievances and collective economic judgments in congressional voting. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1979, *23,* 495-517.

Miller, A. H., Wattenberg, M. P., & Malanchuk, O. Cognitive representations of political candidates. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1982.

Miller, W. E., & Shanks, J. M. Policy directions and presidential leadership: Alternative interpretations of the 1980 presidential elections. *British Journal of Political Science,* 1982, *12,* 266-356.

Nie, N. H., Verba, S., & Petrocik, J. R. *The changing American voter.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976.

Sears, D. O. The person-positivity bias. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 1983, *44,* 233-250.

Sears, D. O. Political behavior. In G. Lindsey & E. Aronson (Eds.). *Handbook of social psychology* (Rev. ed., vol. 5). Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969.

Stokes, D. E. Spatial models of party competition. In A. Campbell et al. *Elections and the political order.* New York: Wiley, 1966.

Wattenberg, M. P. *The decline of American political parties, 1952-1980.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984.

Ideology, Party, and Voting in the U.S. Congress, 1959-1980

KEITH T. POOLE
Carnegie-Mellon University

R. STEVEN DANIELS
University of Nebraska-Lincoln

Current methods of roll-call analysis have practical as well as theoretical shortcomings. We propose here a method based on a spatial theory of voting that overcomes these problems. We apply metric multidimensional unfolding to interest-group ratings of members of Congress in order to obtain a Euclidean spatial configuration of congressmen. Each roll-call vote is then mapped into the configuration of members in a way consistent with spatial theory. Based on 190,000 ratings issued from 1959 to 1980, our empirical analysis demonstrates that a single liberal-conservative dimension accounts for more than 80% of the variance in the ratings. A second dimension, associated with party unity, accounts for 7% of the variance. Approximately 86% of all roll-call voting for the 22 years of our study is consistent with a simple one-dimensional spatial model. The votes that best fit the liberal-conservative dimension are drawn from the government management, social welfare, and foreign policy areas. The votes that best fit the two-dimensional configurations are drawn from the agricultural area.

The United States Congress is the most widely studied legislative institution in the world. The literature written on the structure, procedures, social norms, policymaking processes, voting positions, and other elements of the congressional environment would fill a large library, with the most shelf space undoubtedly taken up by studies of congressional voting. Since Orrin Libby (1897) first issued a call for the study of congressional voting, political scientists, social psychologists, historians, sociologists, and even economists have responded with an ever-increasing flow of research.

Creating a geometrical representation of the legislators or the roll calls is an approach that has been used for some time to study congressional voting (e.g., Rice, 1924). The legislators and roll calls are represented as points in a space where the distances between the points are related to measures of association between the legislators and roll calls. Typically, these measures of association (e.g., Yule's Q, ϕ, $\phi/\phi_{\max}$) are analyzed by factor analysis, cluster analysis or multidimensional scaling in order to produce the spatial representation of legislators or roll calls. The results of a properly designed factor analysis may also be used to select votes for a Guttman scaling. Representative works are MacRae (1958), Weisberg (1968), Clausen (1973), and Hoadley (1980).

This approach is fraught with practical and theoretical difficulties. Practically, the use of such techniques is very cumbersome. The researcher must select the roll calls and legislators, decide how to handle missing data and item directions, choose the appropriate measure of association, and choose a response model (either dominance or proximity) (Weisberg, 1968, p. 233). Performing a factor analysis or a multidimensional scaling of a 100 by 100 or a 435 by 435 matrix of associations is a formidable and expensive undertaking. Working with subsets of legislators or subsets of votes (a vote-by-vote matrix of associations) and then overlapping the subsets is possible but is a clumsy and time-consuming procedure.

In addition to these serious practical limitations, this general methodology suffers from an important theoretical limitation. Suppose that an ideological space exists and that legislators and the yea-and-nay alternatives on each parliamentary notion can be represented as points in this space. Furthermore, assume that the legislators have single-peaked utility functions over the space and vote for the alternative closest to them. Morrison (1972) has shown that, given this model, these scaling techniques are unlikely to recover the true positions of the legislators in a legislator-by-legislator analysis. The input to these techniques are measures of association based on the proportion of disagreement between pairs of legislators. What Morrison showed was that the proportion of disagreement depends upon the distance between the pair of legislators, the angle they form with the (arbitrary) origin of the space, and the distribution of the policy outcomes associated with the roll-call votes. Because the scaling methods described above treat the associations only as measures of distance (multidimensional scaling) or only as measures of angles (factor analysis), distortion in the recovery of the space is unavoidable.

We propose here a new method of roll-call analysis which overcomes these difficulties and enables a researcher to engage in cross-chamber comparisons of both legislators and roll calls within a year and between years. Our method is an extension of that developed by Poole (1981, 1984). In a nutshell, we use multidimensional unfolding on interest-group ratings of legislators (in accordance with a spatial model developed in the next section) to obtain a spatial configuration of the legislators. We then map the roll-call votes into the legislator configuration using a simple spatial model of voting.

A Spatial Model of Interest-Group Ratings

Interest groups are close observers of congressional voting, and each year many of them publish ratings of the members of Congress. To rate a member of Congress, an interest group normally chooses between 10 and 40 votes for each house of Congress from the total set of roll calls taken during the particular session under study. These votes are chosen for their relevance to the group's interests, and the rating is determined by calculating the ratio of "correct" to total (correct plus incorrect) votes. (Some groups treat absences as "incorrect.") Each rating thus represents the legislator's percentage agreement with the stated positions of the group.[1]

There are two basic types of rating interest groups—general and specific. The general interest groups (e.g., the Americans for Democratic Action) construct their ratings from a broad range of issues, whereas the specific groups focus on a narrow range of issues (e.g., the Child Welfare League of America concentrates on issues related to the health and welfare of children). The positions that a general group takes on a wide range of issues are very likely to be systematically related (what Converse (1964) called "constrained"). A group that opposes CETA, OSHA, and busing is likely to favor work requirements for welfare recipients and a U.S. military buildup. Consequently, an interest group's positions on a range of issues are largely determined by the group's positions on a small number of underlying evaluative dimensions. The issue-specific groups can also be viewed within the same framework. Single-issue groups are usually the most committed of the interest groups; they tend to attract more ideologically motivated members. Although their focus is normally on a single issue, their beliefs frequently carry into other issue areas as well. Then, by this argument, the overall rating by both a general or a specific group is a measure of how close in spatial terms the member of Congress is to the interest group on the evaluative dimensions.

---

[1] We were able to obtain ratings for the following groups for the years indicated: American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), 1979-1980; American Conservative Union (ACU), 1971, 1972, 1974-1980; Americans for Constitutional Action (ACA), 1959-1980; Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), 1960-1961, 1963-1980; American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF), 1978-1980; American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), 1973-1977; American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), 1973, 1975-1980; American Federation of Teachers (AFT), 1975-1980; American Security Council (ASC), 1969-1980; Bread for the World (BFW), 1979-1980; Building and Construction Trades Department AFL-CIO (BCTD), 1979-1980; Chamber of Commerce of the United States (CCUS), 1975-1980; Child Welfare League of America (CWLA), 1976-1977, 1979-1980; Christian Voice (CV), 1979; Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy (CFNFMP), 1977-1980; Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress (CFSC), ratings on all issues, economic issues, defense and social issues, 1979-1980; Committee on Political Education of the AFL-CIO (COPE), 1959-1980; Common Cause (CCS), 1978-1980; Congress Watch by Nader's Public Citizen (CW), 1975-1980; Conservative Coalition Support Scores (CC), 1959-1980; Consumer Federation of America (CFA), 1971-1980; Friends' Committee on National Legislation (FCNL), 1977-1980; League of Conservation Voters (LCV), 1971-1977, 1979-1980; League of Women Voters (LWV), 1971-1975, 1977-1980; Lower Federal Spending Support (LFS), 1959; Larger Federal Role Support Score (LFR), 1959-1968; Liberty Lobby (LL), 1961-1969, 1973, 1975, 1977; National Alliance of Senior Citizens (NASC), 1977, 1979-1980; National Council of Senior Citizens (NCSC), 1977-1980; National Education Association (NEA), 1969-1979; National Farmers' Organization (NFO), 1973, 1975-1980; National Farmers' Union (NFU), 1961-1965, 1969-1980; National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB), 1977-1980; National Women's Political Caucus (NWPC), 1979; New Republic (NREP), 1961-1974; National Taxpayers' Union (NTU), 1971, 1973-1980; Presidential Support Scores—Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, 1959-1980; Ripon Society (RIPON), 1969-1978; Citizens for a Sane World (SANE), 1973-1978; Taxation with Representation (TWR), 1977-1978; United Auto Workers (UAW), 1969-1980; United Mine Workers (UMW), 1979-1980. Whenever possible we tried correcting the ratings to remove absences. Some groups, mainly liberal ones such as the ADA, count absences as negative votes. We found that correcting for the absences made almost no difference in the unfolding results.

Along the lines of the spatial model of party competition, we assume that each issue can be represented as a dimension, and each interest group and member of Congress has a most preferred position on each issue which is the ideal point of the group or member on that issue dimension. Let m be the number of issues and let z_{jk} denote the jth ($j = 1, \ldots, q$ where q is the number of interest groups) interest group's position on the kth issue. Then the m ideal points can be denoted as the vector:

$$z_j = \begin{vmatrix} z_{j1} \\ \cdot \\ \cdot \\ \cdot \\ z_{jm} \end{vmatrix}$$

Similarly, the vector

$$x_i = \begin{vmatrix} x_{i1} \\ \cdot \\ \cdot \\ \cdot \\ x_{im} \end{vmatrix}$$

represents the ith ($i = 1, \ldots, p$ where p is the number of members of Congress) member's ideal points on the m issues. The Euclidean distance between the jth interest group and the ith member is

$$d(x_i, z_j) = d_{ij} = \left[\sum_{k=1}^{m} (x_{ik} - z_{jk})^2 \right]^{1/2}$$

If no error is present and there exists s common evaluative dimensions, $s < m$, then there are vectors $\tilde{z}_j$ and $\tilde{x}_i$ of length s such that

$$d_{ij} = \left[\sum_{k=1}^{m} (x_{ik} - z_{jk})^2 \right]^{1/2}$$
$$= \left[\sum_{k=1}^{s} (\tilde{x}_{ik} - \tilde{z}_{jk})^2 \right]^{1/2};$$

that is, each of the m-issue dimensions is a linear combination of the s evaluative dimensions. Or, put another way, all the ideal points lie on an s-dimensional hyperplane (the evaluative, or what Ordeshook (1976) refers to as the "basic" space) through the m-space of issues.

We assume that each roll-call vote has two outcomes, one corresponding to yea and one corresponding to nay; that is, let

$$\psi_{yl} = \begin{vmatrix} \psi_{yl1} \\ \cdot \\ \cdot \\ \cdot \\ \psi_{ylm} \end{vmatrix} \qquad \psi_{nl} = \begin{vmatrix} \psi_{nl1} \\ \cdot \\ \cdot \\ \cdot \\ \psi_{nlm} \end{vmatrix}$$

be the vectors of the outcome positions, respectively, where $l = 1, \ldots t$ indexes the roll calls and t is the number of roll calls. Normally, most of the entries in ψ_{yl} and ψ_{nl} are zeroes because a roll-call vote usually touches only on a small number of issues. If each of the m-issue dimensions is a linear combination of the s evaluative dimensions, then there are vectors $\tilde{\psi}_{yl}$ and $\tilde{\psi}_{nl}$ which are the projections of ψ_{yl} and ψ_{nl}, respectively, onto the basic space.

By this model, the interest groups select roll-call votes with outcome locations near their ideal points in the basic space to construct their ratings. We assume that the legislators have symmetric single-peaked utility functions and will vote for the outcome nearest them in the space. Consequently, setting aside perceptual error, the number of correct votes is monotonic with the distance between the interest group and the member of Congress. To see this, inspect Figure 1. The top part of Figure 1 displays the utility function for one hypothetical interest group near the end of a single evaluative dimension. The horizontal dotted line represents the utility threshold for the interest group. Consider a given set of votes with outcomes that can be represented as positions in this one-dimensional basic space. Then, for any roll call, the interest group will include the vote in its ratings only if there is an outcome in the interval $[O_1, O_2]$. Suppose that the number of roll calls is substantial and that there are a large number of outcomes in $[O_1, O_2]$, with the opposite or "anti" choices for $[O_1, O_2]$ falling in $[O_5, O_6]$. (The distance between pairs of outcomes need not be the same across roll calls.) Assuming no perceptual error, legislators located in the interval $[O_1, O_3]$ would all receive rating scores of 100. (O_3 is the midpoint of O_1 and O_5, and O_4 is the midpoint of O_2 and O_6.) Legislators to the right of O_3, however, will receive scores of less than 100 because they will be closer to some outcomes in $[O_5, O_6]$. The closer a legislator comes to O_4, the lower his or her rating. Legislators to the right of O_4 all receive scores of 0 because, for each roll call used by the interest group, they are closer to the anti outcome. The lower part of Figure 1 shows the rating issued by the interest group as a function of the position of a legislator in $[O_1, O_6)$.

Figure 1 illustrates one of the weaknesses of the interest group ratings, namely, that the ratings are confined to the interval [0,100] when in fact they should be able to assume any value in the interval $(-\infty, 100]$. However, this becomes a less serious problem as the number of interest groups increases. When there are multiple groups, the zones of indifference like $[O_1,O_3]$ and $[O_4,O_6]$ get whittled down and the legislators can be uniquely located.[2]

Because the interest groups select roll-call votes with outcome locations near their ideal points in the basic space to construct their ratings, it is appropriate to treat a score of 85 given by an interest group to a senator in the same way as a score of 85 given to a representative. The comparability of the ratings does not rest on the interest groups selecting roll calls from the same issue area(s) in both houses. All that matters is that the groups select votes with outcomes near them in the basic space. A comparability problem could arise if a group chooses roll calls in one house consistent with the spatial model but utilizes nonspatial criteria in the other house. For example, a group could choose votes on food stamps and arms control in the Senate to construct its ratings and on agricultural votes in the House of Representatives. (We show below that votes on food stamps and arms control are highly consistent with the spatial model, whereas agricultural votes generally are not.) In any case, the House and Senate ratings can be analyzed separately as well as together to guard against this problem. Empirically, we find its occurrence to be rare (see below).[3]

Figure 1. Rating Example



---

[2] Another weakness of the ratings closely related to this one is that it is unclear how many roll calls there has to be for the number to be "substantial"—that is, enough votes in the area of interest of a group with outcomes close enough to be used to construct its ratings. In general, the more votes that are used, the more "accurate" the ratings, that is, the narrower the zones of indifference. This is clearly more of a problem in the earlier years of our analysis than in the later years. However, we believe that the argument we just made applies to this weakness as well; namely, when there are multiple groups, the zones of indifference get whittled down and the legislators can be uniquely located.

[3] A more subtle objection to our model stems from a lack of agenda control in the Congress by the interest groups. Because of this, the number of roll calls that an interest group regards as important may not be very large. As a consequence, the group may have to use some roll calls with outcomes not as close to them as

Because the ratings are measures of closeness or preference, they can be regarded as inverse distances (the higher the rating, the closer a member is to a group) and are therefore suitable for a multidimensional unfolding analysis. In this specific instance, the aim of an unfolding analysis is to locate points representing the legislators and points representing the interest groups in a space of minimal dimensionality such that the Euclidean distances between the two sets of points reproduce the ratings as closely as possible. Formally, let δ_{ij} denote the *j*th interest group's rating of the *i*th member of Congress. We convert the ratings to distances by the linear transformation

$$d_{ij}^{*} = (100 - \delta_{ij})/50 = d_{ij} + e_{ij} \qquad (1)$$

where the error term, e_{ij}, is picking up three effects: 1) perceptual error, 2) idiosyncratic evaluative dimensions, and 3) the substitution of zero for negative ratings. The loss function that we minimize is

$$\mu = \sum_{i=1}^{p} \sum_{j=1}^{q} e_{ij}^{2}$$

$$= \sum_{i=1}^{p} \sum_{j=1}^{q} \left\{ d_{ij}^{*} - \left[\sum_{k=1}^{s} (\hat{x}_{ik} - \hat{z}_{jk})^{2} \right]^{1/2} \right\}^{2}. \qquad (2)$$

Poole (1982, 1984) has developed a method of metric multidimensional unfolding which finds estimates of the member and group locations—$\hat{x}_i$ and $\hat{z}_j$—that minimize μ. If the e_{ij} are assumed to be independently and normally distributed with constant variance, then the $\hat{x}_i$ and $\hat{z}_j$ will be maximum likelihood estimators using this method of unfolding.[4]

Because the interest groups publish ratings every year, time can be regarded as a dimension in the spatial model. With time as a dimension, we introduce the possibility that legislators and interest groups may change their spatial positions from year to year. In order to study these movements, we must place the configurations in a common metric or frame of reference.

The configurations recovered from the ratings are unique up to a selection of origin and a rigid rotation. Techniques have been developed by psychometricians for finding a common origin and rotation for a pair of configurations (it is known as the "orthogonal Procrustes" problem: Schönemann, 1966; Schonemann & Carroll, 1970); and for a set of configurations (Kristof & Wingersky, 1971; Berge, 1977). These techniques are not entirely satisfactory for our purposes here. Each year the interest groups issuing ratings and the membership of the House and Senate change. Some legislators serve for only two years, some for 10, and a few were in the Congress for the entire 22-year period covered by our study. Furthermore, some legislators served several years, were defeated and left Congress for some period, and were later elected again. Consequently, we must fit together a set of configurations in which any particular pair of configurations may have many points that are not in common.

Complicating matters further, we must allow for slight contractions or expansions of the space from year to year owing to the changing mix of interest groups that issue ratings. If the number of groups issuing ratings is small and divided into two camps located at opposite ends of the space from each other with most of the legislators falling between the two camps, then "zones of indifference," which we spoke of in connection with Figure 1, may not get whittled down to the extent

---

they would like. If the set of available roll calls of interest in one chamber were restricted in this way, then this could systematically bias the group's ratings.

We don't think this is a serious problem. First of all, in recent years more than 500 roll calls were taken each year in both houses. Literally dozens of votes are cast on most issues of concern to the interest groups, so they have a lot to choose from. Secondly, most groups use a variety of issues to construct their ratings, and if some issue has only roll calls with outcomes distant from them there are plenty of other issues with closer outcome points to choose from. Third, even those groups that we label as specific use a variety of subjects in their issue area of interest. For example, the National Women's Political Caucus uses abortion, child care, the ERA, and other related roll calls to construct its ratings. Finally, when a group is very narrowly focused (e.g., the Child Welfare League of America), if an insufficient number of roll calls is taken or the outcome points are distant from the group, it is quite likely that the group will choose not to issue ratings. The CWLA did not issue ratings in 1978 because not enough votes were taken in Congress on child nutrition and child health care that year. They told us this in a letter when we asked for their ratings that year.

We think that these arguments also apply to the case when the Democrats control the agenda in one house and the Republicans control the agenda in the opposite house. The mix of issues being voted on did not change markedly when the Republicans took control of the Senate in 1981. What changed was which party won most of the roll calls.

[4] Monte Carlo work with the unidimensional version of the unfolding technique has shown it to be very robust when the normal distribution, constant variance assumptions are violated. The procedure does equally well with error generated in accordance with models based on the log normal distribution, the noncentral chi-square distribution, and the normal distribution with the variance as a function of the true distances. See Poole (1984). The noncentral chi-square distribution can be used to model the truncation in the ratings.

that they would be if there were more groups. This has the effect of slightly compressing the configuration of legislators.

Accordingly, the model we estimate is:

$$X_o = [\xi W' + Jp_t c']_o + E_o \qquad (3)$$

where X_o is the p_t by 22-$\times$-s matrix. (p_t is the total number of legislators serving in the 22-year period of our study.) For one-dimensional configurations, X_o would be p_t by 22; for two-dimensional configurations, p_t by 44; and so on. ξ is the p_t-by-s matrix of average or "target" coordinates of the legislators in the basic space, W is a 22-by-s matrix of weights, c is a vector of constants of length 22 $\times$ s, Jp_t is a p_t-length vector of ones, and E_o is a p_t-by-22-by-s matrix of error terms. The subscript o indicates that there is missing data. The estimate of ξ, $\hat{\xi}$, can be thought of as the best-fitting average set of coordinates. In effect, the 22 configurations are squeezed together as tightly as possible when they are transformed by $\hat{W}$ and $\hat{c}$, and the mean configuration around which they are squeezed or targeted is $\hat{\xi}$. Details of the estimation and extensive Monte Carlo analysis can be found in Poole (1983).[5]

The W and c are used to correct the configurations to remove the effects we discussed above. This allows us to study individual change over time. (It does not affect the configurations individually because only linear transformations are applied.) However, this corrective procedure cannot pick up an across-the-board shift of all legislators and interest groups over time. For example, we find below that the primary dimension recovered from the ratings is liberalism v. conservatism as it is commonly understood by journalists and political scientists. The definition of what is liberal and conservative on specific issues can change over time. This is certainly true of foreign policy, which has become increasingly partisan, and of civil rights, which was a regional issue at one time, but ceased to be such by the late 1960s (Asher & Weisberg, 1978; Clausen & Van Horn, 1977; Bullock, 1981; Sinclair, 1981).

As a consequence, when we discuss the movement of individual legislators over time we are in effect describing their movement relative to some overall uniform (but unknown) trend. Because the movement of every legislator is relative to an across-the-board shift from year to year, comparisons of legislators over time are unaffected by this problem. In any case, it bears reiteration that this procedure fails to pick up only uniform shifts of all legislators and interest groups. If some shift and others do not, this is picked up.[6]

Analysis of the Ratings

Table 1 displays the unfolding results for the combined House and Senate ratings for the 22 years of the study. The measure of fit displayed is the squared Pearson correlation coefficient between the actual interest group ratings and the ratings produced by the recovered configuration from the unfolding. Because the unfolding technique is a metric one, the r-squares, unlike the stress values from non-metric techniques (which only strive to reproduce a weak ordering of the data), are literally the percentage variance explained of the actual ratings.

On the average, one dimension explains approximately 81% of the variance of the 190,000 ratings issued during the 22-year period (mean r^2 = .812). This first dimension is a liberal-conservative left-right continuum (Poole, 1981; see also Kritzer, 1978).[7] The addition of a second and third dimension adds little to the explanatory power of the model. The second dimension adds only 6.1% to the 22-year average, whereas the third dimension adds only 1.4%. However, these figures do hide some significant differences across selected years. Overall, the second dimension is clearly political party. However, the strength of the dimension varies from year to year. It is strongest for the years 1959 to 1960 where it explains an average of 20.4% of the variance.

The nature of the primary dimension can be better delineated by examining the distribution of members in a single year. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the members of Congress across the liberal-conservative dimension in 1979, whereas Figure 3 shows the distribution of the members across the liberal-conservative and the party dimensions.

---

[5] Available upon request.

[6] The overall uniform trend does not have to be linear or monotonic. For example, the uniform shift could accelerate over time then decelerate and reverse direction.

[7] Kritzer (1978) applied factor anaysis to the interest group ratings of the 91st and 93rd House of Representatives and found that a single factor accounted for 81.4% of the variance of the 91st House and 74.6% of the 93rd House. "When one focuses on roll calls which interest groups deem to be salient rather than using the more usual shotgun approach (e.g., Clausen, 1973, or MacRae, 1958), a clear unidimensional structure emerges in House roll-call behavior, and this structure can be interpreted as reflecting a unidimensional ideological structure underlying salient congressional action" (p. 496). Below we show that this conclusion can be extended to almost all roll-call voting.

Table 1. Unfolding Results in Three Dimensions[a]

	Dimension			Interest groups	Senators	Representatives	No. of ratings
	One	Two	Three				
1959	.7451	.8813	.8946	8	100	435	4249
1960	.6040	.8755	.8914	8	100	432	4230
1961	.9043	.9074	.9210	11	100	436	5812
1962	.8904	.9008	.9211	10	100	434	5270
1963	.9168	.9217	.9313	11	100	433	5785
1964	.9173	.9336	.9392	11	100	429	5770
1965	.9383	.9455	.9500	11	100	432	5720
1966	.8987	.9000	.9110	9	100	432	5291
1967	.9114	.9328	.9350	10	100	433	5298
1968	.8647	.8835	.8900	9	100	432	5300
1969	.7609	.8537	.8670	12	100	432	6358
1970	.8075	.8671	.8705	11	100	432	5808
1971	.7987	.8622	.8755	16	100	435	8018
1972	.7641	.8040	.8164	15	99	435	7926
1973	.7528	.8273	.8536	20	100	434	10622
1974	.6978	.8122	.8420	19	100	433	9995
1975	.7814	.8590	.8790	23	100	434	12256
1976	.7810	.8520	.8620	22	100	433	11509
1977	.7730	.8470	.8700	30	100	434	15883
1978	.7590	.8410	.8610	26	100	434	13845
1979	.8167	.8529	.8722	37	100	435	19339
1980	.7701	.8258	.8360	28	100	436	14965

[a] All entries are r^2. The number of senators and representatives fluctuates from year to year because of seat vacancies.

Figure 2.





Figure 3. 1979 U.S. Congress

Table 2. Comparability of the Senate and House Interest Group Ratings

	House		Senate	
	1 dimension	2 dimensions	1 dimension	2 dimensions
1980	.9996[a]	.9938[b]	.9976	.9886
1979	.9994	.9938	.9984	.9898
1978	.9986	.9980	.9974	.9980
1977	.9992	.9878	.9934	.9728
1976	.9932	.9902	.9968	.9884
1975	.9988	.9934	.9926	.9827
1974	.9942	.9870	.9950	.9491
1973	.9960	.9912	.9950	.9577
1972	.9920	.9942	.9980	.9524
1971	.9876	.9972	.9966	.9940
1970	.9934	.9960	.9942	.9860
1969	.9904	.9948	.9876	.9722
1968	.9968	.9720	.8832	.8619
1967	.9988	.9972	.9393	.9029
1966	.9900	.9845	.9633	.9305
1965	.9994	.9892	.9688	.9746
1964	.9996	.9958	.9616	.8686
1963	.9998	.9882	.9962	.9446
1962	.9974	.9968	.9896	.9618
1961	.9992	.9932	.9992	.9681
1960	.8339	.9922	.9417	.9924
1959	.9266	.9928	.9458	.9930

[a] Each entry is the squared Pearson correlation between the unidimensional configurations recovered from the unfoldings of the combined ratings and the ratings of the indicated house of Congress.

[b] For two dimensions each entry is the squared Pearson correlation of the corresponding distances between each of the $p(p-1)/2$ unique pairs of legislators in the configurations.

The histogram on the left of Figure 2 shows the entire Congress; the one on the right separates the Democrats and Republicans. The figure shows a bimodal, ideological dimension. However, there are distinctions between parties: the Democratic party is much less homogeneous than the Republican party. The Republicans are concentrated at center right to far right. The bulk of the Democratic party is concentrated at center left to far left, but substantial numbers of Democrats are located at center right and far right.

In Figure 3, we indicate the approximate two-dimensional structure of the space. As can be seen from the separate plots for the Democrats and Republicans, the party dimension seems to run about 45 degrees off the liberal-conservative dimension. Party unity scores increase with movement along the party dimension as indicated in Figure 3.

To check our assumption that the ratings are comparable between houses, we unfolded the ratings for the Senate and House separately for each year of our study and then compared the resultant one- and two-dimensional coordinates for each house with those recovered from the combined unfoldings. The results are shown in Table 2 which displays the Pearson r-squares between the configurations from the separate unfoldings and the configurations from the combined Senate-House unfoldings.[8]

Table 2 strongly supports our assumption of comparability. Since 1969, the r-squares for both the House and Senate for one dimension are .99 or better. For two dimensions, they are .95 or better. The r-squares for the House tend to be slightly higher than those for the Senate, because there are four times as many Representatives as Senators so that the combined unfolding will more closely resemble the unfolding of only the House members' ratings.

Comparability clearly fails in only two instances —the Senate ratings of 1968 (r-squares of .88 and .86) and the House ratings of 1960 (r-square of .83 for one dimension). In both cases, the number of interest groups was small (9 and 8, respectively) so that bias in just two or three groups' ratings will present problems. As the number of interest groups increases, bias, if it exists, becomes much less of a problem. This can be seen in the r-squares for the Senate configurations in Table 2: they tend to be higher in recent years when there are far more interest groups issuing ratings.

---

[8] The unidimensional r-squares are simply the squared Pearson correlations between the corresponding configurations. For two-dimensional configurations, this is an inappropriate method because of differences in rotation and origin. Instead, we computed the distances between each unique pair of legislators in the corresponding configurations. The r-squares are the squared Pearson correlations between the corresponding vectors of $p(p-1)/2$ distances.

Tables 1 and 2 viewed in conjunction show that, empirically, the interest group ratings are highly consistent with the spatial model we outlined in the previous section. On average, an 85 rating given by a group to a senator is the same as an 85 rating given to a representative. That this is true over long periods of time enables us to introduce the dimension of time into the spatial model. In our time series analysis below, we include the 1960 and 1968 configurations for completeness. Their inclusion does not appreciably affect our results. In our opinion, the average positions (see Figure 4) of various groups of representatives and senators in the common scaled metric are reliable, but the positions of the individual legislators in 1960 and 1968 must be regarded with suspicion because of the results shown in Table 2.

Between 1959 and 1980, 1,426 individuals served in the House and Senate.[9] We applied the model stated in equation (3) to the one- and two-dimensional configurations. To obtain accurate estimates of W and c, we included only those 873 legislators who served six or more years during the period of our study. Accordingly, our X_0 matrices were 873 by 22 and 873 by 44, respectively. The overall fit of the model and the fits for each year are shown in Table 3.

For one dimension, the overall r-square of the model stated in equation (3) is .939. The magnitude of this r-square indicates that the members of Congress are very stable in their location on the liberal-conservative dimension over time. This stability is apparent in the fits for the separate

Table 3. Fit Statistics for Congressional Coordinates

No. of Dimensions	No. Legislators Included	% Missing	Minimum No. of Years	Overall r^2
1	873	47.1	6	.939
2	873	47.1	6	.919

Year	No. Legislators Included	One-Dimension	Two-Dimensions	
		r^2	r^2 1st	r^2 2nd
1959	368	.888	.945	.715
1960	373	.913	.926	.736
1961	426	.934	.973	.410
1962	434	.928	.962	.367
1963	491	.933	.967	.114
1964	492	.940	.967	.370
1965	479	.952	.966	.159
1966	479	.949	.961	.131
1967	512	.934	.948	.258
1968	511	.897	.929	.127
1969	511	.927	.965	.585
1970	509	.930	.960	.726
1971	511	.933	.953	.754
1972	505	.921	.954	.022
1973	501	.962	.953	.789
1974	500	.937	.954	.613
1975	507	.964	.968	.789
1976	502	.962	.966	.758
1977	427	.965	.965	.752
1978	421	.956	.950	.608
1979	351	.945	.939	.683
1980	352	.942	.935	.624
Overall[a]	873	.939	.919	

[a] For both one and two dimensions, 47.1% were missing. Legislators served a minimum of six years.

---

[9] This number includes duplications—namely, those members of the House of Representatives who later served in the Senate are counted twice. See Table 4.

years, the lowest of which is .888 for 1959.[10] The high correlation between the adjusted yearly configurations (X_0 corrected by $\hat{W}$ and $\hat{c}$) and the estimated average or target configuration ($\hat{\xi}$) supports the arguments of Clausen (1973), Bullock (1981), and Stone (1977; cited by Kuklinski, 1979) that variations in the voting patterns in Congress arise mainly through generational replacement.

The results for the two-dimensional configurations are of lesser quality. Although the overall r-square of .919 is quite satisfactory, it does not carry the same message of stability as does the one-dimensional r-square.

As Table 1 and Figure 3 demonstrate, the second dimension does not account for much of the variance of the two-dimensional configurations. The yearly fits reflect this. The overall fit is high because the first dimension, which accounts for most of the variation in the configurations, is being estimated very well. This is not true of the second dimension. The pattern of fits for the second dimension is consistent with the unfolding results of Table 1. As we discussed earlier, a second dimension is clearly present in 1959 and 1960, is largely absent from 1961 to 1968, and then reappears from 1969 to 1980. With the exception of 1972, the fits for the second dimension follow the same pattern. Because the second dimension does not account for much of the variance in the ratings and demonstrates the instability shown in Table 3, we will not attempt to use it in our time series analysis. We will use the party dimension when we study roll calls within a year, however, because party is an important consideration in many roll call votes. The party dimension is unstable from year to year largely because the interest groups do not choose many party-line votes to construct their ratings. They choose votes on issues that override considerations of party loyalty. In spatial terms, the interest groups tend to be located near the ends of the liberal-conservative dimension. The second dimension does tend to separate the interest groups somewhat, but not anywhere near the extent that it separates the legislators (Poole, 1981).

Figure 4 shows the mean locations of all senators, representatives, and the two parties and their northern and southern wings for the 22-year period. We applied $\hat{W}$ and $\hat{c}$ to every member for each respective year, so the means shown are for everyone serving and not just those who served at least six years. With the exception of 1960, the Senate as a body is more liberal than the House. (This finding is consistent with the evidence produced by other researchers, for example, Froman (1963, 1967).) The northern Democrats are the most liberal and stable group. The mean location of the northern Democrats hardly moved at all over the 22 years. In contrast, southern Democrats shifted significantly to the right during the years of intense civil rights activity in the Johnson administration (1964-1968). After 1972, however, when civil rights became a less salient issue in the Congress, they shifted back almost to the center of the spectrum, where they had been before 1964.

The congressional Republican party is more homogenous than the congressional Democratic party. In 1959 there were only 10 southern Republicans in Congress. In 1973, this reached a peak of 45 before the Watergate losses in 1974 brought it down to 35. By 1979, southern Republicans had recovered some of their losses and held 41 House and Senate seats. As the number of southern Republicans increased, a gap opened up between northern and southern Republicans. This gap reached its peak in the early 1970s and then declined in the later 1970s. Interestingly, the gap between southern Republicans and southern Democrats was the smallest during the late 1960s, the period of civil rights activism and urban unrest. In fact, the southern Democrats and southern Republicans were closer together than either was to their respective northern counterparts. After 1975, however, the gap between southern Democrats and southern Republicans was nearly as large as that between southern and northern Democrats.

Overall, Congress drifted slightly to the left between 1959 and 1975 (interestingly, the Watergate election of 1974 produced a Congress more liberal than the Congress produced by Lyndon Johnson's 1964 landslide) and after 1976 drifted back to the right, which undoubtedly continued in 1981. The conclusion that Figure 4 points to is that the civil rights, civil disturbance, Vietnam, Watergate era of 1965-1974 was an interruption of normal liberal-conservative patterns. The 1959-1964 and the 1975-1980 periods are quite similar, whereas the 1965-1974 period is unlike either of the other two.

During the 22 years of our study, 38 current or former members of the House were elected to the Senate (see Table 4). The stability of the configurations from year to year suggests that legislators moving from the House to the Senate will

---

[10] Because only those members serving six or more years were included in the estimation of equation (3), this reduced the number of members included in the analysis from the early and late years. That is, to be included in the 1959 row of Table 3, a member would have had to serve six years beginning in 1959. In contrast, to be included in the 1969 column, a member could have served from 1963-1969 or 1969-1975. Finally, to be included in the 1980 column, a member would have had to serve six years ending in 1980 (the six years do not have to be consecutive).

Table 4. Transitions from the House to the Senate: 1959-1980*

	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
Abourezk											
Armstrong											
Bass	–0.192	–0.347	–0.567	–0.593	–0.449	–0.439	–0.612*	–0.552			
Baucus											
Beall											0.196
Brewster	–0.246	–0.503	–0.413	–0.360	–0.467*	–0.457	–0.637	–0.563	–0.740	–0.457	
Burdick	–0.650	–0.402*	–0.631	–0.696	–0.435	–0.408	–0.701	–0.467	–0.276	–0.299	–0.523
Cochran											
Cohen											
Culver							–0.559	–0.480	–0.686	–0.678	–0.828
Dole			0.873	0.828	0.829	0.842	0.736	0.738	0.703	0.681	0.585*
Dominick			0.578	0.577	0.627*	0.616	0.543	0.527	0.410	0.357	0.677
Edmondson	–0.524	–0.484	–0.629	–0.627	–0.166*	–0.148					
Edwards							–0.021	0.248	0.107	0.124	0.438
Goodell	0.517	0.699	0.587	0.562	0.633	0.653	0.609	0.534	0.370	–0.404*	–0.651
Griffin	0.588	0.602	0.524	0.422	0.520	0.596	0.399	0.201*	–0.118	–0.302	0.354
Gurney					0.930	0.845	0.788	0.805	0.848	0.941	0.990*
Hathaway							–0.645	–0.736	–0.681	–0.766	–0.723
Heinz											
Inouye	–0.590	–0.681	–0.632	–0.625	–0.564*	–0.607	–0.653	–0.625	–0.585	–0.564	–0.648
Mathias			0.151	–0.015	–0.185	–0.148	–0.064	–0.097	–0.260	–0.258	–0.437*
Matsunaga					–0.647	–0.676	–0.700	–0.745	–0.681	–0.765	–0.674
McClure									0.761	0.718	0.657
McGovern	–0.580	–0.630			–0.664*	–0.721	–0.735	–0.555	–0.763	–0.786	–0.849
Melcher											–0.353
Metcalf	–0.650	–0.625	–0.580*	–0.604	–0.576	–0.633	–0.559	–0.492	–0.764	–0.574	–0.687
Montoya	–0.598	–0.602	–0.499	–0.521	–0.355	–0.340	–0.431*	–0.511	–0.251	–0.250	–0.455
Pressler											
Pryor									0.142	–0.008	–0.061
Riegle									0.148	–0.156	–0.443
Roth									0.561	0.451	0.317
Sarbanes											
Schweiker			0.341	0.267	0.252	0.208	–0.085	–0.079	0.067	–0.222	–0.551*
Scott									0.778	0.806	0.639
Stafford			0.250	0.131	0.252	0.192	0.114	0.168	0.048	–0.262	–0.293
Tsongas											
Tunney							–0.560	–0.499	–0.576	–0.683	–0.799
Weicker											–0.155

*The first year the individual was in the Senate.

TABLE 4 (continued)

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Abourezk		–0.970	–0.640	–0.734*	–0.802	–0.761	–0.804	–0.891	–0.793		
Armstrong				0.799	0.716	0.702	0.856	0.807	0.789	0.804*	0.815
Bass											
Baucus						–0.632	–0.603	–0.468	–0.504	–0.712*	–0.724
Beall	0.300	0.230*	0.200	0.200	0.284	0.099	–0.033	0.131			
Brewster											
Burdick	–0.590	–0.527	–0.712	–0.596	–0.723	–0.485	–0.582	–0.364	–0.530	–0.517	–0.481
Cochran				0.720	0.643	0.565	0.471	0.701	0.727	0.466*	0.634
Cohen				–0.137	–0.242	–0.124	–0.211	–0.026	–0.179	–0.014*	–0.127
Culver	–0.815	–0.950	–0.819	–0.724	–0.677	–0.878*	–0.853	–0.927	–0.901	–0.879	–0.941
Dole	0.572	0.558	0.571	0.507	0.553	0.368	0.582	0.513	0.357	0.395	0.410
Dominick	0.612	0.624	0.535	0.593	0.691						
Edmondson											
Edwards	0.490	–0.038	0.646*								
Goodell	–0.941										
Griffin	0.437	0.248	0.223	0.631	0.443	0.542	0.645	0.609	0.394		
Gurney	0.758	0.609	0.580	0.593	0.821						
Hathaway	–0.836	–0.928	–0.714	–0.783*	–0.861	–0.738	–0.715	–0.881	–0.805		
Heinz		–0.347	–0.613	–0.287	–0.329	–0.312	–0.231	–0.232*	–0.337	–0.288	–0.212
Inouye	–0.823	–0.536	–0.615	–0.631	–0.700	–0.555	–0.470	–0.622	–0.661	–0.577	–0.459
Mathias	–0.535	–0.455	–0.480	–0.462	–0.747	–0.603	–0.512	–0.552	–0.551	–0.700	–0.788
Matsunaga	–0.830	–0.624	–0.452	–0.734	–0.770	–0.692	–0.726	–0.723*	–0.704	–0.658	–0.800
McClure	0.664	0.627	0.632	0.651*	0.930	0.974	0.765	0.802	0.660	0.846	0.784
McGovern	–0.842	–0.768	–0.807	–0.734	–0.826	–0.793	–0.804	–0.882	–0.768	–0.991	–0.881
Melcher	–0.394	–0.609	–0.580	–0.537	–0.328	–0.549	–0.464	–0.435*	–0.421	–0.382	–0.360
Metcalf	–0.813	–0.665	–0.705	–0.617	–0.760	–0.776	–0.804	–0.859			
Montoya	–0.524	–0.417	–0.382	–0.411	–0.236	–0.047	–0.141				
Pressler						–0.072	–0.063	0.357	0.129	0.061*	0.142
Pryor	–0.142	–0.588	–0.446							–0.129	–0.116
Riegle	–0.372	–0.700	–0.836	–0.745	–0.853	–0.761	–0.651	–0.835*	–0.842	–0.934	–0.968
Roth	0.403	0.378*	0.340	0.426	0.361	0.298	0.454	0.525	0.677	0.462	0.542
Sarbanes		–0.686	–0.852	–0.850	–0.887	–0.889	–0.882	–0.959*	–0.877	–0.869	–0.955
Schweiker	–0.501	–0.456	–0.629	–0.569	–0.645	–0.817	–0.732	0.184	0.226	0.351	0.404
Scott	0.719	0.764	0.742	0.936*	1.000	0.835	1.002	0.789	0.771		
Stafford	–0.285	–0.242*	–0.228	–0.299	–0.354	–0.516	–0.374	–0.276	–0.417	–0.441	–0.348
Tsongas						–0.871	–0.859	–0.940	–0.778	–0.864*	–0.880
Tunney	–0.808	–0.770*	–0.839	–0.663	–0.767	–0.542	–0.539				
Weicker	–0.197	0.132*	0.012	0.016	–0.393	–0.325	–0.311	–0.234	–0.465	–0.461	–0.685

*The first year the individual was in the Senate.

Figure 4. Change in Voting Blocs over Time



not alter their spatial position. On the other hand, the Senate is more liberal than the House. Senators represent whole states and must cater to a more diverse constituency (Froman, 1963), which suggests that legislators moving to the Senate will, if they shift at all, shift left.

Table 4 is largely consistent with this interpretation. For the most part, a legislator's first few years in the Senate are spatially very close to his or her last few years in the House. Edmondson (D Okla.) and Edwards (D La.), who shifted abruptly to the right, and Griffin (R Mich.), who shifted sharply to the left over a four-year period, are the exceptions. Other legislators, Mathias (R Md.), Riegle (D Mich.), Weicker (R Conn.), and Stafford (R Vt.), for example, shifted their positions, but over much longer periods of time.

In a class by themselves are Richard Schweiker (R Pa.) and Charles Goodell (R N.Y.). During Schweiker's eight years in the House (1961-1968) he drifted slowly from center-right to center. After his election to the Senate, Schweiker shifted to the center-left and continued to drift left until his selection as Ronald Reagan's running mate in 1976. The trip to the mountain top with Reagan had a profound effect upon Schweiker—it produced the largest single one-year shift in the 22 years of our data. By the time Schweiker retired in 1980, he was slightly to the right of where he was when he began his career in 1961. In contrast, Goodell was much more stable than Schweiker during his years in the House (1959-1967 in our data). He was appointed to the Senate by Governor Nelson Rockefeller in 1968 to serve out the remainder of Robert Kennedy's Senate term. Goodell, who had been a moderately conservative upstate New York congressman, by 1970 had become, in Spiro Agnew's view, a radical liberal. In fact, Agnew's characterization was not all that far off. In 1970 Goodell was more liberal than either Edward Kennedy or George McGovern. Goodell's three-year shift is the largest in our data.

Legislators who served in both the House and the Senate do not of course have a monopoly on long-term spatial movement. One of the most interesting examples is John Anderson (R Ill.), who ran for the presidency as an independent in 1980. Anderson appears to have gone through three phases during his 20-year career in the House. From 1961 to 1966 he was more conservative than Gerald Ford, the Republican minority leader.[11] Between 1967 and 1968, he abruptly shifted to the center of the spectrum where he remained until his presidential campaign of 1979-1980, when he abruptly shifted to center left. That Anderson, a moderate to moderate conservative for the bulk of his career, should attract so much support from liberals in 1980, is eloquent testimony to the depth of the dissatisfaction with President Carter.

In conclusion, it is clear from the discussion above that the interest group ratings are highly structured. On average, a single liberal-conservative dimension accounts for 81% of the variance of the 190,000 interest-group ratings issued from 1959 to 1980. Furthermore, the interest groups and the legislators are very stable on the liberal-conservative dimension over time. We now turn to the question of the usefulness of the one- and two-dimensional spatial configurations of legislators derived from the ratings for roll-call vote analyses.

Analysis of the Roll-Call Votes

The spatial model we described in the second section assumes that each roll-call vote has two outcome locations in the evaluative space. The interest groups and the legislators react to these policy outcomes in different ways. The interest groups are not members of Congress. They can indulge in the luxury of "voting" on only those matters of great importance to them. In spatial terms, the interest groups are free to "vote" on only those roll-calls with outcomes near them in the space; otherwise, they abstain. Legislators have no such freedom. In a real-world voting situation, a member of Congress cannot afford to indulge in the luxury of not voting or abstaining too often. Consequently, we assume that legislators vote for the outcome closest to them in the space, even though in some situations it may be a choice between two distant outcomes. Therefore, in a perfect world, there will be a point (in one dimension) or cutting line (in two dimensions) such that all legislators to the left of the point/line will vote for the "left" outcome and all members to the right of the point/line will vote for the "right" outcome.

Because this cutting point/line construct is inherent in the model of the interest group ratings (and given the success of the spatial model of the ratings), it is practically certain that the roll calls chosen by the interest groups will produce clearly defined cutting points/lines in the legislator configurations. The more interesting question is how well the roll calls not chosen by the interest groups will do. If both sets of roll calls produce equally defined cutting points/lines in the configurations, then this is good evidence that the configurations recovered from the ratings are not biased. By "biased" we mean the following. Suppose the interest groups were all on a hyperplane through the space of the legislators. They would therefore tend to select roll calls with outcomes on the hyperplane to construct their ratings, and this would result in the recovery of a distorted version of the true configuration of legislators.

To locate the cutting point/line for a roll call, we place it within the pattern of yea and nay voting such that it minimizes error relative to an ideal pattern. For example, suppose we are working with a single dimension and we observe:

YYYYY · · · YYYNYY|NNYNYNNN · · · NNNNN

Placing the cutting point as shown minimizes the error with respect to a pattern in which everyone to the left of the cutting point votes yea and everyone to the right votes nay. In this example, three errors are made. For an empirical example, consider Table 5. It displays the members of the Senate in the order of their recovery on the liberal-conservative dimension in 1972 and 1977 along with how they voted on the Jackson amendment to the SALT I treaty in 1972 and how they voted on four SALT related motions in 1977.[12]

---

[11] Interestingly, George Bush, who served in the House from 1967-1970, was also more conservative than Ford. In 1980, Jesse Helms (one of the most conservative members of Congress), the Moral Majority, and their allies opposed putting Bush on the ticket with President Reagan. Yet during his years in Congress, Bush's voting record was more conservative than ex-President Gerald Ford's—who almost ended up on the ticket.

[12] Jackson (D Wash.) amendment—as amended by voice votes to state that continued modernization of U.S. nuclear forces was required for a prudent nuclear posture but expressing the hope that such actions would become less necessary in the future—Request that any future permanent treaty on offensive nuclear arms "not limit the United States to levels on intercontinental strategic forces inferior to" those of the Soviet Union but be based rather on "the principle of equality"; endorse the maintenance of a vigorous research, development, and modernization program and provide that failure to negotiate a permanent treaty limiting offensive arms would "jeopardize supreme national interests" of the United States and would be grounds for abrogating the U.S.-Soviet treaty limiting defensive nuclear weapons (*1972 CQ Almanac,* p. 62-S, CQ vote

Table 5. Voting on Strategic Arms Limitations Motions

SALT I Treaty (1972) (Jackson Amendment		Related Votes (1977)				
			Warnke	Warnke	Helms	Church
Muskie	N	Kennedy	Y	Y	N	Y
Kennedy	N	Sarbanes	Y	Y	N	Y
Nelson	N	Metzenbaum	Y	Y	N	Y
Mondale	N	Clark	Y	Y	N	Y
Hart	N	Culver	Y	Y	N	Y
Cranston	N	Pell	Y	Y	N	Y
Hughes	N	Williams	Y	Y	N	Y
Williams	N	Abourezk	Y	Y	Y	N
Harris	N	McGovern	Y	Y	Y	Y
Tunney	N	Hathaway	Y	Y	N	Y
Eagleton	N	Case	Y	Y	N	Y
Case	N	Brooke	Y	Y	N	Y
McGovern	N	Metcalf	Y	Y		
Ribicoff	N	Riegle	Y	Y	N	Y
Hartke	N	Nelson	Y	Y	N	Y
Gravel	N	Haskell	Y	Y	N	Y
Stevenson	N	Anderson	Y	Y	N	Y
Proxmire	N	Javits	Y	Y	N	Y
Humphrey	N	Cranston	Y	Y	N	Y
Bayh	N	Ribicoff	Y	Y	N	Y
Pell	N	Bayh	Y	Y	N	Y
Javits	N	Humphrey	Y	Y	N	Y
Church	N	Muskie	Y	Y	N	Y
Symington	N	Durkin	Y	Y	N	Y
Mansfield	N	Biden	Y	Y	N	Y
Moss	N	Matsunaga	Y	Y	N	Y
Brooke	N	Leahy	Y	Y	N	Y
Burdick	N	Hart	Y	Y	N	Y
Metcalf	N	Jackson	N	Y	N	Y
Pastore	Y	Inouye	Y	Y	N	Y
Schweiker	N	Moynihan	N	Y	N	Y
Inouye	Y	Eagleton	Y	Y	N	Y
Magnuson	Y	Church	Y	Y	N	Y
Percy	Y	Magnuson	N	Y	N	Y
Mathias	N	McIntyre	Y	Y	N	Y
McIntyre	Y	Gravel	Y	Y	N	Y
Hatfield	N	Mathias	Y	Y	N	Y
Montoya	Y	Glenn	Y	Y	N	Y
Randolph	Y	Bumpers	Y	Y	N	Y
Fulbright	N	Stevenson	Y	Y	N	Y
Jackson	Y	Proxmire	Y	Y	N	Y
McGee	Y	Sasser	Y	Y	N	Y
Stafford	N	Melcher	Y	Y	N	Y
Stevens	Y	Huddleston	N	Y	N	Y
Chiles	Y	Burdick	Y	Y	N	Y
Boggs	Y	Ford	Y	Y	N	Y
Pearson	Y	Stafford	Y	Y	N	N
Anderson	Y	Percy	Y	Y	N	N
Hollings	Y	Byrd	Y	Y	N	Y
Byrd	Y	Weicker	N	N		
Bible	Y	Deconcini	Y	Y	N	Y
Bentsen	Y	Heinz	N	Y	N	N
Aiken	N	Randolph	Y	Y	N	Y
Cannon	Y	Hatfield	Y	Y	N	Y
Weicker	N	Chafee	Y	Y	N	Y
Scott	Y	Sparkman	Y	Y	N	Y
Smith	N	Packwood	N	Y	N	N
Packwood	Y	Bentsen	Y	Y	N	Y

TABLE 5 (continued)

SALT I Treaty (1972) (Jackson Amendment)			Related Votes (1977)			
			Warnke	Warnke	Helms	Church
Spong	Y	Hollings	Y	Y	N	Y
Cooper	N	Pearson	Y	Y	N	Y
Saxbe	Y	McClellan	Y	N		
Beall	Y	Stone	N	Y	N	Y
Cook	Y	Cannon	N	Y	N	Y
Griffin		Chiles	N	Y	N	Y
Long	Y	Long	Y	Y	N	Y
Taft	Y	Johnston	Y	Y	N	Y
Roth	Y	Danforth	N	N	N	N
Bellmon	Y	Schweiker	N	N	Y	N
Fong	Y	Talmadge	N	Y	N	N
Gambrell	Y	Stevens	N	Y	N	N
McClellan	Y	Morgan	Y	Y	Y	Y
Miller	Y	Baker	N	N	N	N
Sparkman	Y	Nunn	N	Y	N	Y
Young	Y	Eastland	Y	Y	N	Y
Jordan	Y	Zorinsky	N	N	Y	N
Talmadge	Y	Bellmon	N	N	N	N
Dominick	Y	Young	Y	Y	N	N
Allott	Y	Stennis	N	N	N	Y
Jordan	Y	Dole	N	N	Y	N
Dole	Y	Domenici	N	N	Y	N
Gurney	Y	Thurmond	N	N	Y	N
Baker	Y	Roth	N	Y	N	N
Allen	Y	Lugar	N	N	Y	N
Buckley	Y	Allen	N	N	Y	N
Byrd	Y	Griffin	N	N	Y	N
Edwards	Y	Schmitt	N	N	N	N
Hruska	Y	Byrd	N	N	N	N
Ervin	Y	Bartlett	N	N	Y	N
Bennett	Y	Laxalt	N	N	N	Y
Stennis	Y	Tower	N	N	N	N
Eastland	Y	Hayakawa	N	N	N	Y
Curtis	Y	Hansen	N	N	Y	N
Cotton	Y	Goldwater	N	N	N	N
Brock	Y	Wallop	N	N	Y	N
Tower	Y	Curtis	N	N	Y	N
Thurmond	Y	Scott	N	N	Y	N
Fannin	Y	Hatch	N	N	Y	N
Hansen	Y	McClure	N	N	Y	N
Goldwater	Y	Helms	N	N	Y	N
		Garn	N	N	Y	N
% Predicted	90.1	% Predicted	88.0	93.0	88.7	89.7
2 Party	65.7	2 Party	77.0	81.0	80.4	84.5
3 Party	79.8	3 Party	77.0	81.0	80.4	84.5
Pre 2 Party	.735	Pre 2 & 3	.478	.632	.423	.335
Pre 3 Party	.510					

The cutting lines shown in the table fit well; 90 of 99 senators on the Jackson amendment, 88 and 93 of 100 senators on the two Warnke votes, 86 of 97 senators on the Helms motion, and 87 of 97 senators on the Church motion are consistent with the spatial model. Viewed in isolation, these figures are quite impressive. However, as Weisberg (1978) has pointed out, simply "predicting" that a member will vote with the majority of his or her party (the two-party model) or, better yet, "predicting" that a member will vote with a majority of his or her party where the Democratic party is split into its northern liberal and southern conservative wings (the three-party model), will yield very accurate results. Weisberg found that the two-party model correctly accounted for 82.4% of House votes from 1957-1974; the three-party model correctly accounted for 84.8%. Table 5 shows that the liberal-conservative dimension outperforms both the two- and three-party models on these SALT related votes. As a basis of comparison, in Table 5 we also show lambda, the statistic recommended by Weisberg to measure "predictive" improvement. Lambda measures the proportional reduction in error of one model over another. For example, on the vote to confirm Paul Warnke as director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the liberal-conservative dimension correctly accounts for 93 of 100 senators, whereas the two- and three-party models correctly account for only 81 senators. The proportional reduction in error (PRE) is, therefore, (93 - 81)/(100 - 81) = .632, or 63.2%. All the lambda values in Table 5 are above .3, which indicates that voting on Strategic Arms Limitation—arguably the most important question of our age—is substantially ideological.[13]

Table 6 shows the percentage of votes cast in the 11 congresses in our study that are consistent with the one- and two-dimensional spatial model, the two-party model, and the three-party model. With the exception of the 88th Senate, in both Houses and all Congresses the one- and two-dimensional spatial models outperform the two- and three-party models for all roll-call votes and for all three categories of nonunanimous votes (minority not less than 5%, 20%, and 40% of the total vote cast, respectively). The three- and two-party lambdas are low in the first three Congresses, but are substantial otherwise. Overall, the party dimension only accounts for an additional 1.5% of House voting and 2.3% of Senate voting. However, on closer votes, the party dimension plays a more important role. On roll calls with at least 40% in the minority, party accounts for an additional 2.6% of House voting and 2.7% of Senate voting. Consistent with the interest-group ratings, the party dimension is strongest for the 86th Congress. The results for the 92nd through 94th Congresses are consistent with Schneider's (1979, p. 147) argument that a single liberal-conservative dimension structured congressional voting during this period.

Table 7 offers some evidence bearing on the bias question we raised above. In the 96th Congress, there is little or no difference between the set of votes chosen by the interest groups and the set not chosen in terms of the percentage of the vote consistent with the three models. This result holds even for the subset of roll calls that are chosen by five or more groups. The roll calls chosen by the interest groups from the 96th Congress are a representative sample of the total set of roll calls.

We put quotation marks around the word predict above because, in reality, none of these models is predicting anything because they are applied ex post. Suppose, however, that a random sample of legislators were polled before a roll call and they reported how they were going to vote. For true predictive purposes, the spatial model is the most parsimonious because only one parameter (the cutting point/line) is estimated from the sample, whereas two and three parameters (the majority preference of each subgrouping) are estimated for the two- and three-party models respectively.[14]

#401). The vote took place on September 14, 1972. Confirmation of President Carter's nomination of Paul C. Warnke to head the U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union (*1977 CQ Almanac,* p. 8-S, CQ vote #41). Confirmation of President Carter's nomination of Paul C. Warnke to be Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) (*1977 CQ Almanac,* p. 8-S, CQ vote #42). Both Warnke votes were on March 9, 1977. Helms (R N.C.) motion to table, and thus kill, the resolution that would express congressional support for President Carter's decision to adhere to the arms ceilings in the 1972 U.S.-Soviet interim agreement on strategic weapons (SALT I) after that agreement expired on October 3, 1977. Church (D Idaho) motion to table, and thus kill, the McClure (R Idaho) amendment to stipulate that the resolution would not prohibit the United States from development of any nuclear weapon system (*1977 CQ Almanac,* p. 74-D, CQ votes #513 and #514). Both votes took place on October 3, 1977.

[13] Three especially glaring errors in Table 4 are the votes of Abourezk and McGovern on the Helms and Church motions. Their votes, contrary to President Carter's position, are almost certainly due to their pique at President Carter's handling of the natural gas pricing issue. A number of key votes on natural gas (Abourezk had led a filibuster which had been shut off through questionable tactics) took place on October 1 and October 3.

[14] Of course, if you had a true random sample, the best prediction would be the division found in the sam-

Table 6. Consistency of Roll Calls with Spatial and Party Models

Congress	Number Roll Calls	Spatial Model		Party Model		Two Party Lambda		Three Party Lambda	
		1 Dim	2 Dim	Two	Three	1 Dim	2 Dim	1 Dim	2 Dim
HOUSE									
All Votes									
86	180	84.2	88.6	80.9	84.2	.17	.40	.00	.28
87	240	87.7	89.8	84.3	85.9	.22	.35	.13	.28
88	232	88.2	89.3	85.0	86.4	.21	.29	.13	.21
89	394	89.8	90.9	84.6	87.1	.34	.41	.21	.30
90	478	88.5	89.8	83.4	86.0	.30	.39	.17	.27
91	443	87.7	89.6	82.3	85.0	.31	.41	.18	.31
92	649	86.7	88.6	80.7	83.5	.31	.41	.18	.31
93	1078	85.4	87.2	81.0	82.6	.23	.33	.16	.27
94	1273	86.4	87.7	81.3	83.3	.28	.34	.19	.26
95	1540	86.9	88.1	82.7	84.1	.24	.31	.17	.25
96	1284	86.8	88.1	82.9	84.1	.23	.31	.17	.25
Total	7791	86.9	88.4	82.3	84.2	.26	.35	.17	.27
Nonunanimous votes 5% minority									
86	168	82.1	87.2	78.3	82.1	.17	.41	.00	.28
87	225	85.0	87.6	80.9	82.8	.22	.35	.13	.28
88	219	86.1	87.4	82.3	84.0	.22	.29	.13	.21
89	288	86.7	88.1	79.7	83.0	.34	.42	.22	.30
90	411	84.9	86.6	78.2	81.7	.31	.39	.18	.27
91	317	83.7	86.1	76.1	79.9	.32	.42	.19	.31
92	482	82.7	85.2	74.9	78.5	.31	.41	.20	.31
93	850	83.7	84.3	76.5	78.5	.31	.33	.24	.27
94	1003	83.3	84.9	76.9	79.4	.28	.35	.19	.27
95	1107	82.6	84.1	76.8	78.8	.25	.31	.18	.25
96	971	83.3	85.0	78.2	79.8	.23	.31	.17	.25
Total	6041	83.6	85.2	77.4	79.8	.27	.35	.19	.27
Nonunanimous votes 20% minority									
86	138	81.4	86.8	77.0	81.4	.18	.42	.00	.29
87	154	83.7	86.9	79.2	81.6	.22	.37	.12	.29
88	155	85.0	86.4	80.6	82.7	.23	.30	.13	.21
89	230	85.7	87.3	77.7	81.6	.36	.43	.22	.31
90	270	83.3	85.3	74.9	79.5	.33	.42	.18	.28
91	208	80.1	83.2	70.3	75.8	.33	.43	.18	.30
92	369	80.3	83.4	71.0	75.8	.32	.43	.19	.31
93	613	79.9	82.0	72.1	74.9	.28	.36	.20	.28
94	758	81.3	83.1	73.6	76.9	.29	.36	.19	.27
95	813	79.8	81.6	72.7	75.4	.26	.33	.18	.25
96	746	81.3	83.2	75.5	77.5	.24	.32	.17	.25
Total	4454	80.8	83.3	74.0	77.2	.26	.36	.16	.27
Nonunanimous votes 40% minority									
86	57	79.7	85.3	74.7	79.3	.20	.42	.02	.29
87	82	84.6	87.4	81.4	83.8	.18	.33	.05	.22
88	87	86.7	88.3	83.0	84.8	.22	.31	.12	.23
89	105	87.7	89.0	78.4	83.8	.43	.49	.25	.32
90	123	84.4	87.0	76.6	81.6	.34	.44	.15	.29
91	101	78.7	82.5	68.6	75.3	.32	.44	.14	.29
92	187	79.2	82.9	70.9	76.2	.28	.41	.12	.28
93	273	77.9	81.8	71.9	75.3	.21	.35	.11	.26
94	316	80.6	82.5	71.0	77.0	.33	.40	.16	.24
95	375	79.2	81.2	71.4	75.4	.27	.34	.15	.24
96	346	80.7	82.7	74.9	77.3	.23	.31	.15	.25
Total	2052	80.8	83.3	73.5	77.7	.28	.37	.14	.25

TABLE 6 (continued)

Congress	Number Roll Calls	Spatial Model		Party Model		Two Party Lambda		Three Party Lambda	
		1 Dim	2 Dim	Two	Three	1 Dim	2 Dim	1 Dim	2 Dim
SENATE									
All votes									
86	422	84.9	89.6	80.0	83.1	.25	.48	.11	.39
87	428	84.8	87.0	79.3	82.1	.27	.37	.15	.27
88	534	82.5	86.7	77.1	83.0	.24	.42	–.03	.22
89	497	85.5	86.8	77.9	80.9	.35	.41	.24	.31
90	596	83.9	86.6	78.7	81.4	.24	.37	.13	.28
91	666	86.0	88.7	78.5	81.8	.35	.48	.23	.38
92	955	86.3	89.4	79.2	82.4	.34	.49	.22	.40
93	1138	86.1	88.1	79.1	81.3	.34	.43	.26	.36
94	1311	87.1	88.8	78.7	81.4	.39	.47	.31	.40
95	1156	85.1	86.8	77.6	79.6	.34	.41	.27	.35
96	1054	84.2	87.0	79.1	80.7	.25	.38	.19	.33
Total	8807	85.4	87.7	78.6	81.4	.32	.43	.22	.34
Nonunanimous votes 5% minority									
86	358	82.0	87.7	75.9	79.7	.25	.49	.12	.39
87	398	83.6	86.0	75.9	80.7	.27	.37	.15	.27
88	507	81.3	83.6	75.4	81.8	.24	.33	–.03	.10
89	434	83.6	85.0	74.8	78.3	.35	.43	.25	.34
90	487	80.7	83.9	74.2	77.6	.25	.38	.14	.28
91	534	82.9	86.2	73.4	77.5	.36	.48	.24	.38
92	759	83.3	87.0	74.4	78.4	.35	.48	.23	.40
93	949	83.8	86.0	75.4	78.0	.34	.43	.26	.37
94	1106	85.1	87.0	75.2	78.3	.40	.48	.31	.40
95	993	83.2	84.9	74.2	76.6	.35	.42	.28	.36
96	888	81.6	84.8	75.5	77.3	.25	.38	.19	.33
Total	7413	83.3	85.7	75.0	78.2	.33	.43	.23	.34
Nonunanimous votes 20% minority									
86	284	80.5	86.6	73.3	77.5	.27	.50	.13	.40
87	336	83.0	85.4	74.9	79.5	.29	.39	.17	.29
88	437	80.0	82.5	73.6	80.8	.24	.34	–.04	.09
89	361	82.6	84.0	72.6	76.7	.37	.42	.26	.32
90	383	78.6	82.1	70.5	74.8	.27	.38	.15	.29
91	433	81.4	85.0	70.3	75.2	.38	.50	.25	.40
92	612	81.9	86.0	71.2	76.2	.37	.51	.24	.41
93	745	82.1	84.5	72.0	75.3	.36	.45	.27	.37
94	885	83.6	85.7	72.2	76.1	.41	.49	.32	.40
95	805	81.6	83.4	71.3	74.2	.36	.42	.29	.36
96	720	79.6	83.2	72.6	74.9	.26	.39	.19	.33
Total	6001	81.5	84.2	72.1	76.1	.34	.43	.23	.34
Nonunanimous votes 40% minority									
86	123	79.5	85.0	69.5	74.6	.33	.51	.20	.41
87	147	83.5	85.3	74.0	79.8	.37	.44	.18	.27
88	146	78.6	81.7	71.1	78.4	.26	.37	.01	.15
89	140	83.8	85.3	70.1	76.5	.46	.51	.31	.37
90	155	77.3	81.1	67.7	73.4	.30	.42	.15	.29
91	201	81.2	84.9	68.1	74.4	.41	.53	.27	.41
92	285	81.6	86.3	70.5	76.3	.37	.53	.22	.42
93	295	80.2	83.0	69.9	75.0	.34	.43	.21	.32
94	344	82.2	84.2	70.4	77.1	.40	.47	.22	.31
95	303	79.5	81.5	68.1	73.2	.36	.42	.23	.31
96	331	77.4	82.2	71.3	74.5	.21	.38	.12	.30
Total	2470	80.9	83.6	70.0	75.5	.36	.45	.22	.33

Parsimony, however, is not the important difference between the models. The spatial model is based on a simple theory of voting which can incorporate the essential portions of the other two models (strength of party unity and the conservative coalition of Republicans and southern Democrats versus the northern Democrats) within its framework.[15] In our opinion, it is a straightforward model "with versimilitude to the process being studied" (Weisberg, 1978, p. 557).

The House lambdas for all votes in Table 6 are about the same magnitude as those shown by Weisberg (1978, p. 566) for the Matthews and Stimson (1975) simulation which was based on a cue-taking theory. We think the similarity of our results with those of Matthews and Stimson in terms of "prediction" stems from the finding of many researchers that legislators tend to select cue givers on the basis of similarity of policy attitudes (e.g., Kingdon, 1973, p. 76). Legislators are much more likely to share friendships with, seek advice from, and adopt the positions of fellow party members. The probability of common voting increases further if the members share similar views and are from the same state delegation. Norpoth (1976) examined the sources of party cohesion in roll-call voting and found four key elements:

> (1) representatives choose informants from the ranks of their own party groups; (2) representatives as well as informants share policy attitudes; (3) informants reach their own voting decisions on the basis of shared attitudes; and (4) representatives adopt the decisions of their informants as guides for their own behavior. (p. 1171; see also Cherryholmes & Shapiro, 1969, pp. 63-84)

In spatial terms, representatives who choose informants on the basis of shared attitudes or party are quite likely to be close to such informants in the basic space.

The spatial model will not capture other types of cues—for example, voting with the administration, voting with the committee chairman or ranking minority member, voting with the state party delegation when three-fourths of it vote together—as well as it should capture the policy-related cues. A theory of voting that combined the spatial model and the "non-spatial" cues could very well achieve "predictive" rates in excess of 90% and could satisfy the criteria laid down by Weisberg (1978) for an organizing theory of roll-call voting. A proposal along these lines has been made by Daniels (1983).

The Relationship of the Evaluative Dimensions to Various Issue Areas

Table 6 demonstrates that congressional voting in the aggregate is highly consistent with a unidimensional spatial model. However, the percentages in Table 6 are averages; they disguise differences between issue areas. For example, Table 5 suggests that voting on strategic arms limitation is highly ideological. In contrast, as we will show momentarily, voting on agricultural issues is not very consistent with the spatial model.

In order to determine what issues are most closely associated with the liberal-conservative evaluative dimension (we will turn to the party unity dimension momentarily), we sorted all the nonunanimous (minority not less than 10%) votes in the 1959-1978 period by how consistent they were with the dimension and by the five general policy categories identified by Clausen (1973). To measure the degree of fit of a roll call to the dimension, we used the majority lambda for the vote rather than the percentage predicted correctly. For example, suppose the vote is 281 to 149 and the cutting point on the dimension is placed such that 379 or 88.1% are accounted for correctly. The majority lambda or proportional reduction in error is: PRE = (379 - 281)/(430 - 281) = .658. This PRE measure allows us to disregard vote margins in our analysis. The best-fitting votes were designated as those with PRE values of .70 or higher. The results are shown in Table 8.

The votes that are most closely associated with the dimension are drawn primarily from the government management and social welfare policy areas. These two highly related policy areas can be uniquely associated with the policies developed during the New Deal realignment (cf. Clausen, 1973, p. 47; Clausen & Cheney, 1970, p. 141). On average, 69% of the best-fitting roll calls in the Senate and 72.4% of the roll calls in the House

---

ple! This overstates somewhat the case for the spatial model. The legislator configuration used for prediction would have to be estimated from the previous year's roll calls so it would not include new members. Furthermore, even though the legislator configuration is estimated from the previous year's roll calls, from the standpoint of starting the predictive experiment from scratch, it seems fairer to count the legislator locations as parameters along with the cutting points/lines. In recent years when there have been more than 500 roll calls per session, the one-dimensional spatial model would still have fewer parameters.

[15] As Figure 4 shows, southern Democrats are to the right of northern Democrats, and Republicans are to the right of the southern Democrats. The one-dimensional spatial model will therefore not capture votes on which a coalition of northern Democrats and Republicans form. For example, the civil rights votes in the late 1950s and early 1960s fit this pattern (Sinclair, 1981). However, as Figure 3 shows, the two-dimensional spatial model can capture this phenomenon to an extent.

Table 7. Nonunanimous Votes Chosen by Interest Groups for the 96th Congress

		% Cast Spatial		% Cast		Two Party Lambda		Three Party Lambda	
	N	1 Dimension	2 Dimension	Two Party	Three Party	1 Dimension	2 Dimension	1 Dimension	2 Dimension
HOUSE									
Chosen by:									
Interest groups	312	84.3	85.8	78.9	80.2	.26	.33	.21	.28
5 or more interest groups	40	84.4	85.9	78.7	79.9	.27	.34	.27	.30
Not chosen by interest groups	659	83.0	84.7	78.0	79.7	.23	.31	.16	.25
All	971	83.3	85.0	78.2	79.2	.23	.31	.17	.25
SENATE									
Chosen by:									
Interest groups	332	81.3	84.5	74.5	76.3	.27	.41	.21	.35
5 or more interest groups	28	81.3	84.3	74.9	76.3	.26	.38	.21	.34
Not chosen by interest groups	556	81.7	84.9	75.9	77.7	.24	.37	.18	.32
All	888	81.6	84.8	75.5	77.3	.25	.38	.19	.33

Table 8. Distribution of Best-fitting Votes (%)[a]

Policy Area	Congress										Total
	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	
Senate											
Government management	23.1	18.6	21.6	11.0	14.3	6.9	19.1	35.1	51.4	53.4	29.9
Social welfare	74.4	59.3	59.5	76.9	53.6	43.1	18.1	29.7	17.4	25.0	39.1
Agricultural policy	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Civil liberties	0.0	1.7	8.1	7.7	25.0	12.1	14.9	15.3	10.4	8.0	10.4
Foreign policy	0.0	20.3	5.4	3.3	3.6	29.3	43.6	18.0	10.4	12.5	16.3
Miscellaneous	2.6	0.0	5.4	1.1	3.6	8.6	4.3	1.8	10.4	1.1	4.3
N	39	59	37	91	28	58	94	111	144	88	749
House											
Government management	47.1	41.2	33.3	12.3	40.0	16.7	9.8	33.3	66.7	39.6	35.3
Social welfare	41.2	47.1	25.9	47.7	31.4	50.0	51.2	40.0	21.8	32.1	37.1
Agricultural policy	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2
Civil liberties	11.8	0.0	0.0	10.7	0.0	20.8	12.2	6.7	2.6	11.3	7.5
Foreign policy	0.0	5.9	33.3	12.3	17.1	4.2	22.0	11.1	2.6	15.1	12.2
Miscellaneous	0.0	5.9	7.4	16.9	11.4	8.3	4.9	8.9	5.1	1.9	7.7
N	17	17	27	65	35	24	41	45	78	53	402

[a] PRE > .70.

fall into the government-management and social-welfare categories. The lowest percentage in the House is 59.2% for the 88th Congress, whereas the highest is 88.5% in the 94th Congress. The comparable figures in the Senate are 37.2% for the 92nd Congress and 97.5% in the 86th. All of the House figures and nine of the ten Senate figures are above 50%. The dimension is clearly associated with the controversies surrounding government intervention.

An examination of the content of the two categories reinforces this conclusion. The content of the social welfare domain changes very little over the ten Congresses. The best-fitting votes drawn from the social welfare area in the 86th Congress involved labor relations, public housing, urban renewal, minimum wage legislation, food stamps, aid to education, unemployment compensation, social security, and medical care for the elderly. The votes in the 95th Congress concerned the minimum wage, the Department of Housing and Urban Development appropriations, labor law reform, food stamps, the funding of the Legal Services Corporation, social security, antirecession assistance, appropriations for the Comprehensive Education and Training Act, and unemployment compensation. Given this consistency of content across time, the stability of voting position registered by continuing members that we discussed earlier is not surprising.

The same cannot be said for the government management domain—it shows a dramatic shift in content. The best-fitting votes drawn from this area in the 86th Congress focused on area redevelopment, interest rates on savings bonds, the public debt ceiling, tax reform, and airport construction. By contrast, the 95th Congress was concerned with gas and oil price deregulation, the activities of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, federal campaign spending, budget balancing, mine safety, community reinvestment, pollution control, strip mining, and general energy policy. Yet, the relative voting positions of the continuing members remained very stable. Clearly, a key source of stability in the legislative system is a tendency to classify new issues in terms of old alignments.[16]

The best-fitting foreign policy votes dealt with controversial treaties, Vietnam, the procurement of weapon systems, aid to both communist and right-wing regimes, and foreign aid under Democratic presidents. Civil liberties votes show a temporal as well as a content change. The best-fitting votes early in the study period involve anti-communism and criminal justice. By the end of the period, civil rights moves into the best-fitting category. Finally, conspicuous by their absence are agricultural policy votes. Only one vote in the House fit the liberal-conservative dimension at a PRE level of .7.

Given the results shown in Table 6, it is not surprising that the addition of the second dimension does not greatly increase the consistency of the votes in the various issue areas with the spatial model. There is, however, one interesting exception—agriculture.

Table 9 lists in the same format as Tables 7 and 8 several representative (in terms of their consistency with the spatial model) issue areas drawn from voting in the House from 1969 to 1980. As we indicated above, agricultural votes are not very consistent with the liberal-conservative dimension. However, the addition of the second dimension has a significant impact, no doubt because a coalition of midwestern Democrats, most southern Democrats, and midwestern Republicans passed much of the agricultural legislation in the 1970s. The spatial structure shown in Figure 3 would capture this to an extent. Even so, the two-dimensional spatial model does not really do much better than the three-party model.

In contrast to agriculture, food stamps are almost purely a liberal-conservative issue. About 90% of the voting is consistent with the dimension. The addition of the second dimension has almost no effect. Finally, voting on the national defense budget and on busing are typical of many other issue areas. In line with Table 6, the second dimension adds about 3% to the fits. Voting on the defense budget is more consistent with the party models than is busing, but the spatial model does very well in both issue areas.[17]

---

[16] Although the positions of legislators vis-à-vis each other remained relatively stable over time—which implies that new issues get redefined in terms of old alignments—we cannot tell from our technique whether or not changes in the substantive content of the liberal-conservative dimension have produced a uniform shift to the left/right by all legislators and interest groups over time. In any case, even if such a shift occurred, we think that it is of lesser significance than our finding of the power of the existing liberal-conservative alignment to absorb new issues.

[17] Our results are largely consistent with a recent Senate voting study by Smith (1981), who found that, using Clausen's categories, voting in the governmental management and social welfare areas were very ideological from the 86th Congress onward. Civil liberties voting was very ideological after the 90th Congress, and defense and foreign policy voting were moderately ideological after the 91st Congress. The policy area that was decidedly not ideological was agriculture. He concludes that "the similarity of voting alignments did increase during the period, and, as Schneider suggested, the ideological patterning of policy positions became more visible in several policy areas by the 1970s. Simply put,

Table 9. Consistency of Issue Areas with Spatial and Party Models of the House of Representatives

Congress	Number Roll Calls	Spatial Model		Party Model		Two-Party Lambda		Three-Party Lambda	
		1 Dim	2 Dim	Two	Three	1 Dim	2 Dim	1 Dim	2 Dim
Agriculture									
91	10	67.7	76.8	63.5	69.8	.11	.36	−.07	.23
92	18	72.3	80.9	74.1	78.2	−.07	.26	−.27	.12
93	34	71.3	80.7	73.2	76.6	−.07	.28	−.23	.17
94	25	75.5	78.6	72.9	76.0	.09	.21	−.02	.11
95	41	73.2	77.4	69.9	72.5	.11	.25	.02	.18
96	17	77.7	79.9	73.5	75.8	.16	.24	.08	.17
Food Stamps									
91	3	90.6	91.3	76.3	84.7	.61	.64	.39	.43
92	2	91.2	91.3	78.7	82.5	.59	.59	.50	.50
93	8	87.9	89.4	79.0	81.8	.43	.49	.34	.42
94	6	87.9	88.9	79.7	81.9	.40	.45	.33	.39
95	12	85.9	87.0	78.8	80.9	.33	.39	.26	.32
96	16	90.5	91.4	82.5	82.9	.46	.51	.44	.50
Defense Budget									
91	19	91.3	93.0	80.5	85.1	.56	.64	.42	.53
92	37	88.9	90.4	75.3	80.0	.55	.61	.45	.52
93	63	83.2	85.1	73.9	77.3	.36	.43	.26	.34
94	68	81.7	84.4	73.7	77.2	.30	.41	.20	.32
95	69	83.7	85.7	75.5	78.8	.33	.42	.23	.33
96	59	83.7	86.0	75.2	78.3	.34	.43	.25	.35
Busing–Desegregation									
91	8	89.2	91.2	69.4	78.0	.65	.71	.51	.60
92	18	81.4	83.9	66.5	75.6	.44	.52	.24	.34
93	17	81.4	84.1	65.9	74.1	.46	.53	.28	.39
94	4	79.2	82.2	65.7	71.6	.39	.48	.27	.37
95	6	82.2	83.1	65.4	73.1	.49	.51	.34	.37
96	12	85.2	86.0	72.7	75.6	.46	.49	.39	.43

Conclusion

Our empirical analysis has shown that the liberal-conservative and party evaluative dimensions used by the interest groups to construct their ratings are consistent with much of the roll-call voting in Congress. On average, the liberal-conservative dimension explains 81% of the variance of the ratings and in conjunction with a simple two-outcome spatial theory of voting, successfully accounts for 86.9% of the voting in the House and 85.4% of the voting in the Senate during the period of our study. The addition of the party dimension adds 1.5% and 2.3% respectively to these figures.

The method of roll-call analysis that we used in our empirical analysis has many advantages. The most important advantage is that recovering the spatial configuration of legislators from a multidimensional unfolding of a 535-by-30 matrix of ratings (535 legislators rated by 30 interest groups —e.g., 1977) is much easier than recovering a configuration from a factor analysis of a 100-by-100 or a 435-by-435 matrix of associations. Furthermore, the spatial model of the ratings results in the placement of the members of the House and Senate in a common configuration. We checked the model by separately unfolding the House and Senate ratings for each year. In only two instances were the configurations different enough to cast doubt on the assumption of comparability. Although we have not exploited it here, having the House and Senate members in the same spatial configuration makes cross-chamber comparisons of roll-call voting within and between issue domains possible.

Comparisons across time are also possible with this methodology. As we demonstrated above, the

---

senators' policy positions relative to each other were more stable across policy areas in the 1970s, and that stability was paralleled by a greater match between those policy positions and the standards of evaluation constructed by contemporary ideologue" (p. 794).

liberal-conservative dimension is very stable over time. However, if the interest groups and the legislators uniformly drifted to the left (or right) over time, this would not be uncovered by the unfolding and matrix-fitting procedures.

Our methodology has the further advantage that it does not require a researcher to make any judgments about what roll calls to include in the analysis (e.g., in the computation of the association measures for a factor analysis) and the item directions associated with roll-calls. In effect, the interest groups do it for the researcher. Because the spatial configuration of legislators is what the interest groups "see" in their evaluative space, the roll calls can be fitted to the configuration and can be compared with one another in terms of the evaluative dimensions of the interest groups. This allows a researcher to sort the roll calls not only by issue area but also by how well they are explained by the perceptual space of the interest groups. Voting on strategic arms, for example, is highly ideological.

Although our evidence suggests that the interest groups select a representative sample of roll calls to construct their ratings, the instability of the second dimension recovered from the ratings points to an inherent limitation of their usefulness in spatial analysis. The interest groups are not dispersed enough over the second dimension for it to be recovered as accurately as the first dimension. This has been a less serious problem in recent years when the number of interest groups issuing ratings has been large. Nevertheless, the estimation of the second dimension must be improved.

The "predictive" success of the spatial model is about the same as the voting model of Matthews and Stimson (1975). We think that the spatial model largely captures party and policy-related cue-taking, which suggests that a voting model that incorporated spatial and nonspatial cue-taking could account for more than 90% of Congressional voting. We hope that what we have done here will help to stimulate the development of such new voting theory.

References

Asher, B., & Weisberg, H. Voting change in Congress: Some dynamic perspective on an evolutionary process. *American Journal of Political Science*, 1978, *22*, 391-425.

Berge, M. F. Ten. Orthogonal Procrustes rotation for two or more matrices. *Psychometrika*, 1977, *42*, 267-276.

Bullock, C. Congressional voting and mobilization of a black electorate in the South. *Journal of Politics*, 1981, *43*, 662-682.

Cherryholmes, C. H., & Shapiro, M. *Representatives and roll-calls*. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969.

Clausen, A. R. *How congressmen decide: A policy focus*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973.

Clausen, A. R., & Cheney, B. A comparative analysis of Senate-House voting on economic and welfare policy, 1953-1964. *American Political Science Review*, 1970, *64*, 138-152.

Clausen, A. R., & Van Horn, C. The congressional response to a decade of change: 1963-1972. *Journal of Politics*, 1977, *39*, 624-666.

Converse, P. The nature of belief systems in mass publics. In D. E. Apter (Ed.). *Ideology and discontent*. New York: Free Press, 1964.

Daniels, R. A multi-level, longitudinal model of congressional voting. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, 1983.

Froman, L. A., Jr. *The congressional process: Strategies, rules and procedures*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1967.

Froman, L. A., Jr. *Congressmen and their constituencies*. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963.

Hoadley, F. The dimensions of congressional voting, 1971-1978: Some preliminary considerations. Presented at the Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, 1980.

Kingdon, W. *Congressmen's voting decisions*. New York: Harper & Row, 1973.

Kristof, W., & Wingersky, B. Generalization of the orthogonal Procrustes rotation procedure for more than two matrices. *Proceedings of the 79th Annual Conference of the American Psychological Association*, 1971, pp. 89-90.

Kritzer, H. M. Ideology and American political elites. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1978, *42*, 484-502.

Kuklinski, J. Representative-constituency linkage: A review article. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 1979, *4*, 121-141.

Libby, O. A plea for the study of votes in Congress. *Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1896* (2 vols.). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, I, 1897, pp. 323-334.

MacRae, D., Jr. *Dimensions of congressional voting*. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1958.

Matthews, D. R., & Stimson, J. *Yeas and nays: Normal decision-making in the U.S. House of Representatives*. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1975.

Morrison, R. J. A statistical model for legislative roll-call analysis. *Journal of Mathematical Sociology*, 1972, *2*, 235-247.

Norpoth, H. Explaining party cohesion in Congress: The case of shared policy attitudes. *American Political Science Review*, 1976, *70*, 1156-1171.

Ordeshook, P. C. The spatial theory of elections: A review and a critique. In I. Budge, I. Crewe, & D. Farlie, *Party identification and beyond*. New York: Wiley, 1976.

Poole, K. T. Dimension of interest group evaluation of the U.S. Senate, 1969-1978. *American Journal of Political Science*, 1981, *25*, 49-67.

Poole, K. T. Least squares metric, unidimensional unfolding. *Psychometrika*, 1984, *49*, 311-323.

Poole, K. T. Least squares multidimensional unfolding with applications to political data. Presented at the

Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 1982.

Poole, K. T. Recovering a basic space from a set of issue scales. Working Paper No. 44-82-83, Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie-Mellon University, 1983.

Rice, S. A. The political vote as a frequency distribution of opinion. *Journal of American Statistical Association,* 1924, *19,* 70-75.

Schneider, J. E. *Ideological coalitions in Congress.* Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979.

Schonemann, P. H. A generalized solution of the orthogonal Procrustes problem. *Psychometrika,* 1966, *31,* 1-10.

Schonemann, P. H., & Carroll, R. M. Fitting one matrix to another under choice of a central dilation and a rigid motion. *Psychometrika,* 1970, *35,* 245-256.

Sinclair, B. Agenda and alignment change: The House of Representatives, 1925-1978. In L. C. Dodd & B. I. Oppenheimer (Eds.), *Congress reconsidered* (2nd ed.). Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1981.

Smith, S. The consistency and ideological structure of U.S. Senate voting alignments, 1957-1976. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1981, *25,* 780-795.

Stone, W. J. A panel analysis of representation in Congress: A preliminary report. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1977.

Weisberg, H. F. Dimensional analysis of legislative roll-calls. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1968.

Weisberg, H. F. Evaluating theories of congressional roll-call voting. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1978, *22,* 554-578.

PACs, Contributions, and Roll Calls: An Organizational Perspective

JOHN R. WRIGHT
University of Iowa

This study uses information about the organizational arrangements of five major political action committees to develop an explanation for the extent to which PAC contributions are capable of influencing congressional voting decisions. The explanation claims that the processes by which PACs raise and allocate money must be understood before the impact of money on roll call decisions can be appreciated. In contrast to some previous studies, this analysis demonstrates with marked clarity the limited nature of PAC influence.

Concern about the effects of campaign contributions on congressional voting has stimulated a growing collection of studies on contributions and roll calls. Scholarly interest in this issue is a natural outgrowth of representatives' increased dependence on money for electoral survival. From 1974 to 1980, political action committee (PAC) expenditures increased by 500%, and average total contributions to congressional candidates tripled (Jacobson, 1983). During just the 1981-1982 election cycle, 2665 nonparty PACs contributed over $87 million to federal candidates (Malbin & Skladony, 1984).

Because of the prominent role of money in congressional elections, a relationship between PAC contributions and congressional voting is often claimed.[1] The validity of such assertions, however, has been difficult to establish. More often than not, these claims have not been confirmed through rigorous empirical analysis, and even when they have been, researchers have failed to identify any theoretical forces that might constrain or limit PAC influence. Unfortunately, because such theoretical considerations are absent, our understanding about PACs and their ability to influence roll calls is extremely tenuous.

In the research reported here, I begin to examine organizational arrangements in the PACs of five national associations that affect the ability of these PACs to influence roll call votes. Although organizational arrangements are thought to be important considerations in understanding interest groups generally (e.g., Berry, 1977; Truman, 1951; Wilson, 1973), the consequences of organizational arrangements in PACs have not been explored.[2] As a result, an important constraint on their activities and influence has been overlooked.

My objective in this article is to point out a fundamental paradox about an organizational arrangement common to many political action committees. The contradiction is that the organizational arrangement *most* conducive to raising money from individual contributors is also the organizational arrangement *least* conducive to influencing congressional voting. Paradoxically, the factors that allow some PACs to become very rich are the very same factors that undercut their potential influence. As a consequence, organizational arrangements are capable of limiting the ability of PACs to influence roll calls through money. This argument is assessed in light of empirical evidence drawn from a qualitative study of PAC organizations and a quantitative analysis of contribution patterns and roll calls.[3]

Received: April 24, 1984
Revision received: September 9, 1984
Accepted for publication: October 8, 1984

I am especially grateful to Richard F. Fenno for his suggestions and support. In addition, I wish to thank Greg Caldeira, Samuel C. Patterson, Vernon Van Dyke, and three anonymous referees for their valuable comments.

[1] Representative Downey, Democrat of New York, for example, claims, "You can't buy a congressman for $5000. But you can buy his vote. It's done on a regular basis" (Isaacson, 1982, p. 20). Barber Conable, Republican of New York, suggests that "These new PACs not only buy incumbents, but affect legislation as well. It's the same crummy business as judges putting the arm on lawyers who appear before them to finance their next campaign" (Green, 1982, p. 18). Additional support for these positions can be found in Drew (1982).

[2] Organizational arrangements have not been ignored altogether (e.g., Eismeier & Pollock, 1984; Sabato, 1984; Sorauf, 1982), but the importance of organization for congressional decision making has not received attention.

[3] Naturally, roll call votes are only a rough indicator of the overall influence that contributions might have

PAC Contributions and Roll Calls

Empirical evidence about the influence of PAC contributions on congressional voting is filled with ambiguity and apparent contradiction. On the positive side, Silberman and Durden (1976) found that an increase in total labor contributions in 1972 led to a significant increase in congressmen's support for the minimum wage in the 93rd Congress. Chappell (1982), too, discovered a significant positive connection between contributions and votes: a connection between contributions from Rockwell International and votes on the B1 bomber. In a study using aggregate data, Kau and Rubin (1982) reported that total labor contributions in 1978 were significantly related to votes on such issues as the debt limit, the windfall profits tax, and wage and price controls in 1979. Frendreis and Waterman (1983) uncovered a significant relationship between contributions from the trucking industry and voting in the Senate on trucking deregulation, and Brown (1983) concluded that contributions from the National Automobile Dealers Association and the American Medical Association had "substantial" effects on votes pertaining to those two groups in the 97th Congress.

In contrast, however, Chappell's (1981) work indicates that the effects of campaign contributions from several maritime unions on votes in the 96th Congress were "unavoidably ambiguous." More conclusively, Welch (1982) has asserted that "contributions by dairy PACs were *not* a major influence" (p. 491) on votes for dairy price supports in 1975. Finally, in an analysis of the effects of PAC contributions on House votes for the Chrysler loan guarantee and the windfall profits tax, Yiannakis (1983) has concluded that the influence of money was "very limited."

This diversity in findings is not particularly surprising, because different researchers have analyzed different groups and different votes. Unfortunately, because of the excessive costs involved, a representative sample of PACs and roll calls has not been collected and analyzed, and as a result, the meanings of the existing findings are difficult to interpret.[4] Are there really significant discrepancies in the various findings? Which findings are the aberrations—those that ascribe a positive and significant influence to PAC contributions or those that do not? How substantial is a "substantial" effect? Can even larger effects be expected?

The strategy of this research is to examine just five PACs, but five PACs that appear to have considerable influence on roll call decisions. Because this sample is both so small and skewed, it will not be possible to make generalizations about the influence of all PACs, or even a "typical" PAC. Yet an analysis of some of the most powerful PACs will permit generalizations about the upper bounds of PAC influence on roll call decisions. Given the present state of knowledge, an attempt to specify the range of possible empirical results, along with an explanation of why the range is as restricted as it is, represents a clear step forward in generalizing about PACs and roll calls.

Data on Five PACs

The five PACs included in this study are: The American Medical Political Action Committee (AMPAC), affiliated with the American Medical Association; the Dealers Election Action Committee (DEAC), affiliated with the National Automobile Dealers Association; BANKPAC of the American Bankers Association; the Realtors Political Action Committee (RPAC) of the National Association of Realtors; and the Associated General Contractors Political Action Committee (AGCPAC), affiliated with the Associated General Contractors.

The focus is on the PACs of national associations because many observers think they are among the most active and successful of all PACs in influencing roll call voting. Several factors contribute to this reputation. First, the national associations are generally well known for their strong lobbying organizations, and these organizations are alleged to work closely with the PACs (Malbin, 1979).[5] Second, the PACs of national associations tend to be among the largest PACs in terms of total dollars contributed to congressional candidates. As of 1982, RPAC was the largest of the association PACs; AMPAC ranked second; BANKPAC and DEAC ranked fourth and fifth, respectively; and AGCPAC was seventh largest among the association PACs. Moreover, RPAC, AMPAC, and DEAC were among the ten largest PACs, regardless of type (Cohen, 1983). If

---

on legislative outcomes. Contributions may have considerable effects on other aspects of the legislative process, such as decisions to report bills out of committee, or strategic considerations in scheduling.

[4] Although Sabato (1984) has surveyed a random sample of 399 PACs, his data do not include roll call votes.

[5] Even though many of the labor unions also have strong lobbying organizations, the labor PACs appear to be more interested in using their campaign contributions to influence election outcomes than the voting decisions of incumbent members of Congress (e.g., Budde, 1980).

one assumes that congressmen will be more sensitive to large contributions than small ones, then large PACs are more likely to affect voting decisions.

A third reason for the strong reputation of the association PACs is the excessive publicity they have received from the news media. One of the most publicized cases of influence in the 97th Congress involved the House vote to overturn the FTC rule regulating used-car dealers. Campaign contributions from the National Automobile Dealers Association were thought to be instrumental in that vote (UPI, 1982). The alleged connection between AMPAC contributions and the House's decision to exempt professionals, physicians in particular, from FTC regulation also received attention in 1982 (Barone, 1983). Finally, campaign contributions from the American Bankers Association were thought to be a "major factor" in the effort to repeal the law requiring banks to withhold taxes on interest and dividend payments (Noble, 1983).

Last, the national associations tend to lobby a lot of bills, so that at least one important bill for each group is likely to reach the House floor for a vote in any given session. Consequently, the possibility of a connection between money and votes is greater. Of the five PACs selected for this study, the Associated General Contractors is one of the more active groups. Although smaller and less well-known than some of the other groups, the AGC has traditionally played a leading role in lobbying major pieces of legislation (Ornstein & Elder, 1978). During the 97th Congress, the AGC lobbied extensively for passage of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act. That act involved several roll calls before final passage.

In summary, all five PACs selected for study here are either large PACs, PACs that were quite active in the 97th Congress, or PACs that had reputations for influencing legislation with their contributions. These five PACs certainly are not the only ones that meet these criteria; evidence of the effects of campaign contributions on voting might be found by studying other PACs. But if such evidence is to be found, it is likely to be found among these five.

In relation to the entire universe of PACs, the five PACs of this study fall under the rubric of "connected" PACs. A connected PAC, stated simply, is one that is affiliated with, and which coexists with, some extant organization, and this extant organization is commonly called the PAC's "parent" (Sorauf, 1982). Typical parents are trade and professional associations, membership organizations (such as the National Rifle Association), corporations, and labor unions. The vast majority of all nonparty PACs—more than 80%—are connected PACs. In contrast, unconnected PACs have no sponsoring organizations. Examples are the National Conservative Political Action Committee; National Committee for an Effective Congress, and Life Amendment PAC. Unconnected PACs generally, but not always, fall under the rubric of "ideological" PACs, and ideological PACs are generally, but not always, unconnected PACs (Latus, 1984).

Two types of data were collected for each of the five PACs. One type is from open-ended personal interviews; the other is quantitative data on actual contributions and roll calls. The interview data were collected in order to help characterize the organizational structures of the PACs and to provide first-hand information about fundraising practices and allocation strategies.[6]

Fourteen officials were formally interviewed from the five PACs. Most of those interviewed were located in Washington, but several were in other offices of their committees (e.g., at the regional and state levels). In four of the five, the principal interview was conducted with the executive director, or the official in charge of the day-to-day operations of the PAC. In the fifth, the principal interview was conducted with a consultant to the PAC who was instrumental in its founding. For four of the PACs, lower-level Washington officials were interviewed in addition to the executive director. These formal interviews were then supplemented with a number of informal discussions with various officials in the PAC community in Washington.

The quantitative data on campaign contributions were provided by the Federal Election Commission. The data set includes all nonindependent contributions to all House candidates for the 1979-1980 and 1981-1982 election cycles. Excluded are candidates who received money but subsequently were defeated in a primary, retired, died, resigned, or ran for some other office. These data were combined with data on roll calls in the U.S. House of Representatives from the first and second sessions of the 97th Congress.

Organization, Fundraising, and Allocation Strategies

Students of political action committees and campaign finance have theorized that PAC officials use one of two basic strategies when attempting to influence congressional outcomes through campaign contributions (Welch, 1980). Under one strategy (call it Type I), PACs attempt to influence elections. This strategy gives priority to candidates in the closest contests, and the objective is to keep representatives in office, or to place new candidates in office, who by nature are most sympathetic to the PAC's policy goals. Under the other strategy (Type II), PACs attempt to influence the behavior of incumbent representatives. Theoretically, this strategy gives priority to candidates who are likely to win, regardless of their initial policy positions, and to incumbents who are influential within the House. The objective is to persuade influential congressmen who are not always in agreement with the PAC's policy goals to become more agreeable and to maintain the support of already agreeable congressmen.

---

[6] For a fuller discussion of both types of data, see Wright (1983, pp. 13-21).

Although the goal of each strategy is to influence legislation, the means of accomplishing this goal and the assumptions underlying each strategy are quite different. Under the first strategy, congressmen's policy positions are assumed to be known, but fixed. As a result, voting decisions are not thought to be susceptible to manipulation or persuasion through campaign contributions, and thus the emphasis is on altering the membership of Congress rather than altering members' policy positions.

Under the second strategy, however, congressmen's policy positions are assumed to be variable, and congressmen are thought to be willing to exchange votes for campaign contributions.[7] PACs, therefore, pursue policy objectives by contributing to likely winners, who presumably will have flexibility in their policy positions, and to influential incumbents, who presumably are most capable of affecting the fate of proposed legislation.[8]

Both strategies assume that candidates need money, but the source of the need is different for each strategy. The Type I strategy presumes that the basis for financial need is immediate electoral competition, that is, a very close race. Implicit in the Type II strategy, however, is the notion that need derives from other considerations. Among these are the desire to establish or maintain a large war chest in order to deter future challenges, the desire to win by an exceptionally large margin in order to demonstrate viability for an attempt at a senatorial or gubernatorial seat, and the desire to make contributions to one's colleagues in order to solidify or expand one's influence within the House.[9]

Whether a PAC uses a Type I or Type II allocation strategy depends, in part, on the organizational resources available to the PAC. Theoretically, only those PACs that have the capacity to link contributions to congressional action can effectively employ a Type II strategy. Because Washington lobbyists are essential in establishing these links, a Type II strategy is much more viable for PACs associated with professional lobbying organizations—that is, connected PACs—than for unconnected, or ideological, PACs. In fact, research by Welch (1978, 1980) indicates convincingly that ideological PACs are much more likely to use a Type I than a Type II allocation strategy.

Because the PACs of national associations are affiliated with established lobbying organizations, contributions and lobbyists are often thought to be inextricably linked in the association PACs. Malbin (1979), for example, has suggested that the PACs of national associations are "special interest" rather than "general interest" groups. The hallmark of special interest groups is that they allocate their money "defensively," being concerned more with influencing legislative behavior than with influencing electoral outcomes. One reason the PACs of associations behave this way, says Malbin, is that national associations "tend to be headquartered in Washington, where lobbyists and PAC staffs work closely together" (p. 33). Similar views have been expressed by Fred Wertheimer, President of Common Cause, who states flatly that "PAC money is tied to lobbying" (Hucker, 1978), and by Germond and Witcover (1983) who claim that, "It's left to a few professional lobbyists to steer that [PAC] money in the 'right' direction."

A popular belief about PAC contributions (particularly association PACs), then, is that they are controlled, or at least shaped to a considerable degree, by Washington lobbyists. Surprisingly, however, the analysis of decision-making patterns within the five PACs of this study yielded *very little support for this position.* Instead of allocation decisions being controlled by Washington lobbyists, the evidence suggests overwhelmingly that PACs' allocations are dominated by local inputs—recommendations of active members of the PACs at the state, congressional district, and county levels.[10] Interviews with PAC officials in Washington indicated that when local recommendations are made concerning the amount of money that the national office should allocate to different federal candidates, some *80 to 90% of these recommendations are approved without modification.* Within AMPAC, for example, 80% of all local recommendations are approved. For RPAC, the approval rate is 92%; and for DEAC, 95 to 98%.

---

[7] Congressmen are predicted to alter their votes, however, only up to the point where the gain in electoral support through additional contributions just offsets the losses in support that result from moving away from voters' preferred policy positions. For a mathematical formulation, see Ben-Zion and Eytan (1974).

[8] In reality, PACs probably pursue some mix between the two strategies. Unfortunately, though, attempts to model mathematically behavior motivated by both approaches have been unsuccessful (Welch, 1980, p. 101). The two pure strategies, then, should be regarded as heuristic tools, not as perfect depictions of the real world.

[9] These three rationalizations for money were described in the interviews with the PAC officials.

Furthermore, there is very little evidence that PAC staffs and lobbying staffs work closely together. Historically, lobbying has been an activity of the parent organizations, not the PACs; and thus the two staffs have developed separately. Of the five PACs studied here, only in the case of the AGC does a single individual oversee both the lobbying activities and the PAC activities. Even physical distance often separates the PAC officials from the lobbyists. The NADA maintains an office for its lobbyists in downtown Washington, but the PAC operations are located in the organization's headquarters in McLean, Virginia. The headquarters for AMPAC have been located in Washington only since 1982; before 1982, the AMPAC offices were located in Chicago.

So, in light of the conventional view about PAC contributions and lobbyists, these findings are indeed surprising, and, as with most unexpected results, they raise important questions. Why is it that allocation decisions are dominated so strongly by local officials rather than Washington lobbyists? Who are these individuals at the local levels whose recommendations carry so much weight? Answers to both of these questions require a short digression into the process by which political action committees raise money for distribution to political candidates.

Organization and Fundraising

A continual and pressing problem for political action committees, as for any interest group, is the establishment and maintenance of a large contingent of active, dues-paying members (e.g., O'Brien, 1975; Olson, 1965/1971). Under federal law, corporations, labor unions, and other membership organizations are allowed to draw on their general treasury funds (e.g., funds from the parent organization, such as the AMA) to raise money for their PACs, but they are prohibited from drawing on their general treasury to make campaign contributions to federal candidates. National associations, as well as other organizations, must establish a "separate, segregated fund" (i.e., a political action committee) and make campaign contributions from this separate fund rather than from the general treasury. As a result, a separate membership must be established for the PAC, and this membership is itself a subset of the membership of the parent organization.

The fact that the PAC draws its members from the parent association puts the PAC at a severe disadvantage, relative to the parent, in providing selective material incentives to attract contributors or members. Members of the parent association can enjoy all of the selective incentives provided by the parent without ever contributing a dime to the political action committee, and because PACs are nascent political organizations, generally having been formed some 50 or 60 years after their parents, they lag far behind their parents in the provision of material benefits to prospective members. The American Medical Association, for example, was founded in 1846, but AMPAC was not added until 1961; the National Automobile Dealers Association was founded in 1917, but DEAC was not established until 1975; and the National Association of Realtors was formed in 1908, but RPAC was not founded until 1969. The parent associations, therefore, have had a great deal of "lead time" in testing and adopting those incentives that are most efficient for encouraging membership. In effect, then, the parents have established a virtual monopoly on material incentives, posing a formidable problem for the PACs in their fundraising efforts.

The way the PACs have managed to overcome this obstacle is to take advantage of their basic organizational structures. A common characteristic of the five PACs of this study is that the organizations with which they are affiliated are federated, or decentralized, organizations. Because the PACs were formed so much later than their parents, the organizational lines of the PACs tend to run parallel to the organizational lines of their parent groups.[11] Under the aegis of each of the five national PACs of this study are state-level PACs which, in turn, comprise officials from congressional districts, counties, and, where appropriate, individual corporations.[12]

The federal, or decentralized, structure of the association PAC provides an extensive grassroots network through which contributions can be raised. Each national PAC has, in effect, a dedicated core of local activists who bear much of the responsibility for soliciting individual contributions. These local activists are neither professional lobbyists nor full-time, salaried officials of the PAC, but rather political amateurs, such as professional bankers, physicians, and realtors, who happen to have a strong interest in politics and who take an active role in the local PAC organization.

---

[10] Handler and Mulkern (1982) make a comparable finding with respect to allocation decisions of corporate PACs. In 14 of 70 PACs surveyed, allocation decisions were said to be made by "nonspecialist amateurs."

[11] For a more detailed description of organizational arrangements, see Wright (1983, pp. 50-56).

[12] Member banks of the ABA generally, but not always, have their own political action committees. However, individual corporations of the AGC generally do not have their own PACs, although there are exceptions.

Because these activists operate at the local level through small constituent groups, solidary incentives (e.g., Salisbury, 1969) can be used effectively to stimulate membership. Instead of offering selective material incentives (e.g., Olson, 1965/1971), the basic approach to fundraising is to make persuasive appeals to an individual's sense of *citizen or professional* duty—the opportunity and obligation to join with other members of one's profession in order to create and sustain a political environment that is favorable to the maintenance and growth of the profession or industry. One PAC official characterized this approach as "an appeal to professional responsibility," and he stated that "it's how you market that approach that determines how successful you are going to be."

Persuasive appeals are made in a variety of ways: through direct mailings, presentations and speeches at small gatherings of staff and employees, phone calls, and personal visits. Because persuasive appeals of this sort are most effective when made in person, or in small group settings, the basic fundraising approach of the association PACs is ideally suited to a decentralized organizational structure. In fact, it is doubtful whether such an approach could be implemented successfully in any arrangement other than a decentralized one.

But in addition to persuasive appeals, the PACs also emphasize the effectiveness and legitimacy of contributing money to the PAC. PACs, it is argued, can and do influence election outcomes, and PACs frequently publish figures that emphasize the percentage of winning candidates they have supported. PAC officials also are quite sensitive to the perceived legitimacy of PACs, and they devote considerable effort—through speeches, cooperation with the news media, written editorials, and similar means—to stimulate contributions by portraying PACs in a positive light.[13]

The notion that large groups can be organized on the basis of factors other than selective material incentives is certainly consistent with the theoretical work of other scholars. Even Olson (1965/1971) has pointed out that federal groups may be able to bring about collective action through social incentives in the small constituent groups, and Moe (1980) has argued that

> [It] would be a serious mistake to "understand" organizational politics by automatically pointing to whatever organizational structures exist for the production and distribution of economic selective incentives. Organizations can do much more than this to attract members, and attention must clearly be given to other means of generating support: e.g., the ideological appeals of leaders; peer and leader emphasis on responsibility or fairness; the structuring of meetings, committees or social activities; the organizational generation of social pressure; leader efforts to convince individuals that their contributions make a difference; and the role of newsletters and informal communications networks in shaping member perceptions and values.

Implications for Allocation Strategies

The great dependence on local activists of the PAC for raising money significantly enhances their influence over decisions about how to allocate money to political candidates. National officials of the PAC are acutely aware of the need to respect local recommendations when allocation decisions are made. To do otherwise would reduce the incentives of local officials to raise money. In an outline of guidelines for establishing an effective state PAC organization, one national PAC makes the following suggestion.

> Although [statewide] contribution decisions must finally be made by the state PAC, proper recognition of the role of leaders of local PAC support groups and others should be given. *This is the key to a harmonious PAC program, and an important stimulus to membership development.* (emphasis added)

The national executive director of another PAC explained that:

> If we have someone who raised 10,000 dollars at the local level, but wants to support someone who we don't think is especially deserving, we will usually go along with him. If we didn't, he might not raise that kind of money for us the next time around.

And an official from still a different PAC summed it up this way: "They [the local officials] raise the money; they ought to be the ones who spend it."

---

[13] Additional discussion of the fundraising methods of the association PACs can be found in Wright (1984).

These observations suggest that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the best allocation strategy for the association PACs is a Type I rather than a Type II strategy. The dominance of local inputs emphasizes electoral considerations rather than lobbying considerations, because local PAC officials are much more likely to be familiar with electoral politics of geographic constituencies than with the mechanics of influencing legislation in the Congress. In addition, because allocation decisions are shaped largely by local PAC officials, congressmen who desire campaign contributions are better advised to cultivate favorable relationships with prominent local PAC officials than with Washington lobbyists. This arrangement tends to undercut substantially the value of money as a bargaining tool for professional lobbyists, thereby undermining the effectiveness of a Type II allocation strategy.

Contribution Patterns in Five PACs: Empirical Analysis

The fact that allocation decisions are dominated by local officials leads to testable propositions about allocation strategies and the impact of campaign contributions on congressmen's voting decisions. Specifically, the weak influence of Washington lobbyists relative to the strong influence of local PAC officials suggests that PACs' campaign contributions will be used to elect ideologically sympathetic candidates in close races rather than alter the policy positions of not-so-sympathetic candidates in safe races. As a consequence, campaign contributions are not likely to carry substantial weight in congressmen's roll call voting decisions. These two propositions are examined in this section and the next with the use of data on campaign contributions during the 1979-1980 and 1981-1982 election cycles, along with roll calls from the House during the 97th Congress.

In the analysis that follows, inferences about PACs' allocation strategies are made from information about the characteristics of the candidates to whom the PACs contribute. Under a Type I strategy, as defined previously, priority for contributions is given to congressmen who have the "correct" ideology and to those who face tough electoral competition. Under a Type II strategy, priority for contributions is given to likely winners who are influential within Congress. Theoretically, then, these three factors—ideology, institutional influence, and electoral security—can be used to distinguish between allocation strategies.

The measurement of institutional influence is accomplished through a cluster of variables indicating committee assignments and leadership positions within the party. The relationship between this cluster of variables and a Type II allocation strategy has been recognized by Green (1979).

> Special interest investors, who would not dream of pouring their money into dud stocks, are equally careful when it comes to choosing their legislative portfolios. A freshman legislator with a seat on a dull committee won't cost much, but won't yield much return either. The logical result is that the money goes to the men who rule Congress—the members of key committees, the party leaders of each of the houses, and the committee chairmen (pp. 10-11).

The committee variables included in the present analysis are: AGRICULTURE, APPROPRIATIONS, BANKING, COMMERCE, JUDICIARY, and WAYS AND MEANS. These six committee variables were selected on the basis of the interviews with the PAC officials, who were asked explicitly whether or not members of certain committees were targeted routinely for contributions. Officials of BANKPAC mentioned Banking, Ways and Means, Agriculture, Commerce, Judiciary, and Appropriations, in that order of priority. An official of the realtors' PAC indicated that Ways and Means is sometimes important, and Commerce was mentioned by an official of DEAC. Neither AMPAC nor AGCPAC claimed to give special consideration to members of any particular committee. In addition to membership on these committees, institutional influence is also measured by whether or not a representative is a party leader (REP LEADER, DEM LEADER) or a committee or subcommittee chairman (CHAIRMAN). Complete definitions of these and other variables are given in the Appendix.

The ideology factor is operationalized through another cluster of variables—the congressman's party affiliation (PARTY) and his score on the Americans for Democratic Action index of voting in 1979 (ADA79). And the electoral competition factor is measured by the closeness of the candidate's race and the electoral experience of his or her challenger (NEED).[14] In addition, the NEED variable involves the interaction between ideology and competition, because ideology should be a more important factor under a Type I strategy when competition is strong.

---

[14] A congressman was determined to have had strong competition if he or she received less than 60% of the vote in a two-way race in 1978, or if the challenger in 1980 had held any elective office before the 1980 congressional election. Information on the experience of challengers was taken from "The 1980 Elections," Congressional Quarterly *Weekly Report*, Supplement, October 11, 1980, pp. 2965-3092.

The importance of ideology, institutional influence, and electoral security for predicting allocation patterns should vary depending on whether a PAC uses a Type I or a Type II allocation strategy. Under a Type I strategy, larger campaign contributions should be associated with greater electoral need and more conservative ADA scores. If a Type I strategy is dominant, the coefficients for PARTY and NEED should be large and positive, and the coefficient for ADA79 should be large and negative (because high ADA79 scores denote liberalism). Also, the coefficients for the institutional influence variables should all be negative. Under a Type II strategy, larger contributions should be associated with institutional influence, less conservative ideological positions, and less competitive races. Although the coefficient for ADA79 will not necessarily be positive, it should be small if a Type II strategy is dominant. Similarly, the NEED coefficient should be small, but not necessarily negative, and all of the coefficients for institutional influence should be large and positive.

These hypotheses were tested by regressing the total contributions (minus independent expenditures) in actual dollars for each of the five PACs during the 1979-1980 election cycle on all twelve of the explanatory variables. The results of the regression analyses appear in Table 1.

Generally, the signs of the coefficients in Table 1 are more consistent for the ideology and need variables than for the committee and leadership variables. The sign of the NEED coefficient is always positive, indicating that all five PACs gave more money to candidates who generally agreed with them ideologically and who faced tough election fights. Similarly, the sign of the ADA coefficient is always negative, which indicates a clear preference among all five PACs for conservative candidates. Also, with the exception of DEAC, all five PACs gave more money to Republican than to Democratic candidates. The coefficients for the committee and leadership variables, however, do not exhibit such clear patterns. As expected, BANKPAC favored members of the Banking and Ways and Means Committees, and DEAC clearly favored members of the Commerce Committee. But otherwise, there is little clear evidence that committee and leadership positions elicited larger contributions.[15]

Overall, then, the results of the regression analyses tend to provide greater support for a Type I allocation strategy than for a Type II strategy. The general pattern is for larger contributions to go to sympathetic candidates who need money rather than to candidates who are on influential committees or in positions of party

Table 1. Regression Results for Contributions to Incumbents

Variable	AGCPAC	AMPAC	BANKPAC	DEAC	RPAC
Intercept	245.1	2354.1	864.5	2163.1	3222.8
AGRICULTURE	–51.2	–118.9	409.5	–148.8	555.8
APPROPRIATIONS	–154.0	–365.3	17.2	12.5	–624.2
BANKING	–109.6	–405.8	1281.4	200.8	589.4
COMMERCE	–139.4	172.1	157.8	977.6	–40.7
JUDICIARY	–139.2	580.8	–196.2	86.0	73.7
WAYS AND MEANS	11.8	–225.8	963.6	372.1	–292.4
CHAIRMAN	70.8	–608.2	580.6	575.3	–401.8
REP LEADER	11.6	–475.5	562.4	369.6	195.2
DEM LEADER	178.8	–176.6	–102.2	631.5	–432.8
PARTY	121.5	196.7	13.9	–219.2	84.3
ADA	–2.0	–23.2	–7.9	–22.8	–33.6
NEED	423.6	1739.9	209.8	930.0	1153.0
R SQUARE	.17	.33	.23	.24	.41

N = 385

---

[15] Tests of statistical significance have been omitted here because there is no reason to believe that they would be meaningful. Significance tests are meaningful only when observations have been selected randomly from a larger population or when it can be assumed that the universe from which they have been selected is normally distributed. The universe of interest here is all Congresses from 1974 to 1980, because 1974 marked the first year that the FEC required full disclosure of campaign expenditures. But the observations of this study have not been selected randomly from this universe, and the Congresses since 1974 are certainly not normally distributed with respect to relevant variables, because they have all been controlled by Democrats.

Table 2. Predicted Contributions to Different Types of Congressmen

	Congressman A (conservative, non-leader, competitive)	Congressman B (moderate/liberal, leader, safe)
AGCPAC	$ 740	$ 223
AMPAC	3709	0
BANKPAC	891	2981
DEAC	2304	2857
RPAC	3619	0
Mean	$2253	$1212

leadership. Only the coefficients for the ideology and need variables, not the influence variables, are consistently strong and in the right direction. These are precisely the results one would expect when allocation decisions are dominated by local inputs.

The results in Table 1 can be carried a step further by using the regression coefficients to make predictions of the actual dollar amounts allocated under each type of strategy. Such an exercise yields a more concrete picture of allocation patterns—a picture in terms of dollar amounts rather than OLS coefficients.

The prediction of actual dollar amounts that follows is based on a conception of two hypothetical kinds of congressmen. One kind, Congressman A, is intended to represent the ideal target for a Type I allocation; the other, Congressman B, the ideal target for a Type II allocation. Let Congressman A be a rank-and-file, conservative, Republican congressman from a competitive electoral district. Let Congressman B be a member of a strategic committee (Ways and Means and Banking for the ABA, Commerce for the auto dealers), a committee or subcommittee chairman, a Democratic House leader, a liberal, and electorally secure. Then, a PAC that uses a Type I allocation strategy should give larger contributions to Congressman A, and a PAC that uses a Type II strategy should give larger contributions to Congressman B.

The entries in Table 2 are the dollar amounts that each PAC, on the basis of its allocation strategy, is predicted to give to each kind of congressman.[16] Of the five PACs, only BANKPAC clearly places highest priority on a Type II allocation strategy.[17] Even though DEAC is predicted to give slightly more money to Congressman B, the PAC is also predicted to give a substantial contribution to Congressman A. Each of the other three PACs, however, is predicted to give a substantially larger contribution to Congressman A than to a Congressman B, and on average across all five PACs, Congressman A is predicted to receive almost twice as large a campaign contribution as Congressman B. These results are quite consistent with the hypothesis that allocation decisions are a function of local discretion in the allocation process.

Campaign Contributions and Roll Call Votes

Two necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for PAC contributions to influence roll call votes are that PACs allocate money with the intent of influencing roll calls, and congressmen are aware of that intent. The evidence presented thus far, however, suggests quite clearly that neither of these conditions will be satisfied. The evidence indicates that money is given with the intent of influencing election outcomes, not specific roll calls, and that congressmen and their staffs must cultivate relationships with local PAC officials, not Washington lobbyists. As a result, a strong causal relationship between PAC contributions and roll calls is unlikely.

---

[16] The entries under Congressman B for AMPAC and RPAC have been entered as "0" rather than the negative values (−370 and −216) that actually were predicted. The reason for the negative values is that OLS is an inappropriate functional form when the dependent variable is truncated normal—that is, when there is a lower bound (i.e., zero contributions) with a large concentration of values, but no such concentration at the upper bound. Tobit analysis (Tobin, 1958), which provides an appropriate functional form, was also used to estimate coefficients for the independent variables. However, the results did not differ in any systematic ways from the OLS results, so the more familiar OLS results have been presented here.

[17] BANKPAC also has the most centralized structure of the five PACs for making allocation decisions. The Washington office sends out a computer listing to all state PAC organizations with recommended contributions to all candidates. These recommendations are based primarily on the congressman's committee assignment, and local PAC officials usually, but not always, follow these recommendations.

To assess the influence of contributions on roll call decisions in the 97th Congress, the most important—or one of the most important—roll calls for each of the five PACs was selected for analysis. Information on important roll calls was obtained through communication with PAC and association officials and through a review of the lobbying priorities of each group as reported in the *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports.*

The most important vote for the NADA in the 97th Congress was the vote to overturn the Federal Trade Commission's rule that required used-car dealers to inform customers of known defects in used automobiles. On May 6, 1982, the House adopted a concurrent resolution (286-133) to disapprove the FTC rule.

A crucial vote for the Associated General Contractors was a vote on the rule governing floor consideration of the Transportation Assistance Act (HR6211). A closed rule was assigned to a Ways and Means tax package to be amended to the act, and the AGC supported the closed rule from fear that an open rule might destroy all prospects of passing a highway bill in any form. The House adopted a resolution approving the closed rule on December 6, 1982, by a 197-194 vote.

Votes on the Gramm-Latta budget proposal were important to the National Association of Realtors.[18] The realtors favored as deep a slowdown in the growth of spending as possible and opposed a rule governing consideration of Gramm-Latta-II that would have encouraged lower spending cuts. The rule was overturned by a 210-217 vote (HR3982) on June 25, 1981.

For the AMA, the critical vote was on an amendment to exempt professionals—physicians in particular—from FTC regulation. The AMA succeeded in getting the amendment (HR6995) passed in the House by a 245-155 vote margin in December, 1982, but the amendment subsequently failed in the Senate.

Finally, an important vote to the bankers (although not as important as in the next Congress) was a vote concerning the withholding of taxes on interest income from bank accounts. The ABA opposed a closed rule for consideration of the 1983 tax bill in hopes of amending the bill to exclude the withholding provision. On August 19, 1982, the bankers ended up on the losing side of a 220-210 vote on the rule (HR4961).

Each congressman's votes on these issues was recorded, and various predictor variables, including PAC contributions, were collected in order to examine the impact of campaign contributions on roll call votes, with other factors held constant. The full array of predictor variables fall into four general categories: constituency demographics (URBAN, BLUE COLLAR, INCOME, REAGAN), region (EAST, MIDWEST, WEST, SOUTH), ideology (ADA79, ADA81, PARTY), and contributions. Full definitions of these variables are given in the appendix.

The use of these particular independent variables to predict roll calls can be justified on several grounds. The inclusion of the demographic, or constituency, variables is justified in that demographic characteristics serve as rough indicators of some of the basic needs and concerns of constituents. Fenno (1978), for example, reports that congressmen frequently discuss demographic factors when talking about their constituencies. Even though the basic needs and concerns of a constituency are much more complex and heterogeneous than allowed for by demographic variables, the absence of better measures helps justify their inclusion (Clausen, 1973).

Because the demographic factors are rather firmly fixed, whatever needs or preferences they represent can be assumed to be longstanding. In order to capture some of the more immediate or short-term policy concerns of voters in the district, the variable for support of Reagan in 1980, REAGAN, has been included. Presumably, this variable represents constituency support for the policies of the president or the president's party. Even though it is true that some voters cast their ballots devoid of any policy considerations, congressmen may perceive that the presidential vote percentage is an indicator of voters' policy preferences. If so, congressmen may be reluctant to vote against a bill supported by the president if the president appears to have considerable support in the district, and empirical studies indicate that this is sometimes the case (Erikson & Wright, 1980; Kau & Rubin, 1982).

The region variables have been included to account for differences in outlook and behavior resulting from geographic and environmental constraints. The South, Midwest, East, and West have differed historically with regard to agricultural, environmental, and industrial concerns. Because of the geographic basis of representation in American politics, a congressman's first responsibility is usually to his district, not to the nation as a whole, and as a result, the geographic differences among districts should be reflected in congressmen's voting decisions (Jackson, 1974).

---

[18] Unfortunately, this issue is not as specific to the realtors as one might wish. It is a more general bill and, therefore, does not provide as strong a test of the effects of contributions as the bills selected for the other groups. For a discussion of the realtors' position, see Fair (1981).

The ADA variables have been included as general measures of a congressman's ideological orientation. ADA79 is used to predict votes in the first session of the 97th Congress, and ADA81 is used to predict votes in the second session. The ADA score is a composite measure that reflects numerous voting decisions on different types of issues. Because the ADA score used here is always from the session preceding the vote being analyzed, it provides the most recent snapshot of the congressman's voting behavior. This snapshot captures not only a bit of the congressman's own personal ideological leaning, but also reflects the shared ideology of the congressman and his constituents. Because most congressmen have lived a good portion of their lives in the districts they represent, the beliefs of constituents and the beliefs of the congressman are likely to be similar owing to the common roots of both, and the ADA score is presumed to reflect these beliefs.

The contribution variables indicate the actual dollars contributed by each PAC to each congressman. Ideally, these variables should be weighted by their importance to the congressman, because all congressmen are not likely to attach the same significance to each dollar received. But because the factors that make a contribution particularly important are likely to be highly idiosyncratic across all congressmen, no weighting has been attempted in the following analysis. For some congressmen, an early contribution might be important in that it helps stimulate subsequent contributions; but for others, a late contribution might be more important, especially if the race is close. In some cases, a contribution might stand out if it is one of just a few contributions; but in other cases, if only a few contributions are received, none of them may have any significance.

Each congressman's vote on each of the five roll calls was predicted on the basis of the explanatory variables through a logistic estimation technique. The results of the logit analysis appear in Table 3.[19] The entries in Table 3 are logit coefficients which indicate the change in the log odds of voting "yea" given a unit change in an independent variable, the other independent variables remaining constant. The preferred position was "Yea" for all groups but BANKPAC and RPAC.

With the exception of the sign for AGC, all the signs of the coefficients indicate that contributions increased the probability of voting in the direction preferred by the contributing group. One explanation for the reversal of the sign for the AGCPAC coefficient is that the AGC gave

Table 3. Logit Results for Contributions and Roll Calls

	Roll Call Vote for				
Variable	AGCPAC	AMPAC	BANKPAC	DEAC	RPAC
CONSTANT	−5.934	1.423	−2.2992	2.219	8.947
URBAN	0.034	−0.13	0.014	−0.050	−0.009
BLUE COLLAR	0.049	0.034	0.030	0.0006	−0.038
INCOME	0.00019	−0.00002	0.0001	0.00023	−0.0003
REAGAN	−0.006	0.040	0.006	0.066	−0.078
EAST	0.741	−1.326	−0.634	−1.366	−1.746
MIDWEST	−0.139	−1.579	0.031	−0.330	0.480
WEST	0.652	−0.583	0.292	0.531	−1.982
SOUTH	0.567	−0.615	0.524	0.897	−2.204
ADA	0.007	−0.054	0.002	−0.060	0.100
PARTY	−0.838	−0.182	−0.796	−0.507	−7.189
CONTRIBUTION	−0.00023	0.00027	−0.00004	0.00024	−0.00006
N	348	358	419	416	347
−2 log L	369.41	226.4	537.4	211.69	82.96

---

[19] Since the votes for AGCPAC and AMPAC occurred after the 1982 election, during the lame-duck session, 1982 contribution data were used. The Ns for the DEAC and BANKPAC equations include all members of the 97th Congress who were elected in 1980 and voted on the resolutions. The N for the RPAC equation includes only members of both the 96th and 97th Congresses who voted on the motion. Since this vote occurred relatively early in the first session of the 97th, there were not enough votes to construct an ADA score for the congressmen first elected in 1980. Hence they were excluded from the analysis. The Ns for the AGC and AMA equations include all members of the 97th Congress who were elected in 1980 with the exclusion of 58 lame duck congressmen.

most of its money to conservative Republicans who happened to oppose the rule because of their objections to any tax increases at the time. This finding, however, merely underscores the fact that the congressmen who received money from the AGC voted on the basis of their ideological and partisan convictions, not on the basis of contributions.

With a little manipulation, the logit coefficients can be combined with values of the independent variables to yield predicted probabilities of voting with a contributing group's position. Two probabilities of voting with the contributing group were computed for each congressman. One probability was based on the actual contribution received by the congressman, together with his or her actual values on the remaining independent variables. The other probability was based on a theoretical contribution of zero dollars, with no change in the other independent variables. The difference between these two probabilities indicates the theoretical increase in the probability of voting with the contributing group associated with a campaign contribution.

The mean increases in the differences between these two probabilities are reported in Table 4. Each entry in the table indicates the average (over all congressmen in the analysis) change in the predicted probability of voting with the contributing group's preferred position as a result of a campaign contribution. For example, if the auto dealers had made no campaign contributions in 1979-1980, then, on average, each congressman's probability of voting to overturn the FTC regulation on used cars would have been lowered by .019 (e.g., from a .6 probability of supporting the NADA to a probability of support of .581). Clearly, the changes reported in Table 4 are rather paltry. The mean of the means across all five groups is a mere .0096. Moreover, in none of the cases were the effects of contributions great enough to change the voting outcome.[20]

Table 4. Mean Change in Probability of Voting with Contributing Group due to Difference between Zero Contributions and Actual Contributions

Political Action Committee	Change in Probability
AGCPAC	−.022
AMPAC	.038
BANKPAC	.007
DEAC	.019
RPAC	.006
Mean	.0096

The actual results in Table 4 are quite consistent with the anticipated results, which were that the relationships between campaign contributions and roll calls would be weak. This is clearly the case. In none of the five cases examined were campaign contributions an important enough force to change the legislative outcomes from what they would have been without any contributions.

Even more important, though, to the extent that the PACs under investigation here are among the most influential PACs, the effects exhibited by their contributions should be among the largest effects that campaign contributions can exert on roll call voting decisions. Results that scholars have labelled "substantial" or "significant," therefore, are substantial and significant only in the sense that they characterize the upper limits of PAC influence. But these upper limits pale in comparison to the unbounded influence that many scholars, journalists, and politicians have imputed to PACs.

Finally, as I suggested earlier, there is a sound theoretical reason for not expecting campaign contributions to exert effects on roll call voting any larger than those reported in Tables 3 and 4. Very simply, the organizational arrangements in which PACs raise and allocate money impose strong constraints on the ability of PACs to influence congressional voting through their campaign contributions. Thus, any time the fundraising operation and the locus of decision-making are structured as they are in the PACs of this study, contributions are not likely to carry much weight in congressional voting decisions.

Conclusions

The major finding of this research is that the ability of PACs to use their campaign contributions to influence congressional voting is severely constrained by the organizational arrangements through which money is raised. Paradoxically, the organizational arrangement that allows PACs to raise and allocate large sums of money also restricts their ability to influence roll calls. Because money must be raised at a local, grassroots level, local PAC officials, not Washington lobbyists, are primarily responsible for making allocation decisions. Consequently, congressmen who desire contributions must cultivate favorable relationships with local officials, and this arrangement tends to undercut the value of contributions as a bargaining tool for professional lobbyists.

This finding is significant in two respects. First, in contrast to previous analyses, this analysis has demonstrated with marked clarity the limited nature of PAC influence. Of the numerous variables that influence the voting behavior of congressmen, the campaign contributions of PACs appear to take substantial effect only infrequently. Only when other cues, such as party, are weak can PAC contributions be expected to be important. The results presented here cannot support a claim that PACs never have, or never will, determine voting outcomes, but they do indicate the probable rarity of such influence.

---

[20] This was determined by counting the number of congressmen on each roll call whose probability of support changed from less than .5 to greater or equal to .5 because of the contribution received.

Second, I have formulated an explanation for the limited nature of the influence of PAC contributions. This explanation adds a very substantial degree of confidence to the empirical results. Moreover, it moves the analysis in the direction of a more general understanding of the relationship between PAC campaign contributions and roll calls. Future efforts to understand roll calls in terms of campaign contributions should benefit substantially from a consideration of the organizational arrangements of PACs.

Additional tests of the explanation presented here need to be conducted. Not only is it important to investigate the frequency with which the organizational structures of the five PACs studied here characterize other PACs, but it is also important to explore the implications of quite different organizational arrangements—for example, the organization of "institutional" groups (Salisbury, 1984) or the differences between nascent and mature organizations (Hayes, 1981). Evidence of systematic and predictable differences across different organizational arrangements would put the explanation on even firmer ground.

Finally, evidence of the relative inability of PACs to determine congressional voting should not be construed as evidence that PACs in no way matter. The growth of PACs may have altered the way congressmen allocate their scarce resources of staff and time. Today, congressmen must spend a great deal of time courting past and potential contributors to their campaigns. If such efforts drain members' resources and energies so thoroughly that they can no longer devote themselves properly to important political issues and to formulating sound public policy, then prevailing methods of campaign finance might be considered highly inappropriate. The purpose of this article, however, has been neither to endorse PACs nor to indict them, but only to improve understanding of them.

Appendix

Variables Used for Predicting Contributions (Table 1)

Institutional Influence	
AGRICULTURE	1 if the incumbent was a member of the Agriculture Committee in the 96th Congress; 0 otherwise.
APPROPRIATIONS	1 if the incumbent was a member of the Appropriations Committee; 0 otherwise.
BANKING	1 if the incumbent was a member of the Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs Committee; 0 otherwise.
COMMERCE	1 if the incumbent was a member of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee; 0 otherwise.
JUDICIARY	1 if the incumbent was a member of the Judiciary Committee; 0 otherwise.
WAYS AND MEANS	1 if the incumbent was a member of the Ways and Means Committee; 0 otherwise.
REP LEADER	1 if the incumbent was a floor leader, chairman or secretary of the party caucus or conference, a whip, deputy whip, or assistant whip; 0 otherwise.
DEM LEADER	same as for REP LEADER.
CHAIRMAN	1 if the incumbent chaired a standing or select committee; 0 otherwise.
Ideology	
PARTY	1 if the incumbent is a Republican; 0 if a Democrat.
ADA79	the incumbent's score on the Americans for Democratic Action index in 1979; a score of 0 indicates conservatism; a score of 100 indicates liberalism.
Electoral Need	
NEED	1 if the incumbent was ideologically sympathetic to the PAC's policy goals (ADA79 less than or equal to 50) and faced strong electoral competition; 0 if the incumbent was not sympathetic or did not face strong competition.

APPENDIX (continued)

Variables Used for Predicting Roll Calls (Table 3)

Constituency Demographics	
URBAN	the percentage of residents in a district living in urban areas (as defined by the Bureau of the Census).
BLUE COLLAR	the percentage of blue collar workers in a district.
INCOME	the median income of a district.
REAGAN	the percentage of the presidential vote in a district in 1980 for Ronald Reagan.
Region	
EAST	1 if a district is in Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, or Delaware; 0 otherwise.
MIDWEST	1 if Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas; 0 otherwise.
WEST	1 if Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, Idaho, Nevada, Arizona, California, Oregon, Washington, Alaska, Hawaii; 0 otherwise.
SOUTH	1 if Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, Arkansas; 0 otherwise.
(BORDER)	(Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, Oklahoma, Maryland, West Virginia).
Ideology	
ADA79	the congressman's rating from the Americans for Democratic Action during the second session of the 96th Congress.
ADA81	the congressman's ADA rating from the first session of the 97th Congress.
PARTY	1 if a Republican; 0 if a Democrat.
Contributions	
AGCPAC	total contributions from AGCPAC during the 1981-1982 election cycle.
AMPAC	total contributions from AMPAC during the 1981-1982 election cycle.
BANKPAC	total contributions from BANKPAC during the 1979-1980 election cycle.
DEAC	total contributions from DEAC during the 1979-1980 election cycle.
RPAC	total contributions from RPAC during the 1979-1980 election cycle.

References

Barone, M. When the price is right. *The Washington Post.* March 9, 1983, A25.

Ben-Zion, U., & Eytan, Z. On money, votes, and policy in a democratic society. *Public Choice,* 1974, *17,* 1-10.

Berry, J. *Lobbying for the people.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977.

Brown, K. F. Campaign contributions and congressional voting. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1983.

Budde, B. Business political action committees. In M. J. Malbin (Ed.). *Parties, interest groups, and campaign finance laws.* Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1980.

Chappell, H. Campaign contributions and congressional voting: A simultaneous probit-tobit model. *Review of Economics and Statistics,* 1982, *62,* 77-83.

Chappell, H. Campaign contributions and voting on the cargo preference bill: A comparison of simultaneous models. *Public Choice,* 1981, *36,* 301-312.

Clausen, A. *How congressmen decide: A policy focus.* New York: St. Martin's, 1973.

Cohen, R. E. Here are the big contributors. *The National Journal.* 1983, *15,* 974.

Drew, E. Politics and money—I. *The New Yorker.* Dec. 6, 1982, 54-149.

Eismeier, T. J., & Pollock, III, P. H. Political action committees: Varieties of organization and strategy.

In M. J. Malbin (Ed.). *Money and politics in the United States.* Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1984.

Erikson, R. S., & Wright, G. C. Policy representation of constituency interests. *Political Behavior*, 1980, *2*, 91-106.

Fair, R. Personal testimony in hearings before the subcommittee on housing and community development of the committee on banking, finance, and urban affairs. *Housing and community development amendments of 1981.* Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981, 1576-1618.

Fenno, R. F. *Home style.* Boston: Little, Brown, 1978.

Frendreis, J., & Waterman, R. PAC contributions and legislative behavior: senate voting on trucking deregulation. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, 1983.

Germond, J., & Witcover, J. A pac-man in Congress won't heed constituents. *The Rochester Times Union*. March 7, 1983, 6A.

Green, M. Political pac-man. *The New Republic*, December 13, 1982, 18-25.

Green, M. *Who runs congress?* New York: Viking Press, 1979.

Handler, E., & Mulkern, J. R. *Business in politics: Campaign strategies of corporate political action committees.* Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1982.

Hayes, M. T. *Lobbyists and legislators: A theory of political markets.* New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1981.

Hucker, C. Organized labor takes a hard look at whom it will support this fall. *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report.* 1978, *36*, 193-198.

Isaacson, W. Running with the PACs. *Time*, October 25, 1982, 20-26.

Jackson, J. E. *Constituencies and leaders in Congress: Their effects on Senate voting behavior.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974.

Jacobson, G. C. *The politics of congressional elections.* Boston: Little, Brown, 1983.

Kau, J. B., & Rubin, P. H. *Congressmen, constituents, and contributors.* Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982.

Latus, M. A. Assessing ideological PACs: From outrage to understanding. In M. J. Malbin (Ed.), *Money and politics in the United States.* Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1984.

Malbin, M. J. Campaign financing and the special interests. *The Public Interest*, 1979, *56*, 21-42.

Malbin, M. J., & Skladony, T. W. Appendix: Selected campaign finance data, 1974-1982. In M. J. Malvin (Ed.), *Money and politics in the United States.* Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1984.

Moe, T. A calculus of group membership. *American Journal of Political Science*, 1980, *24*, 593-632.

Noble, K. B. Critics cite banks' aid in elections. *The New York Times,* March 14, 1983, D1.

O'Brien, D. *Neighborhood organization and interest-group processes.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975.

Olson, M. *The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965/1971.

Ornstein, N. J., & Elder, S. *Interest groups, lobbying and policymaking.* Washington: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1978.

Sabato, L. J. *PAC power: Inside the world of political action committees.* New York: Norton, 1984.

Salisbury, R. H. An exchange theory of interest groups. *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* 1969, *13*, 1-32.

Salisbury, R. H. Interest representation: The dominance of institutions. *American Political Science Review,* 1984, *78*, 64-76.

Silberman, J. I., & Durden, G. C. Determining legislative preferences on the minimum wage: An economic approach. *Journal of Political Economy,* 1976, *84*, 317-329.

Sorauf, F. J. Accountability in political action committees: Who's in charge? Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1982.

Tobin, J. Estimation of relationships for limited dependent variables. *Econometrica,* 1958, *26*, 24-36.

Truman, D. B. *The governmental process: Political interests and public opinion.* New York: Knopf, 1951.

United Press International. Congress vetoes FTC rules on disclosure of car defects. *The New York Times.* May 27, 1982, 1.

Welch, W. P. The allocation of political monies: Economic interest groups. *Public Choice,* 1980, *35*, 97-120.

Welch, W. P. Campaign contributions and legislative voting: Milk money and dairy price supports. *Western Political Quarterly,* 1982, *35*, 478-495.

Welch, W. P. Patterns of contributions: Economic interest and ideological groups. In H. E. Alexander (Ed.), *Political finance.* Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1978.

Wertheimer, F. Has Congress made it legal to buy congressmen? *Business and Society Review,* 1978, *27,* 29-32.

Wilson, J. Q. *Political organizations.* New York: Basic Books, 1973.

Wright, J. R. Fundraising by political action committees: The problems of collective action. Unpublished, 1984.

Wright, J. R. Pacs, contributions, and roll calls: Evidence for five national associations. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Rochester, 1983.

Yiannakis, D. E. PAC contributions and house voting on conflictual and consensual issues: The Windfall Profits Tax and the Chrysler loan guarantee. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1983.

Woman Suffrage in the Progressive Era: Patterns of Opposition and Support in Referenda Voting, 1910-1918

EILEEN L. MCDONAGH
Northeastern University

H. DOUGLAS PRICE
Harvard University

Sources of opposition and support for woman suffrage are analyzed with the use of the responses of male voters to constitutional referenda held in six key states during the Progressive era. Traditional axes of opposition and support for suffrage are examined, establishing that stable sources of suffrage support originate most often from Protestant and northern European constituencies (with the exception of Germans), whereas southern Europeans and Catholics (except for Germans) generally show no consistent patterns. Opposition to suffrage is most constant from Germans—both Catholic and Protestant—and from urban constituencies. A structural model indicating the greater importance of prohibition as an intervening variable compared to partisanship or turnout at the grass-roots level of voting behavior explicates the sources of direct and indirect support for suffrage while it also demonstrates the influence of educational commitment in determining suffrage voting patterns. Except in the West, opposition to suffrage was intense and greater at the grass-roots level than among legislative elites. The ultimate success of the federal amendment is discussed in the context of state referenda, the changed political climate after American entry into World War I, and the innovative efforts of state legislatures to grant "presidential" suffrage, thereby circumventing what proved to be the difficult referenda route.

We begin with a question: In what decade have increased use of state referenda, national debate over the rights of women, the political rise of the western states, and intense divisions over proper roles for women been an important feature of American politics? Obviously, the past decade is one answer, but an equally appropriate answer is 1910 to 1920. In that period both woman suffrage and a host of reform issues moved from the periphery of politics, becoming in some cases—such as woman suffrage and prohibition—amendments to the federal Constitution. Woman suffrage now appears uncontroversial, inevitable, and simply part of the larger question of women's rights, whereas prohibition's legacy is principally that of an unfortunate political aberration. At the time, however, both were achieved by major political campaigns involving elected political elites in state and national legislatures as well as the mass electorate empowered to vote on state constitutional referenda. Recent defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment significantly links the era of woman suffrage referenda to the politics of our own times. As a noted historian put it, "the most dramatic ramification for scholarship" of the ERA is "the esteem in which the [successful] woman's suffrage movement is held," including the effectiveness of such leaders as Carrie Chapman Catt and Alice Paul (Pleck, 1982, p. 3).

Woman Suffrage: Historical Overview

Before examining the neglected research opportunities at the mass electoral level, it may be useful to review the struggle for woman suffrage which formally began in 1848 with the Seneca Falls con-

---

Received: September 27, 1983
Revision received: September 15, 1984
Accepted for publication: November 9, 1984

An earlier version of this article was presented at the 1982 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Denver, Colorado. The authors thank Professors Hayward R. Alker, Jr., William H. Flanigan, John E. Jackson, Paul Kleppner, J. Morgan Kausser, Edward C. McDonagh, and David Rochefort as well as Ken Feingold, Jennifer Jackman, and anonymous reviewers for helpful suggestions and criticisms and thank Mark Crimp for his programming assistance.

This project was supported in part by a grant from Northeastern University's Research and Scholarship Development Fund and Harvard University's Clark Fund. The data utilized in this research were made available in part by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. Neither the original source or collectors of the data or the Consortium bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here.

vention. Given the American federal system, full woman suffrage could be obtained either by federal constitutional amendment or piecemeal by state constitutional amendments. Early women's rights leaders viewed the ties between the suffrage and abolition movements as *guaranteeing* enfranchisement of both blacks and women after the Civil War (Flexner, 1975).[1] These expectations were soon dashed by Republican political leaders, who found it virtually impossible to maneuver even black suffrage (for which there was both an ideological and a partisan advantage) past a generally hostile white male electorate and consequently judged there was no hope at all for woman suffrage.[2]

In 1869 the woman's suffrage movement divided into the National organization favoring a federal amendment via congressional lobbying, and the American organization, committed to state-by-state change via state constitutional amendment. Owing to insurmountable political obstacles at the congressional level, the strategy of the latter initially prevailed. When the two movements joined forces in 1890 to form the National American Woman Suffrage Association, an era ensued of literally hundreds of state campaigns. In the words of one of the most important veterans of this period:

> To get the word "male" in effect out of the Constitution cost the women of the country fifty-two years of pauseless campaign. . . . During that time they were forced to conduct 56 campaigns of referenda to male voters; 480 campaigns to get [state] legislatures to submit suffrage amendments to voters; 47 campaigns to get state constitutional conventions to write woman suffrage into state constitutions; 277 campaigns to get state party conventions to include woman suffrage planks; 30 campaigns to get presidential party conventions to adopt woman suffrage planks in party platforms, and 19 campaigns with 19 successive Congresses. (Catt & Shuler, 1926, p. 107)

From 1910 to 1920 efforts were made to hold referenda on woman suffrage in most non-southern states.[3] In some, the state legislature or governor blocked the move, but in a majority the issue ultimately was put to the voters (all male). Although there were early successes in the West, in all other regions the going proved much more difficult.[4] In fact, Kansas became the only state east of the Rocky Mountains to approve full woman suffrage before American entry into World War I in 1917. By contrast, prohibition gained strength first in the southern and border states, and after 1912 scored victories in the West.[5]

An important legal difference between prohibition and state campaigns for full woman suffrage was that the latter could *not* be won by local option at the town or county level. Yet one important loophole enabled women in a given state to

---

[1] Flexner (1975) provides an excellent general account of the suffrage movement in the United States. For the most detailed account, see Anthony et al. (1881-1922).

[2] Dykstra and Hahn (1968) establish that white electorates after the Civil War consistently voted down state referenda extending the franchise to blacks. DuBois (1978) presents a superb analysis of the difficulties of the woman suffrage movement in relation to black suffrage in the context of Kansas referenda in the Reconstruction era.

[3] Women in the South were slower to mobilize in support of suffrage. However, southern white leaders also had a morbid fear of any precedent of federal involvement in regard to the electorate. See Kousser (1974) for the definitive account of the turn-of-the-century disfranchisement. Such support for suffrage as there was in the South generally was limited to the loophole of permitting women to vote in the primaries (usually decisive, and open only to whites), or later favoring state passage of a full suffrage provision in hope of avoiding the federal amendment.

[4] The territorial legislature of Washington had twice enacted legislation (1883 to 1886) to grant the vote to women, but both acts were voided on technicalities by the antisuffrage, Democratic-controlled state Supreme Court. (See the scathing discussion by Ostrogorski (1893, pp. 66-69).) Finally, in 1910 the state of Washington inaugurated a surprisingly successful round of suffrage referenda in the West with an almost two-to-one victory. California's Hiram Johnson, elected Governor in 1910, made woman suffrage part of his comprehensive 1911 reform package, and it was narrowly approved. In 1912 Oregon voters reversed themselves, approving suffrage narrowly. Ten of the remaining 11 western states fell into line by 1914 (Duniway, 1971; Larsen, 1971). The lone exception in the West was New Mexico, where a constitutional amendment had to be approved by three-quarters of the legislature, then by three-quarters of the voters, including two-thirds of all those voting in each county (Scott & Scott, 1982, pp. 132-136).

[5] Until American entry into World War I, the existence of statewide prohibition was of little assistance to the suffrage campaign, because it was concentrated either in the South (which was well-nigh hopeless for suffrage), or in the West (where suffrage had been achieved). Rather, the agitation for prohibition made the political situation more difficult for suffrage (Bordin, 1981; Epstein, 1981). On the other hand, in the West the existence of woman suffrage may well have helped the prohibition movement since Washington, Oregon, and Arizona each adopted prohibition either at the first or the second election after adopting woman suffrage.

Table 1. Pattern of State Approval of Full Woman Suffrage, Presidential Suffrage, and Statewide Prohibition, 1900-1920

	Woman Suffrage		Prohibition
	Constitutional Referenda: Full Suffrage	Statutory Action: Presidential Suffrage	Constitutional Referenda or Statutory Action
Pre-1900	Wyoming, Idaho, Colorado, Utah		Maine, Kansas, North Dakota
1907			Oklahoma, Georgia
1908			Mississippi, North Carolina
1909			Tennessee
1910	Washington		
1911	California		
1912	Oregon, Kansas, Arizona		West Virginia
1913		Illinois	
1914	Nevada, Montana		Washington, Oregon, Arizona, Colorado, Virginia
1915			Idaho, Arkansas, Iowa, Alabama, South Carolina
1916			Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, South Dakota
1917	New York	Michigan,[a] Ohio,[b] North Dakota, Rhode Island, Nebraska, Indiana[c]	New Mexico, Utah, New Hampshire, Indiana
1918	Michigan, South Dakota, Oklahoma		Wyoming, Texas, Nevada, Ohio, Florida
1919		Maine, Indiana, Tennessee, Iowa, Missouri, Ohio, Minnesota, Wisconsin	Kentucky
1920		Kentucky	

[a] Michigan referendum of 1918 superseded legislation of 1917.

[b] Ohio legislation of 1917 was repealed by popular initiative, but was reenacted in 1919.

[c] The Indiana law of 1917 was reenacted in 1919, owing to court challenge.

obtain by legislative action (rather than constitutional referendum) the right to vote for presidential electors, as provided by Article II, Section 2, of the federal Constitution, which states (in part):

> Each state shall appoint, *in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct,* a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress' (*italics added*)

This possibility came to the fore in 1913 in the state of Illinois where a vigorous campaign in the legislature for a partial suffrage bill succeeded despite intense opposition from the liquor and wet interest (Catt & Shuler, 1926, pp. 189-195). The Illinois law demonstrated powerfully a new type of suffrage campaign, opening an alternative route that did not require direct popular approval. Furthermore, the impact of this partial woman suffrage was brought to bear on the single office of most concern to the political parties, the presidency, thereby contributing to the eventual inclusion of the woman suffrage issue on the political agendas that determine national party politics.[6]

Table 1 summarizes the pattern of state approval of full woman suffrage, presidential suffrage, and statewide prohibition from 1900 to 1920 and illustrates the early victories in the West for full woman suffrage and the increased importance of Presidential suffrage in the later years.[7] As is well known, the battle eventually shifted to Congress, which—with the firm support of President Wilson—narrowly passed the Nineteenth Amendment enfranchising women (Morgan, 1972).[8] With the ratification of this amendment, America became *not* the first, but a belated twenty-seventh nation to include women in the electorate (Paulson, 1973).[9]

---

[6] As of mid-1920 and before ratification of the federal amendment, the presidential-suffrage states accounted for 173 electoral votes (excluding Michigan, which adopted full suffrage a year after the legislature ap-

For political science the movements for prohibition and for woman suffrage raise fascinating questions about the structure of Progressive era "belief systems" (how tightly various issues were related); differences in response between office-holding elites (both state and congressional) compared with the mass (male) electorate; strategic allocation of campaign resources and the power of momentum; and the existence of such period-defined effects as those of American entry into World War I. A reanalysis of the neglected state referenda voting provides new perspectives on all of these questions. We shall concentrate our analysis on the task of determining who supported and who opposed each movement, how these groupings were related to traditional ties of Democratic or Republican partisanship, and how they varied over time and across regions.

Woman Suffrage: Axes of Opposition and Support

Much has been written about the leadership and ideas of the suffrage movement, and a good deal has been learned about financial and organizational activities of leading opponents of woman suffrage, particularly the liquor lobby and the German-American Alliance (Cashman, 1981; Kraditor, 1965). However, assumptions about patterns of opposition and support in the *mass* (all-male) electorates are asserted, but rarely tested (Rossi, 1982, pp. 2-3).

The following sources are often said to contribute to opposition to suffrage: 1) organized liquor and brewing interests plus retail saloon operators; 2) German-Americans, who saw prohibition as an assault on their *Kultur* and way of life; 3) Roman Catholic hierarchy and Irish Catholics, especially in the Northeast, where women had been granted the municipal or school ballot partly in an attempt to check growing Catholic influence; 4) big-city political machines, which often had close ties with saloons and the wet interests and presumably would lose influence with a broader (and perhaps purer) electorate; 5) immigrants from Italy and southern Europe, who represented more traditional family patterns; 6) the illiterate and poorly educated, who were more open to machine manipulation; and 7) textile and manufacturing interests, which depended on cheap supplies of women's labor.

Support for woman suffrage, on the other hand, is most often cited as stemming from the following sources: 1) those favoring prohibition, because of the close nineteenth-century alliance between the suffrage and temperance movements; 2) native-born Protestants (outside the South), who were of a northern European background; 3) immigrants of English, Scandinavian, or other northern European backgrounds; 4) Mormons in the West, and Jews in New York City; 5) reform and progressive elements who favored broader popular participation in general, and who saw women as potential allies in particular; 6) the better educated and middle class, who were more open to abstract arguments and who favored a broader role for their own wives and daughters (as in earlier campaigns for women's property rights); and 7) the younger generation and those in the West.

This list suggests axes of opposition and support for suffrage along the following dimensions: opposition derives from those who are southern European, Catholic, immigrant, less educated, urban, and do not favor prohibition, whereas support for suffrage is associated with those who are northern European, Protestant, well educated, rural and favor prohibition. However, not

---

proved the presidential vote) and full suffrage states (including the two admitted from territorial status with woman suffrage) accounted for 137 electoral votes. Thus, at the time of ratification of the national suffrage amendment, women already had either total suffrage *or* the presidential vote in states with 310 of the then 531 electoral votes. This total does not include Arkansas and Texas, which by 1920 had granted women the right to vote in primaries only.

[7] The greater willingness of state legislators compared to referenda voters to grant suffrage to women illustrates one of the distinctions noted by Stouffer (1955) between elites and the rank and file.

[8] Recent scholarship based on Woodrow Wilson's papers establishes that he played a much more supportive and active role in the passage and ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment than previous analyses have suggested (Lunardini & Knock, 1980-1981).

[9] Before the United States Nineteenth Amendment, women had the right to vote in the following nations: Australia, Austria, Belgium (municipal), British East Africa, Burma (municipal), Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Great Britain, Holland, Hungary, Iceland, Isle of Man, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Roumania (municipal), Rhodesia, Russia, Sweden (Catt & Shuler, 1926, p. viii).

only has this array of sources of presumed opposition to and support for woman suffrage been largely untested, but axes of opposition and support contain contradictions best resolved by data analysis. For example, some northern European groups, such as the Germans, include high proportions of both Catholic and Protestant denominations. This raises the question: how does national origin *interact* with religious affiliation to produce a position on the woman suffrage issue?

Even more complex is the alliance between prohibition and woman suffrage voting. It is well known that the overlapping leadership between the temperance-prohibition and woman suffrage organizations inextricably linked these social movements, creating the widespread assumption that a woman's vote was (or would be) a dry vote (Bordin, 1981, pp. 118-119; Paulson, 1973, pp. 113-114; Sinclair, 1965, pp. xxii-xxiii).[10] Temperance and prohibition peaked as political issues before woman suffrage; those mobilized to prevent prohibition saw the woman suffrage issue solely in terms of the instrumental consequence it held for adding dry votes to the electorate (Bordin, 1981, pp. 156-157). Appeals were made repeatedly to (male) voters opposed to prohibition to vote against woman suffrage, for the sake of the prohibition issue:

> The main purpose of the political operations of the [liquor] industry was to prevent Prohibition, the manner of implementing this purpose involved it in fighting allied issues and, generally, financing the opposition to the roots of Prohibitionist strength. . . . The fact that women were clearly prominent among Prohibitionists earned for Suffrage the enmity of the liquor industry. . . . Carl Bauer, president of the Michigan German-American Alliance, had circularised his organization on the eve of a Suffrage referendum. "If the suffrage would be laid into the hands of the native born American women, only the results which surely will follow can easily be predicted. Narrow-mindedness will triumph everywhere, fanaticism will flourish, prohibitionists easily set up for dictators in the State of Michigan." . . . Oscar Schmidt, a Milwaukee brewer . . . commented [on defeat of a suffrage referendum in Nebraska]: "If they [woman suffrage] had carried the election, the state would have been dry." (Morgan, 1972, pp. 159-162)

The presumed alliance between the woman suffrage movement and the prohibition movement cost the suffrage movement dearly, as the suffrage cause automatically inherited the enemies of prohibition, most notably, the brewing interests and those immigrant and religious groups most vehemently opposed to prohibition (Morgan, 1972, pp. 140-141, 156; Paulson, 1973, pp. 137, 140). Brewers' organizations zealously sought to influence voting outcomes in state referenda on both prohibition and suffrage by means of the foreign-language press, registration of immigrants opposed to prohibition, and political use of the German-American Alliance—activities that vitally strengthened the identification of prohibition as a critical intervening variable determining voting behavior on woman suffrage (Morgan, 1972, pp. 158-161).

Yet the alliance of the prohibition and suffrage issues at the level of leadership and interest group activities must not be allowed to mask equally fundamental differences—differences that could be critical sources of quite distinct voting patterns at the grass-roots level. Ideologically, prohibition and suffrage stem from very different democratic concepts (Paulson, 1973). Temperance and prohibition were a response to a social problem—drunkenness and alcoholism—viewed as threatening a democratic conception of community and society.[11] Temperance—the movement in which women were most actively involved—advocated voluntary abstinence or self-control, with the primary goal the restoration of the family unit threatened by increasing drinking problems. The temperance movement was referred to as "the maternal struggle," and its slogan was home-protection, a strategic familial use of a familiar tariff legislation term (Annual Leaflet, 1898; Boole, 1929, p. 46; Bordin, 1981, pp. 3, 58, 158).[12] Prohibition substituted social control for self-control, advocating the use of government to enforce principles and habits of personal abstinence. Both temperance and prohibition, however, affirmed traditional democratic values of responsible citizenship and the conventional status quo. For this reason they were mass movements enlisting thousands of members in their organizations as well as attracting legions of impassioned voters.

---

[10] For example, the pioneer suffragist, Susan B. Anthony, was first involved in organizing a temperance association for women in response to their exclusion from men's temperance societies in the early 1840s, and in 1852 another prominent suffrage leader, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, was elected president of the Woman's State Temperance Society in New York (Boole, 1929, p. 36; Paulson, 1973, p. 70). The national Prohibition Party platform formally endorsed woman suffrage as early as 1872 (Paulson, 1973, pp. 113-114). In 1888 Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton commemorated the fortieth anniversary of the Seneca Falls convention by sponsoring a conference highlighting the close affiliation between the then international suffrage and temperance associations (Paulson, 1973, p. 118). In general, leadership overlapped between the Women's Christian Temperance Union and the organized suffrage movement in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, extending in some cases to overt cooperation between temperance and suffrage organizations in suffrage referenda campaigns (Bordin, 1981, p. 121). However, some suffrage leaders (such as Oregon campaigner, Abigail Scott Duniway) vehemently opposed the informal alliance between the prohibitionist's and women's movements because they viewed this connection as responsible for arousing the hostility and opposition of liquor interests, thereby creating the single most serious threat to successful passage of suffrage referenda (Paulson, 1973, p. 140).

[11] Some analyses of the prohibition era stress urban-rural cleavages as the source of conflict (Cashman, 1981); others emphasize status anxieties entailed by discontinuities in cultural values of nativist and immigrant groups (Gusfield, 1963). However, the existence of a real social problem of alcohol abuse as a component of the prohibition movement is reflected in the following indexes: by 1830 the annual per capita consumption of

By contrast, woman suffrage was part of a feminist movement viewed as radical and based on arguments of rights and principles necessitating such a new vision of women and women's relationship to society that some place it with transformations as major as the Reformation (DuBois, 1975, p. 69; Paulson, 1973, pp. 182-184).[13] In the name of the equality asserted by the Declaration of Independence, suffrage leaders protested the "contradiction between [democratic] principle and practice" involved in the disenfranchisement of women (Paulson, 1973, p. 85). As such, enfranchisement was viewed as the key to a more complete liberation entitling women's admittance to any and all activities conventionally categorized as the public sphere. This proposal, that women could and should step outside the private sphere of family and domestic roles to participate as equal individuals with men in the public spheres of work and politics, was a radical proposition—especially in the nineteenth century and even in early decades of the twentieth —promising (or foreboding) drastic alterations in traditional relationships between the sexes and in primary social institutions, such as the family (DuBois, 1975). The radical premise of the woman suffrage movement explains why it was temperance and prohibition—with emphasis on women's traditional role as caretaker of the home —and not suffrage, that drew a broader base of support from which to influence the suffrage issue rather than vice versa (DuBois, 1975, pp. 67-68).

When the fundamentally different nature of the prohibition and suffrage movements is considered, it becomes problematic whether voting patterns on these two issues will be related as directly as assumed from historians' accounts of the activities of the liquor industry in opposing suffrage referenda. Additional complexities in the alliance between prohibition and woman suffrage stem from recognition that there were some groups such as manufacturing interests which had a positive position on prohibition (in order to curtail the financial losses attendant from alcoholism, absenteeism from work, and job-related injuries resulting from drunkenness), but an equally negative position on woman suffrage (in order to prevent child labor legislation which it was assumed women would support if they had the vote).[14]

With these considerations in mind, we analyze electoral data from suffrage, prohibition, and typical partisan elections along with demographic and religious data for six states: Ohio and Michigan in the Midwest, California and Oregon in the West, and New York and Pennsylvania in the East. The repeated Progressive era suffrage cam-

---

distilled spirits was three times higher than today (Rorabaugh, 1979); by 1909 there was one saloon for every 300 people, which meant there were more saloons than schools, churches, libraries, hospitals, theaters, or parks and by 1914 more than a third of the federal government's revenue came from the liquor trade (Cashman, 1981, p. 3).

[12] Members of the WCTU viewed themselves as "home" women with a focus on the welfare of children (Boole, 1929, p. 46). Perhaps their most successful political campaign was for "compulsory temperance education in the public schools" based on a plan of "graded temperance lessons for hygiene and physiology" to be taken and passed by teachers and students alike. By 1903 all but the state of Georgia had passed such legislation, grandly testifying to the WCTU's success (Bordin, 1981, p. 137).

[13] Certainly until the 1900s the suffrage movement was more advanced ideologically on issues of women's rights than most women were prepared to embrace (Bordin, 1981, pp. 156-157). However, to some degree this began to change in certain states, such as New York, where by 1915 the National American Woman Suffrage Association was able to enroll half a million women in support of the suffrage issue and could claim a national membership between 70,000 and 100,000 compared to only 13,000 paid members in 1895 (Bordin, 1981, p. 151). However, over the vast majority of years during which suffrage was an issue, it did not appeal to large numbers (in contrast to the WCTU), but rather was viewed as on the fringe of politically warranted goals if not actual respectability.

[14] Between 1911 and 1920 more than three-fourths of the states adopted workingmen's compensation laws. Consequently, manufacturing interests campaigned for "safety through sobriety" and increasingly favored prohibition (Cashman, 1981, pp. 5-6). However, business interests usually opposed woman suffrage, because enfranchised women would be likely to take positions on labor legislation—such as child labor laws—antithetical to manufacturing interests (Flexner, 1975, pp. 309-313).

paigns in the Midwest—three each in Ohio and Michigan—permit us to develop and to test a model for suffrage voting and to trace the changing relationship of the suffrage issue to prohibition and partisan voting as well as to turnout for suffrage referenda. The use of suffrage data from the West and East tests our model for regional differences.

Woman Suffrage: Model Specification and Data

We are interested in clarifying the sources of opposition and support for suffrage, particularly whether basic background characteristics such as nationality, religious heritage, and place of residence have a direct effect upon support for suffrage or an indirect effect by means of intervening attitudinal variables, such as attitude toward prohibition and partisan orientation. To test for direct and indirect effects of basic background (predetermined) variables, a path-type, structural model is specified in Figure 1. This model illustrates how the total effects of the background (predetermined) variables are derived from direct effects of background (predetermined) variables and intervening (attitudinal) variables as well as by means of indirect effects of background variables via intervening variables. The final dependent variable of interest is the percentage voting yes on suffrage referenda.

The variables are examined in terms of a causal ordering which runs from the various background (exogenous) variables through the intervening variables to the final dependent variable. Figure 1 hypothesizes that suffrage support is affected by (but does not affect) support for prohibition. Attitude toward education (indexed by the percentage of youths ages 10-14 in school) functions as an intervening variable likely to affect each of the other three intervening attitudinal variables: traditional voter partisanship, degree of support for prohibition, and level of turnout for suffrage. In this model the background (predetermined) variables can directly effect each of the intervening variables as well as the final dependent variable: support for suffrage.

The advantage of a structural model, such as that in Figure 1, lies in the clarification of the different paths by which causal influence flows from background (predetermined) variables through intervening variables to the final dependent variable. As Alwin and Hauser (1975) point out, the total effect of a background variable can be derived by the path analysis method of multiplying the standardized coefficients along the various paths and summing the result. However, an alternative procedure, which does not require standardized coefficients, is to calculate a reduced-form equation, which predicts the final dependent variable solely from the set of background (predetermined) variables, thereby omitting all intervening variables. Subsequent equations can establish the role of the various intervening variables and test for possible direct and indirect effects that link the predetermined variables and the final dependent variable of interest. As Alwin and Hauser put it:

> [the estimation of] successive reduced-form equations in the interpretation of recursive path models substitutes for the more cumbersome computation of direct and indirect effects from the coefficients of each structural equation in a recursive model. (Alwin & Hauser, 1975, p. 37)

Figure 1. Structural Model: Support for Woman Suffrage, 1910-1918


Prohibition: Percentage Voting for Prohibition
Education Commitment: Percentage Youth in School, ages 10-14 years
Background Variables: Nationality, Ethnic, Religious, Economic Indices
Turnout on Woman Suffrage
Woman Suffrage: Percentage Voting for Woman Suffrage
Partisan Vote: Percentage Voting Democratic

Using this approach we test the model on county level referenda voting returns for six states: Oregon, California, Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and New York.[15] The county vote on various referenda and partisan elections was taken from the reports of the relevant Secretary of State for each year indicated. The specific suffrage, prohibition, and partisan votes used in our analysis are listed below in Appendix 1.[16]

The background variables are drawn from either the 1910 *Census of Population* or the 1916 *Census of Religion* and are listed in Appendix 2.[17] First- and second-generation immigrants for foreign-born categories are combined. We have retained major religious denominations in lieu of composite categories.[18] To avoid heteroscedasticity, all variables have been weighted by dividing them by the square root of the county population. The total data set for the six states examined consists of 392 counties.

We initially tested the explanatory power of large, categorical groupings of ethnic and religious variables corresponding to the axes of opposition and support designated above as well as ethnic, religious, and economic variables taken separately as independent variables regressed upon voting variables (see Appendix 3). The census data for 1910 and 1920 monitor most of the post-Reconstruction new immigration accurately, but can provide only an indirect indicator for earlier immigration. This is particularly important in the case of the Irish and Germans. These immigration streams were of massive size in the pre-Civil War period (extending back to pre-Revolutionary days in the case of German settlements in Pennsylvania). Moreover, both nationality groups were divided into Catholic and Protestant groups. In the Midwest Irish Protestants, some of whom came to the United States via Canada, are almost as numerous in the twentieth century as Irish Catholics. To be able to test for differences between German Catholics and German Protestants we developed interaction terms.[19] Similar interaction terms are used for the percentage of Irish, because it proved necessary to distinguish such Protestant Irish from those with a Catholic affiliation. (See Appendix 2 for a complete list of all background variables.)

The four major intervening variables in the model are the percentage supporting prohibition (calculated on basis of total vote cast), percentage turnout on suffrage (calculated on basis of total voting-age population), educational commitment (percentage pupils age 10-14 enrolled in school), and percentage voting democratic (calculated on basis of total vote cast).[20] There are strong *a priori* reasons for considering the role of each of these possible intervening variables in the overall causal structure effecting support for suffrage.[21] Despite Progressive inroads, this was still an era of intense partisanship at both elite and mass levels.[22] Although prohibition and especially suffrage were kept at the periphery of issues endorsed by the traditional two-party system, it is nevertheless reasonable to investigate possible partisan influences when suffrage votes came up at a general election necessarily involving intense partisan activities (which was typically the case). As discussed above, prohibition, whether at state, county, or national level, was widely regarded as being inextricably linked to woman suffrage and an important determinant of suffrage voting choice owing to the lobbying activities of wet interest groups (Timberlake, 1963).[23]

---

[15] We are, of course, well aware of the problems of so-called ecological correlation. We present no correlations or other standardized measures. Economists, who regularly depend upon aggregate data, have developed an extensive literature on possible "aggregation bias," dating back to Theil (1954). For useful introductions to the problem, see Hannan (1971), Langbein and Lichtman (1978), Gillespie and Zinnes (1982), and Hanuschek and Jackson (1977).

[16] The Michigan 1912 prohibition measure is the local option vote held in 35 counties in 1912 and in closely adjacent years for most of the remaining counties. For the few counties not holding a local option vote, we have generated a predicted vote. The 1917 suffrage vote in Ohio was for the repeal of the legislature's grant of presidential-only suffrage.

[17] The *Census of Religion* does have some problems as a data source, such as different denominational practices of "dating" membership from birth versus from other points in the life cycle as well as the selective manner in which some returns were recorded. However, the resulting inaccuracies do not seriously preclude using this data resource as a means for obtaining information on the relative size of religious groupings.

[18] The Midwest has been the focus for analyses emphasizing ethnocultural differences, especially those based on differing religious orientations, such as liturgicals and pietists; see Jensen (1971) and Kleppner (1970). We did not find this dichotomy helpful for our post-1910 analysis for two reasons: by this time Protestant groups had evolved and subdivided—there were 23 Lutheran groups by 1900—making classification difficult, and also, the Pietist-Liturgical typology does not capture aspects of church organization and attitude toward government and society (Vander Meer, 1981). Kleppner himself has argued (1982, p. 71) that ethno-religious conflict was of only quite limited significance for the so-called "fourth party system" (1890s to 1930).

[19] Friedrich (1982) makes a strong case for including—rather than excluding—multiplicative (interaction) terms in regression analysis.

[20] Although the measurement of turnout involves the "ratio variable" controversy, a most recent exposition of the topic argues the case for its inclusion in the model (Long, 1980).

[21] For elections held in 1912 we explored the effect of percentage voting for Progressive Party candidate, Theodore Roosevelt, but this possibility of a fifth intervening variable did not prove particularly useful in analyzing the mass electorate.

[22] See Lichtman (1979) for the most extensive analysis of the determinants of partisanship using aggregate data. Although primarily concerned with the 1928 election, Lichtman also traces patterns of partisanship as far back as 1916.

Voter turnout on suffrage referenda should reflect the relative success of supporters or opponents in getting out the vote and making a persuasive case (not to mention buying votes and political taxidermy or ballot-stuffing).[24] Counties also differ substantially in their commitment to whether children aged 10-14 are in school—whether public or parochial—rather than dropping out to join the labor force.[25] We expected that a strong commitment to education for the young would be associated with support for prohibition, higher turnout, and support for woman suffrage. As we soon shall see, this is precisely the case.[26]

Data Analysis

The Midwest

The Midwest was by far the fiercest regional battleground for both prohibition and for woman suffrage. Repeated referenda votes on both issues provide the analyst with the unusual opportunity to estimate a model on one set of data and then test it against a separate data set. We develop our model initially in the context of the 1913 suffrage vote in Michigan pooled with the 1914 vote in Ohio. This analysis then will be contrasted with earlier suffrage voting (1912 in both states) and with later suffrage votes (1917 in Ohio and 1918 in Michigan).

We explored a variety of specifications both for Ohio and Michigan separately as well as for the two states pooled into a single data set.[27] (See Appendix 3.) The 18 variables indicated in Table 2 emerged as our preferred set of background (predetermined) variables. The five equations presented in the columns of Table 2 indicate the unstandardized coefficients of the 18 background characteristics in relation to each of the four intervening variables—educational commitment, Democratic partisanship (1916 election), support for prohibition, and turnout on the suffrage vote —as well as the final dependent variable: support for woman suffrage.

Looking at the background variables in relation to suffrage and prohibition voting, we see general verification that sources of support for suffrage stem from Protestant, northern European, and rural elements, such as percentage native born, number of farms per county, percentage English, Scandinavian, Presbyterian, and Episcopal. The only significant negative coefficient is for percentage Methodist, perhaps reflecting opposition to suffrage among those with southern antecedents. Although prohibition voting is similar to suffrage voting, it reflects the greater importance of economic variables such as population density and percentage manufacturing wage earners and also registers a negative coefficient for percentage Italian. Expected opposition to suffrage and prohibition from German and Irish groups is not evident in these equations with background variables alone; however, the large number of significant background variables related to Democratic vote, suffrage turnout, and education (equations 3, 4, and 5), suggests that a more complete pattern will emerge when these latter intervening variables are included in the full structural equations analyzing suffrage support.

Looking at the social determinants of the suffrage vote, prohibition vote, and partisan vote, we note the highest R^2 is for prohibition, followed by suffrage, and the lowest for percentage Democratic, indicating the somewhat greater extent to which the response to suffrage and prohibition reflected stable constituencies. Furthermore, suffrage in particular is marked by many more positive sources of support compared to negative, in-

---

[23] Many of the early suffrage leaders had become politically active via the WCTU, and wet interests generally assumed that women as voters would substantially strengthen the dry cause (Flexner, 1975, pp. 306-309).

[24] We do not have complete county-level data on the degree to which the suffrage campaigns may have succeeded in activating women. One presumes that highly committed women were quite successful in converting brothers, husbands, or fathers. After all, the antisuffrage case rested, ultimately, on the argument that most women really did not want the vote.

[25] The proportion-in-school variable indexes commitment to education and compulsory attendance. As such, it certainly is related causally to various background characteristics. Hence, it cannot appropriately be a purely background (predetermined) variable itself.

[26] Indeed, the four intervening variables taken alone (without any of the background variables) typically explain over 90% of the variance in referenda votes for suffrage.

[27] We also tested a variety of dummy variables, both to index individual states and to test for possible substate cultural differences for areas such as the Western Reserve in Ohio and the southern-oriented Ohio River counties in Ohio, but these did not prove significant.

Table 2. Unstandardized Regression Coefficients for Suffrage Support, Prohibition Support, Suffrage Turnout, Democratic Vote and Educational Commitment in Ohio and Michigan, 1913-1914 (Reduced form equations)

Background (Predetermined) Variables	Suffrage Vote[a] Eq. (1)	Prohibition Vote[b] Eq. (2)	Democratic Vote[c] Eq. (3)	Turnout Suffrage[a] Eq. (4)	Education Commitment[d] Eq. (5)
English[e]	2.873***	2.753***	−0.141	1.591***	3.489***
Scandinavian	0.945***	0.914***	0.214	0.375*	1.543***
Dutch	−0.223	0.396	−0.128	−0.372	0.735
Italian	−0.822	−1.400*	−0.029	−1.630**	−1.466*
Congregational	0.435	−0.849	−0.234	−0.900	−1.312**
Methodist	−0.681**	−0.620**	−0.588**	−0.279	−1.360***
Episcopal	5.211***	6.556***	2.649*	3.641**	9.210***
Presbyterian	1.271**	1.343**	0.587	0.952*	1.211*
Native born	0.277***	0.315***	0.412***	0.371***	0.558***
Black males	0.351	0.092	−0.200	−0.574	0.912
German × Catholic	−0.004	0.002	−0.004	0.015*	0.022**
German × Protestant	−0.008	−0.013	0.018**	0.012	0.003
Irish × Catholic	0.091	0.074	0.169***	0.116*	0.126*
Irish × Protestant	−0.050	−0.016	−0.110*	0.039	−0.052
Population Density[f]	3.004	4.750*	7.197***	4.906*	9.758***
Farm[g]	170.413***	253.301***	48.555**	144.484***	294.448***
Manufacturing[h]	0.365	0.462*	0.347*	−0.192	0.521*
Constant	−0.058	−0.069*	−0.057*	−0.037	−0.093*
Adjusted R^2	0.892	0.931	0.852	0.872	0.954
N	171	171	171	171	171

[a] 1913 Michigan pooled with 1914 Ohio.
[b] 1916 Michigan pooled with 1915 Ohio.
[c] 1916 Michigan pooled with 1916 Ohio.
[d] Pupils in school, age 10-14.
[e] County percent.
[f] Log of population per square mile.
[g] Farm: number of farms per population.
[h] Manufacturing: percentage wage earners.

*Significant at .05 level.
**Significant at .01 level.
***Significant at .001 level.

dicating reservoirs of strength not directly evident from the popular vote itself where majorities rejected the issue. (In Michigan only 39% of the electorate voted "yes" on suffrage in 1913, and in Ohio 47.3% voted "yes" in 1914.)

In Table 3 we indicate the effects of the intervening variables operating in our structural model, thereby differentiating between the direct and indirect effects of the background variables (see Figure 1). An examination of the structural equations in Table 3 shows that at least in this election the principal paths determining suffrage support are through attitude toward education and degree of support for prohibition rather than through traditional partisan ties or differences in suffrage turnout.[28] We would expect the prohibition coefficient to be positive in relation to suffrage support, given the alliance between the antiprohibition wets and the antisuffrage forces (as discussed above). However, education emerges as an equally significant and positive influence on suffrage support. Furthermore, when the education variable is added to the predetermined variables as a regressor on the voting variables (equations 1 and 2), the number of predetermined variables that are statistically significant is reduced almost by half for both suffrage and prohibition, indicating that many of the background variables listed in Table 2 affect the voting variables indirectly through intervening variables, such as education.

---

[28] Kleppner (1982) attributes relatively little importance to education measured as the number of residents aged 6-20 in school. However, the high age bracket used tends to capture college towns.

The powerful opposition of the German community to prohibition is evident in the highly significant and negative coefficients for the German Catholic and German Protestant terms in equation 2, Table 3. This German opposition to prohibition produces an indirect effect on suffrage voting, because prohibition is an intervening variable strongly affecting suffrage support (equation 1). In addition, German opposition is a further influence on suffrage as indicated by the direct and negative impact of the German Catholic term on suffrage support (equation 1).

Although population density and German nationality are common negative influences on suffrage and prohibition support, it is equally interesting to note the distinctly different sources of support for prohibition and for suffrage. For example, percentage Methodist and percentage Presbyterian are significant and positively related to prohibition support, but are statistically insig-

Table 3. Unstandardized Regression Coefficients for Suffrage Support, Prohibition Support, Democratic Vote, and Suffrage Turnout in Ohio and Michigan, 1913-1915

	Suffrage Vote[a] Eq. (1)	Prohibition Vote[b] Eq. (2)	Democratic Vote[c] Eq. (3)	Turnout Suffrage[a] Eq. (4)
Background (Predetermined) Variables				
English[d]	0.276	0.283	−1.193***	0.198
Scandinavian	−0.039	−0.178	−0.243	−0.401*
Dutch	−0.657	−0.124	−0.330	−0.763
Italian	0.383	−0.359	0.404	−1.171*
Congregational	1.356***	−0.080	0.167	−0.278
Methodist	0.119	0.342*	−0.139	0.502*
Episcopal	−1.115	0.036	−0.103	−0.412
Baptist	−0.263	0.192	−0.891*	−0.034
Presbyterian	0.239	0.485*	0.175	0.672
Native born	−0.062	−0.080*	0.247***	0.082
Black males	−0.186	−0.554	−0.422	−1.270**
German × Catholic	−0.014**	−0.014***	−0.011*	−0.002
German × Protestant	−0.003	−0.015***	0.018**	0.003
Irish × Catholic	0.015	−0.016	0.131**	0.052
Irish × Protestant	−0.027	0.021	−0.094*	0.073
Population density[e]	−2.736*	−2.157*	4.160**	−0.543
Farm[f]	−46.465*	26.872	−40.849	28.480
Manufacturing[g]	−0.010	0.093	0.187	−0.374*
Intervening Variables				
Education commitment[h]	0.408***	0.708***	0.300***	0.815***
Prohibition support[b]	0.395***	–	–	−0.527***
Democratic vote[i]	−0.064	–	–	–
Suffrage turnout[a]	0.041	–	–	–
Constant	6.909	−0.033	−0.028	0.002
Adjusted R^2	0.958	0.979	0.876	0.910
N	171	171	171	171

[a] 1913 Michigan pooled with 1914 Ohio.
[b] 1916 Michigan pooled with 1915 Ohio.
[c] 1916 Michigan pooled with 1916 Ohio.
[d] County percent.
[e] Log of population per square mile.
[f] Farm: number of farms per population.
[g] Manufacturing: percent wage earners.
[h] Pupils in school, age 10-14.
[i] 1916 Michigan and Ohio vote pooled.

*Significant at .05 level.
**Significant at .01 level.
***Significant at .001 level.

nificant in relation to suffrage support, whereas the reverse is true for percentage Congregational. This finding accords with historical accounts that emphasize common elements of direct opposition to prohibition and the efforts of antiprohibition interest groups getting out an antisuffrage vote. The fact that sources of direct support for prohibition and suffrage do not show as much commonality indicates the presence of diverse constituencies.

Although turnout on suffrage is not significantly related to suffrage support, it is interesting to note in equation (4), Table 3, that prohibition support is negatively related to suffrage turnout. This suggests that the antiprohibition interests were more effective in generating turnout on suffrage referenda compared to those supporting prohibition. However, the fact that turnout for suffrage is not statistically related to support for suffrage indicates that even if antiprohibitionists got more voters to the polls on the suffrage issue, the voters did *not* vote more strongly against suffrage than would otherwise be expected. This finding supports the proposition that examination of referenda voting patterns uncovers complexities in the relationship between the prohibition and suffrage issues at the grass roots level not apparent from historical accounts of the confounding of these issues at the level of organizational elites and interest group politics.

In the case of suffrage and prohibition we have the unusual advantage of being able to test our model against additional referenda elections in the Midwest. Thus, in Table 4 we compare the coefficients for the pooled Michigan and Ohio 1912 suffrage referenda with those we have already presented for the second suffrage test (1913 in Michigan pooled with 1914 in Ohio) and with the coefficients for the third suffrage round in these states (1917 in Ohio pooled with 1918 in Michigan). As a further test, we analyze the change in percentage support for suffrage between these successive referenda.

There is, however, one marked difference in the data which affects the pattern of intervening variables in the case of the 1912 votes (Warner, 1964, pp. 312-353). In both states the liquor question at this election was one of county local option rather than statewide prohibition (and in Michigan the local option question was only on the ballot in years just before or shortly after 1912). As presented in Table 4, equation (1), the local-option measure of prohibition sentiment does not prove significant as a predictor of the 1912 suffrage vote.[29] Apparently, local option campaigns did not generate the same intensity as proposals for statewide prohibition.

There is substantial consistency over time between the background variables and support for suffrage. Except for equation (1), support for suffrage depends heavily on attitude to prohibition and on education but is not significantly related to level of turnout or percentage Democratic of the partisan vote. Additional direct effects of opposition to suffrage are evident in the negative coefficients for percentage Dutch, percentage black males, and for the two German terms. The one consistent source of additional direct support for suffrage is percentage Congregational.

In the last two columns of Table 4 we test our full set of variables against the change in level of support for suffrage between successive suffrage referenda. Given the relative stability of the coefficients for the pattern of support, we would expect few significant coefficients among the background variables, and this is the case. The overall explanatory power is substantially less, and neither education nor prohibition support is significantly related to the change in the pattern of suffrage support. Changes in turnout, however, do appear to be very significantly related to changes in the level of suffrage support, even though turnout itself does not directly affect the outcome of each suffrage referenda (see equations 2 and 3). This finding again indicates the complex relationship between forces that affected turnout for suffrage and the consequent effect such turnout had for the success or failure of the suffrage issue.

A comparable analysis of the stability of patterns in prohibition voting over time is not possible for Michigan and Ohio jointly. During this period, Michigan had scattered local option contests, but only one state referendum vote on prohibition—the 1916 prohibition referendum that passed (Englemann, 1979). This outcome had been prophesized by Michigan Governor Osborn in response to the infamous stolen suffrage referendum of 1912, where an apparent suffrage victory had been turned into a narrow defeat by means of devious ballot-counting procedures apparently launched by opponents to prohibition fearing the dry consequences of women obtaining the right to vote:

> If the liquor interests defeat the [suffrage] amendment by fraud, proved or suspected, the people of Michigan will retaliate in my opinion

---

[29] However, if one substitutes the earliest subsequent statewide prohibition vote (1914 in Ohio and 1916 in Michigan), support for prohibition does prove highly significant in relation to support for suffrage, whereas the list of significant background variables remains virtually unchanged.

Table 4. Unstandardized Regression Coefficients for Suffrage Support and Change in Support between Successive Referenda in Michigan and Ohio, 1912-1918 (Structural equations)

	Suffrage Vote			Suffrage Vote Change	
	1912[a] Eq. (1)	1913-1914[b] Eq. (2)	1917-1918[c] Eq. (3)	1912-1914[d] Eq. (4)	1913-1917[e] Eq. (5)
Background (Predetermined) Variables					
English[f]	0.592	0.276	–0.585	–0.111	–0.718*
Scandinavian	0.018	–0.039	–0.107	–0.094	0.059
Dutch	–1.446***	–0.657	–1.340**	0.816**	–0.526
Italian	0.237	0.383	0.235	–0.106	0.246
Congregational	0.930**	1.356***	0.740*	0.472*	–0.601**
Methodist	–.304	0.119	–0.295	0.479**	–0.441
Episcopal	–1.259	–1.115	–0.365	0.138	0.297
Baptist	0.098	–0.263	–0.076	–0.372	0.086
Presbyterian	0.412	0.239	–0.436	–0.006	–0.771*
Native born	–0.109*	–0.062	–0.104	0.026	0.025
Black males	–0.831*	–0.186	–1.172**	0.474	–0.461
German X Catholic	–0.023***	–0.014*	–0.007	0.005	0.004
German X Protestant	–0.013**	–0.003	–0.016**	0.004	–0.007
Irish X Catholic	0.008	0.015	–0.042	0.015	–0.045
Irish X Protestant	–0.032	–0.027	0.060	–0.001	0.074*
Population density[g]	3.932**	–2.736*	–0.516	–7.362***	0.774
Farm[h]	4.755	–46.465**	–15.634	–46.685**	25.317
Manufacturing[i]	0.149	–0.010	–0.008	–0.067	0.162
Intervening Variables					
Education commitment[j]	0.581***	0.408***	0.531***	0.076***	0.031
Prohibition support[k]	0.056	0.395***	0.503***	–0.005	0.087
Democratic vote[l]	–0.269***	–0.064	–0.150	0.153**	–0.074
Suffrage turnout[m]	0.096*	0.041	–0.101	0.140***	–0.375***
Constant	–0.032	6.909	0.013	0.035*	0.014
Adjusted R^2	0.961	0.958	0.964	0.440	0.676
N	171	171	171	171	88

[a] Michigan and Ohio pooled.
[b] 1913 Michigan pooled with 1914 Ohio.
[c] 1918 Michigan pooled with 1917 Ohio.
[d] 1913-1914 vote compared to 1912 vote.
[e] 1917-1918 vote compared to 1913-1914 vote.
[f] County percent.
[g] Log of population per square mile.
[h] Farm: number per population.
[i] Manufacturing: percent wage earners.
[j] Pupils in school, age 10-14.
[k] Equations 1-3: prohibition vote nearest in time to suffrage vote; Equations (4) and (5) change in prohibition vote between successive referenda.
[l] 1916 Michigan and Ohio pooled.
[m] Equations (4) and (5): change in suffrage turnout between successive referenda.

*Significant at .05 level.
**Significant at .01 level.
***Significant at .001 level.

> by adopting statewide prohibition; the question seems to be largely one as to whether the liquor interests own and control and run Michigan. (quoted in Catt & Shuler, 1926, p. 181)

In Ohio, however, the frequency of prohibition referenda allows us to assess the stability of prohibition sentiment in that state from 1915 to 1917 and from 1917 to 1918. For the latter pair of votes we regressed change in prohibition strength on our standard set of 18 background variables plus education. All coefficients were found to be insignificant, and the adjusted R^2 was 0.001. Between 1915 and 1917, however, the United States had entered the war against Germany. Here we found change in the percentage for prohibition significantly related to the percentage English and percentage native born, but the adjusted R^2 was still only 0.121. Thus, aside from the limited changes triggered by American involvement in World War I, the successive prohibition votes exhibit even greater stability than that displayed by the successive suffrage referenda.[30]

Overall our analysis of suffrage referenda in the Midwest underscores the importance of our structural model (Figue 1) in identifying sources of support and opposition to suffrage. Of particular interest is the finding that support for prohibition and educational commitment are extremely powerful as influences on suffrage support in contrast to partisan vote and suffrage turnout, which are insignificant. Direct negative sources of opposition are typically the same for suffrage and prohibition, which suggest the success of anti-prohibition forces in confounding the suffrage issue with the prohibition issue. However, direct positive sources of support for suffrage and prohibition are diverse, indicating distinct constituencies for these two issues at the grass-roots level of voting behavior.

The West and East

We have seen in Ohio a situation of intense opposition to suffrage linked to a generation of conflict over prohibition in a state that was the cradle of the Women's Christian Temperance Union and the birthplace of the Anti-Saloon League (Stegh, 1975). In the West the 1910 approval of suffrage in Washington is the prototype of the opposite context: a suffrage campaign in the absence of large-scale organized opposition. The result in Washington is a low degree of cleavage, reflected by our 18 background variables producing no statistically significant coefficients when run against support for suffrage (and an insultingly negative adjusted R^2).[31]

The story was strikingly different in neighboring Oregon, however, where suffrage was caught up in the prohibition issue, and repeatedly voted down (Kessler, 1980; Moynihan, 1979). Suffrage finally passed in 1912, after Oregon's neighboring states had adopted it. Finally, there is the case of California, where an extensive 1896 suffrage campaign had faced strong last-minute opposition in the San Francisco Bay area. It was defeated by the heavy antisuffrage margins in San Francisco and Alameda (Oakland) counties generated by wet interests opposed to woman suffrage (Catt & Shuler, 1926, pp. 123-124).

By 1911 California had local option by individual cities and towns (rather than by county), thus freeing the woman suffrage issue somewhat from linkage with prohibition (Ostrander, 1957). The suffrage issue also had the advantage of coming up as part of a popular "reform" package backed by newly elected governor Hiram Johnson. Most of northern California other than the Bay area was highly supportive of suffrage.[32] Although the statewide vote was in doubt for several days, suffrage ultimately carried the state (winning in all but eight counties), despite losing in San Francisco County by almost 14,000 votes and in Alameda County (Oakland) by more than 2,000.[33]

In Table 5 equations (1) and (2) examine the pooled data for the 1911 suffrage vote in California and the 1912 suffrage vote in Oregon. The first equation (without intervening variables) indicates that suffrage draws support from counties with a high percentage of English and native born residents as well as those with a high percentage of Congregationalists, a pattern similar to that of the Midwest. Negative opposition to suffrage in the West also substantially parallels that of the Midwest, stemming from counties with high population density and a high percentage of Dutch. The similarities between the West and Midwest remain when we look at equation (2) in Table 5, where the intervening variables are added. Here we see the same reduction in the number of direct background variables significantly related to suffrage, which indicates that most background variables on suffrage have an indirect effect vis-à-vis intervening variables (see Figure 1). A new partisan dimension to the suffrage vote is apparent with the negative coefficient for the Democratic vote, perhaps reflecting the identification of the suffrage issue with the progressive reforms of Republican Hiram Johnson as well as the growing distaste of suffrage leaders—particularly in the West—with traditional Democratic party leadership (Snapp, 1975).

---

[30] See authors for analysis.

[31] Space precludes presenting the analysis of Washington data.

[32] Up in Mark Twain's Calaveras County, suffrage leaped out to an almost two-to-one margin, and in some far northern counties, such as Modoc (on the Oregon border) and Shasta, the margin for suffrage exceeded two to one.

[33] Alameda resident Jack London wrote later that he voted for woman suffrage in the hope that they "would vote John Barleycorn out of existence" and thus serve as "the true conservators of the race." If so, London was something of an exception in his motivation pattern (Sinclair, 1965, p. 323).

In the East we turn to a region where political parties and machines were much stronger and fear of statewide prohibition less of an issue. In November, 1915, referenda on woman suffrage were simultaneously held in several states, including the crucial states of New York and Pennsylvania. In both, suffrage went down to defeat

Table 5. Unstandardized Regression Coefficients for Suffrage Support in California, Oregon, Pennsylvania and New York, 1911-1915

	California and Oregon, 1911-1912[a]		Pennsylvania and New York, 1915[b]	
	Reduced-Form Eq. (1)	Structural Eq. (2)	Reduced-Form Eq. (3)	Structural Eq. (4)
Background (Predetermined) variables				
English[c]	2.015*	0.269	1.180	−0.658
Scandinavian	0.611	−0.223	2.420***	1.144*
Dutch	−62.562***	4.326	−1.602	−2.814
Italian	1.896*	0.412	1.523*	0.673
Congregational	4.955*	3.412*	0.149	−0.262
Methodist	0.250	0.110	0.895*	0.933***
Episcopal	−5.101*	0.874	0.875	−0.033
Baptist	−1.279	2.080	0.621	0.639
Presbyterian	3.512	2.444	0.176	0.297
Native born	0.374*	−0.021	0.502***	−0.223
Black males	11.263*	4.899	−0.186	−1.328
Jewish	–	–	−1.074	−0.386
German × Catholic	−0.015	0.004	−0.026	−0.029
German × Protestant	0.127	−0.006	0.099***	0.027
Irish × Catholic	0.161	0.043	0.091**	−0.004
Irish × Protestant	−0.054	−0.030	−0.093*	−0.033
Population density[d]	−10.315***	−7.593***	−5.143**	−1.794
Farm[e]	100.316	0.291	−54.940	−85.732
Manufacturing[f]	0.517*	0.107	0.646**	0.429*
Intervening variables				
Education commitment[g]	–	0.651***	–	0.711***
Democratic vote[h]	–	−0.106***	–	−0.002
Suffrage turnout	–	−0.001	–	−0.142**[b]
Constant	0.076	0.010	0.014	0.008
Adjusted R^2	0.904	0.955	0.810	0.858
N	92	92	128	128

[a] California 1911 pooled with Oregon 1912.
[b] Pennsylvania 1915 pooled with New York 1915.
[c] County percent.
[d] Log of population per square mile.
[e] Farm: number of farms per population.
[f] Manufacturing: percent wage earners.
[g] Pupils in school, age 10-14.
[h] California 1910 vote pooled with Oregon 1914 vote; Pennsylvania 1914 vote pooled with New York 1916 vote.

*Significant at .05 level.
**Significant at .01 level.
***Significant at .001 level.

by a substantial margin. Both New York City and Philadelphia turned in massive antisuffrage majorities. However, there were some major differences between the two states, not the least being the Pennsylvania constitutional provision barring a second referendum vote on a defeated proposal for the next five years. In New York, by contrast, an even greater effort was made to have the legislature repass the proposal in 1916, and it was adopted by the voters in November, 1917.

In Table 5, equations (3) and (4), we present reduced-form (background variables only) and structural equations (background variables and intervening variables) for the 1915 suffrage vote in Pennsylvania pooled with the 1915 suffrage vote in New York.[34] From Table 5 it appears somewhat more difficult to account for the sources of support and opposition to suffrage than for the other regions examined, as evidenced by the lower adjusted R^2s. However, for those groups statistically related to suffrage support, we find (equation 3) many more positively related than negatively related, including positive support from the percentage Scandinavian, Methodist, native born, and manufacturing as well as from unexpected positive sources such as the percentage Italian, German Protestant, and Irish Catholic. Groups negatively related to suffrage are percentage Irish Protestant and population density.[35] When the intervening variables are added (equation 4), most of the background variables drop out as direct effects, leaving as positive sources of support the percentage Congregational and manufacturing along with the intervening educational variable, a pattern similar to the one reported for the Midwest. The significant negative coefficient for suffrage turnout in the East is difficult to assess in the absence of a measure of prohibition support, but may reflect the intensity and controversy of the suffrage issue independent of an association with prohibition referenda.[36]

New York also provides insight into the possible effects of World War I as well as of generational differences. A major effort was made to encourage soldiers and sailors (most were under 30) to vote, and these votes were tabulated separately, by county. This provides an interesting slice, if not a sample of distinctly younger male voters and also means that the civilian electorate was somewhat skewed in favor of older male voters. The predominantly young soldier and sailor vote was substantially more prosuffrage than the general civilian vote.

Conclusion

A detailed analysis of referenda voting patterns in our three major regions suggests a reevaluation of usual generalizations about the axes of support and opposition. Were northern European immigrants more supportive of suffrage? Yes, in the case of the Scandinavians and English, but not in the case of the Dutch or Germans. Nor were southern European immigrants, Italians in particular, a significant source of opposition. Were Catholics a general source of opposition? German Catholics were consistently opposed to suffrage, the Irish only to some degree opposed, whereas Italian Catholics do not show a statistically significant negative relationship to suffrage voting. The urban-rural split on the suffrage issue is most clearly seen in the opposition of the more densely populated areas rather than in the support of rural areas, whereas manufacturing measures, when suffrage, perhaps indicating support from labor in contradistinction to managerial opposition.

It is understandable why leaders of the woman suffrage movement have stressed the sources of opposition to woman suffrage, particularly the liquor lobbying interests and the manipulation of electoral processes (Catt & Shuler, 1926).[37] Our analysis confirms the intensity of German and urban opposition to suffrage, but also indicates that at the level of the male mass electorate, there were enduring sources of positive support for woman suffrage across votes and across regions. Counties with high percentages of Protestant and northern European inhabitants (with the exception of the Germans) supported suffrage, whereas those with southern European, Irish, and Catholic (with the exception of the Germans) backgrounds did not evidence a systematic orientation to this issue. Thus, at the grass-roots level we find considerable modification of traditional axes of opposition and support for suffrage. Although urban measures are most often related to opposition to suffrage, we do not find support for suffrage from rural measures to the degree expected. Although it is clear that there were enduring sources of both opposition and support for suffrage, we also note the stability of non-aligned positions of Irish, southern Europeans, and (non-German) Catholics, thereby contradicting assumptions that these groups would be negatively oriented toward the suffrage issue.

---

[34] Percentage Jewish has been added to the usual 18 background variables for analysis of the East.

[35] Final New York City curbside betting odds were three to one that Tammany would capture the mayoralty (with Judge Hylan), but only even money on the outcome of the suffrage amendment (*New York Times*, 1917).

[36] Suffrage lost in all five boroughs of New York City, and also in all but five scattered counties in upstate New York (in which we include Suffolk and Nassau for convenience). Within New York City, suffrage received extremely heavy support from predominantly Jewish Assembly Districts of the lower East Side of Manhattan, South Bronx, and part of Brooklyn. Tammany strongholds, however, were heavily opposed. Between the 1915 and 1917 elections, the United States entered World War I, and many women became involved in war-related efforts. For the 1917 referendum there was a massive campaign conducted in the state, and especially in New York City. Woman suffrage was endorsed by all New York political parties, and by such notables as President Wilson, Treasury Secretary McAdoo, "Colonel" Theodore Roosevelt, Governor Whitman, ex-mayor John Purroy Mitchel, Socialist Morris Hillquit, and Tammany mayoral candidate Judge John F. Hylan. The conventional explanation is that Tammany withdrew its active opposition and was the key factor in reversing the outcome. However, even though it is true that Manhattan (New York County) did display one of the larger shifts, it also is true that such shifts were almost precisely matched in the other four boroughs (where Tammany did not have predominant influence), plus adjoining Westchester County. Suffrage thus carried the city by over 92,000 and the state as a whole by roughly 100,000. Much more was involved than the benevolent neutrality of Manhattan-based Tammany Hall.

In addition to delineating background variables related to support and opposition to suffrage, the specification of a structural model also enables us to determine alternative attitudinal paths by which support for suffrage was effected. Of particular importance is the finding that the percentage voting Democratic is usually insignificant in accounting for suffrage support, demonstrating the degree to which the suffrage issue was cut off from traditional party alliances and party identification.[38] Also surprising was the consistent and powerful effect exercised in all three regions—West, Midwest, and East—by our educational commitment variable, which proved highly significant in regard to suffrage support, as well as for turnout on suffrage and support for prohibition. We did note that controversy on the prohibition issue did affect turnout on suffrage, yet turnout itself displayed no consistent effect on percentage voting for suffrage. Finally, we report with surprise our finding that the Progressive vote in 1912 (for Theodore Roosevelt) was not significant as an intervening variable influencing suffrage support. This suggests that the radical premise of the suffrage issue implicit in its prescription for altering traditional patriarchial political relations between the sexes casts the suffrage issue in an unusually complex position in relation to other progressive reforms of this era.

The specification of our structural model also illuminates the mediating role of prohibition. In the first place, the salience of the issue varied from low concern to a dominant issue (as in Ohio). The very presence of a statewide referendum on prohibition indicates concern beyond a certain threshold, a point not reached in New York or Pennsylvania nor in California.[39] Secondly, although it is true that suffrage and prohibition shared some of the same sources of support, in general the sources of support for prohibition were drawn from a wider range of Protestant and northern European groups than were present for suffrage voting. This confirms the view that prohibition was a mass movement mobilizing extensive support at the grass-roots level in response to a readily perceived social problem. The smaller base of support for suffrage, although stable over time, confirms interpretations of suffrage as a complex ideological issue entailing a radical prescription for women's entry into public domains traditionally reserved for men. As such, woman suffrage was a progressive reform requiring decades for majorities to affirm even with the constant presence of adherents steadfastly committed to it in an era particularly marked by concern for democratic values.

We have benefitted from accounts of organizational leaders involved in the struggle for women's rights and from historians' perceptive interpretations. However, the analysis of the actual votes cast by millions of male citizens via state referenda is long overdue. New perspectives resulting from the investigation of these suffrage referenda clarify sources of support and opposition to the enfranchisement of women, expanding the study of American voting behavior to include an issue—woman suffrage—basic to the implementation, if not very definition, of American democracy.

---

[37] State authorities could put suffrage proposals at a serious disadvantage by printing them on a separate ballot, especially a separate colored ballot (as was done in Wisconsin in 1912 and Iowa in 1916). This facilitated voting by the illiterate and monitoring of the vote.

[38] The Republican and Democratic parties in the progressive era did not view their role as that of making controversial issues acceptable to voting majorities. Rather, splinter groups and nonpartisan organizations were responsible for initiating attention to social problems, after which political parties would join the debate if necessary. Consequently, neither party was formally involved in woman suffrage until 1916 nor in prohibition until 1920 (Cashman, 1981, pp.6-10; Morgan, 1972, pp. 129).

[39] The link between prohibition and suffrage received a fatal blow, however, after American entrance into World War I. With grain in short supply for food shipments, wet interests were literally put out of business. In addition, the super-patriotism generated by the war effort brought antipathy to the German-American community which, as our analysis confirms, had been a primary source of opposition to suffrage (Luebke, 1974). Thus, World War I discredited, if not destroyed, two major opponents to woman suffrage: the wet interests and the influence of German-Americans. Support for the long-moribund federal suffrage amendment skyrocketed.

Appendix 1.

I. Suffrage and prohibition referenda: Oregon, California, Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania, New York.

		Suffrage	Prohibition
West	Oregon	1910	Prohibition, 1910[a]
	Oregon	1912[a]	
	California	1911[a]	
Midwest	Ohio	1912	County Liquor Licensing, 1912[a]
	Ohio	1914	Prohibition, 1915
	Ohio	1917	Prohibition, 1917
	Ohio		Prohibition, 1918[a]
	Michigan	1912	County Liquor Licensing, 1912
	Michigan	1913	Prohibition, 1916[a]
	Michigan	1918[a]	
East	Pennsylvania	1915	
	New York	1915	
	New York	1917[a]	

II. Partisan vote: Oregon, California, Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania, New York.

West		
	California	1910
	Ohio	1916
Midwest		
	Michigan	1916
	Ohio	1916
East		
	Pennsylvania	1914
	New York	1914

---

[a] Referendum passed.

Appendix 2. Background Variables

Nationality, Ethnicity and Religion[a]

English (including Scottish and Welsh)
German (including Austrian)
Italian
Irish
Scandinavian (including Swedish, Norwegian, Danish, and Finnish)
Dutch
Native-born of native-born parents
Black male
Roman Catholic
Methodist
Presbyterian
Baptist
Congregational
Jewish
Protestant (all Protestant denominations)
German × Catholic
German × Protestant
Irish × Catholic
Irish × Protestant

Economic Indicators

Population density (the log of population per square mile)
Percentage employed in manufacturing
Ratio of number of farms to total population

---

[a] As a percentage of the total population.

Appendix 3. Unstandardized Regression Coefficients for Suffrage Support in the Midwest, West, and East: 1910-1918 (Reduced Form Equations)

	Suffrage Vote				
	Midwest			West	East
	1912[a] Eq. (1)	1913-1914[b] Eq. (2)	1917-1918[c] Eq. (3)	1911-1912[d] Eq. (4)	1915[e] Eq. (5)
Specification I. Axes of opposition and support variables					
Southern European	1.119	0.695	0.305	1.953**	1.289
Northern European	1.415***	1.467***	1.529***	1.719***	2.403***
Native born	0.238***	0.345***	0.307***	0.219*	0.780***
Black males	−0.108	0.159	−0.189	8.708*	−0.899
Catholic	−0.075	0.085	0.122	0.446**	−0.041
Protestant	−0.529***	−0.191	−0.575***	0.197	−0.638***
Jewish	5.568	13.151	39.915***	2.120	−0.733
Population density	6.715***	1.462	5.005*	−8.601***	−1.394
Farm	188.080***	154.834***	235.743***	184.569***	−74.920
Manufacturing	0.391*	0.346	0.608**	0.155	0.597**
Constant	−0.052	−0.039	−0.071	0.105*	0.015
Adjusted R^2	0.873	0.853	0.875	0.925	0.803
N	171	171	171	92	128
Specification II. Background variables without interaction terms					
Irish	2.507*	2.114	3.607**	1.731*	−0.698
Italian	−0.685	−0.877	−0.871	1.731*	0.338
German	−0.162	−0.107	0.047	2.072	1.379***
English	2.289***	2.635***	1.877	0.770	1.181
Scandinavian	0.986***	0.913***	1.125***	1.016**	2.102***
Dutch	0.329	0.907	0.706***	−26.294*	−0.231
Native born	0.160**	0.309***	0.258***	0.681***	0.769***
Black males	−0.746	0.005	−0.911	4.542	−1.106
Catholic	−0.113	0.110	0.023	0.069	0.288*
Lutheran	−0.372	0.069	−0.503	−7.816*	−1.462***
Evangelical	−1.119**	−0.771	−1.025*	−2.353	−0.177
Episcopal	2.361	3.789**	5.064**	−1.619	−0.377
Methodist	−1.228***	−0.695**	−1.146***	−0.156	0.038
Congregational	−0.443	0.197	−0.587	3.098*	−2.048
Presbyterian	1.119**	1.107**	0.786	2.495	0.394
Baptist	0.024	−0.439	−0.078	−1.790	0.129
United Brethren	−0.882	−0.327	−0.927	−1.133	−0.298
Jewish	10.320	15.503	43.218***	−25.338	0.027
Population density	10.629***	3.411	8.208***	−2.993*	−1.216
Farm	180.950***	154.663***	217.360	−32.430	−162.546***
Manufacturing	0.222	0.266	0.296***	0.422**	0.326
Constant	−0.098***	−0.073*	−0.118***	0.031	0.003
Adjusted R^2	0.922	0.909	0.913	0.958	0.875

[a] 1913 Michigan pooled with 1914 Ohio.
[b] 1916 Michigan pooled with 1915 Ohio.
[c] 1916 Michigan pooled with 1916 Ohio.
[d] California 1911 pooled with Oregon 1912.
[e] Pennsylvania 1915 pooled with New York 1915.

*Significant at .05 level.
**Significant at .01 level.
***Significant at .001 level.

References

Alwin, D. F., & Hauser, R. M. The decomposition of effects in path analysis. *American Sociological Review,* 1975, *40,* 37-47.

Annual leaflet of national Woman's Christian Temperance Union. Chicago: The Temple, 1898.

Anthony, S. B., Gage, M. J., Harper, I. H., & Stanton, E. C. (Eds.). *History of woman suffrage* (6 vols.). New York: Fowler and Wells, 1881-1922.

Boole, E. A. *Give prohibition its chance.* Evanston, Ill.: Fleming H. Revell, 1929.

Bordin, R. *Woman and temperance: The quest for power and liberty, 1873-1900.* Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1981.

Cashman, D. *Prohibition: The lie of the land.* New York: Free Press, 1981.

Catt, C. C., & Shuler, N. R. *Woman suffrage and politics.* Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1926.

DuBois, E. C. *Feminism and suffrage: The emergence of an independent women's movement in America, 1848-1869.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1978. (a)

DuBois, E. C. The radicalism of the woman suffrage movement: Notes toward the reconstruction of nineteenth-century feminism. *Feminist Studies,* 1975, *3:1/2,* 63-71. (b)

Duniway, A. S. *Path breaking.* New York: Schocken Books, 1971.

Dykstra, R. R., & Hahn, N. Northern voters and negro suffrage: The case of Iowa, 1868. *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 1968, *2,* 202-215.

Engelmann, L. *Intemperance—the lost war against liquor.* New York: Free Press, 1979.

Epstein, B. L. *The politics of domesticity: Women, evangelism, and temperance in nineteenth-century America.* Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1981.

Flexner, E. *Century of struggle.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975.

Friedrich, R. J. In defense of multiplicative terms in multiple regression equations. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1982, *26,* 797-833.

Gillespie, J. A., & Zinnes, D. A. (Eds.). *Missing elements in political inquiry: Logic and levels of analysis.* Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1982.

Gusfield, J. R. *Symbolic crusade: Status politics and the American Temperance Movement.* Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1963.

Hannan, M. T. *Aggregation and disaggregation in sociology.* Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1971.

Hanuschek, E., & Jackson, J. *Statistical methods for social scientists.* New York: Academic Press, 1977.

Jensen, R. J. *The winning of the midwest.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971.

Kessler, L. J. *A siege of the citadels: Access of women's suffrage ideas to the Oregon press, 1884-1912.* University of Washington: doctoral dissertation, 1980.

Kleppner, P. *The cross of culture.* New York: Free Press, 1970.

Kleppner, P. *Who voted? The dynamics of electoral turnout, 1870-1980.* New York: Praeger, 1982.

Kousser, J. M. *The shaping of southern politics: Suffrage restriction and the establishment of the one-party south, 1880-1910.* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974.

Kraditor, A. S. *The ideas of the woman suffrage movement, 1890-1920.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1965.

Langbein, L. I., & Lichtman, A. J. *Ecological inference: Quantitative applications in the social science,* No. 10. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1978.

Larsen, T. A. Emancipating the West's dolls, vassals and hopeless drudges. In R. Daniels (Ed.), *Essays in Western history in honor of T. A. Larsen.* Laramie: University of Wyoming Press, 1971.

Lichtman, A. J. *Prejudice and the old order: The presidential election of 1928.* Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1979.

Long, S. B. The continuing debate over the use of ratio variables: Facts and fiction. In K. F. Schuessler (Ed.), *Sociological methodology.* San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1980.

Luebke, F. C. *Bonds of loyalty: German-Americans and World War I.* DeKalb, Ill.: Northern Illinois Press, 1974.

Lunardini, C. A., & Knock, T. J. Woodrow Wilson and woman suffrage: A new look. *Political Science Quarterly,* 1980-81, *95.*

Morgan, D. *Suffragists and Democrats: The politics of woman suffrage in America.* East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1972.

Moynihan, R. B. *Abigail Scott Duniway of Oregon: Woman and suffragist of the American frontier.* New Haven, Conn: unpublished doctoral dissertation, Yale University, 1979.

New York Times, November 6, 1917.

Ostrander, G. M. *The prohibition movement in California, 1848-1933.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1957.

Ostrogorski, M. *The rights of women.* New York: Scribner's, 1893.

Paulson, R. E. *Women's suffrage and prohibition: A comparative study of equality and social control.* Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1973.

Piepkorn, A. C. *Profiles in belief: The religious bodies of the United States and Canada* (Vol. II). San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1978.

Pleck, E. The ERA defeat: An historian's perspective. *The Organization of American Historian's Newsletter* (August), 1982.

Rorabaugh, W. J. *The alcoholic republic: An American tradition.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1979.

Rossi, A. S. *Feminists in politics.* New York: Academic Press, 1982.

Scott, A. F., & Scott, A. M. *One half the people: The fight for woman suffrage.* Urbana: University of

Illinois Press, 1982.

Sinclair, A. *The emancipation of the American woman.* New York: Harper & Row, 1965.

Snapp, M. A. Defeat the Democrats: The Congressional Union for Woman Suffrage in Arizona, 1914 and 1916. *Journal of the West,* 1975, *14,* 131-139.

Stegh, L. J. *Wet and dry battles in the cradle state of prohibition: Robert J. Buckley and the repeal of prohibition in Ohio.* Kent, Ohio: unpublished doctoral dissertation, Kent State University, 1975.

Stouffer, S. A. *Communism, conformity, and civil liberties.* New York: Doubleday, 1955.

Theil, H. *Linear aggregation of economic relations.* Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1954.

Timberlake, J. H. *Prohibition and the progressive movement, 1900-1920.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963.

Vander Meer, P. R. Religion, society and politics: A classification of American religious groups. *Social Science History,* 1981, *V,* 3-24.

Warner, H. L. *Progressivism in Ohio, 1897-1917.* Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964.

Rights, Boundaries, and the Bonds of Community: A Qualified Defense of Moral Parochialism

RICHARD DAGGER
Arizona State University

One effect of the cosmopolitan turn in recent political philosophy is that widely held beliefs and intuitions are being called into question. My purpose here is to scrutinize one of these beliefs—that we should attend to the needs of our compatriots before the needs of the foreigners—from the perspective of a rights-based theory. After sketching a theory that takes the right of autonomy as its cornerstone, I consider four arguments that might support the intuition that compatriots take priority. Only one of the four is sound, I conclude, and even this argument, the argument from reciprocity, supports the intuition only in a highly qualified form.

Political philosophy seems to have taken a cosmopolitan turn in the last several years, and in some ways this is surely a turn for the better.[1] It is timely, certainly, and there is reason to be encouraged whenever political philosophers devote their attention to timely issues—in this case, issues such as immigration policy, the distribution of wealth and other resources among nations, and the morality of intervention in the (ostensibly) internal affairs of sovereign nation-states. There is also reason to welcome any shift in perspective, such as the cosmopolitan turn, that leads political philosophers to question assumptions and intuitions too often accepted and acted upon without proper reflection. Indeed, my purpose in this essay is to follow the cosmopolitan turn by examining one of these intuitions: the belief, as Henry Shue (1980, pp. 131-132) has put it, that "compatriots take priority."

To say that compatriots take priority is to say that we stand in a special relationship to those men, women, and children who share with us membership in a political community. This relationship is special because it requires us to attend to the needs and interests of our compatriots before we attend to the needs and interests of foreigners. We may have some responsibility to others, that is, but our first responsibility is to the poor, the hungry, and the homeless citizens of our own country. In a sense, this is the political analog of the belief that "charity begins at home," except that the requirements involved, duty and obligation, are more stringent than the requirements of charity.

This view—that compatriots take priority—seems to be both widely and firmly held. But should it be? Perhaps it is only a form of chauvinism or moral parochialism which cannot withstand critical scrutiny. Perhaps an examination of our political and moral relationships from a cosmopolitan point of view may reveal that there is no good reason to give priority to our compatriots.

This seems to be an implication of the human rights perspective which has become prevalent in moral and political philosophy. For if people have rights by virtue of the fact that they are human beings, or persons,[2] then one may wonder whether any moral significance attaches to the fact that almost all human beings are thought to be members (in one way or another) of political communities (of one sort or another). Insofar as a right is a human right, after all, it must be universal and equal, a right that all persons possess in equal measure; and insofar as a human right entails a correlative duty, it must be a duty that falls

---

Received: February 10, 1984
Revision received: June 29, 1984
Accepted for publication: September 5, 1984

An earlier version of this article was presented at the 1983 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in Chicago. I am grateful to Richard Flathman and Michael Mosher, the discussants, for comments which were generous even when critical.

[1] Examples of this turn include: Barry (1982), Beitz (1979), Brown and MacLean (1979), Brown and Shue (1977, 1981), Goldman (1982), Lackey (1982), Richards (1982), Shue (1980), Walzer (1977).

[2] Cf. Benn (1978, p. 66): "It is a mistake . . . to make the distinction hinge on the difference between *human* beings and others: it is not their humanity, a simple biological characteristic having no necessary moral implications, but their personality that makes the crucial difference between right-bearers and other objects." Since nothing important to my argument rests on this distinction, and since it seems odd to regard humanity as "a simple biological characteristic," I do not rely on it in this essay.

equally on all persons. If there is a human right to liberty, for instance, it follows that every person has an equal right to liberty and a correlative duty to respect the liberty of every other person. But this right and duty are universal, so they must apply without regard to race, nationality, or citizenship. By the same token, a human right to life or subsistence recognizes no boundaries, for anyone in need of the means to sustain life would have a claim against those who are in a position to meet his or her needs, even if those who are subject to the claim are citizens of a distant country. Nor is there anything in the bare notion of a human right which would lead one to think that his first responsibility, as far as the protection and promotion of rights is concerned, is to his fellow citizens. In this respect human rights seem to be neutral: the rights of one's fellow citizens are to count for neither more nor less than the rights of others. And neutrality in this respect seems to be hostile to the belief that compatriots take priority.

Does this mean that we must either abandon the human rights perspective or surrender the intuition that we stand in a special moral relationship to our fellow citizens? Not if our rights-based theory of politics is properly conceived. If it is so conceived, I shall argue, a rights-based theory of politics actually requires us to recognize that a special relationship obtains between the members of a political community. This is not to say that no changes are necessary, however, for the intuition in question will have to be qualified by the addition of a *ceteris paribus* clause: that is, compatriots take priority *when other things are equal.* Since other things are seldom equal in these matters, what follows may well be regarded as a qualified defense of moral parochialism.

I

To this point I have referred to "the human rights perspective" as if it were a single, unified point of view. It is not. There are common themes which join all those who consider themselves human rights theorists, such as their opposition to utilitarianism; but there are also significant differences among them, as anyone who compares Robert Nozick's *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* with Ronald Dworkin's *Taking Rights Seriously* may readily attest. These differences are troublesome in the context of this essay because we cannot know, without further exploration, exactly what we are trying to reconcile with the belief that compatriots take priority. For this reason it is necessary to begin with a sketch of what I take to be the most satisfactory account of human rights. The cornerstone of this account is the right of autonomy.

It may seem redundant to speak of the right of autonomy, for "autonomy" is sometimes taken to mean the *right* of self-government. This seems to be what we have in mind when we say that a nation-state is autonomous, for instance. But there is also a stronger sense of the word, a sense that better fits our use of "autonomy" to characterize individual men and women. In this stronger sense, "autonomy" means the ability or capacity to govern oneself—an ability or capacity that someone who is free (from external restrictions) to govern himself or herself may not always enjoy. This is why we say that insane people are not autonomous, for it is not the *right* to rule their lives that they lack, but the *capacity* to do so.[3] Thus there is no redundancy, on this stronger sense of "autonomy," in maintaining that men and women have a right, understood as a claim against others, of autonomy. To say that everyone has a right of autonomy, then, is to say that every person is entitled to exercise his or her capacity to govern his or her life—to live, in short, as he or she sees fit.

This does not mean that the right of autonomy is nothing more than the right to be left alone or nothing less than the right to do whatever one wishes. Like other abilities, autonomy is not something we either do or do not have; it is something we may possess to a greater or lesser extent, just as the ability to speak English varies considerably among English-speakers. Autonomy resembles other abilities in another respect, too, for it may be cultivated, neglected, or impaired. Its cultivation demands some effort on the part of the individual, of course, but it also requires the aid of parents, friends, teachers, and others—perhaps even therapists of one kind or another. No one becomes or remains autonomous solely through his or her own efforts; everyone needs the assistance of others at times, and the right of autonomy establishes a claim to this assistance. It is more than merely the right to be left alone, therefore, because it is the right to the protection *and promotion* of the ability to lead a self-governed life.

The right of autonomy is also less than the right to do whatever one wishes. Because it is a human right, it is a right every person shares with every other person, and this limits what we may do *as a matter of right.* Jones may have the right to live as she chooses, but this does not entitle her to violate others' rights to live as *they* choose. This follows from the logical correlativity of rights and duties. If Jones has a right to do something, then there must be someone who has a duty to assist her, or at least not to interfere with her, when she sets out to do it. When the right in question is one that every person has, furthermore, rights and duties are *completely reciprocal.* By this I mean that every person has both a *right against* and a *duty to* every other person. Thus Jones's right to autonomy implies that everyone else has a duty to respect her choices, but everyone else's right of autonomy implies a correlative duty on Jones's part. Given this complete reciprocity, it is clear that the right of autonomy is no warrant to do whatever one may wish.

---

[3] And we usually justify the deprivation of their rights on the grounds that the insane lack the necessary capacity, at least temporarily, to exercise them.

This limitation notwithstanding, the right of autonomy is the fundamental right because all others follow from it. Recognizing autonomy as a right requires us to respect the dignity of the person; to treat others not as playthings or objects or resources that we may use for our own purposes, but as individuals who are capable, at least potentially, of forming plans, entering into relationships, pursuing projects, and living in accordance with an ideal of the worthwhile life. Everyone possesses this right simply because he or she is a person, moreover, so the right of autonomy is also a right everyone shares equally. This is not a right to equal treatment, but a right, as Dworkin suggests, to be treated *as an equal*: "the right, not to receive the same distribution of some burden or benefit, but to be treated with the same respect and concern as everyone else" (1977, p. 227).

This is all very general, of course, and one may wonder whether the right of autonomy is too vague, too lacking in content, to be of any practical significance. In the following section I shall try to add enough detail to the sketch of the right of autonomy to remove this worry. Because it is the fundamental right, however, the right from which all other rights derive, there is a certain vagueness which must necessarily remain in any account of the right of autonomy.

II

If autonomy is the fundamental right, then every *special* or *general* right is a manifestation of our human right of autonomy. The right of autonomy must necessarily be formal and abstract, in other words, with special and general rights supplying its content. They do this in different ways. "Special rights," as H.L.A. Hart defines them, are those rights that arise out of special relationships between specific individuals (1970, pp. 68-73). The rights that follow from a promise or contract provide the standard examples. These may be said to manifest the right to autonomy in the sense that they are created through the exercise of that right. Without the right of autonomy, there could be no transfer of rights in a promise or contract, for we must have a right to govern our own lives before we can grant someone else a right against us. Hence each right we receive from or confer upon others indirectly manifests the autonomy of the person who confers the right.

General rights also manifest the right of autonomy, but they do so more directly. General rights—Jones's right to be free from assault, for instance—are known in legal terms as rights *in rem*: rights that hold against everyone, that is, rather than rights against specific, identifiable persons (rights *in personam*). Because they hold against everyone, general rights do not grow out of special relationships involving two or more people. Instead, they are instances, or direct manifestations, of the right of autonomy. Jones's right to be free from assault does not follow from any pledge or promise she exacts from other people: it is her right simply because the right of autonomy is the right to govern our own lives, and if assault on our persons threatens our ability to be self-governing, then assault violates the human right of autonomy. It follows, therefore, that the right to be free from assault is one instance of the right of autonomy. In this way general rights, whether as widely recognized as the right to be free from assault or as controversial as the right to medical care at public expense, grow directly out of—and along with special rights supply the content for—the human right of autonomy.

This may solve, or at least rationalize, the problem of vagueness, but the solution immediately prompts another question: Just how are we to know what special and general rights follow from the human right of autonomy? Questions of this sort cannot be answered easily, but I believe that we can at least discern the leading features of an adequate response. The point of departure is the right of autonomy itself, which I have defined as the right to the protection and promotion of the ability to lead a self-governed life. From this point we may go on to identify four questions we should raise, or four tests we should apply, whenever we need to decide whether a putative right should be regarded as a special or general manifestation of the fundamental right of autonomy.

First, we should ask whether the "right" in question does indeed protect individual autonomy. The rule of thumb here is that men and women should ordinarily be left to decide what is in their own interests.[4] Autonomy is the ability to govern one's life, and the direction of that life should be left to the individual as long as he or she respects the autonomy of others. This means that we must ordinarily respect the choices of individuals, including the choices they make when they confer rights on, and thereby undertake obligations to, other men and women. Special rights thus present no problem, not even in those cases where one party to a special relationship is defrauding, exploiting, or coercing other parties, for in these cases the fraud, exploitation, or coercion violates the victim's right of autonomy and prevents any special right or obligation from arising from the relationship. Some general rights will also fall under the heading of rights that protect our autonomy, with the right to freedom from assault once again providing a clear example. Other general rights, such as the right to speak freely, also follow from the right of autonomy, although these rights will often prove troublesome when their exercise threatens to violate the rights of others. But trouble of this sort cannot always be avoided.

---

[4] I say that men and women should ordinarily be left to decide what is in their own interests to leave open the possibility of paternalistic intervention to protect and promote the autonomy of an individual. As "ordinarily" suggests, however, the burden of proof must

The second test goes beyond the first because it leads us to ask whether a putative right will actually promote, not merely protect, individual autonomy. If it will, then it ought to be regarded as a right, positive and general, which flows directly from the fundamental right of autonomy.[5] The stronger sense of "autonomy" as the ability to govern one's life seems to require positive rights of this sort. This point is illustrated by the claim that members of linguistic minorities often make to the right to speak a particular language. When these people—the Quebecois, say, or Hispanics in the United States—lay claim to this right, they ask for more than protection against those who might wish to prevent them from speaking French or Spanish; they ask also for bilingual education and other forms of positive aid which will help them to sustain the use of their language. In this fashion the right of autonomy, through such general rights as the right to speak a particular language, imposes a duty of assistance on those who are in a position to encourage, cultivate, or foster the autonomy of other men, women, and children. Since the right of autonomy is a human right, moreover, it is characterized by what I have called complete reciprocity: every person has a right to the assistance of others in projects that will promote his or her autonomy, and every person has also a reciprocal duty to provide similar assistance to those who will benefit from it.

This begins to sound as if we must devote our entire lives to service to others. This is not the case—indeed, I shall note shortly some limitations on what may be demanded in the name of autonomy—but there is no denying that this is an activist conception of human rights. If we are truly concerned with the autonomy of the individual, however, such a conception is inescapable. Autonomy admits of degree, and this means that the right of autonomy is a right to widen one's range of choice in order to gain greater control of one's life. But rights also entail duties, so those who are in a position to promote the autonomy of others will share a duty to help widen the right-holder's range of choice. A healthy person has a wider range of choice than someone who is unhealthy, for instance, so it seems reasonable to say that, other things being equal, the healthy person is more autonomous, or in greater control of his or her life, than one who is ill. Hence the right of autonomy seems to entail a general right to health care, a right that holds against anyone who is able to help provide this care. In much the same way an educated person usually commands a wider range of choice than the uneducated man or woman, and this again seems to imply a right to schooling of some sort, even if this right imposes certain costs on those who are in a position to help provide the schooling. Thus we may conclude that the rights to health care and schooling pass the second of the four tests because they are among the rights that promote individual autonomy. Rights of this sort also exemplify the activist aspect of a theory of human rights which takes the right of autonomy as its cornerstone.

Even an activist theory has its limits, however, and these are expressed in the remaining two tests. The third test recognizes that a project or action that promotes or protects the autonomy of some individuals may well narrow the range of choice for others. The question we must pose, then, is whether the "right" at issue, assuming it either protects or promotes someone's autonomy, infringes or violates the rights of others. If it does not, then we may pass on to the fourth test. If it does entail a conflict of rights, we must then decide whether the proposed right ought to override a right already recognized. Something of this sort happens with both the right to health care and the right to schooling, for both may come

---

fall on those who call for intervention. On this point see Dworkin (1971) and Goodin (1982, especially chap. 3).

[5] According to Hart (1970, p. 72), general rights are always negative: "In contrast with special rights . . . are general rights, which are asserted defensively, when some unjustified interference is anticipated or threatened, in order to point out that the interference is unjustified." As my argument indicates, I believe that some general rights may be positive rights as well. For a forceful challenge to the validity of the distinction between positive and negative rights, see Shue (1979 and 1980, especially chap. 2).

into conflict with the right to live one's life as one chooses. Acknowledging a general right to health care or schooling will almost certainly require a diversion of resources from some people to others, and there is some truth to the claim that the person who is required to surrender some of his or her wealth for these purposes suffers a loss of autonomy; certainly the transfer of wealth can diminish one's range of choice. How, then, can we resolve this conflict?

There are at least two promising ways to reach a resolution when a conflict of this nature arises. The first is to establish either a floor or ceiling for autonomy. We might say, in other words, that a transfer of resources is just whenever it helps to bring one or more persons up to a certain standard of autonomy—that is, a condition where the range of choice is at least wide enough to begin to resemble true autonomy. Or, conversely, we might consider a transfer to be just when it does not lower those who must surrender resources below a certain level which seems as high as we can reasonably go in the name of autonomy. In the first case, the man or woman who lives in poverty, with little chance for decent food, schooling, or medical care, is able to make some choices; but these are so limited that we are hardly likely to say that he or she is truly autonomous. In the second case, the person who must settle for a Mercedes-Benz because he or she can no longer easily afford a Rolls Royce may suffer a diminished range of choice, but the diminution hardly represents a real loss of autonomy. Autonomy admits of degree, to be sure, and it is related to the range of choice we enjoy in governing our lives. But this is not to say that every change in our range of choice represents a notable extension or diminution of autonomy. In this respect, additions to our range of choice exhibit some of the features of diminishing marginal utility. This is why the floor/ceiling approach may well provide a satisfactory method for resolving conflicting claims with respect to individual autonomy.

The second approach involves the application of something like John Rawls's difference principle to the right of autonomy (1971, esp. pp. 60-82). In this case the intent is to promote the autonomy of the least autonomous people, even if this comes at the expense of those who enjoy greater autonomy. Following this approach, the ideal is to insist on providing everyone with as nearly equal a range of choice as possible unless there is reason to believe that an unequal distribution would somehow extend the range of choice for the least autonomous beyond what they would be likely to achieve with an equal distribution. Applying this principle to wealth, we might say that an unequal distribution is just *only* if such a distribution somehow provides those at the low end of the distribution with a broader set of choices, perhaps through incentives and trickle-down effects, than they would enjoy if wealth were divided equally.

These proposals are nothing more than tentative suggestions, but they do indicate how conflicting claims arising out of the fundamental right of autonomy might be resolved. This brings us, finally, to the last of the four tests, and the second limiting test, for the special and general rights that supply the content for the right of autonomy. Here we must employ a variant of the maxim "ought implies can" and ask whether a putative right can indeed be realized.[6] If it can, and if it passes the other tests, then it should be acknowledged as a right deriving from the right of autonomy. If it cannot, even if it passes the other tests, it must be dismissed. The ability to fly by flapping one's arms might enhance one's autonomy—certainly it would add to a person's range of choice—but it would be silly to claim this as a right for the simple reason that we know of no way to cultivate this particular ability. Or, to take a more serious example, we cannot reasonably acknowledge a right to health, but only to health *care* of the best sort available. Which is to say that we cannot recognize a right unless we have the means to perform its correlative duty or obligation.

This conclusion implies that the rights we may acknowledge as genuine instances of the fundamental right of autonomy will vary from place to place and time to time. Everyone possesses the right of autonomy, that is, and everyone may also share some (very) general rights, such as the right to be free from unwarranted assault, but nesting within these rights will be a number of more specific rights which will differ from one set of circumstances to another. Thus it may be reasonable to maintain that the residents of the United States have a right, say, to the use of a hemodialysis unit because this particular right derives from the general right to health care, which derives in turn from the fundamental right of autonomy. We could not have asserted this right 100 years ago, though, nor can we attribute this right now to the millions of people throughout the world who have no access to hemodialysis units

---

[6] On this point see Flathman (1976, especially p. 75): "*rights* is governed by a rule similar to that which states that *ought* implies *can* and *obligation* implies *ability*. An action or possession can be a right only if there is some *A* capable of serving as the holder of that right and only if there is some *B* capable of discharging the obligation(s) respecting the no-rights, disabilities, and so on, that *A*'s right to *X* imposes. Men and things being what they are, the notion of a right to jump fifty feet straight up is nonsensical."

(although we should probably strive to provide them with this access). Cultural and economic conditions, available technology, the institutions under which we live, even geography, all these will help to determine the particular rights to which we may be entitled under the right of autonomy. Indeed, these various circumstances will even affect the kinds of claims men and women put forward as rights.

There is a sense, then, in which most of the specific rights we enjoy are social in character. All moral rights presuppose the right of autonomy, directly if they are general rights and indirectly if they are special rights. But what counts as protecting or promoting autonomy cannot always be determined without reference to the specific circumstances of specific men, women, and children. When we refer to these circumstances to decide whether a putative right passes the fourth test, we are acknowledging that the human right of autonomy may appear in different guises under different conditions. If this is so, then there is some reason to believe that an adequate theory of human rights will not be so cosmopolitan in outlook that it is entirely hostile to the intuition that compatriots take priority. Whether this belief is well-founded is the question I shall now try to answer.

III

At the beginning of this essay I asserted that compatriots should take priority over foreigners *when other things are equal.* Now I shall defend this assertion. This may best be done by considering the different kinds of arguments that might be mustered on behalf of the intuition in question: arguments from necessity, efficiency, side effects, and reciprocity.

The *argument from necessity* rests on what some regard as a psychological truth about human beings. Samuel Gorovitz puts the point neatly when he says that "one defense of what might be called our moral parochialism is the claim that it is a psychological necessity; that the scope and complexity of the world's population of individuals is such that a person would likely become dysfunctional in attempting to deal with more than a restricted subset—indeed, a very carefully restricted subset—of that population" (1977, p. 140).[7] We might conclude, then, that compatriots take priority because human beings are too limited to cope with a wider range of responsibilities than that defined by national boundaries. Any attempt by individuals to undertake to provide aid to everyone who needs it would not only fail, it would also destroy the persons, or at least the personalities, of those who make the attempt. In short, compatriots should take priority for the simple reason that our psychological limitations will not allow us *not* to grant them priority.

We need not dismiss this view of human psychology in order to reject the argument from necessity. For even if we grant that "a person would likely become dysfunctional in attempting to deal with more than a restricted subset" of the world's population, we cannot simply assume that this subset conveniently comprises one's countrymen. Many countries are now so large that it seems likely that anyone who seriously attempts to identify and sympathize with all his or her compatriots will be rendered every bit as dysfunctional as the person who takes on the burdens of the entire world. There may be some truth to the claim that psychological necessity requires us to restrict our concerns to a subset of the world's population, but perhaps this subset consists of the state, city, town, or neighborhood. We will, in any case, need an independent argument demonstrating that the boundaries of the nation-state also set the boundaries of this subset before psychological necessity has a part to play in this context—and I doubt that such an argument can be found.

Another reason for rejecting the argument from necessity is that it seems to assume that we must actively identify and sympathize with others before we can recognize that they may have a right to our aid. Although we may be more likely to go to the aid of those with whom we strongly identify and sympathize, I do not believe that we can or will acknowledge a duty to aid others *only* when we feel a bond of this sort. We know that there are men, women, and children in this world who are living, and dying, in desperate poverty. We also know that we can take some steps to help them. And if my account of the human right of autonomy is correct, we know, too, that we have a responsibility to go to their aid. Yet all that this requires in the way of identity and sympathy is the simple recognition that these people have a right, as human beings, of autonomy. Certainly we may feel some anguish when we consider the plight of these unfortunate people, or some distress at the thought of what we may have to give up in order to help meet their needs, but this is hardly likely to render us dysfunctional. Given this, the argument from psychological necessity seems rather beside the point.

If the argument from necessity will not justify the belief that compatriots take priority, perhaps the *argument from efficiency* will. Here the claim is that we ought to aid the needy among our fellow citizens before we look to the needs of foreigners simply because this is the most efficient way to meet human needs. We can satisfy more needs at less cost when we begin at home, as it were. It costs less to supply food, shelter, and medical care to the needy within the United States than to supply the same goods to the people of Bangladesh or Ethiopia, so we will provide the most aid for our money if we first take care of our countrymen.

---

[7] I should note that Gorovitz is referring only to individual responsibility and actions here; he goes on to say that the situation "appears quite different" at the level of the national government.

There is something to be said for efficiency, surely, and other things being equal we should prefer an efficient way of achieving a goal to an inefficient one. This notion is not enough to lead us to conclude that compatriots take priority, though, for in some cases it may be more efficient to aid foreigners than fellow citizens. For instance, if I know that there are people who need clothing in Newark, New Jersey, and others with similar needs in Nogales, Mexico, and if I have some clothing that is suitable, mere efficiency may require me to take or send the clothing the 180 miles from my home to the people in Mexico. Or if I am traveling in a foreign country and come across people who need aid that I am able to give, efficiency would hardly require me to find some compatriots whose needs I might satisfy first. As these examples demonstrate, the argument from efficiency does not accord any special status to our fellow citizens, nor does it recognize that we stand in a special relationship of any sort to them. Propinquity seems to be all that matters.

And even propinquity is not enough. If we assume, that is, that as a matter of fact we may more efficiently attend to the needs of our countrymen than to those of men and women in some distant land, we must still go on to assess the extent and severity of the various needs. To take a very simple example, we might face a situation in which we may provide a hearing aid for a compatriot *or* provide food for a month for a starving child in a foreign country. The argument from efficiency presumably requires us to balance the good we can do against the costs we incur while doing it, and in this case it seems that the compatriot would not take priority. Important as it is, efficiency is not enough to establish the priority of compatriots.

Another consequentialist argument, the *argument from side effects,* may come closer to providing a justification for the belief that our first responsibility is to those who share membership with us in a political community. This is because the consequences taken into account here are broader than the argument from efficiency allows. The argument from efficiency requires us to identify our goal—providing aid to those who have a right to it, in this case—and then to take the course of action that will reach that goal at the least cost. The argument from side effects, however, asks us to consider what the indirect consequences of our actions will be. If these prove to be valuable, then we may have reason to follow a course of action which appears to be less efficient, in terms of the original goal, than another course of action which produces side effects of less value. In the present context, this might mean that we should grant priority to our compatriots because doing so leads not only to the fulfillment of some vital needs, but also promotes solidarity, fraternity, or the sense of community. In caring first for our own, we may help to strengthen the bonds of community by affording special recognition to our fellow citizens. Acting as if shared citizenship and mutual aid are important, in other words, may actually help to make them so. Anyone who wishes to foster the sense of community will thus have a reason to believe that compatriots should take priority.

For those who wish to promote the sense of community, the argument from side effects is somewhat attractive. But it is only *somewhat* attractive because it provides a reason for according priority to our countrymen only under certain limited conditions. To begin with, we must have grounds for believing that the policy of attending first to the needs of compatriots will actually help to strengthen the bonds of community, or produce other valuable side effects. Assuming that the policy does this, we have next to consider whether these side effects might not be outweighed by the positive side effects of a different policy, such as the policy of providing aid to as many people as we can without regard to their nationality or citizenship. Someone who takes a cosmopolitan view might maintain that a policy of the latter kind will promote feelings of universal brotherhood and thus combat chauvinism, jingoism, and racism, for instance. Since the argument from side effects is a consequentialist argument, the case cannot be settled in favor of our compatriots until all the side effects are taken into account and balanced against one another, and I see no reason to expect that compatriots will always win this test of consequences. If they do win, one may still object that these positive side effects simply do not deserve to be weighed in the balance with the fulfillment of human rights. Solidarity and community may be good things, on this view, but rights always take priority, and meeting the needs of starving people must take priority over goods to which we have no right, no matter how desirable these other goods may be.

Both efficiency and side effects count, to be sure, and both may lead us to conclude that *in certain circumstances* we ought to grant priority to our compatriots. But both arguments are strictly contingent. They tell us that we ought to take care of our fellow citizens first not because our fellow citizens have a right to this priority—not because they stand in a special relationship to us—but only because this policy may sometimes be the way to do the most good. For a stronger justification, we shall have to look to the *argument from reciprocity.*

Stated simply, the argument from reciprocity holds that we should grant priority to our compatriots because, *ceteris paribus,* we owe it to them. Why? Because there is a special relationship, entailing special rights and obligations, between those who share citizenship in a political community. All human beings have general rights against and corresponding duties to all other human beings; this follows directly from the right of autonomy. But we also enjoy special rights and incur special obligations when we enter into special relationships, such as those created by a promise or by participation in a cooperative enterprise. The parties to these relationships are doubly bound, so to speak, for they are related to each other both as human beings, with general rights and duties, and as participants in a special relationship, with special rights and obligations. Although they may be overridden by more compelling moral considerations, the rights and obligations that follow from these special relationships normally take priority over others. In the case at hand, this means that we can justify the intuition that compatriots take priority if we can show that compatriots do indeed share this kind of special relationship.

One way to do this would be to demonstrate that the men and women who are the citizenry of a country have somehow consented to enter into a special relationship, thereby gaining rights against and undertaking obligations toward one another. But the telling criticisms of the different forms of consent theory seem to doom an effort of this sort. A more promising alternative is to argue that the members of a body politic stand in a special relationship to one another because they are engaged in a cooperative enterprise.

To say that a political community is, or can be, a cooperative enterprise is to draw attention to two of the features it may exhibit. First, a political order typically provides benefits for those who belong to it, for it enables them to work together for common purposes and pursue in peace their private interests. If nothing else, the rules established and enforced by the body politic make it possible for citizens to coordinate their affairs and order their lives with a confidence that would be utterly inconceivable in a state of nature, whether it be Hobbes's brutish state of war or Rousseau's brutish state of peace. These benefits are provided, moreover, through the cooperation of the citizens, which is the second feature of the political community *qua* cooperative enterprise. Their ability to form and act on expectations about the conduct of others—the expectations we rely on when driving, for example—may depend upon the rules of the political order, but these rules would be useless if the members of the body politic did not cooperate with one another by obeying them. Obedience need not be unanimous, of course, but the political order will cease to provide benefits, and perhaps cease to exist, when its rules are widely disobeyed.

When the political order does constitute a cooperative venture of this kind, everyone who joins in that venture incurs an obligation *to the others* to bear a fair share of the burdens of the enterprise in exchange for a fair share of the benefits, which means that every member of the enterprise is under an obligation, other things being equal, to obey the laws of the body politic. Because rights and obligations are correlative, those who take part in the enterprise have rights against as well as obligations to one another. We may all have an obligation to one another to drive on the right-hand side of the road, for instance, and if we do, we must also have a right to require one another to do the same. In this way there is a reciprocity between the cooperating members of a cooperative enterprise. We have, in these circumstances, an obligation to obey the law because we owe it to the cooperating members of the body politic to do so. They have a right to our obedience because they, through *their* obedience, enable us to enjoy the benefits of the political order. They have a claim on us, in other words, as long as the body politic may reasonably be regarded as a cooperative enterprise, a claim that extends to include the notion that compatriots take priority.

This is how reciprocity may require us to grant priority to compatriots; at least, this is a glimpse of how reciprocity imposes a requirement of this kind on us. To see beyond this glimpse, we shall have to examine the argument for political obligation which provides the foundation for the argument from reciprocity. This argument, and the whole conception of rights and obligations arising out of cooperative enterprises, rests on the principle of fair play.

IV

According to the principle of fair play, anyone who takes part in and enjoys the benefits of a cooperative practice must contribute to the production of these benefits, even when his or her contribution is not necessary to their production. To fail to contribute is to act unfairly, for the person who shares the benefits without sharing the burdens is taking advantage of those who cooperate. Thus the principle of fair play demands what Hart calls a "mutuality of restrictions": "when a number of persons conduct any joint enterprise according to rules and thus restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to these restrictions when required have a right to a similar submission from those who have benefited by their submission" (1970, p. 70).[8]

This principle seems to have an intuitive appeal which is both broad and deep. Whether it is sound, however, is a matter of some dispute, with critics raising three objections to it. The first, advanced by Robert Nozick, is that the principle of fair play implies that others can place us under an obligation to them simply by conferring benefits on us. If this is correct, then the principle allows others to foist obligations on us, which is quite a departure from our usual way of thinking about obligations. As Nozick puts it (1974, p. 95), "You may not decide to give me something . . . and then grab money from me to pay for it, even if I have nothing better to spend the money on."

Nozick's point is surely correct, but is it pertinent? Fair play does not require us to reciprocate *whenever* someone does something that is to our benefit; it applies only to the benefits of a cooperative practice. But Nozick sees the same problem arising within such practices because it may sometimes be impossible to avoid the benefits of cooperative enterprises. This seems to be what he has in mind when he offers the following example.

> Suppose some of the people in your neighborhood (there are 364 other adults) have found a public address system and decide to institute a system of public entertainment. They post a list of names, one for each day, yours among them. On his assigned day (one can easily switch days) a person is to run the public address system, play records over it, give news bulletins, tell amusing stories he has heard, and so on. After 138 days on which each person has done his part, your day arrives. Are you obligated to take your turn? (1974, p. 93)

The answer, Nozick says, is "surely not," and it is difficult to disagree. But his claim, by implication, is that anyone who accepts the principle of fair play would have to answer affirmatively. Again, it is by no means clear that this is true, for those who accept the principle may say that the "you" in Nozick's example is under no obligation to take a turn as broadcaster. To see why this is so, we need only look to the principle as Nozick, following Rawls, formulates it:

> This principle holds that when a number of persons engage in a just, mutually advantageous, cooperative venture according to rules and thus restrain their liberty in ways necessary to yield advantages for all, those who have submitted to these restrictions have a right to similar acquiescence on the part of those who have benefited from their submission. Acceptance of the benefits (even when this is not a giving of express or tacit undertaking to cooperate) is enough, according to this principle, to bind one. (1974, p. 90)

Nozick obviously believes that his example meets the conditions set out here. But one may wonder, who has *engaged* in this venture? Perhaps those who found the equipment and began the broadcasts have engaged themselves, but it is far from evident that anyone else has, or that anyone has a right to "assign" a turn at the microphone to others.

The problem here is that Nozick interprets "acceptance of benefits" too broadly (Bell, 1978; Simmons, 1979, pp. 118-136). Merely receiving the benefits of a practice, especially when one cannot avoid them, is not enough to place one under an obligation to comply with the rules of the practice. There must be some sense in which one takes part in the enterprise or leads those who are participating to believe that he or she is taking part in it. Only in these circumstances can we say that someone is obligated to do his or her part. Indeed, it is only in these circumstances that we can sensibly talk about one's *part* in a practice.

We cannot conclude from this, however, that the principle provides the ground of an obligation to obey the law, for now we face a second objection. If we acknowledge that one cannot incur an obligation to cooperate simply by receiving benefits from a practice, we must then go on to show how those who find themselves in a political society may be said to participate in it or voluntarily accept its benefits. But how can we say that any but a few are voluntarily participating in the political society to which they ostensibly belong? (Simmons, 1979, pp. 136-142).

There seems to be two ways to respond to this objection. The first, suggested by Richard Arneson, is to argue that in some circumstances, including those that characterize the body politic *qua* cooperative enterprise, we may acquire obligations under the principle of fair play even when we do not voluntarily accept the benefits of a cooperative enterprise. In these circumstances the political order provides *pure* public goods, and where pure public goods are supplied,

---

[8] See also Murphy (1979, p. 77): "In order to enjoy the benefits that a legal system makes possible, each man must be prepared to make an important sacrifice —namely, the sacrifice of obeying the law even when he does not desire to do so. Each man calls on others to do this, and it is only just or fair that he bear a comparable burden when his turn comes."

Arneson maintains, "voluntary acceptance of benefits is impossible and so unnecessary to generate obligations according to the principle of fairness. Mere receipt of benefits may suffice to obligate" (1982, pp. 620-621).

The second response is to challenge the strict conception of "voluntary acceptance of benefits" which underlies the objection. "Voluntary" and "involuntary" are not clear opposites, as J.L. Austin has demonstrated, and it seems foolish to insist that everything we do must be either (and clearly) voluntary or involuntary (Austin, 1970, esp. p. 191). When we say that obligations (if not duties) must be undertaken voluntarily, we need not mean that the man or woman who undertakes the obligation must say, or even think, "By doing this I am undertaking an obligation." If we take "voluntarily" to mean something like "with full awareness and conscious intent," we rule out many cases in which we attribute obligations to individuals who have not deliberately—i.e., *with actual deliberation*—incurred those obligations. We hold our students accountable to codes of conduct, including rules against plagiarism, for example, although many of them apparently do not know what these codes require when they matriculate. Yet we could not do this if we restricted obligations to those that are taken with full awareness and conscious intent.

The alternative is to say that "voluntarily" should be taken to mean something on the order of "not under constraint or duress" (Austin, 1970; Fitzgerald, 1961; Murphy, 1981), which recognizes that students, or anyone in similar circumstances, are obligated to obey the relevant rules despite their failure to proclaim, or perhaps even to reflect upon, their acceptance of the obligation. Hard cases will arise, certainly, and we will then find it difficult to determine whether an action should be considered voluntary. So far as obligation is concerned, however, the only way to avoid this problem is to limit obligating actions to express statements of consent, promises, contracts, and so on, and this is consistent with neither ordinary use of "voluntary" nor common practice.

Concerning political obligation we can say that someone acquires an obligation to obey the laws of the political order, other things being equal, when he takes advantage of the opportunities it offers to further his interests. This is enough to constitute the acceptance of benefits required by the principle of fair play. Since there are many of these opportunities when the body politic is a cooperative enterprise, there are also many ways in which the obligation can be incurred: using public roads and facilities, entering into contracts secured by law, soliciting aid from the government, owning property, and attending public schools are examples. In each of these ways, and in many others that characterize the intricate web of relationships we call a body politic, one may take advantage of opportunities to further his or her interests—opportunities that exist only because of the cooperation of others. And in each of these ways one may also acquire an obligation to these others to share the costs of cooperation. These costs may take a variety of forms, but in a political society based on the rule of law they reduce to one fundamental restriction on our liberty: the obligation to obey the law. For this is what one owes to those whose cooperation and obedience make the rule of law possible.

This brings us to the third objection: that "the obligation of fair play governs a man's actions only when some benefit or harm turns on whether he obeys" (Smith, 1977, p. 111). According to M. B. E. Smith, who raises this objection, if an enterprise is small enough that any participant's failure to obey the rules could reasonably be expected to harm it—perhaps "by diminishing the confidence of other members in its probable success and therefore reducing their incentive to work diligently towards it" (1977, p. 111)—then everyone involved in the enterprise will have an obligation, stemming from fairness, to comply. But this reasoning will not support a political obligation, Smith charges, for one can readily imagine cases where someone's disobedience neither deprives anyone of any benefits nor harms the political enterprise in any noticeable way. If we accept Smith's claim as to when fairness is and is not a moral consideration, consequently, we must also accept his conclusion—that fairness cannot require us to obey the laws of a state.

Smith presents three hypothetical cases to develop and support his position. In the first case *A*'s compliance with the rules of a practice "will confer on *B* a benefit roughly equal to those he has received from *B*"; in the second, *A*'s failure to comply will harm the practice and thus harm *B* indirectly "by threatening the existence or efficient functioning of an institution on which *B*'s vital interests depend" (1977, p. 111). In both cases, Smith says, fairness demands that *A* abide by the rules. But this does not hold for the third case, where *A* is simply a free rider, for "if *A*'s compliance with some particular rules does not benefit *B* and if his disobedience will not harm the community, it is difficult to see how fairness to *B* could dictate that *A* must comply. Surely, the fact that *A* has benefitted from *B*'s submission does not give *B* the right to insist that *A* obey when *B*'s interests are unaffected" (1977, p. 111).

The problem with this argument is that it rests on an unduly narrow conception of fairness. As Smith sees it, one person cannot be unfair to another without directly or indirectly affecting the latter's interests. But this is simply wrong, as the familiar example of the tax cheater attests. If he is like most citizens of modern states, the cheater's taxes, if he paid them, would constitute an insignificant portion of the state's total tax revenue. This being so, he knows that his failure to pay his taxes will neither bring about the downfall of the political order nor put his favorite programs in jeopardy, nor even affect any of his fellow citizens' interests in any perceptible way. Given these circumstances, and given his notion of fairness, Smith would have to say that the cheater is not acting unfairly. That this judgment is counterintuitive—indeed, the charge typically brought against free riders is precisely that they are acting unfairly by taking advantage of others—demonstrates clearly that Smith's argument rests on a misconception of fairness.

What Smith overlooks is the consideration that underlies the notion of fairness, the conviction that everyone involved in a practice is to be treated as an equal. This holds even when the interests of the parties involved are not affected, for one may be wronged (deceived, treated unfairly) without being harmed.[9] Those who refuse to cooperate in a practice while they accept its benefits are acting unfairly and wronging those who do cooperate, because they are making exceptions of themselves. They want others to cooperate, or at least enough others to preserve the practice, but they are not themselves willing to bear the burdens of cooperation. By according themselves this special treatment and by exploiting the cooperation of others, they betray a lack of respect for other persons. They are, in Kant's terms, using others as means to their own ends rather than treating them as ends in themselves—as men and women, that is, with a right of autonomy.[10]

In short, fairness imposes an obligation on those who engage in cooperative ventures; thus the principle of fair play can provide an adequate foundation for a general obligation to obey the law which rests indirectly on the moral premise that everyone is entitled to equal concern and respect. What remains is to connect this principle with the intuition that compatriots take priority and then to enter some important qualifications.

V

Compatriots take priority because we owe it to them as a matter of reciprocity. Everyone, compatriot or not, has a claim to our respect and concern—a claim founded on the right of autonomy—but those who join with us in cooperative enterprises have a claim to special recognition. Their cooperation enables us to enjoy the benefits of the enterprise, and fairness demands that we reciprocate. When the body politic may reasonably be regarded as a cooperative practice, then, we must accord our fellow citizens a special status, a priority over those who stand outside the special relationship constituted by the political enterprise.

In this way the argument from reciprocity supports the intuition that compatriots should take priority. As I have already noted, though, this intuition must be modified by the addition of a *ceteris paribus* clause before it can be accepted. This is not a trivial modification, for the intuition in question holds only with three significant qualifications. The first is that the argument from reciprocity applies not only to the political order, but to *any* cooperative enterprise. This being the case, we may encounter situations where members of two (or more) cooperative practices may have claims against us, and it is hardly obvious that the claim of the fellow citizen must take priority over the claims of a foreign colleague in one's church, for instance, or one's union or business venture.

The second qualification may be even more serious. For if the belief that compatriots take priority rests on the extent to which a political community may reasonably be regarded as a cooperative enterprise, then there are likely to be some ostensible political communities that fall quite short of the mark. Where violence and terror take the place of the rule of law, we may well conclude that the "citizens" of a particular "body politic" have no special rights against or obligations to one another *qua* citizens. There may be good reasons in this situation for obeying the commands of those in power, but reciprocity or fair play will not be among them. Even where the rule of law seems to prevail, furthermore, the distribution of resources and opportunities among the members of a political community may indicate that their relationships are marked not by reciprocity, but by exploitation. When access to property or wealth or positions of political power is effectively denied to some citizens, those without access will have little choice but to labor for the benefit of those who dominate their lives, hardly the hallmark of a cooperative enterprise that gives rise to special rights and obligations among its participants. There is a critical edge to the argument from reciprocity, it seems, an edge that suggests that compatriots in many cases simply have no moral claim to priority.

We must also qualify the intuition, finally, by noting that the priority we give to the rights of our compatriots is not absolute. Granting the priority of our compatriots' claims, that is, does not entail that we must always honor their claims rather than those of someone who is not bound to us in a special relationship of one kind or another. We should grant our compatriots priority in the sense that we look first to their claims—to what we can do to protect and promote their autonomy. But there may nevertheless be excellent reasons to decide to neglect a compatriot's claim to our aid if we must do so in order to meet a foreigner's. Here, once more, the chief consideration is the severity or extent of the deprivation in question. If we face a hard choice between devoting resources to the attempt to promote the autonomy of some of our countrymen by providing them, say, with opportunities for physical therapy, or to the attempt to promote autonomy by supplying food to starving people in a distant land, then we probably ought to decide in favor of the starving strangers.

---

[9] For the distinction between wronging and harming, see Dagger, 1982.

[10] For similar views of fairness, see Sullivan (1975, especially p. 328) and Lyons (1965, especially p. 177).

For these three reasons, we must conclude that compatriots take priority, but only when other things are equal. Still, this modification leaves the core of the intuition intact. This is significant, in my view, because it means that the adoption of a human rights perspective does not force one to hold that the bonds of political community count for little or nothing. Indeed, if the arguments marshalled in this qualified defense of moral parochialism are correct, our task should be to understand and to cultivate the place of community within a concern for human rights.

References

Arneson, R. The principle of fairness and free-rider problems. *Ethics,* 1982, *92,* 616-633.

Austin, J. L. A plea for excuses. In J. L. Austin, *Philosophical papers.* J. O. Urmson & G. J. Warnock (Eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970.

Barry, B. Humanity and justice in global perspective. *NOMOS XXIV: Ethics, economics, and the law.* J. R. Pennock & J. W. Chapman (Eds.). New York: New York University Press, 1982.

Beitz, C. *Political theory and international relations.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979.

Bell, N. K. Nozick and the principle of fairness. *Social Theory and Practice,* 1978, *5,* 65-73.

Benn, S. Human rights—for whom and for what? *Human rights.* E. Kamenka & A. Ehr-Soon Tay (Eds.). New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978.

Brown, P., & MacLean, D. (Eds.). *Human rights and U.S. foreign policy.* Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1979.

Brown, P., & Shue, H. (Eds.). *Food policy: The responsibility of the United States in life and death choices.* New York: The Free Press, 1977.

Brown, P., & Shue, H. (Eds.). *Boundaries: National autonomy and its limits.* Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1981.

Dagger, R. Harm, utility, and the obligation to obey the law. *Archiv fur Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie,* 1982, *68,* 102-108.

Dworkin, G. Paternalism. *Morality and the Law.* R. Wasserstrom (Ed.). Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1971.

Dworkin, R. *Taking rights seriously.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977.

Fitzgerald, P. J. Voluntary and involuntary acts. *Oxford essays in jurisprudence.* A. G. Guest (Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961.

Flathman, R. *The practice of rights.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

Goldman, A. The moral significance of national boundaries. *Midwest Studies in Philosophy,* 1982, *7,* 437-453.

Goodin, R. *Political theory and public policy.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.

Gorovitz, S. Bigotry, loyalty, and malnutrition. *Food policy: The responsibility of the U.S. in life and death choices.* P. Brown & H. Shue (Eds.). New York: The Free Press, 1977.

Hart, H. L. A. Are there any natural rights? *Human rights.* A. I. Melden (Ed.). Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1970.

Lackey, D. Missiles and morals: A utilitarian look at nuclear deterrence. *Philosophy and Public Affairs,* 1982, *11,* 189-231.

Lyons, D. *Forms and limits of utilitarianism.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965.

Murphy, J. Consent, coercion, and hard choices. *Virginia Law Review,* 1981, *67,* 79-95.

Murphy, J. Three mistakes about retributivism. In J. Murphy, *Retribution, justice, and therapy.* Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1979.

Nozick, R. *Anarchy, state, and utopia.* New York: Basic Books, 1974.

Rawls, J. *A theory of justice.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971.

Richards, D.A.J. International distributive justice. *NOMOS XXIV: Ethics, economics, and the law.* J. R. Pennock & J. W. Chapman (Eds.). New York: New York University Press, 1982.

Shue, H. *Basic rights: Subsistence, affluence, and U.S. foreign policy.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980.

Shue, H. Rights in the light of duties. *Human rights and U.S. foreign policy.* P. Brown & D. MacLean (Eds.). Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1979.

Simmons, A. J. *Moral principles and political obligations.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979.

Smith, M. B. E. Is there a prima facie obligation to obey the law? *Law in Philosophical Perspective.* J. Feinberg & H. Gross (Eds.). Encino and Belmont, Calif.: Dickenson Publishing Co., 1977.

Sullivan, D. Rules, fairness, and formal justice. *Ethics,* 1975, *85,* 322-331.

Walzer, M. *Just and unjust wars.* New York: Basic Books, 1977.

A Biochemical Property Relating to Power Seeking in Humans

DOUGLAS MADSEN
University of Iowa

The disposition to seek power in a social arena is tied in this research to a biochemical marker, whole blood serotonin. This finding constitutes the first systematic evidence of any biochemical property in humans which differentiates power seekers from others. The disposition itself is given empirical content with the use of measures of three components of the Type A behavior pattern—aggressiveness, competitiveness, and drive—and of distrust and self-confidence. The statistical fit with serotonin is very good. This discovery echoes similar findings in a species of subhuman primates.

Power seekers are different.[1] Surely few students of politics would assume otherwise. But different how? It will not do to answer that the difference lies in a special attraction to or need for power. That is true by definition. It is by the strength of their desire to dominate and control others that we recognize power seekers. So we must ask what else differentiates them from other people? The answer seems to be that we don't know. Dahl, after scrutinizing the relevant literatures, offers what appears to me an uncontroversial conclusion: "Whatever the reasons may be, some people do seek power more intently than others [but] scientific knowledge about the personalities and motives of power seekers is still scanty" (Dahl, 1976, p. 116).

This ignorance plainly represents a fundamental void in behavioral political science. After all, we are here dealing with—as Lasswell (1948, p. 19) put it—"political man, *homo politicus*, a basic political type." Understanding the inner drive of those who devote themselves to the capture and use of power roles was for Lasswell central to the understanding of politics. Perhaps most students of politics would agree. But, as noted above, progress in understanding that drive, and in understanding the contextual circumstances that influence it, has been slight.

This research report speaks to that void. Evidence is presented below which suggests that power seeking, or possibly *successful* power seeking, has a biochemical marker, namely whole blood serotonin. Serotonin is a neuroregulatory agent already known to be intimately involved in dominance relations in certain subhuman primates. It is shown here to be strongly tied to a syndrome of human behaviors and orientations characteristic of a drive for power.

This discovery, mysterious in many ways, gives Lasswell's "political type" the beginning of a neurochemical profile. It offers political scientists an important new tool in the behavioral study of influence and the influential, and relatedly, it provides a research bridge from behavioral political science to the neurosciences, perhaps the first such bridge built on a foundation of systematic empirical results instead of untested hypothetical argument.

The report is organized in four sections. In the first, previous research is discussed, with special attention given to the biochemical studies of dominance in the aforementioned primates. In the second, the methods used in the present project are described. The third section presents findings. Finally, there is a discussion of those findings and of possibilities for future studies.

Received: March 20, 1984
Revision received: August 9, 1984
Accepted for publication: October 3, 1984

This research could not have been undertaken without a great deal of help. The Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation provided major funding. Financial support also came from the General Clinical Research Center Program RR59 of the National Institutes of Health. Dr. Barry M. Sherman, Professor of Internal Medicine and Director of the Clinical Research Center at the University of Iowa, provided facilities, medical staff, technical support, and advice. Dr. Michael McGuire, Professor of Psychiatry and Director of the Biobehavioral Science Program at the University of California, Los Angeles, provided technical support and advice. Dr. Evelyn Edelmuth of UCLA conducted serotonin assays. Professors Samuel C. Patterson, Peter G. Snow, and John C. Wahlke offered very useful comments on an early draft of the report. Paul Johnson provided able research assistance. I am most grateful for these invaluable contributions.

[1] Fortunately, it is not necessary for me to get into the conceptual morass surrounding the term *power*. The only importance of the term here is in describing a circumstance sought with special intensity by some individuals. That circumstance could as well be described as great influence or dominance.

Studying Power Seeking

Although political science is interested in power seekers because of their presumed impact on the nature and conduct of government, it is important that behavioral research on power seekers not be recast as research on the incumbents of potentially powerful government roles. There are three reasons for this. First, all social organizations, not just the general or public governments of broad political communities, have within them a value allocation process (even if not deemed fully authoritative). Hence, all social organizations have power roles—that is, roles that permit their incumbents to exercise disproportionate influence over the allocation process. This is obvious in private corporations and in armies, but it is also true of social cliques and street gangs. Indeed, for most people almost all struggles for influence will take place in nongovernmental arenas, for example, in school, in the workplace, and in social arenas more generally. It might seem easy to dismiss this, to view as trivial the influence that can come from these everyday routes and contrast it with the influence that can come to those at the pinnacle of government. Yet in terms of either attitude or behavior, there is no reason at this point to assume important differences with respect to those seemingly lesser struggles.

Second, if it is true that not all power seekers are public governors, it is equally true that not all public governors are power seekers. Those who fill political roles for which no struggle was required, for example, hereditary monarchs or legislators from uncontested electoral districts, may well lack a power-seeking disposition.

Finally, understanding power seeking will require that we understand its limits. How does the power seeker set boundaries for his ambition? When will the big frog venture from his small pond in search of greater gain? We know that complex societies have nested hierarchies—that is, smaller power games within larger ones, which are themselves within still larger ones. Understanding movement across games will require examination of power seeking at all levels.

In thinking about behavior it is often useful to employ the three-part scheme made famous by the classic whodunits. Behavior, it is argued, results from the interaction of motive, resources, and opportunity. Such a scheme can serve here to organize a sketch of the work relevant to power-seeking behavior. Consider opportunity. We know in a general sense that opportunity is important to political success. In pursuing dominant status, only the right power seeker for the context will succeed. But there has been very limited empirical specification of how context works its effects. Of course, all circulation-of-elites theorists argue the importance of changing contexts for the emergence and decline of different types of leadership. Max Weber, for example, found in severe social and economic distress the societal conditions that set the stage for the rise of the charismatic political leader (e.g., Weber, 1968). However, although there is evidence supporting this general argument, there still are no specific predictions about how the opportunity presented by the context influences the behavior of power seekers, successful or otherwise.

Similar problems exist with the small group research literature in social psychology (although that literature is far more developed on this point than the political science literature). There is evidence, for example, that highly competitive or otherwise stressful situations set the stage for autocratic leadership (see Blake & Mouton, 1961; Hamblin, 1958; Sherif et al., 1960). But again there is no specification of the kinds individuals who will gain or lose power in such settings. Fiedler's work (1965) is an exception in that it deals both with context and with effective leadership style. However, the operational definition of context is most relevant to static formal structures, and there is no concern in this work with power seeking.

With respect to opportunity, then, there is some evidence on how room at the top is shaped by context, and one can intuitively appreciate the importance of environmental contingencies for political success. But there is little understanding of how the context influences power-seeking behavior.

The second and third factors, resources and motivation, both shift attention to the individual actor, although, as noted above, their effects depend on context. Separation of the two factors in particular cases is sometimes difficult. For example, although skills would surely be considered a resource, would a disposition like Machiavellianism (Christie & Geis, 1970) or a physical characteristic like energy level be a skill or a feature of motivation?

In discussing the role of resources, Dahl (1975) is representative of many analysts when he writes, "In allocating income, wealth, status, knowledge, occupation, organizational position, popularity, and a variety of other values, every society also allocates resources with which an actor can influence the behavior of other actors in at least some circumstances" (pp. 145-146). But no evidence about which resources come into play for power seekers in particular contexts is available. The political participation studies (e.g., Verba & Nie, 1972) describe certain social and psychological resources of several strata of political activists, but one cannot substitute measures of electoral or community activism for measures of power seeking. As already noted, power seeking occurs in many arenas, and those defined by local or national elections may not be very important to most people. Beyond that, many activists in elections may themselves have no desire to dominate or control others. Their satisfactions may have little to do with actual power (see Eldersveld, 1964; Marvick, 1967).

Motivation is the least understood aspect of human behavior. Moreover, it has ambiguous status as a construct in studies of behavior because its presence so often can only be inferred from the behavior it is supposed to have influenced. Thus, one finds in some work the rather unenlightening argument that power seeking is a result of a "power drive" (Hutschnecker, 1974). Ultimately, of course, motivation must be defined in terms amenable to causal analysis, and those terms are very likely to be biological. At present, except in the areas of eating and drinking, such definition is missing (Teitelbaum, 1967). Still, we are not entirely without guidance on the motivational underpinnings of power-seeking behavior.

A most interesting contribution comes from Christie and his collaborators (Christie & Geis, 1970), who have derived from Machiavelli's *Prince*, Kautilya's *Arthasastra*, and examples of Chinese legalist philosophy, a set of orientations which these writings hold to be characteristic of the successful power seeker. Among them are a great desire to win, little concern with conventional morality, manipulativeness, low ideological commitment, and suspicion of others—but none of these in pathological degree. A psychological scale was built from these characteristics, and the behavioral distinctions between high and low Machs were these: highs lied more plausibly and effectively, were more inclined to engage in and to enjoy the manipulation of others, were likely to initiate and control bargaining situations and to be very successful in such situations, were much stronger and more forceful in social relations, persuading others more often and being persuaded by others less often, and, finally, saw more manipulativeness in those around them.

This striking picture is quite close to the popular conception of power seekers. Not surprisingly, Christie and his colleagues found Machiavellianism to be correlated positively with scales measuring need for achievement (.29) and internal control (.43). One could speculate that self-confidence would also be tied in, an argument that has been made by others for political leaders in general (see Gibb, 1969; Stogdill, 1974).

Weaving together the three strains in the whodunit analysis has proven to be an impossible task for students of power seeking. It is clear that characteristics of the individual can be more or less suited to a particular context or vice versa, but no research on human social systems has given empirical specification to this intuitively obvious point.

The UCLA Studies

By and large, political scientists—even those of the behavioral persuasion—seem not much impressed with animal models of social processes. We surely would not quibble with the contention that animal models have served medicine and psychology well, but the empirically oriented investigators in political science seem to assume that the leap from animal models to human politics is simply too great to be seriously considered.[2] Whatever the accuracy of this assumption in general, there is in this particular case a body of research using animal models which is of exceptional value.

A team of scientists at UCLA has for some years studied the social structure and political behavior of vervet monkeys.[3] McGuire (1982) offers some basic information on this species:

> These animals have distinct male and female dominance hierarchies which generally operate independently. . . . Considerably more is known about male-male relationships and they appear to be less complex than their female counterparts. . . . Male vervets generally have a binary type dominance system: one adult male is dominant. Kin relationships (genetic kin) appear to be minimally important in adult male relationships, and agonistically based coalitions—two or more animals joining together to fight one or more other animals—are seldom observed. . . . When animals engage in aggressive encounters, dominant animals most often win. . . . As sub-adult males reach maturity, they inevitably challenge the dominant male through display. . . . Depending on the intensity and frequency of such behaviors, aggressive encounters with the dominant male will follow. In most instances, say 80% of the time, the sub-adult male does not become the dominant male. Rather, he continues his challenging behavior for several months and then assumes a non-dominant position in hierarchy. If he fully assumes a non-dominant status, the probability that he will become the dominant male is considerably reduced.

In their experimental studies, the UCLA investigators most often have worked with vervet subjects which, although reared in the wild, had been in captivity for several months before the research commenced. Groups typically included three male and three female adult members housed in outdoor cages. Note that these arrangements provide very important simplifications for the study of behavior. First, the context is relatively constant; hence, ascension to power is less likely to be dependent on environmental factors. Constancy is also found in the kinds of resources that permit success. It is the skills involved in a direct challenge which are important, rather than the presence or absence of allies, for example. Motivation is still a mysterious factor, but recall that all subadult males apparently will sooner or later mount a challenge; this clearly provides more constancy than in the human case.

---

[2] That is not to say that there is no published speculation about the relevance of animal studies for political science. Indeed, the unfortunately named subfield, biopolitics, is awash with such argument. But among the many empiricist students of political behavior, Wahlke (1979) is one of the very few calling for greater attention to relevant work on animal models.

[3] The species name is *Cercopithecus aethiops sabaeus*.

The UCLA researchers initially focused on the effects of social factors on vervet behavior. Of much greater interest here, however, is their work that connects status differences with distinct biochemical profiles. A key finding was that among captive male vervets there is a clear biochemical marker for dominance, namely the level of serotonin in the blood (McGuire, Raleigh, & Johnson, 1983; Raleigh & McGuire, 1980; Raleigh et al., in press).[4] For nondominants the level of whole blood serotonin was on average 650 nanograms/milliliter (ng/ml), and for dominants, it was 937 ng/ml. The difference is significant at $p < 0.001$. Serotonin level also correlates with a repertoire of behaviors closely tied to dominance, such as approaching others, not avoiding others who come near, and initiating aggression (Raleigh et al., 1981), and most interesting, serotonin levels track changes in status: dominant males who become nondominant exhibit a decline in whole blood serotonin from the 900 ng/ml range to the 650 ng/ml range, whereas nondominant animals who become dominant show the reverse (McGuire, Raleigh, & Brammer, 1982; Raleigh et al., in press). In other words, biochemical change here follows status change, which suggests that for vervets the success or failure of power seeking, and not power seeking itself, is crucial to serotonin levels. I will return to this point later.

The connections between peripheral serotonin and central nervous system function have been partially worked out (Raleigh, Brammer, & McGuire, 1983; Raleigh et al., 1983). However, for immediate purposes the details of this relationship are not important. The interesting question is whether or not the whole blood serotonin findings with respect to dominance can be replicated in man.

Methods

The present research was launched with the major purpose of examining the relationship between psychological stress levels and distributions of influence in small social units that are processing problems of collective importance. The concern with testing for serotonin correlates came later.

The design was experimental and involved 12 groups of six men, half of the groups in the high-stress condition and the other half in the low. Subjects were male undergraduates who were recruited through an advertisement in the student newspaper. Volunteers were excluded if they had a chronic illness, high blood pressure or severe allergies, were using medications or other drugs on a daily basis, or smoked a pack or more of cigarettes a day.

All sessions were held in a university hospital. Subjects were fully informed of the nature of the study and of the procedures involved. All physiological procedures were carried out by medical staff.

Tension was high as the experimental sessions began. Each group was directed to devise group solutions to 10 very difficult logic puzzles, presented seriatim.[5] For each puzzle only 10 minutes were allowed. For a puzzle solution to be registered by a group, at least five of the six members had to vote in favor of that solution. Thereafter, one of the group had to report the group's solution and why it was the only correct one. (There was a financial incentive for members to resist being stampeded to a solution.)

Three types of observations were recorded. First, the session for each group was videotaped for subsequent coding of each subject's behavior. Second, questionnaires collected behavioral, judgmental, and attitudinal data. (The questionnaire items are given in the Appendix.) The basic questionnaire was administered three times: when volunteers assembled in a large room in response to the advertisement, about a month later when each set of six volunteers for a particular session had come to the hospital, and when a session was finished. The third type of observation required that a sample of blood be taken from each subject every 20 minutes throughout the session.[6] Later, these samples would be assayed for a number of biochemical properties.

---

[4] Serotonin, also known as 5-hydroxytryptamine (5-HT), is a biochemical agent having neuroregulatory functions (Muller, Nistico, & Scapagnini, 1977). Those functions are not yet well understood. Serotonin is found in the central nervous system, in the blood, and in several other locations in the body. In vervets, whole blood serotonin has no significant seasonal or daily fluctuations (McGuire, Raleigh, & Brammer, 1982). In humans, it also appears to be a stable biological feature, not affected by normal variations in diet and not showing short-term fluctuations (Yuwiler et al., 1981).

[5] An example of the kind of puzzle used is this: Three boxes are labeled apples, oranges, and apples & oranges. Each label is incorrect. You may select only one fruit from one box. How can you label each box correctly?

Each group was processed on a separate day but at the same time of day. A session began with the subjects' arrival at the hospital at 4 P.M., at which point vital signs and baseline blood samples were taken. At 5:30 all subjects were given a standard meal. At 6:00 the questionnaire was administered. From 6:30 until roughly 8:30 the group dealt with 10 logic problems, each of which required an agreed-upon solution (or the expiration of the allotted time) before the next puzzle could be addressed. Subjects were sent home at about 9:00 P.M.

In the blood sampling for the serotonin analysis, about 7 ml of venous blood was drawn, frozen, and maintained at −70C.[7] When all samples had been collected, they were packed in dry ice and sent by overnight express to UCLA where serotonin levels were determined.[8] The UCLA investigators were blind to other information collected in this study.

The basic questionnaires had three major foci, two attitudinal and one more behavioral. The first attitudinal focus was the perceived locus of control (internal vs. external) over events in one's life. Items from the Rotter (1966) scale were used in that assessment, but they (as well as the other items in the questionnaire) were converted to a magnitude scaling format.[9] The second attitudinal focus was perceived normal anxiety levels, for which modified items from Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lusheme (1970) were used.

The behavioral items in the questionnaire dealt with the Type A pattern. Because this typology has been little noted by political scientists, it will be useful to consider it in some detail. The Type A (vs. Type B) behavior pattern was originally observed by Friedman and Rosenman (1974) through structured interviews with cardiac patients. (See also Rosenman, 1978.) The behavior pattern has four key elements: extremes of aggressiveness, easily aroused hostility, a sense of time urgency, and competitive achievement striving (Matthews, 1982). The burgeoning research attention to Type A behavior derives from its connection with coronary disease, but obviously that connection is not in point here. Rather, it is hard-charging competitiveness itself which is of interest.

To permit larger epidemiological studies of Type A effects, Jenkins and others (Jenkins, 1978; Jenkins, Rosenman, & Friedman, 1967, 1968) developed the Jenkins Activity Study (JAS), a self-administered questionnaire of approximately 50 questions about the kinds of personal behaviors assessed in the structured interview. The JAS items were validated and weighted in a discriminant function analysis of a criterion population (i.e., a population of individuals already classified as Type A or Type B on the basis of structured interviews). Test-retest reliability checks of the Jenkins survey have produced correlations of approximately .65 over a year or more (Jenkins, 1978). The JAS has seen widespread application, but there remains a need for better measurement of the components of the Type A pattern. One effort along these lines, a factor analysis of the JAS items (with, for unexplained reasons, a varimax solution) did not produce dimensions having predictive power with respect to coronary disease (Zyzanski & Jenkins, 1970). Magnitude scaling was introduced in this study in response to these measurement problems.

The specific Type A items used in this study, 19 in number, come from Glass (1977), who created a student version of the Jenkins survey. This version involves minor rewordings to make questions suitable for an undergraduate population. Glass confirmed the comparability of this student version with the original JAS through the examination of factor structures.

In conceptual terms, the Type A pattern has clear overlap with Machiavellianism. Both include aspects of dominance, and, in fact, Glass (1977) shows a strong empirical relationship between the student JAS and a measure of dominance. Both emphasize competitiveness. Both emphasize (and correlate with) achievement striving and sense of personal control over the events of life (Glass, 1977). There is, however, an important difference in the ways the two have been measured: Machiavellianism is assessed primarily in terms of attitude, whereas the Type A pattern has always been tied more closely to (reported) behavior.

---

[6] Blood samples were drawn from a special type of catheter placed in a vein of the arm (the antecubital vein) at the start of each session and left there until its finish about three hours later.

[7] These samples were drawn into a special type of vial (an EDTA vacuum tube) which has within it a substance to prevent clotting of the blood.

[8] Whole blood serotonin was assayed at UCLA using the procedure of Yuwiler et al. (1970). The assay was conducted with the use of duplicate 2-ml samples. Mean variation of duplicates was less than 4%.

[9] Lodge and Tursky (1979, 1981) have provided dramatic evidence of the superiority of magnitude scaling over the conventional category scaling used in most questionnaires. In this case, the mode of response was line drawing, to indicate intensity of agreement or disagreement with each item, relative to a standard line for "slight intensity." The technique was explained and illustrated for subjects before they began the first questionnaire. For further discussion of psychophysical scaling, see Stevens (1975) and Hamblin (1974).

Findings

The analysis of serotonin levels (introduced after the above basic design was completed, remember) was exploratory. The only expectation was that some feature of power seeking or dominance would be tied to whole blood serotonin (WBS), but how the particular descriptions of self elicited by the questionnaire would relate to WBS was unknown.[10] This, then, could be no more than a loose test in humans of the UCLA group's fascinating finding for male vervets.

The distribution of WBS in this set of subjects was normal, with a mean of 146 ng/ml and standard deviation of 49. The highest value was 295 ng/ml, and the lowest 40 ng/ml. The responses to the questionnaire items were also approximately normal.

Preliminary analysis of the questionnaire measures involved testing their interrelationships. The items (given in the Appendix) representing each of the three scales—internal control, anxiety, and the Type A behavior pattern—should reflect a common domain, and they do. The mean correlation within the set of four items measuring internal control was 0.38, and that for the eight measures of anxiety, 0.42. For the 19 measures of Type A, it was only 0.19; however, this is not appreciably different from the mean interrelationship in other analyses of JAS items. Moreover, the orthogonal factor structure of these Type A data included the *H* (hard-driving) and *S* (impatience) dimensions found by Zyzanski and Jenkins (1970) in their factor analysis of the full set of JAS items, and with much higher communalities for the defining measures. Glass (1977) also has found these two dimensions, using the same factoring techniques. Hence, it seems that the magnitude scaling version of the A-B measures was valid.

Correlational analysis showed significant covariation between WBS and a number of the questionnaire items. However, further inspection of these relationships showed that in most instances they were not linear but instead depended heavily on the more extreme values at one end of the distributions. For example, the simple correlation between the response to the statement, "I find competition stimulating," and WBS was +0.13. But when that measure is rescaled with the lower two-thirds of the distribution scored zero and the upper third scored one, its correlation with WBS increases to +0.25. This was not a matter of dividing the distribution at the agree-disagree point; it was well into the agree response that the flat relationship continued. Put differently, it was not those who agreed that competition was stimulating who were more likely to have elevated WBS values; rather, it was those who strongly agreed. This, of course, further illustrates the value of magnitude scaling; had category scaling been used, this relationship might well have been lost.

The questionnaire items having a significant zero-order relationship ($p < 0.05$) with WBS are presented in Table 1. The form of each item—dichotomous or continuous—is indicated. All Type A items are also indicated.

What is immediately apparent in Table 1 is that Type A items show up in striking proportion. Ten of the 13 significant items are drawn from the JAS. This is more than half of the A-B items in the pool. What does not show up here are the items tapping anxiety and sense of internal control. Other than A-B items, the significant correlates of WBS are self-confidence, dislike of being in a leaderless group, and distrust of others.

These simple findings are most intriguing. The aggressively competitive type defined as Type A does in fact seem to have elevated WBS. In addition, the discovery of the WBS correlation with distrust of others, when put in the context of a Type A behavior pattern, suggests plainly the orientation Christie labelled Machiavellian.

An obvious next step was to test multiple-item scales. The findings were straightforward: first, the composite measures of internal control and anxiety, whether items are weighted or unweighted, do not show significant relationships with serotonin. In the case of the Type A measures, neither a summed index, a first principal component, nor the orthogonal dimensions described earlier show a relationship with WBS as great as the correlations for most of the individual items given in Table 1. With the summed index, it was once again noted that the relationship was curvilinear: the takeoff in WBS values came at the upper end of the index. Hence, the A-B items were refactored, this time with the "optimal" form for each item. Because there seemed no reason to continue following Zyzanski and Jenkins (1970) in seeking orthogonal structure, the defining items of the three resulting factors (given in the Appendix) were simply added together after being standardized. This produced three indexes: drive, aggressiveness, and competitiveness. Their correlations with WBS were +0.41, +0.44, and +0.33. When given simultaneous tests in a regression analysis, com-

---

[10] The questionnaire data in this analysis were collected immediately before the beginning of the experimental session.

Table 1. Correlations of Whole Blood Serotonin with Selected Questionnaire Items

Everyday life is filled with challenges to be met.	.249*	(A)
I would dislike being a member of a leaderless group.	.248*	
I probably eat faster than I should.	.364*	(A)
People can be trusted.	.275**	
I am more responsible than most college students.	.272*	(A)
I often set deadlines for myself.	.258*	(A)
I have more willpower than most people seem to have.	.335*	(A)
I plan to find a career that is difficult and challenging.	.267	(A)
I lose patience with speakers who don't get to the point.	.322*	(A)
I find competition stimulating.	.251*	(A)
I get a bit angry with people who can't understand simple ideas.	.320*	(A)
Normally I feel self-confident.	.340*	
It makes me angry when people are late for appointments.	.363*	(A)

All correlations are significant at $p < 0.05$. Coefficients marked with * indicate the attitude item is dichotomous, with the upper third of the distribution scored one. Those marked with ** also indicate a dichotomy but with the lower third of the distribution scored one. Items from the student version of the Jenkins Activity Survey are marked (A).

petitiveness dropped out of significance, both substantively and statistically. Both of the others proved to have about equal impact (betas $\approx .30$; t-ratios ≈ 2.5). The resulting multiple correlation, adjusted for degrees of freedom, was 0.487. That competitiveness dropped out is a reflection of the correlation this index has with the other two. It should not be taken as evidence that competitiveness per se, or even of this particular index of competitiveness, has no role in the statistical explanation of WBS levels. What is suggested here is that its effect is indirect, flowing through the other two factors.

Another technique for exploring these data is provided by stepwise regression analysis with backward elimination of statistically insignificant variables. (The procedure stops when all coefficients are significant at $p < 0.05$.) This is a brute force method which plainly lacks theoretical grounding. Moreover, criticisms of the caprice that can operate in such an exercise are well-founded (Lewis-Beck, 1978). There is every reason, then, not to pay much attention to the individual coefficients that result from such an exploration. Nonetheless, here the technique can serve a very useful purpose: namely, to give a rough picture of the stamina of the WBS correlates in what is now a multivariate setting. Starting with the full set of questionnaire items (again, with optimal forms), the stepwise procedure continued until a final model incorporating 14 variables was reached. (The variables are identified in the Appendix.) Of these 14 variables, nine were from the Type A set. Distrust also remained. In a purely empirical sense this model constitutes a very good statistical explanation of WBS levels; after adjusting for degrees of freedom, 50% of the variance in WBS was statistically explained. Perhaps more important, however, is the evidence given here of the resilience of the Type A items in a multivariate analysis.

Discussion

What is to be made of these findings? First, there is good evidence here of a connection between a peripheral biochemical measure, WBS, and a number of reported behaviors and attitudes. Note that this is not at all an obvious connection, as would be the case, for example, in the correlation between an attitudinal measure of fright and adrenaline. Moreover, with respect to the Type A measures, it is a connection with an extensively analyzed syndrome of behaviors and orientations, a syndrome important in its implications for other (i.e., coronary) features of human physiology. Finally, it is a connection that has in its biochemical component a quite stable biological property (Yuwiler et al., 1981). Changes do not occur quickly and reflect only ephemeral, and therefore for the political scientist uninteresting, human states. Of course this stability complements the demonstrated stability of the Type A pattern and the assumed stability of the attitude measures.

Second, and more important for students of political behavior, there is in the WBS-related amalgam of behaviors and attitudes a striking portrait of the kind of person one would intuitively take to be power oriented. Hard-charging, competitive, impatient, aggressive, distrustful, confident—all in all a remarkable mix, and one readily tied to Machiavellianism, lacking only evidence of the ruthless and manipulative aspects to make the match very close. The strong relationship WBS has with this amalgam makes it a biochemical marker of fundamental importance to political science. For the first time, evidence is at hand which suggests that Lasswell's political type may be at least partially characterizable in terms of biological properties.

This finding has immediate and obvious methodological implications for the study of influence and the influential in human social units. However, its substantive implications, potentially enormous, can for now only be a matter of speculation. There is no theory about how power seeking might drive WBS; we do not yet know what consequences elevated WBS levels might have. With respect to the latter, it might be tempting to argue some sort of changed brain function, because serotonin is a neuroregulator, but such an argument would be premature. Recall that the connections between WBS and brain serotonin have not been fully worked out, and within the brain itself, the role of serotonin is still highly uncertain. However, even in the absence of that kind of knowledge, one can see in this discovery clear linkage between behavioral political science and the neurosciences, which reminds us that many of the most enduring research problems in political science have investigatable biological foundations.

Third, there is in these findings a clear, although not closely specifiable, connection with the UCLA group's results with male vervets. One important implication of this connection is that animal models can indeed prove useful in biobehavioral studies of politics. Of course such models cannot substitute for direct investigation of human behavior, but they can serve as invaluable heuristic guides in the specification of hypotheses about the biological substrata of that behavior.

Of greater immediate importance, however, is the fact that the connection established here with the previous work on vervets confers additional validity upon the interpretation of the present findings. A power orientation related to dominance seems clearly involved in human subjects with high WBS levels, and this view gains still more support in pilot work by the UCLA group which has found that leaders of campus social organizations have significantly higher WBS levels than do initiates (McGuire, personal communication).

However, note that there is a disparity between the vervet findings and the view that high WBS levels in humans mark power *seeking.* In the vervets, recall WBS levels *followed* status, rising with ascent and falling with descent. With the humans there was no dynamic analysis; only cross-sectional correlations are available. Because WBS is a stable biological property over many days at a time, we know that success or failure in the experimental context could not produce the recorded WBS values. What we do not know is the subject's power or dominance status in the social settings of greatest relevance to him. Thus, the available data do not permit us to rule out the possibility that for humans, a high WBS level is a marker of *successful* power seeking, as it was for vervets. I have opted for the less restrictive interpretation (i.e., that WBS marks power seekers, successful or not) because of the general characterization of self found in the questionnaire data and because I have no evidence that my volunteers were dominant in any social arena. Obviously, sorting this out is a high priority in future work.

A note on the measurement of power seeking in this study: It goes without saying that questionnaire data here are only second best and that direct and detailed observations of actual social behavior would have been preferable. These findings obviously must be judged within the limits imposed by questionnaire data (a caveat that could appear in almost all political behavior research reports; see Wahlke, 1979). Bear in mind, however, that the questions treating the Type A pattern have been developed and refined on the basis of careful and frequent assessments of their ties to actual behavior (and to the coronary disease that is thought to be associated with that behavior).

What are the next research steps that might be taken by political scientists (necessarily in collaboration with medical and biological consultants or co-investigators)? The first need, of course, is a study that attempts to reproduce the findings presented above. The design for such a study should provide for much greater attention to the social environments from which volunteers are drawn, taking as a special concern the power status of each volunteer within his natural environment. It should also involve greater specification of the elements of the Type A pattern and of Machiavellianism which are related to WBS level. A second possibility would be replications in different subject populations, for example, in women or in various age groups. A third would be to work backward from blood samples, perhaps available from other projects, to the individuals in their social contexts. One could select a sample of males with high and low WBS levels, for example, and then collect ethological or questionnaire data on them and on their natural environments. A fourth possibility is close to being the reverse of the preceding one: to go to structured social environments and take blood samples from high and low dominance individuals. Finally, one might try to create a natural social environment in the fashion of Sherif et al. (1960) and to monitor both power status and WBS levels over the course of a number of weeks.

In summary, then, there is in these research results good evidence of a tie between whole blood serotonin and a power or dominance orientation in humans. That discovery echoes similar findings in a species of subhuman primates and constitutes the first systematic evidence of any biochemical property in humans that differentiates power seekers from others. This finding represents for political science a major new direction in the behavioral study of power.

Appendix. Questionnaire Items

Type A Behavior Pattern

Aggressiveness

I lose patience with speakers who don't get to the point.
I get a bit angry with people who can't understand simple ideas.*
It makes me angry when people are late for appointments.

Drive

I probably eat faster than I should.*
After eating, I want to get busy instead of sitting around.*

Competitiveness

I am more responsible than most college students.*
I often set deadlines for myself.
I need to slow down, to be less active.
I plan to find a career that is difficult and challenging.
I am more precise than most people.
I find competition stimulating.*

Other

Everyday life is filled with challenges to be met.
I stay up late at night to relax and unwind.
I am relaxed and easy going.*
When I do a job, I do it well.*
My friends see me as competitive and hard-driving.
Frequently I think of other things when someone is talking to me.
I like to get up and get going in the morning.*
I give more effort to my work than do most college students.
I am more serious than most people.*

Internal-External Control

I do not believe that luck plays an important part in my life.
When I make plans, I am almost certain I can make them work.
Most people's lives are controlled by chance circumstances.
I have more will power than most people seem to have.*

Anxiety

Normally I feel secure.*
Sometimes I feel useless.
Much of the time, I feel under stress.*
Normally I feel calm.
Normally I feel a little bit anxious.
Normally I feel self-confident.
Often I feel worried.

General

I would dislike being a member of a leaderless group.
Strong leaders are what made this country great.
People can be trusted.*
Once I make up my mind I seldom change it.
I have less energy than most people my age.*

*These items were left in the final regression model.

References

Blake, R., & Mouton, J. Reactions to intergroup competition under win-lose conditions. *Management Science*, 1961, *7*, 420-435.

Christie, R., & Geis, F. *Studies in Machiavellianism*. New York: Academic Press, 1970.

Dahl, R. Governments and political oppositions. In F. Greenstein & N. Polsby (Eds.), *Handbook of political science* (vol. 3, *Macropolitical theory*). Menlo Park: Addison-Wesley, 1975.

Dahl, R. *Modern political analysis*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1976.

Eldersveld, S. J. *Political parties: A behavioral analysis*. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964.

Fiedler, F. The contingency model: A theory of leadership effectiveness. In H. Proshansky & B. Seidenberg (Eds.), *Basic studies in social psychology*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1965.

Friedman, M., & Rosenman, R. *Type A behavior and your heart*. New York: Knopf, 1974.

Gibb, C. Leadership. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), *Handbook of social psychology*. Menlo Park: Addison-Wesley, 1969.

Glass, D. C. *Behavior patterns, stress, and coronary disease*. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1977.

Hamblin, R. L. Leadership and crises. *Sociometry*, 1958, *21*, 322-335.

Hamblin, R. L. Social attitudes: magnitude measurement and theory. In H. M. Blalock (Ed.), *Measurement in the social sciences: Theories and strategies*. Chicago: Aldine, 1974.

Hutschnecker, A. *The drive for power*. New York: Evans and Co., 1974.

Jenkins, C. D. A comparative review of the interview and questionnaire methods in the assessment of the coronary-prone behavior pattern. In T. Dembroski, S. Weiss, J. Shields, S. Haynes, & M. Feinleib (Eds.), *Coronary-prone behavior*. New York: Springer Verlag, 1978.

Jenkins, C. D., Rosenman, R., & Friedman, M. Development of an objective psychological test for the determination of the coronary-prone behavior pattern in employed men. *Journal of Chronic Diseases*, 1967, *20*, 371-379.

Jenkins, C. D., Rosenman, R., & Friedman, M. Replicability of rating the coronary-prone behavior pattern. *British Journal of Preventive and Social Medicine*, 1968, *22*, 16-22.

Lasswell, H. D. *Power and personality*. New York: Norton, 1948.

Lewis-Beck, M. Stepwise regression: A caution. *Political Methodology*, 1978, *5*, 213-240.

Lodge, M., & Tursky, B. Comparisons between category and magnitude scaling of political opinion employing *src/cps* items. *American Political Science Review*, 1979, *73*, 50-66.

Lodge, M., & Tursky, B. On the magnitude scaling of political opinion in survey research. *American Journal of Political Science*, 1981, *25*, 376-419.

Marvick, D. The middlemen of politics. In W. Crotty (Ed.), *Approaches to the study of party organization*. Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1967.

Matthews, K. Psychological perspectives on the Type A behavior pattern. *Psychological Bulletin*, 1982, *91*, 293-323.

McGuire, M. Social dominance relationships in male vervet monkeys. *International Political Science Review*, 1982, *3*, 11-32.

McGuire, M., Raleigh, M., & Brammer, G. Sociopharmacology. *Annual Review of Pharmacology and Toxicology*, 1982, *22*, 643-661.

McGuire, M., Raleigh, M., & Johnson, C. Social dominance in adult male vervet monkeys II: Behavior-biochemical relationships. *Social Science Information*, 1983, *22*, 311-328.

Muller, E., Nistico, G., & Scapagnini, U. *Neurotransmitters and anterior pituitary function*. New York: Academic Press, 1977.

Raleigh, M., Brammer, G., & McGuire, M. Male dominance and the behavioral and physiological effects of drugs in vervet monkeys. In K. Miczek (Ed.), *Ethopharmacology*. New York: A.R. Liss, 1983.

Raleigh, M., Brammer, G., McGuire, M., Yuwiler, A., Geller, E., & Johnson, C. Social status related differences in behavioral effects of drugs in vervet monkeys (Cercopithecus aethiops sabaeus). In H. Steklis & A. Kling (Eds.), *Hormones, drugs, and social behavior in primates*. New York: Spectrum Publications, 1983.

Raleigh, M., & McGuire, M. Biosocialpharmacology. *McLean Hospital Journal*, 1980, *2*, 73-84.

Raleigh, M., McGuire, M., Brammer, G., & Yuwiler, A. Social status and whole blood serotonin in vervets. *Archives of General Psychiatry*, in press.

Raleigh, M., Yuwiler, A., Brammer, G., McGuire, M., Geller, E., & Flannery, J. Peripheral correlates of serotonergically influenced behaviors in vervet monkeys. *Psychopharmacology*, 1981, *72*, 241-246.

Rosenman, R. The interview method of assessment of the coronary-prone behavior pattern. In T. Dembroski, S. Weiss, J. Shields, S. Haynes, & M. Feinleib (Eds.), *Coronary-prone behavior*. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1978.

Rotter, J. Generalized expectancies for internal vs. external control of reinforcement. *Psychological Monographs*, 1966, *80*, 1-28.

Sherif, M., et al. *Intergroup conflict and cooperation: The robbers' cave experiment*. Norman, Okla.: University Book Exchange, 1960.

Spielberger, C., Gorsuch, R., & Lusheme, R. *Manual for the state-trait anxiety inventory*. Palo Alto, Calif.: Consulting Psychology Press, 1970.

Stevens, S. *Psychophysics: Introduction to its perceptual, neural, and social prospects*. New York: Wiley, 1975.

Stogdill, R. *Handbook of leadership*. New York: Free Press, 1974.

Teitelbaum, P. *Physiological psychology*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1967.

Verba, S., & Nie, N. *Participation in America: Political democracy and social equality*. New York: Harper & Row, 1972.

Wahlke, J. Pre-behavioralism in political science. *American Political Science Review*, 1979, *73*, 9-31.

Weber, M. *Economy and society*. New York: Bedminster Press, 1968.

Yuwiler, A., Brammer, G., Morley, J., Raleigh, M., Flannery, J., & Geller, E. Short-term and repetitive administration of oral tryptophan in normal men. *Archives of General Psychiatry*, 1981, *38*, 619-626.

Yuwiler, A., Plotkin, S., Geller, E., & Ritvo, E. A rapid accurate procedure for the determination of serotonin in whole human blood. *Biochemical Medicine*, 1970, *3*, 426-436.

Zyzanski, S., & Jenkins, C. Basic dimensions within the coronary-prone behavior pattern. *Journal of Chronic Diseases*, 1970, *22*, 781-795.

A Politico-Economic Theory of Income Redistribution

ROBERT D. PLOTNICK
University of Washington

RICHARD F. WINTERS
Dartmouth College

This study integrates models of income redistribution developed by economists, who suggest that citizens voluntarily redistribute because of interdependent preferences and rely on the state for implementation owing to the public-good nature of redistribution, and political scientists, who focus on conditions that lead to demands that the state intervene to assist the poor and on the development of institutions that facilitate such demands. We propose a testable theory of redistribution and apply it to data from the American states.

The empirical analysis addresses determinants of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children guarantee, adjusted for Medicaid and food stamps to which a family receiving the guarantee would be entitled. We posit significant links between the guarantee and both observable explanatory variables, such as per-capita income, and latent constructs, such as liberal party control. We specify observable indicators for the latent constructs and use the LISREL method to estimate parameters for the indicators and structural coefficients. The findings show that both political and economic variables significantly affect the level of the guarantee.

Of the many topical frontiers that join the social sciences, the study of income redistribution is an important one to economists and political scientists. Speculation about causes of redistribution neatly sets up concepts that mark their two disciplines: voluntary and coercive behavior. Some economists suggest that redistribution by government occurs because citizens value income transfers to the poor for direct reasons (satisfaction of charitable impulses, knowledge of poverty is personally unsettling), or indirect reasons (redistribution might make the poor more productive members of society or help reduce crime). Because the direct and indirect consequences of redistribution are public goods, everyone will benefit if they are provided. When everyone benefits, citizens might freeride if redistribution were voluntary (Hochman & Rodgers, 1969). Thus, government action is desirable to ensure that the entire community contributes.

Political scientists and some economists with a public choice orientation adopt a different, although not necessarily conflicting view. Schumpeter (1947), Downs (1957), and other theoreticians suggest that redistribution by government is largely a coercive, extractive process. Political parties in a modern democratic state compete for the votes of poor and nonpoor alike by promising to extract from others, the wealthy or the uninformed. There are limits to this extraction, an important one being the power and influence of the wealthy.

We began our research by asking: "What ought to characterize a theory of redistribution as a public good?" It became clear that although political institutions collectively determine redistributive policy, factors that shape individuals' choices are properly economic and political. An inclusive theory must address both the choices of individuals with diverse attitudes towards welfare and with varying resources acting as voters, members of interest groups, and supporters of political parties, and the aggregation of these choices via states' political institutions.

We advance the political-economic analysis of explicitly redistributive programs in several respects. For reasons discussed later, we, unlike others, focus on the income guarantee for the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC) in the American states. Each state legislatively establishes its guarantee, which is the maximum benefit for a family with no other income, through an explicit political process. The guarantee, we suggest, expresses a collective

---

Received: January 3, 1984
Revision received: May 30, 1984
Accepted for publication: October 8, 1984

Our research has been supported by the Interdisciplinary Research Fund of the Rockefeller Center for the Social Sciences at Dartmouth College. We thank Thomas Barthold, Kenneth Bollen, William Dougan, Daphne Kenyon, Robert Nakamura, David Stapleton, Denis Sullivan, and the referees for helpful comments on earlier drafts. Stephan Chase, Alan Dickman, and William Epstein provided research assistance.

choice of the preferred level of income support for the state's needy.

In addition, we develop a theoretical model of the redistributive process in the American states which integrates the voluntaristic perspective of economists with the institutional perspectives of political scientists.[1] We posit significant links between the welfare guarantee and both observable explanatory variables (e.g., per-capita income) and latent constructs (e.g., voter preferences and interest group strength). We also develop in greater detail than previous work several testable theoretical relationships among the political-institutional variables. In the empirical work we specify observable indicators for the latent variables and use Jorsekog's LISREL method to generate estimate coefficients for the indicators and in the structural equations.

AFDC has features that make it an attractive subject for investigation. Unlike Social Security, widely perceived by voters and recipients as an elaborate insurance program, or the present Supplemental Security Income program, widely seen as assisting the deserving poor, AFDC tests the political limits of redistribution. There is substantial political conflict over the deservingness of its recipients—female-headed families, disproportionately minority (47% of the caseload is nonwhite), often with illegitimate children (33% of caseload families have an illegitimate child).[2] Additionally, AFDC is a genuinely federal program. State legislators and executives establish the levels of benefits, but conditions of federal assistance are important influences on their choices.

The balance of this article has six sections. The second section briefly reviews previous related scholarship in economics and political science. The third section discusses why we chose the welfare guarantee rather than other program measures as the dependent variable. The fourth section presents our politico-economic model. The fifth section discusses the data and estimation technique, and the sixth contains empirical findings. The last section provides a conclusion.

Review of Previous Scholarship

Economics

Three approaches to the determinants of income redistribution have received attention by economists: 1) voluntary redistribution owing to interdependent preferences and the use of government because of the public good nature of redistribution (i.e., the approach discussed in the introduction), 2) an insurance model of voluntary redistribution, and 3) self-interest models of involuntary redistribution as an outcome of voting, legislative, and bureaucratic processes.[3]

The second approach perhaps better suits analyses of social insurance programs such as unemployment insurance or workers' compensation, rather than needs-tested ones such as AFDC. We will not discuss it here. The involuntary model is largely consistent with work by political scientists discussed below.

The most ambitious work in the interdependent preference/public good framework is by Orr (1976, 1979).[4] In his model a taxpayer gains utility from his disposable income and also from transferring income to welfare recipients. Each taxpayer balances the marginal utility from higher benefits against the marginal disutility from larger taxes to choose an optimal benefit. After each taxpayer has chosen his own preferred benefit level, the median voter's choice determines state policy. Orr's model implies that willingness to transfer is conditioned by personal income and the cost to the taxpayer. Holding the benefit level fixed, the cost per taxpayer depends on the ratio of recipients to taxpayers and the federal matching rate for AFDC benefits. Work in political science and earlier economic analyses had overlooked this price incentive. Testing the model with state-by-state data on mean AFDC benefits during the 1963-1972 period, Orr finds strong support for it. His later article extends the model to account for the fiscal incentives of the food stamp program as they affect states' AFDC decisions. The model again receives empirical support using 1975-1976 data.[5]

---

[1] There has been little sustained cross-disciplinary effort on this topic. An important economic review of the income redistribution literature (Rodgers, 1974) cites one political science article (Wilson & Banfield, 1964). The standard textual treatment in political science (Albritton, 1983) cites no economic articles. Yet economic and political analyses of income redistribution largely complement one another, and an integration of the two is feasible.

[2] Data on the caseloads are drawn from *1977 Recipient Characteristics Study: Part 1—Demographic and Program Statistics* (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services: Social Security Administration; Office of Policy, Office of Research and Statistics, June 1980), pp. 1 and 28.

[3] See Rodgers (1974) for a useful summary of each approach and Mueller (1979), *passim.*

[4] See also comments on the 1976 article by Spall (1978a) and Schiller (1978) and Orr's replies. Earlier studies of state welfare policy include Tresch (1975), Albin and Stein (1971), and others cited in Orr (1976). As Orr (1976, fn. 8) observes, these articles did not develop models of policy determinants.

[5] Spall (1978b) analyzed state-by-state data for 1975 within a framework similar to Orr's. His findings also supported the interdependent preference/public good model. Parsons (1982) provides an elementary analysis

Orr's clarification of the crucial roles of fiscal incentives in redistributive policy is a major contribution. Yet he paid little attention to the role of political variables in shaping policy and simply assumed that the political process proceeds straightforwardly to translate the median voter's preferences into public policy.[6]

More recently Gramlich (1982), Moffitt (1983), and Hulten and McCallum (1982) have analyzed state AFDC policy. All adopt models similar in spirit to Orr's, but extend the empirical work in different directions. Like Orr, none attempts to integrate the economic analysis with institutional and theoretical perspectives of political science.

Political Science

Studies of the formation and implementation of welfare and income redistributive policies date from about 1963.[7] In the 1960s and 1970s, scholars concentrated on quantifying data on welfare policy, applying various simple statistical techniques, exploring the power of political explanations of redistributive policy, and consciously building on the research of others.

Research focused on institutional models of redistribution. For example, some analysts speculated that the degree of interparty competition shaped inducements for electoral support and ultimately redistributive policy (Dawson & Robinson, 1963). Others argued that the extent of legislative malapportionment affected the representation of the urban poor (Dye, 1966).

Complicating the discussion of the 1960s was the discovery that these institutional links seemed to be dependent on the level of socioeconomic development in the states. Empirical work suggested that the more developed the state, the more competitive the party system and, therefore, the more generous the welfare program. Socioeconomic development was measured eclectically: Dawson and Robinson (1963) utilized indicators of per-capita income, urbanization, and industrialization, whereas Dye (1966) added education.

Jones (1973) and others criticized this early research. As Hofferbert (1972, p. 32) put it, these studies had "high propositional vitality," but "low theoretical content." There were strikingly few well-reasoned arguments why particular practices should be the focus of political research, nor were there arguments that linked the various propositions into consistent theoretical models of the causes of redistribution. The logic justifying the role of interparty competition seemed to be based largely on an argument derived from Key's *Southern Politics,* with little attempt to spell out why variations in competition across the states outside the south will lead to greater sensitivity to the poor (Uslaner, 1978). After all, the poor are less informed than the not-so-poor and therefore more difficult to reach, less likely to participate in politics, and more difficult to mobilize. Additionally, a perfectly reasonable argument suggests that greater interparty competition leads to greater sensitivity to the wealthy because of the crucial quality of their resources in competitive elections. Similarly, there was little theoretical rationale for why increasing income, industrialization, or similar factors ought to lead to more competition between the political parties and to greater welfare generosity.

In the more recent past, research on state welfare and income redistribution policy diversified. Studies used more sophisticated statistical techniques (Lewis-Beck, 1977). Analysis of longitudinal data sets appeared (Jones, 1974; Winters, 1976). More carefully specified theoretical approaches were developed (Jennings, 1979; Uslaner & Weber, 1975), and studies focused on policy measures more proximate to the decisions of political leaders (Gary, 1973; Gronbjerg, 1977; Tompkins, 1975).

The political analysis of redistribution has advanced over the last 20 years. Yet critics (Burstein, 1981; Godwin & Shepard, 1976) claim that the links among voters, political institutions and public policy still remain poorly established. This article presents an explicit model that links these variables and provides a theoretical rationale for many of the traditional propositions. Our purpose is to integrate the political-institutional-organizational arguments for redistribution with voluntaristic-public goods ones.

Use of the Guarantee as the Dependent Variable

The actual redistributive impact of a welfare program depends on its eligibility and benefit rules, and the distribution of germane socioeconomic characteristics in the population. For most direct income support programs, the latter would typically include age, earnings, other sources of income, marital status, and family size. The rules and characteristics jointly determine the size and demographic composition of the recipient population and the average benefit per recipi-

---

of state Old Age Assistance policy that compares altruistic and voting power explanations for the aged's welfare benefits. Neither of these studies is as thorough as Orr's.

[6] This criticism also applies to studied cited in footnote 4.

[7] Hofferbert (1972, 1974), Jacob and Lipsky (1968), Gray (1976), and Uslaner (1978) present excellent reviews of the literature.

ent. In AFDC, a family's actual cash benefit equals the income guarantee minus a fraction of the family's earned income and a (usually higher) fraction of its unearned income such as Social Security or alimony. Legislators and governors can only directly alter the rules of the redistributive programs.

Once one recognizes the interaction of both types of factors, it becomes clear that the redistributive intent of a program is probably best reflected in its rules, not in the final distribution of benefits, the mean benefit, the number of recipients, or total outlays.[8] The legislated rules may partly reflect considerations of how many persons are likely to qualify for benefits and the expected level of total spending. But these latter variables are products of both legislative choice and factors outside legislative control. For this reason we suggest that the legislated rules are appropriate and important variables for analysis.

In income-conditioned programs such as AFDC, the crucial rules are the income guarantee, the eligibility requirements, and the rate at which benefits are reduced as other income rises. This study focuses on the guarantee, an important indicator of the state's willingness to redistribute income to the needy. Joint analysis of all three parameters remains for future research.

A simple measure of the guarantee is the maximum annual cash AFDC payment for a four-person family with no other income. Additionally, most AFDC families are eligible for the federally funded food stamp program. Food stamps provide a maximum in-kind benefit, which varies by family size, to families with no cash income. As a family's cash income including AFDC rises, federal law requires the food-stamp benefit to be reduced at a specified rate until net food-stamp benefits reach zero. AFDC guarantees have been sufficiently low that any family receiving the full guarantee also would qualify for some food stamps. Because food stamps are excellent substitutes for cash, states may well take into account contributions to total income of this food assistance when legislating AFDC cash guarantees. If this is so, the appropriate dependent variable would be the sum of the AFDC guarantee (*G*) and the annual food-stamp benefit (*FS*) that would be gained by a family of four if its only cash income were *G*.

One other important factor may condition the AFDC guarantee. AFDC recipients are eligible for Medicaid, which annually provides hundreds of dollars of aid per eligible person. Variation in the Medicaid benefit differs from that of the AFDC guarantee alone because, within limits of federal law, states differ in the scope of medical services they choose to cover. Also, Medicaid utilization rates by eligible persons vary by state. We suggest that legislators, aware of both the past utilization rates and number of Medicaid services, recognize that there is an implicit, but not legislatively mandated, guarantee of medical aid for the indigent. If so, legislators would adjust the cash guarantee accordingly to obtain their desired overall cash-food-medical welfare package. Let *MED* denote the value of the medical services that a four-person AFDC family would expect to receive in a year. An alternative and for legislators probably the most relevant measures of state redistributive policy is, therefore, $G+FS+MED$. The empirical work examines all three notions of a welfare guarantee.

A Politico-Economic Model of Welfare Policy

Legislative decisions, affirmed by the governor, directly establish redistributive policy. The impact of any political or economic variables then, occurs only by the way it affects statutory action. We suggest that the path diagram of Figure 1 summarizes the causal links and directions of the relationships among these variables. Political variables exert both direct and indirect effects on the guarantee (paths 1 to 12, 18, 19). The economic variables have only direct effects (paths 12 to 18).

The Political Segment of the Model

Our model of the state political process draws on theories of pluralism and party competition. It posits a series of relationships among social diversity, voter preferences, interest group activities, political party control, interparty competition, and welfare policy.

Social Diversity. In our formulation, states are more socially diverse the less accurately any single category, be it racial, ethnic, religious, or economic, portrays the population. Our concept

---

[8] Almost every study of the determinants of redistribution or welfare focuses on other measures of spending, for example total welfare spending, total per capita, per $1000 of personal income, or per recipient. These measures do not represent the direct political choice regarding the proper levels of statewide redistribution. Rather they indicate outcomes shaped by the factors separate from and often occurring after the political decision on the guarantee. For example, mobility into the state might be a response to the level of the guarantee and would then shape total spending, number of recipients, and aggregate per recipient. Studies that focus on these *consequences* of political choice in economics are Orr (1976) and Spall (1978); in political science, Fry and Winters (1970), Dawson and Gray (1971); in sociology, Gronbjerg (1977), and Isaac and Kelly (1981).

Figure 1. A Politico-Economic Model of Welfare Policy



of social diversity, although not systematically applied to the political analysis of the American states (however, see McConnell, 1966; and Dahl & Tufte, 1973) is related to the more general political concept of socioeconomic development.

The notion of development in the writings of the 1960s appears to be a composite of factors such as personal income, urbanization, and industrialization. Early analyses devoted little effort to explicitly detailing the links between changes in different dimensions of socioeconomic development and changes in welfare policy. Therefore, we will unpack the more general concept, examine carefully the causal role of each factor, and explain how the factors enter our own model.

Among the discrete political science components of development, personal income and urbanization are compatible with a theory of income redistribution based on interdependent preferences. A high level of development in part simply means larger numbers of citizens with high personal incomes. Greater affluence allows larger numbers of persons to indulge at higher levels their impulse to aid the needy. This logic is identical to that in the interdependent preferences-public goods theory of economists, which predicts a direct connection between income and the guarantee.

Analysts argued that greater urbanization leads to more generous welfare policy. Although the authors did not usually spell out the logic, we infer that they assumed that the urban poor were probably easier to organize than the rural poor for reasons of proximity and lack of informal social controls. However, it is also reasonable to hypothesize that citizens in states with large urban populations have more direct contact with the urban poor and therefore more direct knowledge about their condition. All too often the destitute are in the streets, directly visible to the urbanite. If, as the interdependent preference theory maintains, citizens' own senses of well-being are sensitive to the welfare and happiness of the poor, then a direct causal link from the density of the poor (an indicator of how frequently one would likely interact with a poor person) to redistribution in the states is consistent with the voluntaristic theory, which assumes taxpayers' well-being is reduced by encountering the destitute.

A third model of the effects of development focuses on economic, social, ethnic, and religious diversity. Such diversity directly affects the number of politically active and important groups within the states and the sensitivity of the political parties to the special pleadings of these organized interests and probably tips the balance of political sentiments in a more liberal direction (Dahl & Tufte, 1973; Eulau & Prewitt, 1973; McConnell, 1966). Although these consequences of diversity may directly affect redistributive policy, diversity exerts an indirect affect in this model.

A final view of how development affects welfare policy, a view commonly found within the political science literature, addresses processes of rapid and substantial industrial transformation. This view of development's impact meshes with the political view, the extractive hypothesis. Industrialization creates a factory class, which faces a more marginal existence than the wealthy or farm families and may be forced to rely on welfare at times. The growing factory class probably leads to a transformation of the party system into largely class-based parties in which the traditionally liberal party favors extractive redistribution from the wealthy and business sectors for insurance against economic insecurity. Additionally, for reasons of political convenience alliances with the nonworking poor will probably develop.

In the industrial transformation view, development changes the nature of political institutions, the number and content of political demands placed on them, and ultimately the choices regarding redistribution. Development's impact is indirect. This model essentially offers a historical interpretation of the origin of redistributive policies in the states. Since we are dealing with the post-transformation period of the 1960s and 1970s, this view of development lies outside our model. The empirical work that follows addresses the first three aspects of development.

The general concept of state development, therefore, has several separate dimensions, each with its own causal links. Personal income is treated as a separate independent variable because of its direct effect on personal choice. The economic logic, discussed more fully below, seems compelling: greater income leads to a greater ability to pay for redistribution to the needy. (See path 12 in Figure 1.) We have treated urbanization as a causal agent that also directly shapes citizens' willingness to transfer to the poor (path 18).

Socioeconomic development will manifest itself in diversity that drives other political factors related to redistribution. Diversity is more likely to manifest itself in a highly competitive political arena (path 1) and a larger number of interest groups (path 2). Such states will have a larger number of politicians and groups who advocate and support redistributive programs (path 3). We now discuss more carefully the effects of social diversity and the other paths in Figure 1.

Diversity and Interparty Competition. Diversity directly affects the strength and competitiveness of the political party system (path 1). The competitive balance between political parties is likely to be closer in the more diverse states. Groups obtain maximum influence on party behavior when they can claim that the votes of their members formed the marginal bloc of the winner's electoral coalition. As diversity increases, more groups can reasonably assert their crucial marginality and represent themselves as influential. Greater diversity thereby increases the parties' sensitivity to the pleadings of more groups. In the diverse states, party leaders will lack precise information on the validity of the claims of group influences and will become captive to the pleas of many of them.

Interparty Competition and Redistribution. Probably the best known link in the comparative state politics literature is that between two-party competition and redistribution to the "have-nots" (Key, 1949; Lockard, 1959; Price, 1970). There are good theoretical reasons to expect such a consequence of competitiveness (path 8). Under conditions of routine competitiveness, the state will be active in many areas as political leaders vie in offering the authority and services of the state to various groups in return for electoral support. Policy initiatives to the poor simply represent one more attempt to use the authority of the state to benefit selectively a particular constituency.

The politics literature correctly points out that low income people form a large pool of unmobilized voters. They are conventionally thought of as Democratic voters, but both the statistics and the more calculating professionals suggest otherwise.[9] The politically unmobilized quality of the poor, their numbers, and the uncertainty of their response to policy overtures make them an attractive target for the politician operating in the highly uncertain world of competitive politics in a diverse American state.

Diversity and Interest Groups. As the states increase in economic diversity, the number of special interest groups increases. The poor and those who support or express the interests of the poor will be represented among these groups. Although there is no necessary reason why organizations must appear to represent the latent interests of individuals (see Olson, 1965), it is a widely accepted argument that as society, or as we argue here, the American state, increases in population size, urbanization, and economic and social differentiation, diverse organizations will develop to represent these segmented interests (Dahl & Tufte, 1973; Eulau & Prewitt, 1973).

Interest Groups' Impact on Party Control and Redistribution. Interest groups will seek special advantages through laws and regulations (Olson, 1983; Peltzman, 1976; Stigler, 1971). Their objectives (in our case, more generous welfare programs) can come about through two processes. First, an interest group can negotiate its goals with the leadership of the parties, offering its support, votes, and financial contributions for successfully promoting the ends of the groups (path 10). Thus, strong interest group efforts on behalf of the poor will lead to more liberal party control of the state government.

---

[9] For a useful statistical summary of the contribution of the poor to various Democratic presidential election coalitions, see Axelrod (1972). Moynihan (1973) succinctly analyzes the Nixon administration's perception of the Republican electoral gains to be made from among the ranks of the working poor.

Second, a group can lobby elected officials, whatever their party affiliation or ideological convictions, as a direct means of influencing legislative action (path 9). The more powerful the interest groups acting on behalf of the poor, the more likely it is that a high welfare guarantee will be enacted.

Diversity and Political Liberalism. Our earlier analysis suggests that diversity leads to ever larger numbers of expressions of political sentiment. We further propose that more socially diverse states will also be states where voters and leaders express a more enduring political liberalism (path 3).

The logic yielding this conclusion starts from Key's observation that interests of conservatives, those preferring the status quo, and the wealthy are already well organized in every state, diverse or not (Key, 1949; McConnell, 1966; Price, 1970). The wealthy have a straightforward, tangible interest that the state not redistribute. They possess political skills, contacts, and information that make for political potency (Dahl, 1961). Sentiments promoting the welfare of the indigents obviously face more severe costs of political organization (Lipsky, 1968). But as the state becomes more diverse, greater numbers of organizations arise to represent groups that are, by default, less elite than those already entrenched politically. Thus, the balance of political forces begins to tip away from the already well-organized forces of the wealthy and business community in favor of the more difficult to organize, yet larger numbers of the poor.

Two expressions of greater fundamental liberalism will be increased strength of pro-redistributive interest groups (path 5) and a greater frequency of liberal party control (path 6).

Liberal Party Control and Redistribution. Control of the state legislature and governorship by the relatively more liberal political party will also be positively related to redistribution (path 11).

Voter Preferences and Redistribution. Preferences for redistribution may vary across the states. For example, state per-capita contributions to United Way charities differ widely. More altruistic preferences lead to a stronger enduring liberalism which produces larger numbers of liberal elected officials (path 4). Also, more altruistic voters will directly elect more liberal lawmakers (path 7). Note that voter preferences do not influence the policy decision directly. Preferences only enter indirectly in a representative democracy via election of like-minded legislators and, after the election, by direct or indirect (via interest groups) communication to these lawmakers.

Local Cost Sharing and Redistribution. Counties or localities share the nonfederal cost of AFDC in a few states. Cost sharing may encourage state officials to raise the guarantee, since political blame for any ensuing tax increase will be partly shifted to county and city officeholders. Pressure from these officeholders upon state officials to hold down the costs of state-enacted policies that raise county and local tax needs exerts an offsetting force. Hence, we cannot offer an unambiguous theoretical prediction of this variable's impact on the guarantee (path 19).

The Economic Segment of the Model

Economic theories of voluntary redistribution derive from the general theory of individual choice with the assumption of interdependent preferences: a person's utility partly depends on the economic circumstances of other persons who, in this context, are less fortunate than he. The individual choice is the size of the welfare guarantee he is willing to finance.

Figure 2 portrays the key financial factors in this decision.[10] For simplicity, consider a case with one recipient, *R*. One of many potential donors (taxpayers), *D*, is choosing his preferred guarantee. Suppose the tax price of providing one dollar to *R* is *t*, a figure less than unity because other taxpayers share the cost. Given income *I*, *D* could consume all of it privately and provide nothing to *R* (point *I*). Alternatively, he could choose to give it all to *R* and have nothing for himself (point I', where $I' = I/t$). In principle, he could select any point on budget constraint $I'I$, which has a slope of $-t$. Given the financial constraint $I'I$, his preferences for redistribution will determine the actual point he chooses. If *D*'s utility depends partly on *R*'s income, *D* will maximize his own utility by locating at, say, point *X* along $I'I$ and being willing to provide *R* with income I_r at a private cost of $I - I_d$. In the absence of interdependent preferences, *D* would choose point *I* instead.

If *D*'s income increases, the budget constraint shifts out parallel to $I'I$. This will usually lead *D* to provide a higher income to the recipient by sharing a portion of his increase. The theory does not predict the extent of sharing, however. Holding income constant, if the tax price rises, the constraint pivots to the left around point *I*. *D* would

---

[10] This discussion rests largely on Orr's (1976) work, which should be consulted for a formal exposition. The treatment of food stamps is new, though related to Orr (1979). The seminal theoretical contribution appeared in Hochman and Rodgers (1969).

Figure 2. Taxpayer Equilibrium Choice of Welfare Guarantee



probably reduce the amount of redistribution he is willing to buy when its price rises.[11]

Suppose now that *R* is eligible for the federal food-stamp program as well as the cash benefit provided by *D* and other state taxpayers. The food-stamp program changes the constraint in an important way and hence affects *D*'s choice. Assume *D* ignores the tax cost of food stamps, which are paid almost entirely by out-of-state citizens. Further, assume that *D* views a dollar of aid in the form of food to be equivalent to a dollar of cash aid. Under provisions of the food stamp program, even if *D* gives *R* nothing in cash, *R* will receive *F* dollars in food stamps, where *F* is the federally established food-stamp guarantee. If this were the only feature of food stamps, the constraint would simply shift parallel to *I'I* over to *K'K*. But in addition, the benefit reduction rate of food stamps changes the constraint's slope. According to federal rules, as *R*'s cash income including the welfare benefit financed by *D* rises, his food stamp benefit will be reduced by *f*, the food stamp tax rate. Therefore, given the tax price of cash aid, *t*, the true effective tax price to *D* of raising the full aid package by a dollar is: $t/(1 - f)$, which exceeds *t*. The constraint's slope returns to *t* (at point *J* on Figure 2) if cash aid exceeds the food-stamp breakeven level of F/f.[12]

---

[11] This proposition does not contradict our earlier conclusion that the effect of local cost sharing on state policy would be ambiguous. The crucial difference there was that county and local cost sharing does not alter the total cost to the state's citizens of welfare, but only shifts the distribution of cost among governments. There is, then, no economic reason to expect greater or lesser benefits since the budget constraint is not changed. Any effect can only arise from the interplay of political factors discussed in the text.

[12] The breakeven point is where net food-stamp benefits reach zero. Any AFDC recipient is always eligible for a minimal amount of food-stamp aid, even if cash

With the new constraint *IKJI'*, suppose *D* selects point *Y* to maximize his utility. The new guarantee I_{rr} delivers *OG* in cash and GI_{rr} in food stamps. Clearly the net food stamp benefit GI_{rr} will always be less than the food-stamp guarantee *OF*. One would expect I_{rr} to exceed I_r owing to a positive income effect from the food-stamp guarantee. The tax price increase due to *f* creates an income effect that reduces desired welfare support, but it is dominated by the positive income effect. The price change, however, induces a substitution effect which tends to lower the desired total cash and food-stamp guarantee. Observe that in Figure 2 the recipient obtains a higher total guarantee while at the same time *D*'s taxes decline to $I - I_{dd}$. Donor and recipient both may gain from the federal program.[13]

If food stamps are offered only to a portion of AFDC families, as occurred before 1975 when the program was a county option, constraint *I'JKI* is altered. Suppose the fraction of recipients covered by the program is *p*. Then *F* falls to *pF; K'K* shifts to the left, accordingly; and the net tax rate becomes $t/(1 - pf)$. The food-stamp breakeven level does not change.

Medicaid can be straightforwardly incorporated into the diagram. State and federal revenues jointly fund this program, and in all but a handful of states the tax price of Medicaid is identical to that of AFDC. Medicaid benefits do not decline as cash or food-stamp income rises. Thus, I_r can be reinterpreted as the sum of the AFDC and Medicaid guarantees.

We conclude that three financial variables affect the choice of I_{rr}: donor income, the net tax price, and the food-stamp guarantee. Assuming that legislators understand the magnitude of the constraint, these three variables have direct effects on the guarantee (paths 12, 13, and 14).

In a polity with many recipients the number of them relative to the taxpayer population will affect *D*'s choice of guarantee per recipient. Holding constant the tax price and total amount of income that *D* is willing to sacrifice, a higher recipient-to-taxpayer ratio implies there will be a smaller guarantee per recipient (path 15).

Along with these financial considerations, taxpayers' preferences will influence the size of the guarantee. For example, given *I'I*, taxpayers with stronger tastes than *D* for redistribution might desire a guarantee larger than I_r. In the context of welfare policy, preferences can be usefully split into two dimensions. First, preferences may take into account recipient characteristics and the nature of recipient-taxpayer interactions. Taxpayers' feelings of sympathy may depend upon their perceptions of recipients' deservingness (e.g., morality, as evidenced by the frequency of out-of-wedlock births) or demographic traits such as race. Willingness to provide aid may be greater if taxpayers frequently encounter the poor and are distressed by evidence of destitution, malnutrition, and bad health, or by unsanitary, unsightly slums. Because recipient characteristics can be easily observed by lawmakers or communicated to them by interested groups, such characteristics will directly influence the decision (paths 16, 17, 18).

Second, holding recipient traits constant, the strength of voters' basic altruistic tendencies matter in choosing a guarantee.[14] We discussed this aspect of preferences and its role in the public choice process earlier (paths 4, 7).

Estimation Method, Equations, Data, and Measurement Model

The structural model of Figure 1 can be expressed by a recursive set of equations:

$$IPC = b_1 DIV + e_1 \tag{1}$$

$$LIB = b_2 DIV + b_3 PREF + e_2 \tag{2}$$

$$INT = b_4 DIV + b_5 LIB + e_3 \tag{3}$$

$$PTY = b_6 PREF + b_7 LIB + b_8 INT + e_4 \tag{4}$$

$$GUAR = b_9 INT + b_{10} PTY + b_{11} IPC + BX + e_5 \tag{5}$$

where

DIV = social diversity,
PREF = voter preferences,
IPC = interparty competition,
LIB = explicit liberalism,
INT = interest group strength,
PTY = liberal party control,

---

income exceeds the breakeven level. We ignore this complication since no actual AFDC guarantee is high enough to create this situation.

[13] For donors initially choosing low levels of cash aid, the food-stamp program may move them to *K*. This is not most donors' preferred choice (if public policy bears even a faint resemblance to majority wishes) because no state has reduced its AFDC guarantee to zero since food stamps became a national program.

[14] Strictly speaking, there is no true altruism in the model. Donors provide aid to increase their own utility. However, while aware of the semantic and philosophical quicksand surrounding the notion of altruism, we see little objection to calling such motives altruistic.

Figure 3. Empirical Specification for the Full Model with Results on the Measurement Model for Latent Variables[a]



[a]Factor loadings appear below each indicator name. Indicators assigned as unit of measurement have loadings fixed at 1.0, and, thus, no standard errors. Asymptotic *t*-statistics for other loadings are in parentheses.

GUAR = annual $G+MED+FS$ for a four-person family (see above),
X = a vector of other exogenous variables discussed below and the e's are error terms. We assume the equation errors are mutually uncorrelated.

The data for estimating this model consist of state-by-state observations on welfare guarantees and a wide variety of observable indicators and exogenous variables. Minnesota and Nebraska are omitted because of their formally nonpartisan legislatures. Data are for the 1971-1972 period ($N=96$). We deflated all monetary variables to constant 1967 dollars.

We had to modify the key dependent variable *GUAR* because food stamps were not available nationwide before 1975. Instead each county had the option of offering them. Thus, in measuring a state government's AFDC and food-stamp benefit package, we should multiply the food-stamp portion of the total by the fraction of AFDC households living in counties with this program. Such information is not available. As an approximation of this proportion, we used data on the fraction of counties offering food stamps in each state (*AVAIL*) for years before 1975. The dependent variable used in estimation was, therefore, $G+FS*AVAIL+MED$.

Four of the endogenous variables—*IPC, INT, LIB,* and *PTY*—and two exogenous ones—*DIV* and *PREF*—are unobservable theoretical constructs. One can estimate their coefficients in the equations, though, by positing a measurement model that specifies observable indicators for these six variables and applying Joreskog's maximum likelihood LISREL method. This method also estimates factor loadings to show which indicators are most closely related to the theoretical construct.[15] We assume uncorrelated errors across all equations in the measurement model. Joreskog (1973) and Joreskog and Sorbom (1982) present details of the statistical procedure. Carmines and McIver (1983) discuss applications to political science.

The LISREL methodology is especially appropriate when there is reasonable concern about the errors of measurement of the variables. Such measurement problems are likely to be substantial in the analysis of comparative state politics. The concept of social diversity illustrates the problem. Although the concept often appears in the literature and there seems to be agreement about its importance, there is little agreement on how to measure it. LISREL allows us to posit multiple observable indicators of the underlying latent construct and, through the use of confirmatory factor analysis, to propose and to test a measurement model of the construct and its indicators.

---

[15] In the Joreskog approach there is really one measurement model for unobservable exogenous constructs and a second for unobservable endogenous ones. The distinction is unnecessary here, though important when setting up the estimation procedure.

This section will now discuss the measurement model of each theoretical construct. Then the observable variables, which require no measurement model, are described. Figure 3 reproduces the path model of Figure 1 and adds the indicators of the latent constructs and their estimated factor loadings. Latent variables are circled, whereas observable variables are not.

We have two indicators of diversity (*DIV*). *HERFINC* and *HERFWORK* are modified Herfindahl indices of the concentration of income generated or workers employed by the leading industrial sectors.[16] Higher values of the modified indices correspond to greater industrial diversity. We assigned the unit of measurement for the latent construct of diversity to equal *HERFINC*'s by fixing this indicator's loading at 1.0. *HERFWORK* bears a positive relationship to the index variable. The loading has a *t*-value of 9.75. We examined other indicators: Sullivan's (1973) measure of diversity, the percentage of foreign stock in the state, a Herfindahl index of foreign stock in the states, and a per-capita measure of "who's who in the black community." None showed significant factor loadings.

We lack direct measures of voter preferences for redistribution (*PREF*). We rely on two indicators of concern for others: contributions to United Way charities per capita and charitable deductions claimed on federal income tax returns as a percentage of adjusted gross income. The charitable deductions indicator (*CHAR*) is the index variable. The coefficient on the United Way contributions indicator (*UWAY*) is statistically significant and unexpectedly negative. This construct is the least satisfactory in the model and may reflect the difficulty in obtaining accurate measures of political sentiments.

Competition between the political parties (*IPC*) is a well-studied aspect of American state politics with a sizable literature. Our measurement model of competition (*IPC*) exploits the features of LISREL. We assume there is an underlying dimension of competition that characterizes electoral conflict in the state. Indicators of this dimension include competition in the last gubernatorial election and the party balance in the state House and Senate ($G+H+SPIC$), competition over the recent past (*R*62-73) as measured by indices developed by Austin Ranney (1976) for statewide political competition, and a measure of expected party balance (*NRMVOTE*). We cannot confidently point to any single one of these measures and claim that it fully measures competition. Rather, each is an imperfect indicator of the underlying dimension. The measurement model works well. With $G+H+SPIC$ as the index variable, both factor loadings are positive as expected and quite significant. The *t*-values exceed 7.8.

Indicators for the organizational and political strengths of groups directly interested in welfare benefits (*INT*) are state memberships per 1000 population in the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and National Association of Social Workers (NASW), and per-capita outlays in the state on Legal Assistance (*LEGAL*), Office of Economic Opportunity Programs (*OEO*), and Community Action Programs (*CAP*). With *NASW* as the index variable, the indicators have the predicted positive loadings, most of which are statistically significant.

We constructed two indicators of liberal party control (*PTY*). One equals the fraction of a state's upper house which is Democratic multiplied by the AFL-CIO COPE voting index of all federal representatives and senators from that state who were Democrats, plus the corresponding product for Republicans. The result is an indicator of the average degree of liberalism of the state's senate (*SENLIB*), assuming that within-state politicians share fundamental liberal or conservative traits with their congressional counterparts. COPE indices for the state senators themselves would be preferred, but these are not compiled, and we believe they would be similar. Our second indicator is constructed in identical fashion for the state's lower house (*HOUSLIB*).[17] With *SENLIB* as the index variable, *HOUSLIB* has a factor loading of 1.01 with a *t*-ratio of 30.3. We also developed a similar pair of indicators using the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) index. It yielded similar results.

---

[16] The standard Herfindahl index is computed by summing the squared value of each sector's share. The maximum value is 1.0 if a single sector accounts for the entire population. Our modified variable equals one minus the usual Herfindahl index so that higher values indicate more diversity. We find such an index preferable to a simpler measure such as percentage of state income derived from manufacturing, which ignores where the rest of the income is generated. Our diversity variable accounts for the relative contribution of all economic groups.

[17] Initially we used the fraction of the state's upper and lower house members who are Democrats as indicators of *PTY*. As we and critics of earlier drafts

Explicit liberalism (*LIB*) is gauged by two indicators, the ADA and AFL-CIO's COPE indices of voting records for each state's entire U.S. House and Senate delegation. These indicators of the general political climate are admittedly imperfect, well removed from the state capitals, and based on national issues, but are among the few both available and comparable. The two indicators are closely related to one another. With ADA as the index variable, the COPE variable loads 1.04 with a *t*-value of 12.3.

Among the observable variables in the X vector, the only political variable is the local cost share (*LOCAL*). It equals the percentage share of benefits paid by county or local governments.

The remaining observable exogenous variables represent elements of the budget constraint or recipient characteristics. Income (*INC*) is represented by real per-capita income. The price of welfare (*PRICE*) equals the state matching rate for AFDC divided by one minus the food-stamp benefit reduction rate, both as established by federal rules.[18] The food stamp guarantee (*FSG*) is the value for a four-person family set in U.S. Department of Agriculture regulations multiplied by *AVAIL*. Although *FSG* is uniform across states in each year, by using pre-1975 data which require the *AVAIL* adjustment, we obtain variation in this variable and can estimate its effect. We obtain recipients as a percentage of taxpayers (*REC/POP*), following Orr, by dividing the number of AFDC recipients by total state population, both lagged one year to eliminate possible simultaneity between the caseload and the guarantee.

Recipient characteristics that may affect voters' willingness to pay for welfare include the percentage of the caseload that is black (*NONWH*), and the percentage of AFDC mothers with an illegitimate child (*ILLEG*). The number of poor persons per square mile (*POORDEN*) is a proxy for the likelihood of interaction with needy individuals and, thus, discomfort at seeing destitution.[19]

Results for the Structural Model

Table 1 presents estimates of the structural coefficients of equations (1) through (5) using $G + FS^*AVAIL + MED$ as the dependent variable in the last equation. The proposed link in equation (1) between our constructs of social diversity (*DIV*) and interparty competition (*IPC*) is supported. The coefficient is positive with a *t*-value of 3.7.

The relationship hypothesized in equation (2) received no support. Our construct for charitability of voters (*PREF*) is negatively related to the liberalism (*LIB*) of the political climate, and the coefficient is significant at the .01 level. This results, we suggest, from the imperfect measure of altruism of the states' populations. Although this first effort at measuring voter sentiments at the state level and identifying its effects on policy is disappointing, it demonstrates the need for better measures of this theoretically important variable. The coefficient on *DIV* has the expected positive sign, but its *t*-value of .30 is insignificant.

Equation (3) predicting interest group strength receives modest support. States with liberal political climates have stronger interest group systems (*t*-ratio of 5.1). The relationship with diversity is positive as predicted although not significant (*t*-ratio of .35).

Our explanation for the strength of liberal party control (*PTY*) works well. The coefficients on *LIB*, *INT*, and *PREF* are positive, and the first two are significant at the .01 and .05 levels, respectively.

The last equation is the most important. The expected relationships are generally supported. Interest group strength (*INT*) directly affects the

---

realized, such indicators are insensitive to regional differences in a party's officeholders' liberalism. This is especially likely to be a problem because of differences between southern Democrats and northern/western Democrats. By following the method described in the text, which explicitly builds in ideological differences, we think we adequately capture the north-south difference.

[18] The matching rate is set by federal authorities and varies across states because it is correlated with per-capita income. As Orr discusses, the AFDC matching rate was endogenous for those states which chose to share costs with the federal authorities using the "old" matching formula. With that formula, the matching rate was determined by the average benefit (and, thus, indirectly by the guarantee). To purge the results of any simultaneity bias that could result, we will follow the same two-step procedure for states still on the old formula that Orr used. States that use the newer Medicaid formula face a constant matching rate at all levels of benefit. When the dependent variable is measured as just the cash AFDC guarantee, the price of welfare is not adjusted for the food stamp tax rate.

[19] We measure the density of the pre-welfare poor (persons who fall below the poverty line before their welfare income is counted).

Table 1. Coefficient Estimates of the Structural Model[a]

(1) $$IPC = \underset{(2.69)}{1.87^{**}}\,DIV$$

(2) $$LIB = \underset{(.30)}{50.21}\,DIV - \underset{(3.72)}{76.9^{**}}\,PREF$$

(3) $$INT = \underset{(5.09)}{.003^{**}}\,LIB + \underset{(.35)}{.18}\,DIV$$

(4) $$PTY = \underset{(4.50)}{.86}\,LIB^{**} + \underset{(2.01)}{38.4^{*}}\,INT + \underset{(1.47)}{23.4}\,PREF$$

(5) $$GUAR^{b} = \underset{(2.41)}{2263^{*}}\,INT + \underset{(1.55)}{732}\,IPC + \underset{(.04)}{.18}\,PTY + \underset{(2.17)}{6.3^{*}}\,LOCAL + \underset{(4.07)}{.83^{**}}\,INC - \underset{(1.61)}{1421}\,PRICE$$
$$+ \underset{(5.59)}{.92^{**}}\,FSG - \underset{(2.85)}{115^{**}}\,REC/POP - \underset{(1.93)}{6.2}\,NONWH - \underset{(2.22)}{17.7^{*}}\,ILLEG + \underset{(2.75)}{8.6^{**}}\,POORDEN$$

Chi-square for the complete model = 1011 with 256 d.f.

(6) $$GUAR^{c} = \underset{(3.00)}{2076^{**}}\,INT + \underset{(2.08)}{690^{*}}\,IPC + \underset{(1.10)}{-3.3}\,PTY + \underset{(.84)}{1.7}\,LOCAL + \underset{(4.40)}{.62^{**}}\,INC - \underset{(1.82)}{1119}\,PRICE$$
$$+ \underset{(8.52)}{.98^{**}}\,FSG - \underset{(3.36)}{94.4^{**}}\,REC/POP - \underset{(1.47)}{3.3}\,NONWH - \underset{(3.15)}{17.5^{**}}\,ILLEG + \underset{(2.77)}{6.0^{**}}\,POORDEN$$

Chi-square for the complete model = 995 with 256 d.f. (First four equations under this specification are not shown.)

[a] Absolute values of asymptotic *t*-statistics are in parentheses. No constant terms appear because the equations are derived from a covariance matrix in which variables are measured as deviations from their means.

[b] Defined as *G+MED+FS*AVAIL*. *GUAR, INC,* and *FSG* are measured in 1967 dollars.

[c] Defined as *G+FS*AVAIL*. *GUAR, INC,* and *FSG* are measured in 1967 dollars.

*Significant at the .05 level.

**Significant at the .01 level.

annual guarantee and achieves a .05 significance level. Interparty competition (*IPC*) has the predicted positive effect, but achieves statistical significance only at the marginal 12% level.[20] The degree of liberal party control (*PTY*) has no discernible effect on the guarantee. Both its coefficient and *t*-statistic are near zero. The final political variable, local cost share, had a significant (*t*-ratio = 2.17) positive effect on *GUAR*. According to our earlier discussion, the positive coefficient implies that the price incentives to state authorities that result from cost sharing dominate the interests of local authorities in controlling local costs.

The coefficients on the economic variables are quite satisfactory. Per-capita income (*INC*) is positively related to the guarantee and significant at the .01 level. A $1.00 increase in average income is associated with a $.83 rise in the welfare guarantee. Because recipients are a small proportion of the total population, this does *not* mean that nearly all income increases are spent on welfare. For example, if 2% of a state's population receives AFDC and the state's matching rate equals 25%, the $1.00 increase in mean income among the other 98% that leads to a $.83 rise in the guarantee will cost each taxpayer about $.005 (2*83*.25/98), leaving $.995 for other uses. Finding that welfare guarantees rise with income supports the interdependent preference framework.

The matching rate, or *PRICE* of welfare to the state, has the anticipated negative effect and is marginally significant at the .11 level. If the rate rises by .01, the guarantee falls by $14.21. The food-stamp guarantee, *FSG,* has a strong (*t*-ratio = 5.59) positive impact on the dependent variable. Raising *FSG* by $1.00 leads to an increase in the full welfare guarantee of about $.92. This implies that an extra dollar of federal support for the needy in the form of food (recall, food stamps are entirely federally funded) ends up helping both the poor, who enjoy a rise in the overall guarantee, and taxpayers, who reduce the cash-Medicaid part of the guarantee by \$.08 and thereby save on state taxes. An outcome in which both sides gain from a federal program makes political sense.

---

[20] The seemingly large coefficients on *INT* and *IPC* are consistent with the units in which these constructs are measured. For example, *IPC* is indexed to the *G+H+SIPC* indicator, which can only range between 0 and 0.5.

The recipient/population percentage (*REC/POP*) has the expected negative impact on the guarantee. A one percentage point increase in the caseload burden, relative to state population, tends to lower *G* by \$115 or about 3.7% of the mean *GUAR*, which was \$3107. This effect is significant at the .01 level.

Along with these effects of the budget constraint parameters, some recipient characteristics also affect legislative decisions on *GUAR*. The percentage of the caseload that is nonwhite (*NONWH*) has an effect on *GUAR* that is significant at the .06 level. A one point rise in this percentage tends to lower *GUAR* by \$6. Interestingly, the extent of illegitimacy (*ILLEG*) among welfare recipients has a larger negative effect on welfare generosity, which achieves significance at the .05 level. A one-point rise here tends to reduce *GUAR* by \$18. Finally, density of the poor (*POORDEN*) is positively, significantly (t-ratio = 2.75) related to *GUAR*, as predicted. Because these characteristics of the welfare population are significantly associated with the size of *GUAR*, the interdependent preference view is supported.

The R-square for the equations predicting the five dependent variables (*IPC, LIB, INT, PTY,* and *GUAR*) are .09, .66, .37, .78, and .71.

We also estimated equations (1)-(5) using the cash guarantee (*G*) and $G+FS^*AVAIL$ as alternative and less satisfactory measures of the welfare guarantee. For both estimates, results for equations (1)-(4) were virtually identical to those in Table 1.[21] Interesting differences did appear in predicting $G+FS^*AVAIL$ as reported in equation (6) in Table 1. The coefficient for *IPC* achieves significance at the .05 level, whereas the effects of *NONWH* and *LOCAL* fade to statistical insignificance. The coefficient on *PRICE* becomes nearly significant at the .05 level. Coefficients on *INT, REC/POP* and *ILLEG* become more highly significant. In equation (5) the only insignificant variable in predicting the fully adjusted guarantee other than *IPC* was our measure of political party control (*PTY*). In the estimate using $G+FS^*AVAIL$, the coefficient on *PTY* remains small and insignificant, although perversely, its sign becomes negative.

Conclusion

We conclude with a discussion of the advances made in this article toward a politico-economic theory of income redistribution.

We have argued that the legislatively established welfare guarantee is the appropriate focus of politico-economic analysis. Analyses that have used indirect measures such as payment per recipient, size of recipient population, payments per \$1000 of personal income, or even broader variables of the aggregate redistributive impact of all expenditure and revenue programs are flawed. They focus on variables that are several steps removed from the actual political choices regarding redistribution. The adjusted guarantee is an explicit figure most proximate to the political process.

The approach we have taken yields other gains. Our general theory of redistribution gives a theoretical basis for the oft-observed correlation between economic variables (e.g., personal income or industrialization) and policy choice, and hence bypasses a problem that afflicts the political literature. From our perspective, the conflict between economic and political explanations of redistribution is an artificial one. Redistribution is not simply a function of economic or political factors, but is a result of legislative decisions shaped by voter preferences for transfers, interest group pressures for and against assistance, party competition, and the financial condition of the states.

Secondly, the discussion of diversity and voter preferences as related to the traditional state politics concept of socioeconomic development adds an important theoretical distinction heretofore missing in the literature. According to our model, variables that traditionally measure socioeconomic development properly should be broken down into 1) those financial and economic factors that directly shape voter choices, such as income, urbanization, and proximity to the poor, and 2) a broader collective or community notion that has here been labelled diversity. The former operate directly on the voters by shaping their ability and willingness to pay, whereas the latter is a property of the system that bears on the character of political institutions.

Last, the model properly incorporates the price incentives and financial constraints that condition individual and institutional choice.

The least satisfactory aspects of our analysis are the weak empirical links among our measures of redistributive preferences, diversity, and party, and their hypothesized effects. Our behavioral measures of statewide charitability are unsatisfactory. Contrary to prediction, per-capita contributions to the United Way charity and federal tax deductions for charitable contributions are negatively related. Thus, further search for nonobvious measures of this important determinant of party and group political behavior is in order. Similarly, our measure for diversity is not linked to interest group activity or to liberalism in the predicted manner. We may need to examine several different dimensions of diversity as the analysis by Sullivan (1973) implies. Finally, the insignificant link between liberal political party control and redistribution is puzzling. The erratic effect of party on policy is a common finding in the literature (Jones, 1973; Winters, 1976). However, others point out that the effect of party may be quite indirect, possibly being felt only via interaction between party control and competition (Jennings, 1979), or among party control, party liberalism, and changing control.

---

[21] Full results for specifications for *G* and $G+FS^*AVAIL$, and details on the data used in all estimates are available from either author.

Underlying our entire analysis has been the search for an integrated politico-economic theory of redistribution. We have not sought to compare and contrast political and economic explanations of redistribution, nor have we tried to demonstrate empirically that one approach is better than the other. Instead, an inclusive theory must address both the choices of individuals with diverse attitudes toward welfare and with varying resources acting as voters, members of interest groups, and supporters of political parties, and the aggregation of these choices via states' political institutions. We believe that the theory presented here takes a major step in this direction.

References

Albin, P., & Stein, B. Determinants of relief policy at the sub-federal level. *Southern Economic Journal,* 1971, *37,* 445-457.

Albritton, R. The politics of welfare. In V. Gray, H. Jacob, & K. Vines (Eds.). *Politics in the American states* (4th ed.). Boston: Little Brown, 1983, pp. 373-414.

Axelrod, R. Where the vote comes from: An analysis of electoral coalitions. *American Political Science Review,* 1972, *67,* 11-20.

Burstein, P. The sociology of democratic politics and government. In *Annual Review of Sociology,* 1981, *1,* 291-319.

Carmines, E., & McIver, J. An introduction to the analysis of models with unobserved variables. *Political Methodology,* 1983, *9,* 51-102.

Dahl, R. *Who governs?* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961.

Dahl, R., & Tufte, E. *Size and democracy.* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1973.

Dawson, R., & Gray, V. The politics of welfare. In H. Jacob & K. Vines (Eds.). *Politics in the American states* (2nd ed.). Boston: Little Brown, 1971.

Dawson, R., & Robinson, J. Inter-party competition, economic variables and welfare policies in the American states. *Journal of Politics,* 1963, *25,* 265-289.

Downs, A. *An economic theory of democracy.* New York: Harper, 1957.

Dye, T. *Politics, economics and the public: Policy outcomes in the American states.* Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966.

Eulau, H., & Prewitt, K. *Labyrinths of democracy: Adaptations, linkages, representation, and policies in urban areas.* Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1973.

Fry, B., & Winters, R. F. The politics of redistribution. *American Political Science Review,* 1970, *64,* 508-522.

Gary, L. E. Policy decisions in the aid to families with dependent children program: A comparative state analysis. *Journal of Politics,* 1973, *35,* 886-923.

Godwin, R. K., & Shepard, W. B. Political process and public expenditures. *American Political Science Review,* 1976, *70,* 1127-1135.

Gramlich, E. M. An econometric examination of the new federalism. *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,* 1982, *2,* 327-360.

Gray, V. Models of comparative state politics: Comparing cross-sectional and time series analyses. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1976, *20,* 235-256.

Gronbjerg, K. *Mass society and the extension of welfare, 1960-1970.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977.

Hochman, H., & Rodgers, J. Pareto optimal redistribution. *American Economic Review,* 1969, *59,* 542-557.

Hofferbert, R. State and community policy studies: A review of comparative input-output analyses. In J. A. Robinson (Ed.). *Political science annual* (Vol. 3). Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972.

Hofferbert, R. *The study of public policy.* Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1974.

Hulten, C. R., & McCallum, J. A model of state determination of AFDC benefits. Unpublished. Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1982.

Isaac, L., & Kelly, W. Racial insurgency, the state, and welfare expansion: Local and national level evidence from the postwar United States. *American Journal of Sociology,* 1981, *87,* 1348-1386.

Jacob, J., & Lipsky, M. Outputs, structure, and power: An assessment of changes in the study of state and local politics. *Journal of Politics,* 1968, *30,* 510-538.

Jennings, E. T. Competition, constituencies, and welfare policies in American states. *American Political Science Review,* 1979, *73,* 414-429.

Jones, C. State and local public policy analysis: A review of progress. In *Political science and state and local government.* Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association, 1973.

Jones, E. Political change and spending shifts in the American states. *American Politics Quarterly,* 1974, *2,* 159-178.

Joreskog, K. A general method for estimating a linear structural equation system. In A. Goldberger & O. Duncan (Eds.). *Structural equation models in the social sciences.* New York: Seminar Press, 1973, pp. 85-112.

Joreskog, K., & Sorbom, D. *LISREL V: User's guide.* Chicago: National Educational Resources, 1981.

Key, V. O. *Southern politics in the state and nation.* New York: Knopf, 1949.

Lewis-Beck, M. The relative importance of socioeconomic and political variables for public policy. *American Political Science Review,* 1977, *71,* 559-565.

Lipsky, M. Protest as a political resource. *American Political Science Review,* 1968, *62,* 1144-1158.

Lockard, D. *New England state politics.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959.

McConnell, G. *Private power and American democracy.* New York: Knopf, 1966.

Moffitt, R. The effects of grants-in-aid on state and local expenditures: The case of AFDC. Discussion Paper 729-83. Madison, Wis.: Institute for Research on Poverty, 1983.

Moynihan, D. P. *The politics of a guaranteed income.* New York: Vintage Books, 1973.

Mueller, D. *Public choice.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

Olson, M. *The logic of collective action.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965.

Olson, M. *The rise and decline of nations.* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983.

Orr, L. Food stamps for AFDC families: Income supplementation or fiscal relief? Unpublished, 1979.

Orr, L. Income transfers as a public good: An application to AFDC. *American Economic Review,* 1976, *66,* 359-371.

Orr, L. Reply. *American Economic Review,* 1978, *68,* 990-994.

Parsons, D. Demographic effects on public charity to the aged. *Journal of Human Resources,* 1982, *17,* 144-152.

Peltzman, S. Toward a more general theory of regulation. *Journal of Law and Economics,* 1976, *19,* 211-240.

Price, H. D. Rise and decline of one-party systems in the Anglo-American experience. In S. Huntington (Ed.). *Authoritarian politics in modern society.* New York: Basic Books, 1970, pp. 75-98.

Ranney, A. Parties in the American states. In H. Jacob & K. Vines (Eds.), *Politics in the American states* (3rd ed.). Boston: Little Brown, 1976, pp. 51-92.

Rodgers, J. Explaining income redistribution. In H. Hochman & G. Peterson (Eds.). *Redistribution through public choice.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1974, pp. 165-205.

Schiller, B. Income transfers as a public good: Comment. *American Economic Review,* 1978, *68,* 982-984.

Schumpeter, J. *Capitalism, socialism and democracy.* New York: Harper, 1947.

Spall, H. Income transfers as a public good: Comment. *American Economic Review,* 1978, *68,* 985-989. (a)

Spall, H. State tax structure and the supply of AFDC assistance. *Public Choice,* 1978, *33,* 85-96. (b)

Stigler, G. The theory of economic regulation. *Bell Journal of Economics and Management,* 1971, *2,* 2-21.

Sullivan, J. L. Political correlates of social, economic, and religious diversity in the American states. *Journal of Politics,* 1973, *35,* 70-84.

Tompkins, G. L. A causal model of state welfare expenditures. *Journal of Politics,* 1975, *37,* 392-416.

Tresch, R. State governments and the welfare system. *Southern Economic Journal,* 1975, *42,* 33-43.

Uslaner, E. M. Comparative state policy formation, interparty competition, and malapportionment: A new look at "V. O. Key's Hypothesis." *Journal of Politics,* 1978, *40,* 409-432.

Uslaner, E., & Weber, R. Politics of redistribution: Towards a model of policy making in the American states. *American Politics Quarterly,* 1975, *3,* 130-170.

Wilson, J. Q., & Banfield, E. Public-regardingness as a value premise in voting behavior. *American Political Science Review,* 1964, *58,* 876-887.

Winters, R. F. Party control and policy change. *American Journal of Political Science,* 1976, *20,* 597-636.

Modernization and Traditionality in a Multiethnic Society: The Soviet Case

ELLEN JONES
Defense Intelligence Agency

FRED W. GRUPP
Central Intelligence Agency

Exposure to modernizing institutions such as the school, factory, and city has been found to be associated with the breakdown in traditional values, beliefs, and behaviors in a wide variety of cultural settings. Socioeconomic change has had a similar impact on the late-modernizing Islamic minorities in the USSR. Although patriarchal attitudes and behaviors have persisted in some areas of family life, extensive shifts in family values and approved gender roles have occurred, particularly in the last two decades. These trends parallel those found in nonsocialist settings.

A growing body of evidence on the impact of modernizing institutions in cultural settings from Bangladesh to Boston suggests that exposure to institutions such as the school, factory, and city tends to be associated with a breakdown in traditional values, beliefs, and behaviors. The most ambitious attempt to explore the syndrome of individual modernity is Inkeles's and Smith's (1974) six-nation study. Their results show that males with the most exposure to modernizing institutions tended to score higher on a "modernity" scale. A sampling of modernity studies shows a similar link between modern institutions and individual modernity in many different national settings and social groups: adult male factory workers in Mexico and Brazil (Kahl, 1968); schoolchildren in Brazil (Holsinger, 1973) and Puerto Rico (Cunningham, 1974); schoolboys in Nigeria (Armer & Youtz, 1971); urban males in Pakistan (Ghazanfar, 1980); male parents in Ghana, India, and Brazil (Park, 1980); two generations of married men in India (Daykin & Hertel, 1978); teenage males in Mexico and North Carolina (Godwin, 1975); families with adolescent children in Tunisia (Klineberg, 1973); male workers in Tunisia (Sack, 1973); and blacks in Boston (Suzman, 1973).

The modernity literature has been criticized on both conceptual and empirical grounds. Some critics have argued that the measures of modernity are more accurately described as measures of western values (Armer, 1977a; Portes, 1973a). Others have criticized the assumed unidimensionality of the concept, the validity of the scales, and the methods used (Armer, 1975, 1977b; Armer & Schnaiberg, 1972; Coughenour & Stephenson, 1972; Godwin, 1975; Gough, 1977; Guthrie, 1970; Hagen, 1975; Rau, 1980; Stephenson, 1968). Still others have noted that much of the work on the relationship between modernization and modernity rests on observation of male subjects; the implicit assumption of research that ignores females is that the primary vehicle of value change within a given culture is the changing values and attitudes of its male component (Klineberg, 1973; Portes, 1973b; Rosen & LaRaia, 1972; Weisner & Abbott, 1977). Nonetheless, there is little doubt about the basic finding of the modernity literature: the process of modernization is associated with a breakdown in traditional attitudes, values, and to a lesser extent behaviors (Armer & Isaac, 1978; Kumar & Waisanen, 1979; Nachmias & Sadan, 1977; Sutcliffe, 1978; Trivedi, 1977).

To date, most individual modernity studies have focused on nonsocialist societies. There has been no systematic attempt to test the hypothesized relationships between modernization and traditionality in the Soviet Union. This is unfortunate because the USSR provides a particularly intriguing test of the individual modernity thesis. The Soviet Union is a multiethnic society whose minority citizens are separated from the dominant Russians by language, culture, lifestyle, and modernization level. These differences are particularly striking for Islamic minority groups in the USSR's less-developed southern provinces. The Soviet leadership has attempted to ameliorate the most glaring socioeconomic disparities, energetically endorsing a series of affirmative action programs

---

Received: October 13, 1983
Revision received: July 20, 1984
Accepted for publication: October 3, 1984

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency or the U.S. government.

explicitly designed to help its late-modernizing ethnic groups and regions to catch up with the more modernized Russians. These efforts have met with some degree of success (Bahry, 1983; Bahry & Nechemias, 1981). Although progress has been uneven, the less-modernized minorities are being drawn more fully into modern Soviet life (Jones & Grupp, 1982, 1984).

Has the modernization process resulted in the value change observed in nonsocialist settings? In particular, has increased exposure to modernizing institutions produced a modification of the traditional values and behavior patterns characteristic of the USSR's Islamic minorities?[1] The major difficulty in evaluating the extent to which modernization has resulted in value change is the availability of appropriate data. The individual modernity studies conducted in nonsocialist settings generally employ psychological tests, social surveys, or both to identify the modernity levels of individuals. Clearly, the most desirable way to test the relationship between exposure to modern institutions and traditional values in the USSR is to develop analogous instruments and to administer them to samples of Soviet citizens. The closed nature of Soviet society, however, precludes this approach.

There are alternative strategies. First, we isolated one dimension of modernity that would serve as the focus of investigation. In this study, we concentrate on that dimension of modernity/traditionality relating to sex roles and family values. We chose these values as a focus for research because the way people feel about home and family are among those values most resistant to change (Portes, 1973b; Stephenson, 1968).[2] Moreover, traditionality in family life represents one of the most dramatic characteristics distinguishing the late-modernizing Soviet Muslims from their more Europeanized counterparts in the north and west. Both Soviet and pre-revolutionary ethnographic studies underline the strength of patriarchal family values among Soviet Muslims.[3] Families operated as an economic unit of production; the oldest male, generally considered to be the head of the family, controlled the family's resources and property. The younger family members were required to defer to the elders, females to males (Sukhareva & Bikzhanova, 1955). Women were assigned an exclusively domestic role and derived social status from their position as wife and mother. Mothers of large families were considered particularly blessed, especially those who had many sons. Unquestioning obedience and fidelity to the husband and male head of household was mandatory and enforced by both physical fear and the wife's economic dependence on her husband. In short, pre-Soviet Muslim culture involved very rigid gender roles that limited females to those of wife, mother, and homemaker.

Examination of change and continuity in family traditionality in the Muslim southern tier thus provides a promising test of the individual modernity hypothesis. If modern institutions have operated in Soviet Asia as they have in other national settings, there should be considerable change in traditional family roles and values: those individuals with the most contact with modern institutions (city, school, and factory) *should have the most modern orientations toward* the family.

The alternative hypothesis is that exposure to modern institutions has produced little change in values and basic life styles, despite the efforts of Soviet authorities to promote such change. Indeed, some western observers of developments in the USSR's Muslim borderlands are dubious of the Soviet ability to modify traditional value systems among Islamic groups (Rywkin, 1982). These doubts are most emphatically embodied in Helene Carrere d'Encausse's concept of *Homo islamicus*:

---

[1] The terms Muslim and Islamic are used throughout the article to refer to cultural heritage, not religious belief. The major Muslim groups in the USSR include the Azeri, Kirgiz, Kazakhs, Turkmen, Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, and Tatars.

[2] On the relationship of modernity to fertility and family practices, see also Miller and Inkeles (1974); Mukherjee (1977); and Inkeles (1980).

[3] There were, of course, significant variations in the pre-revolutionary social systems that produced important ethnic, regional, and socioeconomic class differences in the social position of Muslim women. In general, the social systems of nomadic and semi-nomadic Muslim peoples, such as the Kazakhs and the Kirgiz, involved somewhat more egalitarian sex roles. Women's roles in traditional oasis cultures of Soviet Asia, characteristic of Uzbeks and Tadziks, were more strictly circumscribed (Bikzhanova, 1959; Gadzhiyeva, 1971; Kislyakov, 1954; Lobacheva, 1975; Luzbetak, 1951; Smirnova, 1968). Women practiced veiling, and homes were frequently divided into men's and women's quarters to conform with Islamic law forbidding a woman to show her face to men other than her husband and close relatives. Even among oasis peoples, however, sexual segregation was less strict in rural areas. Similarly, patriarchal traditions and sexual segregation were practiced more fully among higher status families (Bacon, 1980). These ethnic, regional, and class differences in sex roles among Muslim peoples are important because they help to explain the varying degree of success enjoyed by Bolshevik programs to "liberate" Muslim women.

> Without doubt in every modern society, urbanization, improved transportation, education, and the media all serve to break down barriers, to alter and standardize human thought. In the USSR, however, despite these factors which are an integral part of modern life everywhere, despite a continuous effort by the political system to encourage interethnic contacts and dispel differences in Soviet political culture, it seems clear that in the Moslem regions the attempt to transform human thought has run into an almost impenetrable socio-cultural situation. (Carrere d'Encausse, 1979, p. 249)

If this emphasis on resistance to modernization is correct, the USSR's Islamic minorities represent an exception to the individual modernity theory. This would be an important exception for two reasons. First, Soviets of Muslim heitage represent a substantial and growing proportion of the USSR's non-Russian population. Developments affecting these groups will surely have a salient impact on cultural patterns in the Soviet Union as a whole. Second, and more important from the perspective of comparative research, the USSR's Islamic groups share a core of cultural values with many Muslim groups beyond the Soviet borders. Trends affecting Soviet Muslims have much to tell us about how other Muslim populations may react to the impact of modernization.

To test these competing hypotheses, we used two types of data: the published results of Soviet surveys and aggregate behavioral indicators of female roles. Relevant Soviet surveys include demographic studies of ethnic differences in expected and desired family size and family planning use. These surveys tend to be based on very large samples of Soviet citizens and are likely to be representative of the larger population. Also available are ethnosociological studies that include questions on attitudes toward employed wives and mothers, communal child care, the distribution of household tasks, family decision making, and parental authority. These questions tend not to have unambiguous "right" or "wrong" answers. Although official Soviet statements often idealize large families and discourage family planning, many official Soviet commentators endorse medium-size families. Official attitudes toward employment and motherhood are similarly ambiguous. In other words, the findings of the survey questions in these areas are not apt to be skewed by respondents who give what they perceive to be the "expected" response. Findings from these surveys provide useful data for evaluating the individual modernity theory. If this theory is correct, those Soviet Muslims who have been most exposed to modernized institutions should display attitudes similar to those of their counterparts in the USSR's European regions.

Soviet surveys have two major shortcomings as a source of information on values. The first is that the raw data collected by Soviet researchers are not available to western scholars for secondary analysis. The problem with this is not that the Soviet researchers select out findings that are not in conformity with regime expectations; indeed, much of the data presented by Soviet social scientists runs counter to official ideals. Rather, the problem is that results are most often presented in bivariate format. For example, Soviet authors often present tables showing age differences in response to a particular question, while additional tables may present the results broken out by educational level. Without access to the raw data, however, one cannot investigate how age and education might interact with each other (or with other variables such as social class, gender, or ethnicity). The bivariate results are interesting and informative, but they do not permit multivariate modeling of the individual modernity process.

A second shortcoming of these data is that they are cross-sectional. We cannot examine trends over time and, therefore, demonstrate that the respondents are becoming more modern. For that we must rely on aggregate behavioral indicators of female participation in modern Soviet life. Also examined are the relationships between these behavioral indicators of individual modernity and measures of exposure to modernizing institutions. If the trends and relationships demonstrated by the aggregate analysis are consistent with the findings of the surveys, we can be more confident that our results are not contaminated by the ecological fallacy.

Survey Results

Attitudes toward Family Limitation

One of the most graphic reflections of traditionality in life styles among Muslims inside and outside of the Soviet Union is the high value placed on large families.[4] To what degree have traditional preferences for large families shifted under the impact of modernization? Recent Soviet demographic surveys show that ethnic differences in family size expectations are still very great; Russian women report an average expected family size of two children; for many Muslim groups, the expected family size is nearly six (Vishnevskiy & Volkov, 1983, p. 187). Nonetheless, age, education, and place of residence breakdowns for these indicators suggest that these differences are eroding in precisely the directions suggested by the individual modernity hypothesis (Belova, 1983; Jones & Grupp, 1981). Younger Muslim women expect much smaller families than their older sisters. Muslim women from urban areas, particularly large cities, report a much smaller expected family size than do their rural counterparts. Educational level is also negatively correlated with Muslim family size. These research findings indicate that urbanity, education, and occupation are having the same natality-inhibiting affects on Muslim women that they had earlier on their European counterparts. When one or more of these characteristics is controlled, ethnic family size differences narrow dramatically. For example, a survey of young, unmarried women in Baku (a large city in the Muslim southern tier) found only marginal differences between the family size desires of the European Russians and the Islamic Azeris (Akhmedov, 1974). Such trends suggest that traditional values regarding the family are slowly eroding among the less modernized groups.

---

[4] Preference for large families, however, is not always accompanied by high levels of fertility. Poor health conditions, lengthy breastfeeding, postpartum sexual taboos, and high infant and child mortality often operate to keep fertility and completed family size low (Coale, Anderson, & Harm, 1979). In many developing regions, birth under-registration keeps reported fertility at artificially low levels (Jones & Grupp, 1983). Reported fertility, then, is not apt to be a good measure of the extent to which a culture values large families.

These changes in the value placed on large families have been accompanied by modifications of the entire system of values relating to home, family, and appropriate female roles, including changes in Muslim attitudes regarding family planning, working wives, child care, and the sharing of household chores. Use of family planning methods is of particular importance because achievement of the smaller family sizes that frees married women for a more active occupational role is not possible without broad acceptance of family limitation techniques. Although comparative data on family planning in the USSR are extremely limited, it appears that use of family planning among Muslims, as among other Soviet women, is most widespread among better educated, employed urbanites. For example, a 1972 study of Russian and Kirgiz women in the southern tier republic of Kirgizia showed that among indigenous nationalities, 50% of the urban respondents and 27% of the rural respondents used family planning methods. The corresponding findings for European nationalities were 76% and 69% (Abdullin, 1977).

Muslim women who want to limit their families rely heavily on abortion as a means of family planning. Abortion use among the more traditional women, including Muslims, is directly related to education and status (Dzhangishiyev, 1973). A study of family formation among urban Muslims with four or more children, for example, found a higher incidence of abortion among the most highly educated women (Katkova & Mamatokhunova, 1976). The results of a study of child-bearing activities in the first seven years of marriage among Muslim women in Alma Ata are similar. Muslim women with higher education averaged 2.28 abortions; those with secondary education only 1.99 abortions. The European and Islamic women in this study reported nearly identical abortion rates (Katkova, 1977). A similar pattern is evident in family planning data from the southern tier republic of Azerbaydzhan. A republic-wide survey of women seeking abortions found that highly educated women and urban residents had the most frequent recourse to abortion (Mamedov, 1976). The direct link between status indicators and abortion use for Islamic women was also found in a sample survey of pregnancy and birth histories in the four Central Asian republics (Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirgizia, and Turkmenistan) (Aliakberova, 1976, 1978, 1980). In European areas of the USSR, by contrast, abortion use is inversely related to status, apparently because high-status women in these areas who want to limit their families are making more effective use of contraceptive techniques (Arutyunyan, 1968; Katkova, 1971, pp. 66-72; 1977).

Muslim women make less frequent use of contraception than their European counterparts. In the study of Muslim mothers of four mentioned above, only 16% of the total sample used contraceptive techniques. Although no directly comparable data for other nationalities are available, several studies of family planning practices in other areas of the USSR showed that 70-80% of the couples who have completed their families practice contraception (Darskiy & Belova, 1969; Katkova, 1971, p. 80; Shlindman & Zvidrinish, 1973, pp. 134-145). Higher status women of all nationalities, however, report more frequent use of contraception. One study of Islamic women, for example, showed that 27% of the working wives and only 4% of the housewives reported use of contraceptive methods (Katkova & Mamatokhunova, 1976). In the Azerbaydzhan survey, well-educated women and urban respondents made more effective use of contraceptive methods (Mamedov, 1976). Muslim use of family planning methods of any kind is much less frequent among rural women, particularly housewives (Buriyeva, 1978; Golin, 1971).

Although it emphasizes the resilience of traditional preferences for large families, the data on family limitation are consistent with individual modernity theory. Large families are still popular in the Islamic southern tier regions of the USSR, and family planning methods are far less widespread than in the European areas to the west and north. Those Muslim women most exposed to modern institutions, however, prefer and expect strikingly smaller families than their less-modernized counterparts, and they are willing to use family-planning methods like abortion that are strongly condemned by traditional Muslim values. Younger, better-educated, urban women and those employed in high-status jobs have been most affected by the erosion in family size values, whereas older, rural, less-educated housewives have been virtually unaffected. This pattern may result partly from the conservatism of rural communities and partly from the fact that religious and cultural disapproval of birth control practices is probably strongest in the countryside.

Attitudes toward Employed Wives and Mothers

Another key aspect of the changing role of women is popular acceptance of employed wives and mothers. Soviet survey researchers typically include at least two questions touching on this issue. In one, respondents are asked which of two family life styles is most attractive to them. Two women with an identical specialty marry and have children. In one family, the wife works; she, the husband, and a grown son all share the housework equally. In the other family, the wife is a full-time homemaker. Because traditional patriarchal values in many Islamic areas have stressed the woman's role as wife and mother, one would expect to find widespread resistance to the more egalitarian life style of the employed mother. Comparative data demonstrate, however, that most Soviets, including those from traditional Islamic areas, favor a combination of career and motherhood. In the Uzbekistan study, for example, 64% of the urban respondents and 72% of the rural respondents favored employment for the wife (Mirkhasilov, 1979b).[5] In rural Estonia (a European area), 65% of the women and 53% of the men reported a preference for the first lifestyle (Arutyunyan & Kakhk, 1979, pp. 54-55). This pattern of stronger support among females for the employed-mother role was found in Islamic Uzbekistan as well. In both the urban and rural samples, support for the employed mother was stronger among females.

A similar pattern emerged when respondents were asked a second question: whether or not they favored employment for the mother even if family finances didn't require it or she was "fully occupied" with housework and children. Even under these conditions, 59% of the rural Muslim respondents and 56% of the urban Muslim respondents in Uzbekistan still favored employment outside the home; an "overwhelming majority" of urban Muslim women in Kirgizia endorsed the working mother role (Karakeyeva, 1979, pp. 149-156; Mirkhasilov, 1979a, b). In rural Estonia, 57% of the females and 47% of the males chose this response (Arutyunyan & Kakhk, 1979, pp. 54-55). Higher status, younger and better educated respondents from both European and Muslim areas tended to be more in favor of an active professional life for the women (Arutyunyan, 1973b, 1980, p. 92; Mirkhasilov, 1979a).

Strong support for paid employment was also found among women employed in various fields in a separate study conducted in the Islamic province of Dagestan between 1973 and 1978. Respondents were asked about their attitudes toward the participation of women in the paid labor force; 76% of the urban respondents and 61% of the rural residents considered such participation "necessary." The European women in this survey reported somewhat stronger support for female employment than their Islamic counterparts; 86% of the ethnic Russian women, compared to 65% of the Islamic Dagestanis, considered employment a necessity for women. Only 3% of the Russians felt that a woman should confine herself only to housework, compared with 26% of the Dagestanis. However, social class, not nationality, was the major factor differentiating employment motives, with women in white-collar jobs more likely to report that they were motivated to work by a combination of financial reasons *and* the desire for self-realization (Abdusalamova, 1981). The Dagestan study is particularly revealing because this area is among the most traditional of all Muslim regions in terms of the gender role measures of native women, yet acceptance of the dual mother-worker role among employed Dagestani women is remarkably strong.

The patterns demonstrated in the data reviewed thus far indicate a relatively high degree of acceptance of the employed wife and mother in the USSR by both European and non-European groups, even when the family does not need her income. How does this compare to attitudes about female employment in other industrialized countries? A 1975 European Economic Community poll of 10 European countries also included questions designed to tap popular attitudes toward working wives.[6] In this case, each male respondent (married men only) was asked whether he preferred his wife to work, and each female respondent (married women only) was asked whether she preferred to work. Only 41% of the males favored employment for their wives. As in the Uzbekistan data, women more readily endorsed employment; 64% of the married women preferred to be employed. The American public is somewhat more strongly supportive of the full-time homemaker, especially if she has children. A 1978 *Time* magazine survey in the United States found that 77% of the sample agreed that a mother with young children should not work outside the home unless it was financially necessary (Barron & Yankelovich, 1980, p. 61). Because the questions used in these surveys are not identical to those used by Soviet ethnographers, these findings are not directly comparable to the Soviet data, but they do permit us to place the Soviet data in better perspective, highlighting the relatively strong public support for working wives and mothers in the USSR. The impact of modern life, coupled with economic necessity and an energetic socialization program that stresses the working-mother role model, have produced strong approval for female labor-force participation in the Soviet Union, even among the most traditional Islamic groups.

---

[5] The higher rural percentage may reflect the greater ease with which many rural wives and mothers can integrate both family and employment responsibilities; female employment in an urban environment more often means non-agricultural employment.

[6] Euro-Barometer 3. Data made available by the ICPSR.

Communal Child Care

Other Soviet data suggest that an important corollary to working motherhood—communal child care—receives generally favorable support among women from traditional southern-tier areas. One study of Islamic women with large families in Uzbekistan showed that although 60% of the respondents favored caring for infants in the home, women with longer employment histories had more favorable attitudes toward communal child care (Katkova & Mamatokhunova, 1976). Strong support for communal child care for older children (ages three and above) were reported in a study of Russian and Muslim (Kazakh) families in the Asian republic of Kazakhstan (Zhelokhovtseva & Sviridova, 1973). An ethnographic survey in the Muslim province of Tataria showed that Russian and Muslim urbanites had virtually the same proportions of children in child-care facilities (Arutyunyan, 1973, pp. 185-186). Although far from conclusive, these findings suggest a relatively high level of receptivity to communal child care, even for very young children, among later-modernizing groups that might be expected to advocate that mothers remain in the home caring for their small children.

Family Life and Divorce

Another useful barometer of family values is the extent to which the traditional division of household labor has persisted even in the face of high female participation in the paid labor force. In the traditional patriarchal families that dominated the social system in Soviet Asia before the Bolshevik takeover, virtually all domestic tasks were the woman's responsibility (Khashimov, 1972, pp. 107-113). Soviet ethnographic studies of Islamic areas published in the 1950s and early 1960s noted that traditional attitudes toward housework had begun to change. By the postwar period, some husbands, particularly the younger ones, had begun to assist their wives in tasks that had earlier been considered women's work, such as child care. This was particularly true in families where the young wife was employed outside the home. But many men, particularly those in the older generation, still scorned such necessary but mundane chores as demeaning (Dzhumagulov, 1960, p. 60; Sukhareva & Bikzhanova, 1955, pp. 190-191).

More recent ethnographic data indicate that even husbands in traditional Islamic families have grudgingly shouldered a more equitable share of the housework. Fifty-eight percent of the urban Muslim respondents in Uzbekistan reported that the husband helped with both the housework and child care (Mirkhasilov, 1979b). Another question, which was asked in several surveys, allowed the respondent to specify the extent of that help. In 21% of the rural Muslim families in Uzbekistan, couples shared household chores equally; in 52% of the families, the husband assisted his wife; and in 7% of the families, husbands did not help at all (Mirkhasilov, 1977, pp. 36-41). These findings are comparable to those for European groups (Arutyunyan, 1973b). Another survey of the distribution of household responsibilities in Islamic Kirgizia showed that Muslim husbands were about as likely to lend a hand with household tasks that are traditionally defined as woman's work (laundry, food preparation, cleaning, and mopping) as their European counterparts. Sharing the household chores was much more common among urban families of both nationalities (Kharchev, 1979, pp. 259-260). Supporting this finding is a mid-1970s study of rural Muslim families; in a third of the families surveyed, the husband did a significant portion of the housework. Husbands whose wives contributed a large portion of the family income were the most likely to take a more active role in household chores (Sushanlo, 1979, pp. 45-51).

The available data on sharing of tasks in Muslim families suggest that patterns of family responsibility here are similar to those in central and western USSR. Of course what is missing from all of these surveys is an actual breakdown of time spent by each spouse on each task. Individual perceptions of assistance and equal sharing are highly subjective; and Soviet studies that present results broken down by husband and wife demonstrate substantial differences in perceptions, with husbands evaluating their own contributions to housework more generously than their spouses (Yurkevich, 1970, pp. 189-190). Moreover, results of time-budget surveys show huge disparities in the actual amount of time spent by each spouse on domestic obligations. According to a recent survey conducted in eight cities in the European republic of Lithuania, for example, women typically spent far more time on housework than did men (Klichyus, 1980, pp. 32-39). A study of working-class families in Islamic Azerbaydzhan demonstrated a similar pattern (Abbasov, 1980, p. 57). As such studies make clear, the typical Soviet husband may be fairly willing to lend a hand with household tasks, but the bulk of the time spent by the family on housework is spent by his wife.[7] Nonetheless, the available information suggests that although the Soviet wife still suffers from a double burden of job and housework, her husband's willingness to share at least some of the domestic tasks depends less upon his nationality than on his social status and place of residence. Traditional Islamic gender role values have not, it seems, spared the Muslim husband from at least a small portion of the housework.

Another area where exposure to modern institutions has resulted in some erosion of traditional views is that of distribution of family authority. To be sure, the traditional view regarding the husband as the head of the family and primary decisionmaker still persists in many areas of the Soviet southern tier (Gantskaya, 1974, 1977; Mirkhasilov, 1979). However, these traditional patterns of family authority are less pronounced for the younger and better-educated members of Islamic groups. For example, in a 1969 survey of rural Muslim couples in Dagestan, younger husbands were more likely to consult with their wives and placed a higher value on her opinion than did the older-generation husbands (Abdurakhimov, 1970). Ethnographic surveys in Muslim Uzbekistan indicate that, as in European settings, more modernized couples were more likely to share family decision making (Arutyunyan & Drobizhiva, 1976; Mirkhasilov, 1979b). In Islamic Kirgizia, researchers found only marginal differences between Kirgiz and Russian attitudes on whether the husband should always act as head of the family (Attokurov, 1983, pp. 94-96).

Traditional values remain much stronger with regard to divorce. Even the more modernized Muslim couples are considerably less willing to terminate an unhappy marriage than European couples (Drobizheva & Tul'tseva, 1982). A higher percentage of Uzbeks reject the possibility of a divorce if the couple has children; 87% of the rural Uzbeks and 84% of the urban Uzbeks rejected divorce under these conditions. This compares with significantly lower rates among the more modernized European groups: 73% of the urban Georgians, 67% of the Moldavians, and 51% of the Estonians (Arutyunyan, 1977, pp. 244-246; Drobizheva, 1981, pp. 164-165; Mirkhasilov, 1979).[8] Age-specific data from the Estonian study suggest that the widespread acceptance of divorce in families with children occurred only recently; older respondents were more insistent on keeping the marriage intact if the couple had children (Arutyunyan & Kakhk, 1979, pp. 51-52). The strong Islamic insistence on keeping the family together has affected the attitudes of ethnic Russians who live in these regions. Of the Russians residing in Uzbekistan, 63% rejected divorce if children were involved; this compares with 54% of the Russians residing in the Russian republic and 50% of those residing in Estonia, one of the most westernized of the Soviet republics (Arutyunyan & Kakhk, 1979, pp. 118-119).

Parental Authority

Another area that for at least some Muslim minorities has been relatively insulated from the impact of modernization is the pattern of attitudes toward the older generation. To measure values relating to parental authority, Soviet ethnographic surveys typically ask whether the respondent feels that parental approval is needed to get married. Respondents from the southern tier area, both Muslim and non-Muslim republics, are considerably more deferential to parental authority than are their counterparts in European USSR (Arutyunyan, 1977, p. 245; Arutyunyan & Mirkhasilov, 1979; Mirkhasilov, 1979b). The contrast between the European Estonians and the Muslim Uzbeks is particularly striking. Compared to 92% of the Uzbeks, only 25% of the Estonians felt that parental approval was required for marriage. For European groups, the effect of modern institutions (i.e., urban residence) is to erode the perceived need for parental approval. This has not occurred among Islamic groups. Adherence to traditional values that mandate parental approval before marriage is only slightly lower among Uzbek urban dwellers than their counterparts in the country. Moreover, the high value placed on parental approval is still very strong even among the youngest Uzbeks surveyed: 90% of the 20- to 24-year-old rural Uzbeks claimed that parental approval was a prerequisite to marriage—a proportion only marginally lower than the 94% of the over 60-year olds who voiced the same opinion (Arutyunyan, 1980b). As with attitudes toward divorce, the prevailing value system that mandates deference to older generations in the Islamic regions appears to affect the attitudes of Russians who reside there. Among Russians, only 35% living in Estonia and 38% living in the RSFSR felt that parental approval is mandatory, compared to 55% of those Russians living in Uzbekistan (Arutyunyan & Kakhk, 1979, pp. 118-119).

---

[7] Soviet women are not alone in their double burden. A 1978 *Time* survey in the United States found that over half of the respondents felt it was "the wife's responsibility to make sure that the house is clean and neat, even if she works as hard as her husband" (Barron & Yankelovitch, 1980, p. 80).

[8] In a 1978 U.S. survey, only 39% of the respondents rejected divorce if young children were involved (Barron & Yankelovitch, 1980, p. 84).

These findings demonstrate both change and continuity in measures of traditionality. Exposure to modern institutions is indeed associated with more modernized family life styles; the more Europeanized Muslims—the better educated, younger urbanites—are more Europeanized in many aspects of family life. Other facets of traditionality, however, have been more resistant to the impact of modern life (Arutyunyan & Drobizheva, 1981). Respect for parental authority, for instance, is still much stronger among Islamic groups than their European counterparts; youth and urban residence appear to have only a marginal influence on this core value.

Behavioral Indicators of Family Values

The cross-sectional data summarized above permit us to examine variations in the strength of traditional family values within late-modernizing ethnic groups and to compare and contrast traditionality between European and non-European minority groups. Those data do not, however, allow an assessment of trends over time, because the Soviets have not released either time series data or the results of panel studies. To evaluate changes in life styles, we must turn instead to behavioral indicators of family values that are reported in the aggregate for nationalities. Three behavioral measures are examined below: female access to education, female labor force participation in high status occupations, and early marriage.

Female Education

One manifestation of the strength of traditionality in gender roles in the Muslim southern tier regions was the widespread resistance to the Bolshevik program of sending young girls to school (Vagabov, 1968). Female access to education, therefore, provides one measure of traditionality in family values. The use of female educational opportunity as a surrogate measure of traditionality finds strong support in survey results from nonsocialist settings. Scanzoni (1975) found that education levels and the rejection of the traditional-wife role were positively correlated among American wives, except for older Catholics. His findings were confirmed by Bagozzi and Van Loo's (1980) reanalysis of the data. Similar links between the woman's acceptance of more egalitarian sex roles and her education level have been reported by other researchers (Jones, 1980; Mason, 1975; Thornton & Friedman, 1979; Tobin, 1976). Nor does the relationship between education and traditionality in family values appear to be limited to western industrial societies. It has also been reported for Taiwan (Sun & Soong, 1979); Brazil (Rosen & LaRaia, 1972); and Ghana (Smock, 1977).

Time series data on female educational attainment in the USSR show that more restrictive attitudes toward women's roles in the Islamic southern tier are mirrored in relatively low female educational attainment. However, considerable change has taken place in the past two decades among late-modernizing groups (Table 1, cols. 1-4). Generally speaking, minority women who were less well-educated than Russian women have made significant gains in the percentage of women over age 10 with completed secondary education, college education, or both. To be sure, significant differences in female attainment still separate the late-modernizing minorities from their European counterparts, and the Soviet press still contains stories critical of parents who neglect to send their daughters to school and of husbands who interfere with their wife's desire for further education. However, considering how far Muslim women have come in six decades, enhanced female access to education, even among groups traditionally resistant to female schooling, provides persuasive (although indirect) evidence of a substantial shift in popular attitudes toward the proper roles for women among the traditional Soviet minorities.

Female Access to High Status Jobs

Another indicator of female roles is female access to modern, high-status occupations. This measure was chosen instead of female labor force participation per se because research findings on

Table 1. Female Participation in Soviet Life (Number per 1,000 Women)

	High School Graduate and Above[a]		College Graduate[b]		Specialists[c]		Early Marriage[d]	
	1959	1970	1959	1970	1959	1970	1959	1970
Slavs								
Russians	158	258	23	42	106	190	93	91
Ukrainians	113	216	13	28	71	141	101	112
Belorussians	107	202	10	24	71	136	70	76
Balts								
Estonians	165	256	16	40	109	213	42	49
Latvians	155	251	17	37	103	191	45	59
Lithuanians	83	177	11	30	74	164	48	54
Muslims								
Uzbeks	42	136	3	12	20	62	318	217
Kazakhs	51	151	4	17	36	100	287	123
Azeri	86	155	13	22	58	101	278	183
Kirgiz	47	139	4	14	32	77	442	201
Tadzhiks	32	108	2	7	16	40	366	249
Turkmen	37	116	3	9	15	47	320	191
Bashkirs	58	118	4	11	36	86	130	85
Balkars	30	125	1	15	49	101	70	60
Tatars	83	162	9	20	63	118	80	71
Chechens	4	36	0	2	4	19	404	199
Dargintsy	17	55	1	8	NA	NA	208	186
Kumyks	40	114	3	14	NA	NA	214	152
Lezgins	39	101	3	12	NA	NA	185	130
Ingush	15	62	2	7	5	37	149	90
Kabardinians	68	167	4	15	61	92	111	140
Avars	17	64	1	8	NA	NA	202	185
Adygir	84	199	6	27	NA	123	NA	NA
Karachayev	35	126	2	21	NA	93	NA	NA
Cherkess	59	161	2	22	NA	154	NA	NA
Karakalpak	27	106	2	12	NA	64	395	231
Abkhazy	122	231	11	41	NA	121	102	95
Others								
Georgians	284	401	47	75	110	169	107	134
Moldavians	38	98	3	11	33	70	149	119
Armenians	210	308	33	49	96	151	158	152
Buryats	93	206	13	40	84	214	80	40
Komis	112	170	11	21	130	260	69	61
Maris	37	75	3	8	29	65	61	56
Udmurts	62	113	5	12	46	96	70	69
Chuvash	70	127	5	11	45	91	44	63
Yakuts	71	184	7	25	79	176	55	32
Jews	606	687	240	304	NA	452	NA	NA
Mordvinians	42	96	2	7	28	73	71	67
Kalmyk	29	116	2	16	38	115	115	56
Karelians	63	117	4	12	65	144	58	59
Osetins	198	312	24	46	100	170	35	53
Tuvins	26	150	1	18	33	113	157	84
Altay	57	112	4	15	NA	172	NA	NA
Khakas	52	111	6	20	NA	127	NA	NA
Komi-Permyaks	54	94	1	6	NA	NA	NA	NA
CV	1.14	.652	2.77	1.66	.591	.587	.742	.543
Soviet Score	139	234	20	37	90	171	112	106
T value	21.25*		9.19*		12.30*		3.95*	

*$P < .001$.

NOTES TO TABLE 1:

---

[a] Number of women with high school diplomas or more education per thousand women aged 10+. Source: *Itogi*, vol. 4, pp. 393-548.

[b] Number of college graduates per thousand women aged 10+. Source: *Itogi*, vol. 4, pp. 393-548.

[c] The number of specialists per thousand women aged 20-54. Specialist data derived from *Zhenshchiny v SSSR*, pp. 76-77. Nationality age groups derived from: *Itogi*, 1970, vol. 4, pp. 360-382; *Itogi vsesoyuznoy perepisi naseleniya 1959 goda SSSR*, pp. 211-225; and *Itogi*, 1959, *RSFSR*, pp. 388-409.

[d] The number of married women per thousand women aged 16-19. Source: *Itogi, 1970*, vol. 4, pp. 383-392.

the relationship between female employment in the paid labor force and the retention of traditional values in nonsocialist settings are mixed (Sanday, 1974; Scanzoni, 1975). There is stronger empirical support for use of female access to high-status occupations. For example, Rosen and Simmons (1971) found a strong relationship between female participation in high-status jobs and nontraditional sex role attitudes. For our test in the Soviet context, we used the "specialist" portion of the white-collar labor force. Specialist occupations range from mid-level status, such as technicians and nurses to higher-status occupations such as scientific researcher, engineer, and physician.[9]

The data on female participation in the specialist workforce (Table 1, cols. 5-6) reinforce the conclusions suggested by the education data. The more traditional gender role values in the Islamic regions are clearly reflected in more restricted female access to high-status jobs in these areas. Nonetheless, dramatic increases in the proportion of working-aged women who held specialist jobs occurred between 1959 and 1970; indeed, almost all of the less-modernized minority groups increased their scores relative to the Russians during this period. There remains, to be sure, a substantial gap between the Russian women and some of their less-modernized counterparts. Almost a fifth of the 20- to 54-year-old Russian women were specialists in 1970, whereas fewer than 2% of the Chechen women were specialists. Clearly the Soviets have a long way to go to integrate the Muslim woman as fully into the specialist labor force as her Russian counterpart in Moscow (Lubin, 1981). Nonetheless, these data provide dramatic evidence that cultural barriers to female participation in the modernized labor force among traditional minority groups are being overcome.

Early Marriage

The third indicator of the social role of women is early marriage. The traditional stress on the women's role as wife and mother was coupled in many areas with social pressures to marry at an early age. Early marriage was undesirable to the Bolshevik leadership for both economic and ideological reasons, but legislating the marital age upwards in the Soviet southern tier proved difficult because many Muslim families simply ignored the marriage law (Vagabov, 1980, pp. 139-143). Nonetheless, the proportion of early marriages (in which the bride is younger than 20) decreased dramatically among Soviet Muslims and other traditional minorities during the 1960s (Table 1, cols. 7-8). Fragmentary ethnographic data indicate that this trend continued in the 1970s (Gadirzade, 1983). The marriage data reinforce the conclusion—drawn from the educational and occupational data—that a gradual breakdown in traditional female roles is occurring in the late-modernizing Muslim areas.

The Statistical Link between Modernity and Traditionality

The survey data summarized earlier indicate that those individuals with the greatest exposure to modern institutions expressed more European, less traditional attitudes on many issues relating to family life styles and sex roles. The census data reported above indicate that female roles have changed over time in the USSR as a whole and among late-modernizing groups in particular. To test the relationship further, we examined the statistical link between one measure of exposure to modern institutions (urbanization) and various measures of female participation in modern life.[10]

---

[9] Status ratings for various professions are drawn from Soviet studies of the social prestige of occupations. For example, see Titma (1982, pp. 8-35), Titma (1975, pp. 128, 144), *Molodezh i trud* (pp. 85-88), and Vodzinskaya (1969).

[10] Our use of educational and occupational participation as surrogate measures of female traditionality limits our choice of independent variables in explaining the change that took place between the two Soviet censuses to urbanization level. Clearly, we cannot have educational and occupational measures on both sides of the equation.

Figure 1. Urbanization and Female Higher Education
All Variables Logged Base 10



The results of these tests lend limited support to the individual modernity hypothesis.

The strongest link is between urbanization and female college education. Figure 1 presents the results of regressions of the percentage of adult females (logged) with college degrees on the percentage urban (logged) for 43 nationality groups in 1959 and 1970.[11] Two other groups were excluded—the Jews, the most modernized, urbanized and educated nationality group, and the Muslim Chechens, who score lowest on all three dimensions; the two outliers are plotted in Figure 1, but not included in the calculation of the regressions. In 1959, 43% of the variance in female higher education (adjusted r square) is explained by urbanization level ($t = 5.77$; $p < .001$). Also plotted in Figure 1 are the regression lines computed separately for the 23 non-Muslim and 20 Muslim groups. The stronger relationship between urbanization and female education among the non-Muslim groups in 1959 is not unexpected—traditional Muslim values regarding female roles dampened, but did not halt, the effects of modernization. Adding a dummy Muslim variable to the 1959 regression ($t = -2.7$; $p < .01$) increases the adjusted r square by eight percentage points to 51%.

The analogous regression for 1970 data explains a smaller, but still statistically significant, 21% of the variance ($t = 3.51$; $p < .005$) for the 43 nationality groups. For the non-Muslim groups, a relatively strong linear relationship remained in 1970 (beta, .582, down from .750 in 1959). This weakening of the relationship among the more modernized non-Muslim groups was the result of the muting of urban-rural differences that occurs as the value of female higher education becomes diffused throughout society. For the Muslim groups, the linear relationship between urbanization and female higher education disappeared by 1970 (beta, .077, down from .473 in 1959). For the 1970 data, the dummy Muslim variable was statistically insignificant.

The absence of a relationship between urbanization and female higher education for the Muslim groups in 1970 was probably the result of government intervention. Urbanization rates for some of these groups increased only marginally in the intercensal period, but access to higher education expanded significantly, partly because of government education policy, such as quotas for minority students, and partly because of the youthful age structures of the more traditional groups. Many of the dramatic gains in Muslim higher education by 1970 can be traced to this increased educational opportunity (Jones & Grupp, 1984). The 1960s were also a period in which government-sponsored programs to increase female access to higher education were accelerated. That Muslim *women,* as well as Muslim men, were willing to take advantage of this enhanced educational opportunity during the intercensal period is evidence of considerable value change among those groups. The net effect of these changes was to wash out the relationship between urbanization and female higher education.

Other measures of female roles show much weaker links with urbanization. The relationship between urbanization and early marriage rates, for instance, is in the predicted direction, but is relatively weak: $r = -.31$ in 1959 and $-.28$ in 1970 for the 38 groups for which we have complete data. The statistical relationship between urbanization and early marriage practices was even weaker when we lagged the data; the correlation between 1959 urbanization and 1970 early marriage is only $-.21$.

Analysis of the statistical relationship between modernization level (as measured by percentage urban) and traditionality (as measured by female education and early marriage rates) provides findings that, although not overwhelmingly strong, are generally consistent with the individual modernity hypothesis. It may be argued, however, that the hypothesis should be tested dynamically. Accordingly, we computed change scores[12] for level of urbanization and for female participation rates. Correlation of change in percentage urban with change in the various measures of female participation provides results that are either weak or contrary to the hypothesis. For example, the correlation between change in urbanization and change in early marriage rates is .55, that is, in the direction opposite to that expected: those ethnic groups with the smallest increases in percentage urban showed the greatest decline in early marriage rates. The urbanization level of the Chechen, for example, actually declined between 1959 and 1970, yet their early marriage rate declined by 51%, from 404 per thousand women in 1959 to 199 in 1970.

Results more consistent with the individual modernity hypothesis were obtained when we controlled for modernization level through the use of two-stage regression. First, female change scores were regressed on the analogous change in male rates for the same indicator (except for early marriage, discussed further below), and then the residuals were regressed on change in urbanization. In other words, the modernization level of the group as indicated by the appropriate male rate was removed from the analysis to determine the independent contribution of urbanization. The rationale for this procedure is that groups where males have much higher levels of achieved education than their female counterparts are qualitatively different in terms of modernization from groups where both sexes have nearly equivalent (either high or low) educational achievement.

---

[11] The variables were logged to help overcome the skewness of the distribution and reduce the impact of extreme values.

[12] Psychologists have led the way in condemning the use of change scores in analyzing treatment effects, primarily because they compound measurement error. Here, however, the individuals are different (16- to 19-year-old females at two time periods) and the measurement errors, although unknown, are likely to be consistent across the two censuses. Early marriage rates for Soviet nationalities from the 1979 Soviet census have not been released.

Change in urbanization explains 14% of the variance in the residuals when change in female specialized secondary education is the dependent variable ($t = 2.74$; $p < .01$). Analogous two-stage regressions for change in female college and specialist participation produced weaker results; change in urbanization explains 5% and 8% of the variance respectively. As before, early marriage does not conform to the individual modernization hypothesis. No matter what male rate is used to partial out modernization, the residuals are always related to change in urbanization positively, not negatively as required by the hypothesis, which indicates that changes in family values and female roles can occur very rapidly once they begin to be diffused throughout a society.

In sum, statistical tests of the modernity-traditionality link provide only limited support for the hypothesis that levels of traditionality are statistically related to modernization levels. These mixed results are probably owed at least in part to the weaknesses of the available measures. Urbanization in particular is likely to decline in strength as a predictor of modern values. Increased mass communications are likely to diffuse urban values to rural regions even without a commensurate increase in the percentage who are urban.

Conclusion

The evidence we examined points to areas of both change and continuity in family life styles. Patriarchal attitudes and behavior patterns have persisted most strongly in four areas: family size, family planning use, acceptance of patriarchal authority patterns, and attitudes regarding the role of marriage. Survey results on certain issues, such as those relating to parental authority, suggest that even those members of the late-modernizing groups most exposed to modern institutions (i.e., young urban residents) hold traditional values virtually identical to those of their older and less-modernized counterparts. The persistence of these behavioral and attitudinal patterns indicate that there are, as Carrere d'Encausse has suggested, important aspects of continuity in family values.

These areas of continuing ethnic difference, however, should not obscure the extensive shifts in life styles, attitudes, and basic values regarding home and family that have occurred and continue to occur. Over the last two decades, there has been dramatic change in gender roles in the late-modernizing regions of the USSR. Data on female educational attainments provide persuasive evidence that the Soviet strategy of promoting fuller female access to education has worked very well. Data on labor force participation show increasing levels of female entry into the modernized labor force, even in Muslim southern-tier areas where such access had been quite limited. Public attitudes toward the working mother in the Muslim areas do not seem very different from those in the European regions to the north and west. Many women from even the most traditional areas exhibit a surprisingly high degree of acceptance of institutional child care.

The increasingly active "public" role of women from traditional minorities has been accompanied by changes in their domestic role as well. Data on marital patterns indicate that these trends have been paralleled by dramatic declines in the percentage of early marriages among groups for whom early marriage had long been the predominant way of life. The traditional support for very large families in the southern tier has also begun to diminish. Although use of family planning is still relatively limited in the traditional areas, the younger, better-educated, and employed women are beginning to display patterns of family planning acceptance similar to those of their European counterparts. Some of the more dramatic ethnic differences, even in those areas of family life that display the most resistance to change, virtually disappear when key socioeconomic variables are controlled. The identical pattern of abortion use by young Kazakh and Russian women in the Alma Ata study and the similarity of family size desires among young Azeri and Russian women in Baku are two examples. Distribution of household tasks seems to be determined more by social status variables than by nationality or region of residence. These findings point to aspects of life style and values that are generally compatible with the "Soviet" family system in central USSR. These trends are all the more significant precisely because many of the changes documented above are in areas thought to be least susceptible to change.

These findings are in close accord with the conclusions reached by western scholars studying the role of modern institutions on the attitudes, behavior, and personality traits of individuals. Those studies have consistently found that exposure to modern institutions—school, factory, and city—increased individual modernity. The most powerful predictor of modern values across a variety of national settings was education (Holsinger & Thiesen, 1977). Some of the modernity studies included questions similar to the Soviet ethnographic survey questions. For example, Kahl's study in Mexico included a series of questions on family modernism, tapping acceptance of divorce as a way of resolving an unhappy marriage, beliefs regarding parental authority, and attitudes toward working wives. Composite scores on this measure were positively related to socioeconomic status (Kahl, 1968, pp. 33, 47-48). Other studies by western scholars that focus more narrowly on gender roles show a similar nexus between exposure to modern institutions, particularly school, and support for egalitarian sex roles (see, for example, Scanzoni, 1975, pp. 19-62). The Soviet data, which demonstrate a direct link between exposure to modern institutions and modern family and sex role values and behavior, are quite consistent with these findings.

The USSR's late-modernizing ethnic groups, then, do not appear to be an exception to the generalization that contact with modern socioeconomic settings tends to produce individuals with less traditional, more modern values. Although the cultural heritage of Islam has made some of the USSR's Muslim regions more resistant to the erosion of traditional family values associated with modernization, Islamic heritage has not rendered those groups immune to the effect of socioeconomic development. Exposure to mass communications, education, urban life, modern occupations, and the modern bureaucracy in the USSR has produced dramatic changes in family values and gender roles—changes that parallel those found in nonsocialist settings.

References

Abbasov, A. A. *Sovremennyy byt i kultura gornopromyshlennykh rabochikh Azerbaydzhana.* Baku: Elm, 1980.

Abdullin, K. D. Study of the reproductive situation of married women in Kirgizia. *Zdravookhraneniye Kirgizii,* 1977, *5,* 8-12.

Abdurakhimov, M. A. The role of moral duty in family-everyday ethics. In *Sotsociologicheskiy sbornik.* Makhachkala: Dagestanskiy Filal AN SSSR, 1970, pp. 117-135.

Abdusalamova, T. A. Female labor activity in Dagestan. *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya,* 1981, *4,* 140-143.

Akhmedov, A. Several results of a study of opinions of young women on the number of children in the family. *Vestnik Statistiki,* 1974, *8,* 16-21.

Aliakberova, N. M. Analysis of contemporary fertility developments in Central Asia. In *Regional'nyye demograficheskiye issledovaniya.* Tashkent: Tashkent State University, 1978, pp. 18-26.

Aliakberova, N. M. Birthrate in the rural family. In *Demografiya sem'i.* Tashkent: Tashkent State University, 1980, pp. 14-26.

Aliakberova, N. M. Fertility trends in Central Asia. In *Sotsial'noekonomicheskiye osobennosti vosproizvodstva naseleniya v usloviyakh razvitogo sotsializma* (vol. 2). Kiev, 1976, pp. 134-136.

Armer, M. Education and social change: An examination of the modernity thesis. *Studies in Comparative International Development,* 1977, *12*(3), 86-99. (a)

Armer, M. Reply to Cohen and Till. *American Sociological Review,* 1977, *42*(2), 378-382. (b)

Armer, M. Review of education and individual modernity in developing countries. *School Review,* 1975, *85*(1), 164-167.

Armer, M., & Isaac, L. Determinants and behavioral consequences of psychological modernity: Empirical evidence from Costa Rica. *American Sociological Review,* 1978, *43,* 316-334.

Armer, M., & Schnaiberg, A. Measuring individual modernity: A near myth. *American Sociological Review,* 1972, *37,* 301-316.

Armer, M., & Youtz, R. Formal education and individual modernity in an African society. *American Journal of Sociology,* 1971, *76,* 604-626.

Arutyunyan, Yu.V. International and national-specific in the Soviet way of life. In *Sotsialisticheskiy obraz zhizni i voprosy ideologicheskoy raboty.* Moscow: Politizdat, 1977, pp. 244-246.

Arutyunyan, Yu.V. National-regional variation in the Soviet village. *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya,* 1980, *3,* 78-81. (b)

Arutyunyan, Yu.V. *Opyt etnosotsiologicheskogo issledovaniya obraza zhizni. Po materialam moldavskoy SSR.* Moscow: Nauka, 1980. (a)

Arutyunyan, Yu.V. On several tendencies in a nation's cultural pattern. *Sovetskaya Etnografiya,* 1973, *4,* 3-13. (b)

Arutyunyan, L. A. Several peculiarities of family planning in Armenia. In M. A. Adonts & L. M. Davtyan (Eds.), *Materialy vsesoyuznoy nauchnoy konferentsii po problemam narodonaseleniya zakavkaz'ya.* Yerevan: Scientific Research Institute of Economy and Planning, 1968, pp. 37-40.

Arutyunyan, Yu.V. *Sotsial'noye i natsional'noye. Opyt etnosotsiologicheskikh issledovaniy po materialam tatarskoy ASSR.* Moscow: Nauka, 1973. (a)

Arutyunyan, Yu.V., & Drobizheva, L. M. Ethnosociological research in the USSR. *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya,* 1981, *1,* 64-70.

Arutyunyan, Yu.V., & Drobizheva, L. M. Soviet form of life: General and nationality-specific. *Sovetskaya Etnografiya,* 1976, *3,* 10-21.

Arutyunyan, Yu.V., & Kakhk, Yu. *Sotsiologicheskiye ocherki o sovetskoy estonii.* Tallin: Periodika, 1979.

Arutyunyan, Yu.V., & Mirhasilov, S. M. Ethnosociological research of culture and life in Uzbekistan. *Obshchestvennyy nauki v Uzbekistane,* 1979, *1,* 36-41.

Attokurov, T. *Sem'ya i kommunisticheskoye vospitaniye.* Frunze: Kyrgyzstan, 1983.

Bacon, E. E. *Central Asians under Russian rule: A study of culture change.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1980.

Bagozzi, R. P., & Van Loo, M. F. Decisionmaking and fertility: A theory of exchange in the family. In T. K. Burch (Ed.). *Demographic behavior: Interdisciplinary perspectives in decisionmaking.* Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1980.

Bahry, D. Political inequality and public policy among the Soviet republics. In D. N. Nelson (Ed.). *Communism and the politics of inequalities.* Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, pp. 109-127.

Bahry, D. & Nechemias, C. Half full or half empty? The debate over Soviet regional equality. *Slavic Review,* 1981, *40*(3), 366-383.

Barron, D., & Yankelovich, D. *Today's American woman: How the public sees her.* Study prepared for the President's Advisory Committee for Women, 1980.

Belova, V., *et al.* Dynamics and differentiation of birthrate in the USSR. *Vestnik Statistiki,* 1983, *12,* 14-24.

Bikzhanova, M. A. *Sem'ya v kolkhozakh uzbekistana.* Tashkent: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk Uzbekskoy SSR, 1959.

Buriyeva, M. Family formation in rural Uzbekistan. In *Lyudi v gorode i na sele.* Moscow: Statistika, 1978, pp. 95-102.

Carrere d'Encausse, H. *Decline of an empire. The Soviet Socialist Republics in revolt.* M. Sokolowsky & I. La Farge (Trans.). New York: Newsweek Books, 1979.

Coale, A. J., Anderson, B., and Harm, E. *Human fertility in Russia since the nineteenth century.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979.

Coughenour, C. M., & Stephenson, J. B. Measures of individual modernity: Review and commentary. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology,* *13*(2), 81-98.

Cunningham, I. The relationship between modernity of students in a Puerto Rican high school and their academic performance, peers, and parents. In A. Inkeles & D. B. Holsinger (Eds.). *Education and individual modernity in developing countries.* Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974, pp. 47-88.

Darskiy, L.Ye., & Belova, V. A. Social-hygienic questions connected with marriage and childbirth in families. *Zdravookhraneniye rossiyskoy federatsii,* 1969, *3,* 14-17.

Daykin, D. S., & Hertel, B. R. The bearing of urbanism and socioeconomic status on individual modernity in India. *The Eastern Anthropologist,* 1978, *31*(4), 379-392.

Drobizheva, L. M. *Dukhovnaya obshchnost narodov SSSR. Istoriko-sotsiologischeskiy ocherk mezhnational'nykh otnosheniy.* Moscow: Mysl', 1981.

Drobizheva, L. M., & Tul'tseva, L. A. Marriage rituals in public opinion. *Sovetskaya Etnografiya,* 1982, *5,* 33-40.

Dzhangishiyev, N.Kh. 1973. Social-hygenic characteristics of the birthrate in Leninskiy Rayon of Dagestan ASSR. *Zdravookhraneniye rossiyskoy federatsii,* 1973, *3,* 16-19.

Dzhumagulov, A. *Sem'ya i brak u kirgizov chuyskoy doliny.* Frunze: AN Kirgizskoy SSR. Institut Istorii, 1960.

Gadirzade, G. I. Dynamics of average marital age of Azeris. *Polevyye issledovaniya instituta etnografii. 1979.* Moscow: Nauka, 1983, pp. 134-137.

Gadzhiyeva, S.Sh. et al. (Eds.). *Sovremennaya kul'tura i byt narodov Dagestana.* Moscow: Nauka, 1971.

Gantskaya, O. A. Ethnicity and family in the USSR. *Sovetskaya Etnografiya,* 1974, *3,* 20-29.

Gantskaya, O. A. General tendencies of ethno-social development of marriage and family relations. In *Sovremennyye etnicheskiye protsessy v SSSR* (2nd ed.). Moscow: Nauka, 1977, pp. 433-460.

Ghazanfar, S. M. Individual modernity in relation to economic-demographic characteristics: Some evidence from Pakistan. *Studies in Comparative International Development,* 1980, *15,* 37-53.

Godwin, R. K. The relationship between scores on individual modernity scales and societal modernization. *The Journal of Developing Areas,* 1975, *9* (April), 415-432.

Golin, Ya.I. Birthrate in Dagestan. *Zdravookhraneniye rossiyskoy federatsii,* 1971, *12,* 9-13.

Golin, Ya.I. Indicators of population reproduction in Dagestan ASSR. *Zdravookhraneniye rossiyskoy federatsii,* 1972, *10,* 6-8.

Gough, H. G. Further validation of a measure of individual modernity. *Journal of Personality Assessment,* 1977, *41*(1), 49-57.

Guthrie, G. M. *The psychology of modernization in the rural Philippines.* Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1970.

Hagen, E. E. Becoming modern: The dangers of research governed by preconception. *History of Childhood Quarterly,* 1975 (Winter), 411-421.

Holsinger, D. B. The elementary school as modernizer: A Brazilian study. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology,* 1975, *14*(3), 180-202.

Holsinger, D. B., & Thiesen, G. L. Education, individual modernity, and national development: A critical appraisal. *Journal of Developing Areas,* 1977, *11*(3), 315-333.

Inkeles, A. Modernization and family patterns: A test of convergence theory. *Conspectus of History,* 1980, *1*(5), 31-63.

Inkeles, A., & Smith, D. H. *Becoming modern: Individual change in six developing countries.* London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1974.

Jones, E., & Grupp, F. W. Infant mortality trends in the Soviet Union. *Population and Development Review,* 1983, *9*(2), 213-246.

Jones, E., & Grupp, F. W. Measuring nationality trends in the Soviet Union: A research note. *Slavic Review,* 1982, *41* (Spring), 112-122.

Jones, E., & Grupp, F. W. Modernisation and ethnic equalisation in the USSR. *Soviet Studies,* 1984, *36*(2), 159-184.

Jones, E., & Grupp, F. W. Socio-cultural development and political stability in the Soviet multinational state. Presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, 1981.

Jones, P. A. Sociopsychological correlates of family traditionalism. In E. Anthony & C. Chiland (Eds.). *Preventive child psychology in an age of transitions.* New York: Wiley, 1980.

Kahl, J. *The measurement of modernism: A study of values in Britain and Mexico.* Austin: University of

Texas Press, 1968.

Karakeyeva, S. I. The experience of studying the cultural and life style of Kirgiz urban families. *Polevyye issledovaniya instituta etnografii, 1977.* Moscow: Nauka, 1979, pp. 149-156.

Katkova, I. Particularities of demographic behavior of families in the first years of marriage. *Molodaya Sem'ya.* Moscow: Statistika, 1977.

Katkova, I. *Rozhdayemost' v molodykh sem'yakh.* Moscow: Meditsina, 1971.

Katkova, I., & Mamatokhunova, A. Several aspects of the formation of contemporary large families. In D. I. Valentey (Ed.). *Demograficheskaya situatsiya v SSSR.* Moscow: Statistika, 1976, pp. 81-89.

Kharchev, A. G. *Brak i sem'ya v SSSR.* Moscow: Mysl', 1979.

Khashimov, A.Kh. *Formirovaniye novykh semeyno-bytovykh otnosheniy u narodov sredney azii.* Dushanbe: Irfon, 1972.

Kislyakov, N. A. (Ed.). *Kul'tura i byt Tadzhikskogo kolkhoznogo krestyanstva.* Moscow: Izdatelstvo AN SSSR, 1954.

Klichyus, A. Several peculiarities of the lifestyles of families in small cities. In P. Gulyan (Ed.). *Sotsial'no-demograficheskiye issledovaniya sem'i v respublikakh sovetskoy pribaltiki.* Riga: Zinatne, 1980, pp. 32-39.

Klineberg, S. L. Parents, schools and modernity: An exploratory investigation of sex differences in the attitudinal development of Tunisian adolescents. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology,* 1973, *24,* 221-244.

Kumar, K., & Waisanen, F. B. Education, adoption of innovation and individual modernity. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology,* 1979, *20*(3-4), 213-223.

Lobacheva, N. P. *Formirovaniye novoy obryadnosti Uzbekov.* Moscow: Nauka, 1975.

Lubin, N. Women in Soviet Central Asia: Progress and contradictions. *Soviet Studies,* 1981, *33*(2), 182-203.

Luzbetak, L. J. *Marriage and the family in Caucasia* (Vol. 3). Vienna: St. Gabriells Mission Press, 1951.

Mamedov, K. V. Several methodological aspects of studying the impact of socio-economic factors on the reproductive functions of women. In *Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskiye osobennosti vosproizvodstva naseleniya v usloviyakh razvitogo sotsializma* (Vol. 2). Kiev, 1976, pp. 41-43.

Mason, K. O. U.S. women's sex role ideology. *American Journal of Sociology,* 1975, *80*(5), 1212-1219.

Miller, K. A., & Inkeles, A. Modernization and acceptance of family limitation in four developing countries. *Journal of Social Issues,* 1974, *30*(4), 167-188.

Mirkhasilov, S. M. Contemporary families of the rural population of Uzbekistan. *Obshchestvennyye nauki v Uzbekistane,* 1977, *4,* 36-41.

Mirkhasilov, S. M. Social-cultural changes and their reflections in the contemporary family of the rural population of Uzbekistan. *Sovetskaya Etnografiya,* 1979, *1,* 3-15. (a)

Mirkhasilov, S. M. On several tendencies in the development of contemporary families in Uzbekistan. *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya,* 1979, *1,* 121-123. (b)

Molodezh' i trud. Moscow: Molodaya Guardiya, 1970.

Mukherjee, B. N. The role of some modernity value orientations in fertility behavior. *Indian Journal of Psychology,* 1977, *52* (March), 1-84.

Nachmias, C., & Sadan, E. Individual modernity, schooling and economic performance of family farm operators in Israel. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology,* 1977, *18*(3-4), 268-279.

Park, W. Modernity and views of education: A comparative study of three countries. *Comparative Education Review,* 1980, *1,* 35-47.

Portes, A. The factorial structure of modernity: Empirical replications and a critique. *American Journal of Sociology,* 79, 15-44. (b)

Portes, A. Modernity and development: A critique. *Studies in Comparative International Development,* 1973, *8*(3), 247-279. (a)

Rau, W. C. The tacit conventions of the modernity school: An analysis of key assumptions. *American Sociological Review,* 1980, *45,* 244-260.

Rosen, B. C., & La Raia, A. L. Modernity in women: An index of social change in Brazil. *Journal of Marriage and the Family,* 1972, *34,* 353-360.

Rosen, B. C., & Simmons, A. B. Industrialization, family, and fertility: A structural-psychological analysis of the Brazilian case. *Demography,* 1971, *8*(1), 49-70.

Rywkin, M. *Moscow's Muslim challenge. Soviet Central Asia.* London: M.E. Sharpe, 1982.

Sack, R. The impact of education on individual modernity in Tunisia. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology,* 1973, *14*(3-4), 245-272.

Sanday, P. Female status in the public domain. In M. Rosaldo & L. Lamphere (Eds.). *Woman, culture, and society.* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1974, pp. 189-206.

Scanzoni, J. H. *Sex roles, life styles, and childbearing.* New York: Free Press, 1975.

Shlindman, Sh., & Zvidrinish, P. *Izucheniye rozhdayemosti.* Moscow: Statistika, 1973.

Smirnova, Ya.S. Family and family life. In J. K. Gardanov (Ed.). *Kul'tura i byt narodov severnogo kavkaza.* Moscow: Nauka, 1968.

Smock, A. C. The impact of modernization on women's position in the family in Ghana. In A. Schegal (Ed.). *Sexual stratification: A cross-cultural view.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, pp. 192-214.

Stephenson, J. B. Is everyone going modern? A critique and a suggestion for measuring modernism. *The American Journal of Sociology,* 1968, *74,* 265-275.

Sukhareva, O. A., & Bikzhanova, M. A. *Proshloye i nastoyashcheye seleniya aykyran. Opyt etnograficheskogo izucheniya kolkhoza im Stalina Chartakskogo rayona Namaganskoy oblasti.* Tashkent: Izdatel'stvo AN Uzbekskoy SSR, 1955.

Sun, T. H., & Soong, Y. L. On its way to zero population growth: Fertility transition in Taiwan, Republic of China. *Fertility Transition of the East Asian Populations.* Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1979.

Sushanlo, M. *Sem'ya i semeynyy byt Dungan.* Frunze: Ilim, 1979.

Sutcliffe, C. R. The predictive power of measures of individual modernity: A critique of the paradigm of modernization. *Comparative Political Studies,* 1978, *11*(1), 128-136.

Suzman, R. M. Psychological modernity. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology,* 1973, *14*(3-4), 273-287.

Thornton, A., & Friedman, D. Change in the sex role attitudes of women, 1962-1977: Evidence from a panel study. *American Sociological Review,* 1979, *4*(5), 831-842.

Titma, M.Kh. *Sotsial'no-professional'naya orientatsiya molodezhi* (Vol. 2). Tallin: Eesti raamat, 1982.

Titma, M.Kh. *Vybor professii kak sotsial'naya problema.* Moscow: Mysl', 1975.

Tobin, P. L. Conjugal role definitions, value of children, and contraceptive practice. *The Sociological Quarterly,* 1976, *17,* 314-322.

Trivedi, D. N. Causes of individual modernity: A study among railroad employees in India. *Human Organization,* 1977, *36*(2), 150-155.

Vagabov, M. V. *Islam i sem'ya.* Moscow: Nauka, 1980.

Vagabov, M. V. *Islam i zhenshchina.* Moscow: Mysl', 1968.

Vishnevskiy, A. G., & Volkov, A. G. (Eds.). *Vosproizvodstvo naseleniya SSSR.* Moscow: Finansy i Statisika, 1983.

Vodzinskaya, V. V. On the social conditionality of choice of profession. *Sotsial'nyye problemy truda i proizvodstva.* Moscow: Mysl', 1969, pp. 39-61.

Weisner, T. S., & Abbott, S. Women, modernity, and stress: Three contrasting contexts for change in East Africa. *Journal of Anthopological Research,* 1977, *33*(4), 421-451.

Yurkevich, N. G. *Sovetskaya sem'ya.* Minsk: Izdatelstvo BGU im V. I. Lenina, 1970.

Zhelokhovtseva, I. N., & Sviridova, L.Ye. To the question of realizing desired family size. *Sovetskoye zdravookhraneniye,* 1973, *4,* 24-27.

War Making and State Making: Governmental Expenditures, Tax Revenues, and Global Wars

KAREN A. RASLER
Arizona State University

WILLIAM R. THOMPSON
Claremont Graduate School

Addressing the disputed relationship between war and the expansion of governmental expenditures and revenues, Box-Tiao intervention models are applied to a number of British (1700-1980), United States (1792-1980), French (1815-1979), and Japanese (1878-1980) spending and taxation series. Distinguishing between global and interstate wars, the more intensive and extensive bouts of warfare (global wars) tend to bring about abrupt, permanent impacts in contrast to the temporary changes associated with most interstate wars. The observed displacements are reflected in both war-related and nonwar-related types of expenditure and are also observed before 1900. Although our findings are not universally applicable and are subject to various other qualifications, they may be interpreted, in general, as reinforcing the need for an appreciation of the persistent centrality of war, especially global war, in the discontinuous growth and expansion of the modern state.

We live in an era in which the appropriate scope of governmental activities is a subject of intensive political debate. Conservatives complain that governmental expansion and the encroachment of the public sector on the private sector have gone too far and must be curbed. Liberals, on the other hand, complain that the process has not gone far enough to satisfy the demands of public welfare. Whatever one's ideological persuasion, it is clear that governments have expanded the scope of their activities and functions. But even if this last statement enjoys consensus agreement, it is by no means evident that we have a clear understanding of how and why states have expanded their scale of operation. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, for instance, advocates of Wagner's Law contended that governmental activities would expand in roughly linear response to the development of growth-related social problems (see Bird, 1971; Wagner & Weber, 1977). However, Peacock and Wiseman (1961) have argued that governmental expansion has outpaced economic growth in the twentieth century and that increasing the scope of governmental functions requires the advent of national crisis so that the popular reluctance to accept tax increases can be overwhelmed by the need to respond to the crisis. We agree that long-run governmental growth tends to be discontinuous but contend that, for certain states at least, the principal agent of change is a singular type of crisis—global war—and that the fundamental war making-state building process is much older than developments relatively unique to the twentieth century. Throughout the remainder of this article, we will attempt to provide empirical support for this longer-term view by examining the long-term pattern of changes in governmental expenditures and revenues in relation to the onset of different types of war. In the process, we hope to contribute to the overcoming of our collective underappreciation of the general significance of war (see Stein & Russett, 1980) to an understanding of domestic changes and developments.

The Expenditure Displacement Hypothesis

Expressed most simply, Peacock's and Wiseman's (1961) displacement hypothesis states that governmental expenditures will increase during periods of national crisis and that although expenditures may decline in the post-crisis period, they will remain higher than pre-crisis expenditure levels. This permanent displacement effect on ex-

---

Received: July 12, 1983
Revision received: September 14, 1984
Accepted for publication: October 3, 1984
The research reported in this article has been supported by National Science Foundation grants SES 82-06063 (Rasler) and SES 82-06062 (Thompson). An earlier version of this article was presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Mexico City, Mexico, April, 1983. The comments of a number of reviewers have helped clarify the presentation of our findings.

penditures is attributed primarily to crisis-induced shifts in taxpayers' perceptions of what tax-burden levels are viewed as tolerable. Depending on the governmental decision makers' attitudes toward the roles of public expenditures and their willingness to take advantage of the opportunity, major crises, especially wars, work to weaken or override normal (non-crisis) resistance to increased taxes. Tax revenues therefore are easier to raise. Wars, in addition, offer excellent opportunities to revise or overhaul the prevailing tax system and to create new sources of revenue. As a result, the widened tax base facilitates greater spending after the war or crisis than before.

Peacock and Wiseman (1961) present a detailed examination of Great Britain's principally twentieth-century expenditure patterns as a test of their hypothesis. Because their central hypothesis is attitudinally based, there are of course very real constraints on the extent to which expenditure data can be used to address their thesis. Through the visual examination of a large number of spending series, however, they are able to demonstrate that World Wars I and II brought about major shifts in governmental spending that cannot be accounted for by either population growth, inflation, or economic growth. Further support for their interpretation is produced by the finding that the expenditure increases are not due solely to increases in war-related and military costs. If this had been the case, the expenditure displacement process would represent merely the periodic augmentation of military spending and the gradual accumulation of war debts and pensions. But because non-military and war-related spending increases as well, Peacock and Wiseman view this indicator as evidence of genuine governmental role expansion made possible by the involvement of a society in crisis or war.

Beyond the difficulty of tapping taxpayer attitudes with spending patterns, the Peacock-Wiseman evidence is also restricted by the small sample of one state and their exclusive reliance on the visual examination of longitudinal plots of numerous expenditure series. Yet their hypothesis has stimulated a respectably extensive literature that sometimes uses more sophisticated empirical techniques or expands the number of countries surveyed or both. Although the most popular examples remain the British and American ones, the following states have also received some expenditure displacement effect attention: Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Japan, Panama, Sweden, and Taiwan. Looked upon in the aggregate, the empirical outcomes represent some decidedly mixed support for the original Peacock-Wiseman assertion. Four conclusions seem to have emerged.

Crises associated with world wars:

1. bring about permanent changes in state expenditure levels (Emi, 1963; Gupta, 1967).
2. sometimes bring about permanent changes in state expenditure levels (Andre & Delorme, 1978; Blondal, 1969; Kaufman, 1983; Tussing & Henning, 1974).
3. create, at best, only temporary, not permanent, shifts in state expenditure levels. The temporary impact may be attributed to the wartime higher priority given to military over civilian spending (Borcherding, 1977a, b; Musgrave, 1969; Pryor, 1968; Reddy, 1970) or postwar increases in civilian spending presumably related to addressing war damages and reconstruction (Bonin, Finch, & Waters, 1967; Rosenfeld, 1973).
4. may effect expenditure growth but so do a number of other influences (Bennett & Johnson, 1980; Meltzer & Richard, 1978) including non-world wars (Emi, 1963; Leff, 1982; Nagarjan, 1979), depression (Blondal, 1969; Gupta, 1967), and changes in governmental philosophies during peacetime (Goffman & Mahar, 1971; Mahar & Rezende, 1975; Reddy, 1970).

Clearly, the four conclusions do not add up to anything resembling a consensus. Nor can the extent of disagreement be explained away by the variety of examined countries. For example, all four conclusions have been arrived at by different analysts of the same or similar British and American expenditure data. To be sure, some of the findings should be viewed with more skepticism than some of the others, owing to various research design problems.[1] Nevertheless, it is apparent that several questions deserve further investigation. Does the war-induced expenditure displacement phenomenon apply to Great Britain? To what extent does it apply outside of Great Britain? Alternatively, Peacock and Wiseman's explanation stresses "national crises," but their examination is restricted primarily to the effects of World Wars I and II. Yet several authors contend that some interstate wars (e.g., the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War for Japan, the 1962 Indo-Chinese War for India) had greater impacts on spending patterns than some of the twentieth century's world wars. Other authors find significant impacts associated with World War I but not World War II and vice versa. Do all wars influence governmental spending in idiosyncratic ways and to varying extents? Or, are some kinds of warfare, such as "world wars," more likely than others to bring about permanent expenditure displacement effects?

---

[1] For Peacock's and Wiseman's reactions to some of this literature's design problems, see Wiseman and Diamond (1975) and Peacock and Wiseman (1979).

The War Making-State Making Interpretation

The variety of specification problems raised by the empirical studies that have followed Peacock and Wiseman do not exhaust the questions that need to be raised about the asserted displacement process. The Peacock-Wiseman emphasis on the crisis-induced stretching of tax burden tolerances is not implausible, and we see no need to reject it completely. But it is very much a twentieth-century explanation in flavor, just as it is based primarily on the examination of twentieth-century data. If the displacement phenomenon, however, is much older than the twentieth century, it is conceivable that a more general or broader and less time-bound explanation is needed.[2]

Support for our contention that the displacement process predates the twentieth century is not particularly difficult to find. Tilly's (1975, 1979) expression that "war made the state and the state made war" summarizes a number of overlapping views on the long-term contribution of war to several hundred years of European state-building (see Ames & Rapp, 1977; Anderson, 1974; Ardant, 1975; Bean, 1973; Braun, 1975; Eichenberg, 1983; Gilpin, 1981; Gourevitch, 1978; Hintze, 1975; McNeill, 1982; Modelski, 1972; North & Thomas, 1973). A primary, if not the primary, imperative of state building has been the suppression of internal rivals and the defeat of external enemies. To remain in power at home and competitive abroad, military preparations have been essential and increasingly costly as military technology has improved. To pay for these seemingly ever-rising military costs, rulers have felt compelled to extract more and more resources from their populations. To collect and manage the increasing scale of these resource extractions, rulers have been forced or encouraged to create and expand their state's bureaucratic-administration apparatus as well.

This version of the death-and-taxes cycle has not been unaffected by change. Economic growth in general, and industrial development in particular, have made tax collections easier and more remunerative, but these same developments have also contributed to the likelihood of more intensive and costlier wars. The idea of national debt has been invented to overcome shortfalls in tax revenues, especially in time of war, but the institutionalization of state debts also implies long-term debt accumulation and predictable debt interest payment schedules (increasing organizational fixed costs). Much more recently, and hardly in isolation from other ongoing developments, the scope of governmental intervention in society and economy has also expanded. Yet although these developments may have modified the processes of state building and expansion, it is doubtful that they have been so radically transformed that we need to look for entirely new patterns. Interstate competition, wars, and the increasing costs of military preparations have not disappeared, nor has the need to pay for these activities. It seems reasonable to suggest, therefore, that the historical connection between war making and state making and expansion is a persistent one.

The differences between this historical perspective on the growth of the state and the Peacock-Wiseman interpretation can be viewed as a matter of degree and emphasis. Peacock and Wiseman stress an image of contemporary state decision makers, with a perceived need to expand the scope of governmental activities, taking advantage of periods of crisis and war to expand their revenue base. The longer view does not preclude this inherently opportunistic possibility, but it chooses to emphasize instead a broader conceptualization of states owing their very organizational existence and raison d'etre to the need to survive, and to prevail, during the periods of warfare. Confronted with very real threats, decision makers are compelled to mobilize human and material resources at their disposal in the interest of state security and military victory. At war's end, successful and unsuccessful states demobilize, but there is no reason to assume or to expect that the demobilization will be complete, except perhaps in cases of absolute defeat. Nor is it likely that state decision makers will insist on the strict restoration of the state's prewar role in national society. To the contrary, the realities of wartime change will make turning back the political clock extremely difficult and unlikely:

---

[2] We are reluctant to argue that the twentieth century is an era generally characterized by more governmental sensitivity to taxpayer preference schedules. It is true that taxpayer revolts, Proposition 13 notwithstanding, were once more common than they are currently. But whether this generalization suggests greater governmental sensitivity or greater taxpayer passivity, resignation, acquiescence, or all of the above, remains debatable. Nevertheless, we are suggesting that contemporary anaysts are much more conditioned to emphasize popular constraints on governmental expansion than they were likely to before the twentieth century. In a similar vein, Wagner's Law's complete avoidance of the subject of war betrays a late-nineteenth-century flavor. As Bird (1971, p. 4) notes, Wagner's late-nineteenth-century generation did not expect wars to be very common in the future.

New sources of revenue will have been created and old sources will have been expanded, embellished, and perhaps made more efficient.

New social problems (e.g., price controls, provision for the homeless and refugees, concerns over inadequate diets and education for the draft-eligible portions of the population, the need to suppress racial tensions at home and in combat units, reconstruction) will emerge and old problems will receive greater political attention than before.

New domestic political coalitions may emerge or have an improved opportunity to emerge as their constituencies' contribution to the war effort becomes more highly valued. The general resistance to social and political change, in any event, is more likely to be either weakened or even overwhelmed by the need to respond to the demands of the war effort.

New bureaucratic organizations will emerge to deal with novel war-related problems. Old governmental agencies will be expanded not only to deal with the increase in management problems, but also because the opportunity to invoke security-related justifications for bureaucratic expansion will be expanded as well.[3]

The significance of some of these war-induced changes may be eliminated or subsequently diminished in the postwar era, but it is most unlikely that all of the war-induced changes in expenditures, revenues, number of governmental agencies and personnel, salience of social issues and problems, and the nature and identity of political coalitions will disappear or even fade away. Wars, especially major wars, thus induce direct domestic changes in the short run and also serve as catalysts and facilitators for direct and indirect domestic changes in the long run. A respectable proportion of the war-induced growth of the state is thus a not-altogether-planned by-product of making war.

Yet there is no reason to believe that all wars will have the same impact on state-building processes. Some wars may bring about very little in the way of change, whereas others may be associated with profound and wide-ranging impacts. Modelski's (1978, 1981, 1982) long cycle of world leadership perspective is crucial in this regard because it supplies a theoretical rationale for anticipating that one category of warfare, the global war, will be more likely than others to be associated with significant societal impacts. Global wars are identified as the decisive contests fought over the issue of succession to world leadership and, therefore, demarcate the transition from one long cycle of leadership to the next. During and immediately after each global war, one state emerges in a leading capability position. The eventual erosion of this preponderance leads to leadership challenges mounted by rivals and another succession struggle to be resolved in global war.

Although global wars are not defined in terms of scope, participation, or costs, they tend to be unusually extensive in terms of geography encompassed and the number of major actors involved. Global wars tend also to be among the most costly wars in terms of both lives lost and resources expended. Consequently, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that the most important wars, the deadly turning points in modern political history for the global political system, should have the most important and significant impacts on the state-building processes of the participants. In contrast, non-global interstate wars generally tend to be much less extensive and intensive affairs and, therefore, are relatively less likely to exert significant impacts.

By focusing on the two categories of warfare as separate types of impact-producing interventions, our version of the war making-state making approach differs from the Peacock and Wiseman interpretation in several respects. First, Peacock and Wiseman restrict the temporal scope of their displacement argument to late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century British attitudinal and philosophical shifts toward greater state involvement in social policy arenas. Alternatively expressed, the two most recent world wars facilitated the expansion of the British state into new areas of governmental intervention. However, the distinction between global and interstate war applies as far back as the initially crude emergence of the global political system in 1494, thereby encompassing nearly 500 years of state building and expansion.

Peacock and Wiseman (1961, p. 38) had noted that their emphasis on changing governmental attitudes would have been less tenable if crisis-related expenditure displacements had occurred before 1900. They then proceeded to demonstrate the absence of a permanent displacement effect on British spending after the Napoleonic Wars. If they are correct, the validity of our own historical argument is open to some question unless the British pattern is exceptional. To ascertain what is a deviation from the norm will of course require an expansion of the number of states examined. However, we also believe that Peacock and Wiseman misinterpreted the early nineteenth-century British data. In order to explore this claim and to assess better the longer view on state building, the present examination will need to develop data series that extend back in time as far as is practical. The development of reasonably lengthy time series will also facilitate the employment of impact assessment models that measure the displacement impact of war in as systematic a manner as is possible.

---

[3] On this point, see Porter's (1980) argument that American governmental agencies learned to use national defense rationalizations to justify expanded budgets to legislators even when they were not directly related to the ongoing World War II effort.

Although the global war making perspective expands the temporal scope of the displacement explanation, the focus on the intervention agents is being narrowed considerably. Despite the fact that their own examination was restricted to the twentieth century's two world wars, Peacock and Wiseman equated their conceptualization of the opportunities for displacement with "social disturbances" or "national crises." These broad categories imply the need to investigate the possible impacts of a relatively large list of candidate events. Non-war crises such as severe economic depressions may indeed lead to the expansion of the state but we doubt that any single type of crisis can compare over the long run to the ostensibly consistent, historical impact of global war.

Implicit in our approach is the assumption that seeking information on war impacts for all states is not likely to prove to be a very efficacious strategy. Instead, given the disparities in types of states and historical experiences, a more selective and categorically homogenous state sample is desirable. Peacock's and Wiseman's focus on a single state, of course, could be said to represent the extreme interpretation of this preference. But there is a middle course between the extremes of single state case studies and large sample aggregations. The logic of our hypothesis development suggests an actor focus on states that have participated in both global and interstate wars. Yet all war participants do not participate fully or in the same way. For example, we might expect to find some differences in comparisons between strong and weak states or between persistent combatants and states defeated and occupied early in a war. On the other hand, we need to avoid eliminating all of the variance. Consequently, we will confine our sample construction to the premise that the hypothesized displacement effects of global war should be most noticeable in the expenditures of those states that are most acutely involved in the succession struggles as contenders for systemic power. Ideally, then, our examination would focus on the nine states that have been identified as the principal contenders (at various points in time) in the long cycle process.[4]

Unfortunately, continuous expenditure records from the sixteenth century on are not available for any state. We also need to be careful to control for the possible complications of economic growth. Moreover, we wish to determine whether tax revenues follow the same historical course as do expenditures. In spite of the explanatory emphasis on tax revenues in Peacock's and Wiseman's tax burden argument, these data are only rarely inspected vis-à-vis the displacement hypothesis. Finally, we too wish to check whether any war-induced displacement effect that is uncovered can be explained solely in terms of increased military and war-related spending. A greater emphasis on the historical significance of warfare need not preclude the expansion of non-war-related activities but the extent to which these governmental activities have expanded is probably subject to some degree of evolution.

The need for hard-to-come-by, continuous time series data on central government expenditures, tax revenues, military expenditures, and some measures of national wealth—all of which must encompass one or more global wars—forces some compromises on analysts.[5] Longitudinal data that meet the requirements outlined immediately above are readily accessible for only a very few states. Accordingly, we will concentrate our analyses on four global powers: Great Britain (1700-1980), the United States (1792-1980), France (1815-1979), and Japan (1878-1980), and the sets of global and interstate wars listed in Table 1.[6]

---

[4] From the long cycle perspective, global wars have taken place in 1494-1516, 1580-1608, 1688-1713, 1792-1815, and 1914-1918/1939-1945. Global powers must satisfy minimum global reach capability (naval power) criteria. The following states qualify for consideration: Portugal (1494-1580), Spain (1494-1815), England/Great Britain (1484-1945), France (1494-1945), Netherlands (1579-1815), Russia/Soviet Union (1714-present), United States (1816-present), Germany (1871-1945), and Japan (1875-1945). Other assessments of the impacts of global wars on wholesale prices, economic growth, and public debts may be found in Thompson and Zuk (1982) and Rasler and Thompson (1983, in press).

[5] By dividing expenditures and tax revenues by GNP, we are not overlooking the probability that government spending and the economy as a whole are likely to be subject to different rates of inflation. Specialized deflationary indexes, however are not normally available for long time series.

[6] Gathering data on governmental expenditures and revenues is subject to a host of pitfalls—some of which, no doubt, we have failed to avoid. Whenever possible, we have attempted to use closed accounts as reported by governmental agencies or secondary and tertiary sources based on governmental abstracts. We have occasionally been forced to deviate from a reliance on official accounts in cases of overtly understated military spending figures. We have also attempted to exclude from the expenditure and revenue series spending for, and receipts from, public enterprises in order to enhance their longitudinal comparability. The data sources utilized are for France, Sudre (1883), de Kaufmann

Table 1. Interstate and Global Wars

Interstate Wars		Global Wars	
France (1815-1979)			
Franco-Spanish	1823	World War I	1914-1918
Roman Republic	1849	World War II	1939-1945
Crimean	1854-1856		
Italian unification	1859		
Franco-Mexican	1862-1867		
Franco-Prussian	1870-1871		
Sino-French	1884-1885		
Franco-Thai	1940-1941		
Korean	1951-1953		
Sinai	1956		
Great Britain (1700-1980)			
Anglo-Swedish	1715-1719	Spanish succession	1701-1713
Quadruple alliance	1718-1720	French Revolutionary	1793-1802
Anglo-Spanish	1726-1729	Napoleonic	1803-1815
Austrian succession	1739-1748	World War I	1914-1918
Seven years	1756-1763	World War II	1939-1945
American independence	1778-1783		
Anglo-American	1812-1814		
Crimean	1854-1856		
Anglo-Persian	1856-1857		
Korean	1950-1953		
Sinai	1956		
Japan (1878-1980)			
Sino-Japanese	1894-1895	World War I	1914-1918
Russo-Japanese	1904-1905	World War II	1941-1945
Manchurian	1931-1933		
Sino-Japanese	1937-1941		
United States (1792-1980)			
Anglo-American	1812-1814	World War I	1917-1918
Mexican-American	1846-1848	World War II	1941-1945
Spanish-American	1898		
Korean	1950-1953		
Vietnam	1965-1973		

Time Series Problems and the Utility of Box-Tiao Impact Assessment Models

Previous studies concerned with estimating the impact of war on various processes such as economic growth and the increase in national and social welfare expenditures can be divided into two groups. The first group basically relies on visual evaluations of the differences between pre- and post-intervention series in an attempt to assess war impact (Emi, 1963; Mahar & Rezende, 1975; Peacock & Wiseman, 1961; Reddy, 1970; Rosenfeld, 1973). As a preliminary step or in instances where an impact is acutely obvious, the

---

(1884), Marion (1914), Jeze (1927), Mallez (1927), Ministere des Finances (1946), Marczewski (1961), Mitchell (1975, 1981), Ministere de l'Economie (various years), OECD (1980, 1981); for Great Britain, Deane (1955, 1968), Deane and Cole (1962), Mitchell (1962, 1975, 1981), Mitchell and Jones (1971), Feinstein (1972), Central Statistical Office (various years), Cole (1981), OECD (1980, 1981); for Japan, Emi (1963, 1979) Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1973), Mitchell (1982), Japan Statistical Yearbook (various volumes); and for the United States, U.S. Department of Commerce (1975), Berry (1978), U.S. Office of the President (1982, 1983). The identification of the wars has been guided by information found in Wright (1965), Singer and Small (1972), Dupuy and Dupuy (1977), and Small and Singer (1982).

eyeball technique may suffice and certainly is always helpful. As the number of interventions and national series to be examined increases, however, visual plots quickly become cumbersome analytical and communication devices, especially if space is limited and if not all of the impacts are readily discernible. In general, but particularly in these circumstances, more objective tests are definitely desirable.

The second group, for the most part, uses regression techniques to estimate the changes in the level of prewar and postwar intervention series (Andre & Delorme, 1978; Barbera, 1973; Bonin et al., 1967; Gupta, 1967; Kaufman, 1983; Nagarajan, 1979; Organski & Kugler, 1980; Pryor, 1968; Stohl, 1976; Tussing & Henning, 1974; Wheeler, 1980). The ultimate validity of many of these regression-based findings, we feel, is handicapped by certain statistical problems related to an overemphasis on data fitting operations and an underemphasis on controlling for autocorrelation and trend.

Most of the earlier expenditure displacement analyses exclude war period data from their analyses in an effort to assess long-term effects without the results being unduly influenced by the war outliers. In the process, analysts have selected various time periods ranging anywhere from 3 to 70 years or more for the ad hoc prewar and postwar data intervals. In order to fit a least squares model to the data, prewar and postwar contortions in the original series that might reduce the degree of fit tend to be ignored.

In the presence of autocorrelation, a problem commonly encountered in time series and frequently ignored, the data will track for a period away from the equilibrium point. This tracking phenomenon results in unbiased but inefficient estimates of the parameters of a model. In linear regression, OLS estimates of β will be unbiased while the variances of the estimators will be understated. In addition, the error variance of the regression model will be minimized and, if autocorrelation is ignored, the model will appear to provide a much better fit to the empirical data than is actually the case. Inferences based on sample t and F-statistics will be misleading owing to the deflation of the true variance of β and the regression model (Hibbs, 1974).

Trend poses still another obstacle in time series analysis. It produces a systematic change in the level of the series in such a way that it is difficult to interpret the short- and long-term effects of an intervention. The conventional method of removing trend has been to subtract a least squares trend line from the data. However, it can be argued that the OLS parameters cannot be estimated with much accuracy owing to their sensitivity to outliers as well as their somewhat static dependence on the positions of the first and last observations of the observed series.[7]

Perhaps an even more central issue with OLS detrending methods is the presumption by researchers that a time series is influenced by deterministic trend when it may be characterized by stochastic drift. A time series that is modeled as a fixed function of time (deterministically) when in fact the values vary in a probabilistic manner (stochastically) will result in errors in assessing the magnitude of an intervention's impact (McCleary & Hay, 1980). In addition, because a time series can drift upward or downward for long periods of time owing only to random forces, it is not always obvious whether a progressive change in the level of a series is due to deterministic trend or stochastic drift.

To address the problems of fitting, autocorrelation, and trend, we use impact assessment models developed by Box and Tiao (1975). These models avoid the fitting problem because they use all of the data in a time series to estimate parameters that are likely to have generated the series. Consequently, the analyst has the opportunity to avoid excluding selected data points arbitrarily. Another advantage of Box-Tiao models is that they provide a parsimonious way to control for the effects of autocorrelation. An ARIMA scheme is used to model a noise component which includes the random and deterministic effects of drift, trend, and autocorrelation. A linear filter(s) is then applied to transform the observed time series into white noise before estimating the actual effect of the

---

[7] To subtract a least squares trend line from a series, a researcher regresses that Y_t series on time (X_t = 1, 2, 3, . . . N), estimates the least squares slope of the model, and then calculates the "detrended" Y_t series. In this case, the Y series is a function of the $Y_t = b_0 + b_1$ (time) $+ e_t$ equation where b_0 is the intercept and represents the mean level of the Y_t series and b_1 (time) represents the slope of the trend line or the expected change in the level of Y_t from one observation to the next. However, b_0 and b_1 are derived by minimizing the sums of squares function

$$\Sigma(Y_t - \hat{Y}_t)^2 = \Sigma[b_0 - \hat{b}_0 + (b_1 - \hat{b}_1)]^2.$$

As the independent variable t (time) increases monotonically, the first and last observations of Y_t usually make the greatest contribution to the sums of squares function. Consequently, the OLS estimates of b_0 and b_1 are estimated so that the OLS trend line generally passes through Y_t and Y_n regardless of how well the middle observations ($Y_{t+1} \ldots Y_{n-1}$) fit. This procedure represents a rather static approach to dynamic phenomena (McCleary & Hay, 1980). Moreover, studies that do not attempt to remove trend may be subject to many of the same problems in comparing pre-intervention and post-intervention slopes.

intervention.[8] Moreover, the Box-Tiao models neutralize the problems associated with trend and drift, without a priori distinctions, through the use of difference equation models that can be used to differentiate between trend and drift and to provide dynamic estimates of trend.[9]

Types of Intervention Effects. The intervention component of the Box-Tiao models is represented by two transfer function parameters, ω_0 and δ, which estimate the initial impact of an event (I_t) on the observed Y_t series and the rate of growth or decay in the level of the time series after the impact. While the omega parameter (ω_0) reflects the initial impact of the intervention, an estimate of the difference between the pre-intervention and postintervention levels of Y_t, the delta parameter (δ) captures the dynamic response. Delta is a rate parameter in the sense that it specifies how quickly the postintervention series level continues to change (increasing or decreasing) by smaller and smaller increments (or decrements). The size of δ, which is constrained between -1 and $+1$, indicates how quickly (or slowly) the postintervention series reaches equilibrium. When δ approximates 1, the postintervention series returns to equilibrium very slowly. Conversely, when δ approximates 0, the postintervention series returns to equilibrium very quickly.

ω_0 and δ provide the tools to assess whether an intervention has an initial abrupt or gradual effect on Y_t and whether it is associated with a temporary or permanent change in the level of Y_t. The behavior of a time series generated from the impact of an event will take the form of two basic patterns, a step or pulse model of intervention. These models and their appropriate Box-Tiao intervention components are displayed in Figure 1.

Step model A represents an abrupt, permanent impact pattern where the event (I_t) is associated with a significant shift in the level of the Y_t time series from pre-intervention to postintervention. Model B characterizes a gradual, permanent impact. The onset of an event is accompanied by a significant initial change in the level of the postintervention series. However, the full impact of the event is not realized immediately. Instead, it has a gradual effect over a number of subsequent observations (or time periods) until the postintervention series reaches a new equilibrium.

Alternatively, Model C illustrates a situation in which the event under study has a significant initial impact on a Y_t series at one period—the onset of the event—and has no residual effects on the rest of the observations. Finally, Model D represents the case when an event is associated with an abrupt but temporary change in the level of the postintervention series.

Summarily, the strategy of this approach is to identify the noise model (ARIMA structure) of the Y_t series with the pre-intervention data. Then, an intervention component from Figure 1 is

Figure 1. Models of Intervention and Impact



ω_0 = An estimate of the difference between the pre- and post-intervention process levels.
I_t = 1 during a war and 0 during nonwar years.
δ = Rate of decay or increase.
B = A backshift operator which may be interpreted as $B(Y_t) = Y_{t-1}$.

---

[8] A white noise series describes a set of independent and random observations that are normally distributed about a zero mean and constant variance.

[9] If a time series is the realization of an integrated process (i.e., a random walk due to drift), it can be modeled by simply differencing that Y_t series. If the differenced series has a nonzero mean, it is characterized by linear trend which is represented in the following equation as

$$Y_t = Y_{t-1} + \theta_0 + a_t,$$

where θ_0 is estimated as the mean of the differenced series. To distinguish between drift and trend, θ_0 is subjected to a t-test. If θ_0 is not statistically different from zero, the series is considered to be drifting rather than trending. Whereas OLS detrending methods estimate linear trend using a time counter as the independent variable, the difference equation model uses the values of Y_{t-1} as the independent variable. Since all of the Y_{t-1} values influence the estimate of θ_0 (the constant of the difference equation), a dynamic estimate of linear trend is produced (see Box & Jenkins, 1976; McCleary & Hay, 1980).

selected based on theoretical notions about the type of impact that I_t will have on the observed time series.[10] These parameters, in addition to the ARIMA parameter(s), are estimated in a full model through iterative, nonlinear estimation procedures. In most cases, parameters lacking statistical significance are removed from the equation, and the full model is reestimated. An important exception to this rule is provided by cases involving deltas with values greater than one or where the confidence intervals associated with the deltas are not constrained within the ±1 range. This warning of model misspecification reflects what is referred to as "explosive growth" (also known as a ramp effect) after the impact of the intervention. Intuitively, such an outcome is more likely to be interpreted as providing support for a step function, permanent change than it is for a delta-less, temporary, pulse function model.[11] In any event, an intervention model's ultimate goodness-of-fit is judged by the degree of correspondence between the observed and predicted output series values, the residual mean squared error, the statistical significance of the model parameters, and the white noise or random character of the residuals.

Data Analysis

Our principal hypothesis states that for certain states, global wars are more likely to displace governmental expenditures and revenues that are interstate wars. In the Box-Tiao context, we would then expect to find significant, permanent impacts associated with the intervention of global wars and either temporary or nonsignificant impacts registered by interstate wars. This expected outcome is very close to what is found and reported in Table 2. All of the interstate war impacts reflect abrupt, temporary models, and only half of the omegas are significant. All of the global war omegas are significant, and all but one are associated with abrupt, permanent models.[12] The sole exception is the Japanese expenditures/GNP series, which requires the imposition of an abrupt, temporary model.

In contrast to the evident British, French, and American displacements owing to global war, World War I had no visible impact on Japanese expenditures and revenues, especially in comparison to the disturbance in the expenditure series caused by the 1904-1905 interstate war and the temporary expenditure spike during World War II. If it is fair to dismiss the first Japanese global war as a case of marginal participation (Singer and Small (1982) report 400 Japanese battle deaths for World War I), the second case suggests that defeat and occupation may interrupt the displacement effect, or at least alter the direction of displacement. Interestingly, however, Japanese revenues/GNP are permanently displaced by World War II even though expenditures/GNP are not.

Nevertheless, in three of the four expenditure cases and in all four revenue cases, the intervention outcomes are markedly different. The intervention impact of the global wars are permanent or sustained while the impacts of the interstate wars are either insignificant or transitory. It is of course possible to be more specific about the nature of these impacts. We could, for example, translate each of the logged omega parameters into estimates of percentage change before and after the interventions. The largest omega in Table 2, for instance, is the 1.01 parameter associated with the impact of global wars on the United States expenditure/GNP series. In percentage

---

[10] The intervention (I_t) is represented as a discontinuous variable that ranges between zero (denoting the absence of the event) and one (denoting the presence of the event). Although the effects of war are not always restricted to the actual duration of warfare, we will code as one only those years of actual warfare. To do otherwise could easily bias the attempt to assess the impact of war by capturing other, postwar influences on expenditures and revenues and thus incorrectly exaggerating or minimizing the war impacts.

[11] McCleary and Hay (1980) suggest that when $\delta \geqslant 1.00$, the level of the series changes by the quantity ω_0 in each postintervention moment. In other words, before the intervention the series is trendless. After the intervention, the series follows a trend with the parameter ω_0 interpreted as the slope. Such a radical change (from a state of equilibrium to a state of growth) is more than likely due to a postintervention time series which is too short to encompass the equilibrium state of the process.

[12] Significant deltas approximating or exceeding the value of one were estimated in each of Table 2's global war intervention components (with the exception of the Japanese expenditure/GNP case). Substantively, this outcome may suggest that new expansionary influences were introduced in the aftermath of war. For our immediate purposes, however, the important thing to note is that the postwar levels in French, British, and American spending and revenue series (and the Japanese revenue series) did not return to the prewar levels, thus indicating abrupt, permanent changes. More precisely, what tends to occur is a very large temporary spike, especially in the spending series, that recedes to a level higher than that found in the prewar era. Efforts to estimate compound models (incorporating both temporary and permanent changes) were unsuccessful, we believe, due to the substantial parameter collinearity encountered and the often overwhelming size of the temporary spike. While Box-Tiao models offer certain statistical advantages, they also clearly possess some limitations in analyzing global war-induced changes.

Table 2. The Impact of War on Logged Expenditures/GNP and Tax Revenues/GNP[a]

	Interstate Wars[b]		Global Wars	Noise Model[c]	
State	ωo[d]	δ	ωo	N_t	X^2
Logged Expenditures/GNP					
Great Britain (1700-1980)	.13* (4.8)	.72* (6.9)	.39* (7.8)	white noise	18.6
United States (1792-1980)	.15 (1.8)		1.01* (7.6)	white noise	20.1
France (1815-1979)	.07* (2.4)		.50* (6.7)	white noise	18.4
Japan (1879-1980)	.27* (3.4)		.65* (5.2)	white noise	12.4
Logged Revenues/GNP					
Great Britain (1700-1980)	.03* (2.6)	.87* (6.2)	.08* (2.6)	white noise	12.0
United States (1792-1980	−.06 (−1.2)		.30* (2.4)	white noise	19.4
France (1815-1979)	−.02 (−1.2)		.27*[c] (5.7)	white noise	12.4
Japan (1878-1980)	.05 (1.3)		.20* (2.3)	$\theta 1 = .41$* (4.3)	15.2

Note: No statistically significant trend parameters were encountered; *t*-values are reported in parentheses.

*Statistical significance at the .05 level.

[a] All data have been logged in order to achieve variance stationarity.

[b] The impact of interstate wars was abrupt and temporary, whereas the impact of global wars was abrupt and permanent.

[c] The first seven noise models are white noise, first differenced series (0,1,1). The Japanese revenue noise model is a first differenced, moving average process (0,1,1). $X^2 \leqslant .05$ where H_0: residuals are white noise.

[d] The reported omega is based on a five-year lag for World War I.

change terms, the 1.01 parameter can be interpreted as an approximately 175% change in the expenditures-to-gross-national-product ratio. This figure can be compared to the insignificant and temporary 16% change ($\omega_0 = .15$) associated with the expenditure/GNP impact of the United States participation in interstate wars. Yet it should be kept in mind that we are modelling multiple interventions over fairly long periods of time and that the omega parameters and percentage changes reflect average, as opposed to cumulative, effects. Calculating percentage changes in this context, therefore, does not really provide us with a more concrete numerical handle for interpreting and comparing the specific outcomes. Only the metric of the parameter is changed. Although such changes are helpful when the impact of a specific war is being analyzed, the interpretation advantage when the average impact of wars is being assessed collectively seems quite marginal.[13]

This observation seems all the more true when the outcome is as clearcut as the findings sum-

---

[13] For those readers who wish to pursue the percentage change conversion procedure further, McCleary and Hay (1980, pp. 171-185) advance the following formula for translating omega parameters in log metric into percentage change intervention estimates:

$$\text{percentage change} = (e^{(\omega_0)} - 1)100,$$

where $e^{(\omega_0)}$ is the ratio of post-intervention to pre-intervention equilibrium. However, in models with significant delta parameters, the incremental post-intervention movement of the process requires the analyst to exponentiate the asymptotic change ($\omega_0/1-\delta$), in the process level.

marized in Table 2 indicate. The persistent effects of global war on both the expenditures and revenues of the states examined are simply of a different order of magnitude than the impacts of interstate war. The logged parameter values also permit us to point out an interesting difference between expenditure and revenue outcomes. In the aggregate, global war tends to exert similar impacts on both types of series—that is, permanent and statistically significant. But wartime displacements of revenues are far less dramatic than for expenditures. In fact, revenue increases during wartime tend to lag behind expenditure increases in terms of magnitude and timing. Revenue levels only begin to match expenditure levels toward the end, or after the end, of a war and only after expenditure levels have begun to decline.

This tendency could be viewed as somewhat contrary to what one might expect, based on Peacock's and Wiseman's argument that wars increase tax burden tolerances. Alternatively, it could be argued that dramatic expenditure increases drag revenues upwards and that the extent to which this occurs is dependent on the extent to which postwar expenditures decline and not the other way around. Unfortunately, there is only so far one can push this counter-argument with aggregate data. We need more detailed case studies of how wars bring about both temporary and permanent governmental expansion (see, for example, Burke, 1982; Marwick, 1974; Skowronek, 1982; Stein, 1980; Strickland, 1983).

Several data problems prevent us from examining many pre-twentieth century global wars. Although the limited French data that are available do indicate some, but less than expected, expenditure displacement between 1688-1713 and 1792-1815, our current empirical evidence is restricted to the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century British record. Fortunately, however, these data encompass the period used by Peacock and Wiseman to reject the presence of permanent pre-twentieth-century displacements. Our analysis, whether all British global wars are lumped together or examined separately, suggest that British participation in global wars, at least since 1700, have brought about permanent displacements.[14] How then do we account for the more general discrepancy between our findings and those of Peacock and Wiseman?

Table 3 lists Peacock's and Wiseman's 1792-1890 data on expenditures/GNP for selected years and contrasts it with our own corresponding data. Clearly, the numbers we are using are not exactly identical with those utilized by our predecessors, but the direction of movement is sufficiently similar to regard them as being in the same ballpark. However, there are two important differences. First, our series begins in 1700. This enables us to see a permanent displacement occurring between 1700 and 1720 (5 to 9% which roughly persists in peacetime through the rest of the century), an impact that probably would be

---

[14] This statement is not entirely true. When British global wars are examined separately (as opposed to being treated as a class of warfare as in Table 2), the impact of the 1701-1713 Spanish Succession war on expenditures/GNP is not statistically significant, even though the same war has a significant impact on revenues/GNP. We do not regard the 1701-1713 deviation as a meaningful exception, however, because we have only one year (1700) of prewar GNP data. Moreover, the 1701-1713 warfare constituted only the second phase of the 1688-1713 global war.

Table 3. British Expenditures, GNP, and Expenditures/GNP

	Expenditures/GNP (%)			
	Peacock-Wiseman	Rasler-Thompson	Expenditures	GNP
1700		5	4	70
1720		9	8	67
1792	11	9	16	182
1800	24	17	28	166
1814	29	29	61	209
1822	19	15	51	350
1831	16	12	48	413
1841	11	11	47	428
1850	12	10	61	596
1860	11	10	65	621
1870	9	7	65	1013
1880	10	6	84	1446
1890	9	6	113	1890

Note. British expenditures and GNP are expressed in 1913 pounds (000.000 omitted).

even more impressive if our data could be extended back through the 1680s.

The second difference is seen in Peacock's and Wiseman's expenditure/GNP level returning to the 1792 level by 1841. Our series suggests that this does not occur until some 20 years later in the 1860s. Nevertheless, both series indicate an eventual return to the pre-French Revolutionary/Napoleonic Wars equilibrium level thereby suggesting a less-than-permanent effect. But how long is "permanent"?[15] The disturbance to our series does not subside for some 45 years, and even Peacock's and Wiseman's evidence indicates a 25-year effect, or nearly a generation in length. Regardless of how permanence is defined, it is equally clear that Great Britain enjoyed remarkable economic growth rates during the period in question. Between 1700 and 1792, the British economy expanded by roughly a factor of 2.5, although much of this growth was offset by population growth. In marked contrast, the size of the nineteenth-century British economy doubled approximately every 20 to 25 years. Any British government might have been hard pressed to expand their budgets at this same rate—particularly in an era consistently characterized (through the 1870s) by a conservative approach to governmental spending.

Thus, Peacock and Wiseman are not incorrect to treat the 1793-1815 displacement as less than permanent, but the nature of the evidence also requires careful consideration. In absolute terms or constant British pounds (see Table 3), there is no doubt that British governmental expenditures were displaced upward. In relation to economic growth, this upward displacement ultimately proved to be temporary. How long the effect took to be regarded as temporary depends upon whose data are used, but it is also evident that the "temporary" status is as much, if not more, dependent upon the intervention of the Industrial Revolution as it is dependent upon austerity budgets. Considered in conjunction with the permanent impact (on revenues/GNP at least) of the second half of the 1689-1713 global war, we should be most reluctant to restrict permanent expenditure displacement to the twentieth century and the evolution of contemporary ideas about the appropriate scope of governmental activities.

Our final question centers on the extent to which the permanent expenditure/revenue impacts of global war can be traced to military spending. The long view of state making stresses the role of military and war expenditures and preparations as the primary impetus to the growth of the state organization. Yet we do not infer from this emphasis that the growth of the state is predicated solely upon the growth of military spending. On the contrary, preparing for war and interstate competition has had a number of spillover consequences, ranging from the need for a permanent bureaucracy to collect taxes in order to pay for sporadic warfare to the war-related growth of social services administered by the state. Titmuss (1969), for example, has argued for a close link between the ascending intensity of war and the evolution of British social policy. As an increasing proportion of the population has become involved in the warfare of the past few centuries, the state has been forced to expand its efforts to improve the health and morale of, initially, men available for combat, later, the next generation of recruits (especially children) and, ultimately, to the whole population as they have all become important to war efforts.

There seems little need to restrict this argument to the British experience for it is indeed a point of view that is quite compatible with what we are referring to as the broader view of the war making-state making linkage. At the same time, it also means that we have little basis—aside from the distinction about relevant crises—for expecting findings different from those advanced by Peacock and Wiseman. Global wars presumably should influence both military and nonmilitary expenditures.

In this examination, we will initially pursue a minimal definition of military spending by restricting the concept to those expenditures consumed directly by the state's armed forces. Accordingly, we will confine our empirical attention to the differential impacts of interstate and global war on military and nonmilitary expenditures/GNP, as reported in Table 4 for the four global powers.

The outcome reported in Table 4 is not quite as clearcut as the findings put forward in Table 2. With the exception of the American case, both interstate and global wars exert abrupt, temporary impacts on military spending. Only in the American case is there a temporary/permanent split between the impacts of the two types of war. Further analysis, however, suggests that the categorical approach to war impacts requires some qualification, depending on which global wars are involved. When the impact of each global war is examined separately, it is the pre-1939 global wars that are associated with temporary impacts. World War II, however, led to significant and permanent increases in British, American, and French military expenditures/GNP. Not too surprisingly, the Japanese experience requires the construction of a more complicated model—a temporary pulse model for war years followed by an abrupt, permanent model for the dramatic postwar decrease.

---

[15] The effect lasts sufficiently long to be able to model the impact of the French Revolutionary/Napoleonic wars as exerting a permanent effect on the British series.

In contrast, the war-type distinction is operative for nonmilitary expenditures/GNP. The impact of interstate wars is nonsignificant for all four countries, whereas abrupt, permanent models are found to be applicable in the British, American, and French global war cases. The unusual Japanese case takes a gradual, permanent model in this instance, reflecting increases in nonmilitary spending after both twentieth-century world wars. Ironically then, it is nonmilitary, and not military, spending that is more systematically influenced by periodic global warfare. Nor is this phenomenon an innovation of the twentieth century.

Still, dividing expenditures into military and nonmilitary spending categories constitutes a limited test of the extent to which global war expands nonwar-related allocations. We can take this analysis one step further by removing some more of the war-related expenditures from the nonmilitary side of the ledger. Two prime budgetary candidates for removal as explicitly war-related are interest payments on the national debt and veteran pensions. Series pertaining to the first item are relatively available for all four global powers. Data concerning veteran pensions, unfortunately, are somewhat less accessible for our long periods of time, but we were able to extract them for the Japanese and American cases.

Table 5 reports selected observations on two proportional series: 1) nonmilitary expenditures/GNP (nonmilitary expenditures equal total expenditures minus military expenditures, as analyzed in Table 4) and 2) nonwar expenditures/GNP (nonwar expenditures equal total expenditures minus (military expenditures plus debt interest payments plus veteran pensions) for the United States and Japan and minus (military expenditures plus debt interest payments) for Great Britain and France). The point of the exercise is not to compare the magnitude of the two sets of observations (the nonwar proportions must be smaller than the nonmilitary ones, by definition) but rather to check whether the global war changes in the nonwar series appear to behave

Table 4. The Impact of War on Logged Military and Nonmilitary Expenditures/GNP[a]

	Interstate Wars[b]		Impact Type	Global Wars			Noise Model[c]	
	ω_0	δ		ω_0	δ	ω_0	N_t	X^2
Logged Military Expenditures/GNP								
Great Britain (1700-1980)	.32* (4.0)	.69* (4.9)	abrupt, temporary	1.60* (9.6)			white noise	11.9
United States (1792-1980)	.32* (2.9)	.71* (3.7)	abrupt, permanent	1.49* (8.3)			white noise	11.9
France (1815-1979)	.13* (2.3)		abrupt, temporary	1.10* (8.9)	.47* (5.8)		white noise	28.8
Japan (1878-1980)	.30* (2.1)		abrupt, temporary	2.32* (8.0)			white noise	29.9
Logged Nonmilitary Expenditures/GNP								
Great Britain (1700-1980)	.00 (–.5)		abrupt, permanent	.33* (4.7)			$\theta_1 = .50$* (10.0)	15.7
United States (1792-1980)	–.04 (1.8)		abrupt, permanent	.52* (4.7)			white noise	18.4
France (1815-1979)	–.03 (–.6)		abrupt, permanent	.27* (3.2)			$\theta_1 = -.11$* (2.2)	21.0
Japan (1878-1980)	.08 (1.9)		gradual, permanent	.35* (3.5)		.86* (9.5)	$\phi = -.35$* (–3.5)	32.8

Note: No statistically significant trend parameters were encountered; *t*-values are reported in parentheses.

*Statistical significance at the .05 level.

[a] All data have been logged in order to achieve variance stationarity.

[b] The impact of the interstate was abrupt and temporary.

[c] Five of the first six noise models are white noise, first differenced series (0,1,0). The British and French nonmilitary noise models are first differenced, moving average processes (0,1,1) whereas the Japanese nonmilitary noise model is a first differenced, autoregressive process (1,1,0).

Table 5. Selected Data on Nonmilitary and Nonwar Expenditures as a Proportion of GNP

	Great Britain		France		United States		Japan	
	Non-military	Nonwar	Non-military	Nonwar	Non-military	Nonwar	Non-military	Nonwar
1780	.057	.013						
1790	.070	.013						
1820	.110	.027						
1830	.088	.021						
1840	.071	.019						
1850	.076	.022						
1860	.064	.023						
1870	.045	.019						
1880	.040	.020						
1890	.038	.023	.096	.047	.019	.008	.063	.049
1900	.035	.024	.085	.046	.018	.008	.074	.062
1913	.042	.035	.061	.037	.010	.005	.083	.052
1920	.145	.092	.150		.045	.031	.054	.038
1930	.147	.084	.112	.055	.027	.018	.081	.051
1938	.132	.094	.174	.136	.065	.050	.173	.058
1950	.192	.155	.219	.207	.104	.076	.160	.158
1960	.175	.141	.181	.168	.096	.071	.108	.099
1970	.227	.202	.235	.212	.119	.094	.103	.096
1980	.285	.247	.272[a]	.234[a]	.172	.143	.176	.146

Note: The United States and Japan nonwar proportions exclude veteran pensions, whereas the British and French nonwar proportions are restricted to the common base (total expenditures – (military + debt interest spending)/GNP).

[a] 1979 values.

much differently from the previously analyzed nonmilitary series.

The nonwar spending series do seem to exhibit the same patterns of discontinuous growth and permanent changes before and after global wars observed in the more broadly defined nonmilitary spending series. Equally worth noting is the 1790-1820 doubling of the proportion of GNP devoted to nonwar purposes in the British case. The proportions admittedly are quite small, in accordance with pre-twentieth century austerity policies, and decline between 1820 and 1840 but, unlike the nonmilitary series, the upward shift in the nonwar proportion reflects a permanent change. Thus, Table 5 reinforces the support for the contention that the displacement phenomenon should not be dismissed simply as an artifact of postwar increases in war-related spending.

Conclusion

We have attempted to achieve several goals in the present study. First, we have sought to reduce some of the empirical ambiguities about, and disputes over, the existence of a war-induced expenditure displacement phenomenon. In contrast to the divergence of opinion in the literature, the relationship between global war and permanent spending shifts in some of the world system's most important states (Great Britain, the United States, France, and Japan) is statistically and substantively significant. Moreover, the displacement that takes place is only partially a function of war-related expenditures. Nonwar-related spending is affected as well. Global war must therefore be considered one of the more important sources of the growth and expansion of the modern state.

Second, we have also attempted to make a distinction between Peacock's and Wiseman's hypothesized displacement effect and their tax tolerance explanation of the relationship. Demonstrating the existence of the displacements does little to confirm, or to disconfirm for that matter, the relatively independent idea that national crises provide opportunities for overcoming taxpayer resistance to greater revenue extraction efforts. Rather than seeking ways to compare taxpayer attitudes during war and peacetime, something about which we know very little (see Goetz, 1977), our own interpretive preferences are to stress the broader, historical context of the reciprocal interactions between war and state-building processes. For the older and most powerful states at least, an appreciation for the persistent role of war is central to explaining the growth and expansion of the state, whether or not governmental leaders choose to pay much attention to citizen preferences on tax burdens.

Last but not necessarily least, the outcomes of the data analyses underscore the theoretical significance of a special category of warfare—the global war—that is far less appreciated than it deserves. There is no need to overstate our case by insisting that global wars are the only external events to have significant internal impacts. Other types of events, including the more frequent nonglobal wars, can and do have domestic repercussions,[16] but we have been able to demonstrate that the spending and tax revenue patterns and, more generally, the organizational expansion of some of the system's leading states are more likely to be displaced and displaced permanently by global wars than they are by interstate wars. We suspect that we are only beginning to tap, in a systematic way, the domestic implications of the global war as both a catalyst and as an agent of socioeconomic and political change.[17]

References

Ames, E., & Rapp, R. T. The birth and death of taxes: A hypothesis. *Journal of Economic History,* 1977, *37,* 161-178.

Anderson, P. *Lineages of the absolutist state.* London: New Left Books, 1974.

Andre, C., & Delorme, R. The long-run growth of public expenditure in France. *Public Finance,* 1978, *33,* 42-67.

Ardant, G. Financial policy and economic infrastructure of modern states and nations. In C. Tilly (Ed.). *The formation of national states in Western Europe.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975.

Barbera, H. *Rich nations and poor in peace and war.* Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1973.

Bean, R. War and the birth of the nation state. *Journal of Economic History,* 1973, *33,* 203-221.

Bennett, J. T., & Johnson, M. H. *The political economy of federal government growth: 1959-1978.* College Station, Texas: Center for Education and Research in Free Enterprise, Texas A&M University, 1980.

Berry, T. S. *Revised annual estimates of American gross national product.* Richmond, Va.: Bostwick Press, 1978.

Bird, R. M. Wagner's "law" of expanding state activity. *Public Finance,* 1971, *26,* 1-26.

Blondal, G. The growth of public expenditure in Iceland. *Scandinavian Economic History Review,* 1969, *17,* 1-22.

Bonin, J. M., Finch, B. W., & Waters, J. B. Alternative tests of the "displacement effect" hypothesis. *Public Finance,* 1967, *24,* 440-456.

Borcherding, T. E. One hundred years of public spending, 1870-1970. In T. E. Borcherding (Ed.). *Budgets and bureaucrats: The sources of government growth.* Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1977. (a)

Borcherding, T. E. The sources of growth of public expenditures in the United States, 1902-1970. In T. E. Borcherding (Ed.). *Budgets and bureaucrats: The sources of government growth.* Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1977. (b)

Box, G. E. P., & Jenkins, G. M. *Time series analysis: Forecasting and control* (Rev. ed.). San Francisco: Holden-Day, 1976.

Box, G. E. P., & Tiao, G. C. Intervention analysis with applications to economic and environmental problems. *Journal of the American Statistical Association,* 1975, *70,* 70-92.

Braun, R. Taxation, socio-political structure, and state-building: Great Britain and Brandenburg-Prussia. In C. Tilly (Ed.). *The formation of national states in Western Europe.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975.

Burk, K. (Ed.). *War and the state: The transformation of British government, 1914-1919.* London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982.

Cameron, D. R. The expansion of the public economy: A comparative analysis. *American Political Science Review,* 1978, *72,* 1243-1261.

Central Statistical Office. *Annual abstract of statistics.* London: HMSO, various years.

Cole, W. A. Factors in demand, 1700-80. In R. Floud & D. McCloskey (Eds.). *The economic history of Britain since 1700,* vol. 1: *1700-1860.* London: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Deane, P. The implications of early national income estimates for the measurement of long-term economic growth in the United Kingdom. *Economic Development and Cultural Change,* 1955, *4,* 3-38.

Deane, P. New estimates of GNP for the United Kingdom, 1830-1914. *Review of Income and Wealth,* 1968, *14,* 95-112.

---

[16] Intensive civil wars may also have a permanent impact on expenditures and revenues that is comparable to global war as occurred in the United States in the nineteenth century.

[17] Although an emphasis on global wars may not tell us much about the growth of states made independent since 1945, our findings should at least encourage other analysts of the ongoing expansion of public expenditures and revenues in industrialized states (e.g., Cameron, 1978; Gould, 1983; Kohl, 1983; Schmidt, 1983; and Taylor, 1981) to consider incorporating the effects of global wars in their models. In the 1983 conference version of this article, we extended our global war impact analysis to the twentieth-century expenditure and revenue experience of 22 states other than those examined here. Although these data are characterized by a number of missing values that hamper serial examination, the permanent impacts of global war do not appear to be restricted to the major or global contenders for systemic power. The expenditures and revenues of other war participants (including minor power active belligerents and occupied states) as well as some nonparticipating states that were located near the combat theaters appear to have been affected as well. However, the examination of these data introduce several analytical complications that cannot be discussed adequately in the space presently available and will have to be postponed for separate treatment in the future.

Deane, P., & Cole, W. A. *British economic growth, 1688-1959.* London: Cambridge University Press, 1962.

Dupuy, R. E., & Dupuy, T. N. *The encyclopedia of military history* (Rev. ed.). New York: Harper & Row, 1977.

Eichenberg, R. C. Problems in using public employment data. In C. L. Taylor (Eds.). *Why governments grow.* Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1983.

Emi, K. Expenditure. In K. Ohkawa and M. Shinohara with L. Meissner (Eds.). *Patterns of Japanese economic development: A quantitative appraisal.* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979.

Emi, K. *Government fiscal activity and economic growth in Japan, 1868-1960.* Tokyo: Kinokuniya, 1963.

Feinstein, C. H. *National income expenditure and output of the United Kingdom, 1855-1965.* London: Cambridge University Press, 1972.

Gilpin, R. *War and change in world politics.* London: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Goetz, C. J. Fiscal illusion in state and local finance. In T. E. Borcherding (Ed.). *Budgets and bureaucrats: The sources of government growth.* Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1977.

Goffman, I. J., & Mahar, D. J. The growth of public expenditures in selected developing nations: Six Caribbean countries, 1940-65. *Public Finance,* 1971, *26,* 57-74.

Gould, G. The growth of public expenditures: Theory and evidence from six advanced democracies. In C. L. Taylor (Ed.). *Why governments grow.* Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1983.

Gourevitch, P. The second image reversed: The international sources of domestic politics. *International Organization,* 1978, *32,* 881-911.

Gupta, S. P. Public expenditure and economic growth: A time series analysis. *Public Finance,* 1967, *22,* 423-461.

Hibbs, D. A., Jr. Problems of statistical estimation and causal inference in time series regression models. In H. L. Costner (Ed.). *Sociological methodology.* San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1974.

Hintze, O. Military organization and the organization of the state. In F. Gilbert (Ed.). *The historical essays of Otto Hintze.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1975.

Japan statistical yearbook. Tokyo Executive Office of the Statistics Commission and Statistics Bureau of the Prime Minister's Office, various years.

Jeze, G. *Les depenses de guerre de la France.* Paris: Les Presses Universitaires de France, 1927.

Kaufman, J. P. The social consequences of war: The social development of four nations. *Armed Forces and Society,* 1983, *9,* 245-264.

deKaufmann, R. *Les finances de la France.* Paris: Guillaumin et Cie, 1894.

Kohl, J. The functional structure of public expenditures: Long-term changes. In C. L. Taylor (Ed.). *Why governments grow.* Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1983.

Leff, N. H. *Underdevelopment and development in Brazil* (vol. 2). London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982.

Mahar, D. J., & Rezende, F. A. The growth and pattern of public expenditure in Brazil, 1920-1969. *Public Finances Quarterly,* 1975, *3,* 380-399.

Mallez, P. *La restauration des finances Francaises apres 1814.* Paris: Librarie Delloz, 1927.

Marczewski, J. Some aspects of the economic growth of France, 1660-1958. *Economic Development and Cultural Change,* 1961, *9,* 369-386.

Marion, M. *Histoire financiere de la France depuis 1715* (6 vols.). Paris: Arthur Rousseau, 1914.

Marwick, A. *War and social change in the twentieth century: A comparative study of Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the United States.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974.

McCleary, R., & Hay, R. A., Jr. *Applied time series analysis for the social sciences.* Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1980.

McNeill, W. H. *The pursuit of power.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.

Meltzer, A. H., & Richard, S. F. Why government grows (and grows) in a democracy. *Public Interest,* 1978, *52,* 111-118.

Ministere de l'Economie. *Annuaire statistique de la France.* Paris: Republique Francaise, various years.

Ministere de Finances. *Inventaire de la situation financiere (1913-1946).* Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1946.

Mitchell, B. R. *Abstract of British historical statistics.* London: Cambridge University Press, 1962.

Mitchell, B. R. *European historical statistics, 1750-1970.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1975.

Mitchell, B. R. *European historical statistics, 1750-1975* (2nd rev. ed.). New York: Facts on File, 1981.

Mitchell, B. R. *International historical statistics, Africa and Asia.* New York: New York University Press, 1982.

Mitchell, B. R., & Jones, H. G. *Second abstract of British historical statistics.* London: Cambridge University Press, 1971.

Modelski, G. The long cycle of global politics and the nation state. *Comparative Studies in Society and History,* 1978, *20,* 214-235.

Modelski, G. Long cycles, Kondratieffs, and alternating innovations: Implications for U.S. foreign policy. In C. W. Kegley, Jr., & P. J. McGowan (Eds.). *The political economy of foreign policy.* Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1981.

Modelski, G. Long cycles and the strategy of U.S. international economic policy. In W. P. Avery & D. P. Rapkin (Eds.). *America in a changing world political economy.* New York: Longman, 1982.

Modelski, G. *Principles of world politics.* New York: Free Press, 1972.

Musgrave, R. A. *Fiscal systems.* New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1969.

Nagarajan, P. Econometric testing of the "displacement effect" associated with a "non-global" social disturbance in India. *Public Finance,* 1979, *34,* 100-113.

North, D. C., & Thomas, R. P. *The rise of the western world.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973.

OECD. *Main economic indicators: Historical statistics, 1960-1979.* Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1980.

OECD. *National accounts of OECD countries: Detailed* *tables, 1963-1980.* Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1981.

Ohkawa, K., & Rosovsky, H. *Japanese economic growth.* Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1973.

Organski, A. F. K., & Kugler, J. *The war ledger.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.

Peacock, A. T., & Wiseman, J. *The growth of public expenditures in the United Kingdom.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961.

Peacock, A. T., & Wiseman, J. Approaches to the analysis of government expenditure growth. *Public Finance Quarterly,* 1979, *7,* 3-23.

Porter, B. D. Parkinson's law revised: War and the growth of American government. *Public Interest,* 1980, *60,* 50-68.

Pryor, F. L. *Public expenditures in communist and capitalist nations.* Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1968.

Rasler, K., & Thompson, W. R. Global wars, public debt, and the long cycle. *World Politics,* 1983, *35,* 489-516.

Rasler, K., & Thompson, W. R. War and the economic growth of major powers. *American Journal of Political Science,* in press.

Reddy, K. N. Growth of government expenditure and national income in India: 1872-1966. *Public Finance,* 1970, *25,* 81-97.

Rosenfeld, B. D. The displacement-effect in the growth of Canadian government expenditures. *Public Finance,* 1973, *28,* 301-314.

Schmidt, M. G. The growth of the tax state: The industrial democracies, 1950-1978. In C. L. Taylor (Ed.). *Why governments grow.* Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1983.

Singer, J. D., & Small, M. *The wages of war,' 1816-1965.* New York: John Wiley, 1972.

Skowronek, S. *Building a new American state: The expansion of national administrative capacities, 1877-1920.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982.

Small, M., & Singer, J. D. *Resort to arms.* Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1982.

Stein, A. A. *The nation at war.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980.

Stein, A. A., & Russett, B. Evaluating war: Outcomes and consequences. In T. R. Gurr (Ed.). *Handbook of political conflict: Theory and research.* New York: Free Press, 1980.

Stohl, M. *War and domestic political violence: The American capacity for repression and reaction.* Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1976.

Strickland, J. "The second image reversed" revisited: The concept of the state, war, and the enhancement of American national administrative capacities, 1916-1920. Presented to the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Mexico City, Mexico, March, 1983.

Sudre, F. C. *Les finances de la France au XIXe siecle* (vol. 1). Paris: Librarie E. Plon et Cie, 1883.

Taylor, C. L. Limits to governmental growth. In R. L. Merritt & B. Russett (Eds.). *From national development to global community.* London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981.

Thompson, W. R., & Zuk, G. War, inflation, and Kondratieff's long waves. *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 1982, *26,* 621-644.

Tilly, C. Reflections on the history of European state-making. In C. Tilly (Ed.). *The formation of national states in Western Europe.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975.

Tilly, C. Sinews of war. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Council of European Studies Conference of Europeanists, Washington, D.C., March, 1979.

Titmuss, R. M. *Essays on the welfare state* (2nd ed.). Boston: Beacon Press, 1969.

Tussing, A. D., & Henning, J. A. Long-run growth of non-defense government expenditures in the United States. *Public Finance Quarterly,* 1974, *2,* 202-222.

U.S. Department of Commerce. *Historical statistics of the United States: Colonial times to 1970.* Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975.

U.S. Office of the President. *The budget of the United States government.* Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983.

U.S. Office of the President. *Economic report of the president.* Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1982.

Wagner, R. E., & Weber, W. E. Wagner's law, fiscal institutions and the growth of government. *National Tax Journal,* 1977, *30,* 59-67.

Wheeler, H. G. Postwar industrial growth. In J. D. Singer (Ed.). *The correlates of war II: Testing some realpolitik models.* New York: Free Press, 1980.

Wiseman, J., & Diamond, J. Comment: On long-run growth of nondefense government expenditures in the United States. *Public Finance Quarterly,* 1975, *3,* 411-414.

Wright, Q. *A study of war.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965.

Communications

Comment on Katz, Mahler, & Franz (Vol. 77, December 1983, pp. 871-886)

The empirical study by Katz, Mahler, and Franz (1983) of the impact of taxes on the distribution of income, investment, and economic growth is both simple and powerful. Unfortunately, it is also somewhat misleading. Katz et al. have shown that those aspects of taxes that they considered have no impact on investment and growth, whereas some aspects have an effect on the distribution of income. The problem is that other aspects of taxes may still have an effect on investment and growth. What is worse, Katz et al. neglected to consider precisely those aspects of taxes that should be expected to influence investment in the light of economic theory.

Nevertheless, the conclusions of Katz et al. that neither total taxes, nor the totals received from taxes on incomes, profits, and capital gains, nor sales and value added taxes, nor social security contributions have a significant effect on capital formation is of interest independently of the other ways in which taxes may influence investment. Katz et al. imply that there is no necessary trade-off between growth and income redistribution, no "big trade-off" between efficiency and equality. They open room for the possibility that governments can pursue growth-oriented policies under a reasonably egalitarian distribution of income. The results of their analysis are consistent, therefore, with the empirical studies that conclude that partisan control does matter for the distribution of income, levels of welfare spending, or both (Cameron, 1978; Castles, 1982; Hicks & Swank, 1983; Shalev, 1983) but not for the rate of capital formation (Cameron, 1983).

Our purpose here is 1) to present the correct model, according to neoclassical economics, of the effects of profit taxes on investment, 2) to provide an explanation for the finding by Katz et al. that the total revenue collected from taxes on profits is to a large extent independent of the rate of investment, and 3) to show that this result is not in contradiction with the empirical studies by economists (Almon & Barbera, 1980; Bischoff, 1971; Hendershott & Hu, 1981; Jorgenson, 1971), which conclude that the rate of taxation of profits and the rate of tax relief for investment do affect the rate of investment.

A Model of Investment with Taxes on Profits

According to the standard theory of investment, firms choose that rate of investment which maximizes the present value of current and future profits, where profits are measured after taxes and net of the cost of investment. A recent and useful review of the literature on taxes and investment by Auerbach (1983) presents the following specification of the firm's investment decision:

$$\max_{I(t)} \int_0^\infty e^{-rt}\,[R(t) - I(t) - T(t)]\,dt, \text{ where} \qquad (1)$$

$$R(t) = R[K(t)], \text{ with } R' > 0 \text{ and } R'' < 0, \qquad (2)$$

$$I(t) = K'(t) + \delta K(t), \text{ and} \qquad (3)$$

$$T(t) = \tau R(t) - (k + \tau Z)I(t). \qquad (4)$$

Reading equation (1) from left to right: r is the real rate of interest, $R(t)$ is the before-tax revenues or cash flow received by the firm, $I(t)$ is gross investment, and $T(t)$ is the total tax liability of the firm, all in period t. By equation (2), the revenues of the firm are a function of the capital stock in place at time t with additions to capital yielding positive but diminishing marginal returns. By equation (3), gross investment is equal to the net changes in the capital stock, $K'(t)$, plus depreciation, $\delta K(t)$. Finally, by equation (4), the total tax liability equals the tax rate τ assessed on total revenues $R(t)$ minus investment tax credits of $kI(t)$ and minus the present value of deductions for depreciation $\tau ZI(t)$. The term k is the tax credit given per unit of investment while Z represents the present value of the depreciation allowance. Assuming for notational simplicity that relative prices are constant, the solution to the maximization problem (equation (1)) consists of an initial investment to attain the optimal (profit-maximizing) level of capital and future investment sufficient to maintain the stock of capital at its optimal level. In mathematical notation, the profit-maximizing firm will choose the path of investment given by:

$$I(0) = K^* - (1 - \delta)K(0), \text{ and} \qquad (5)$$

$$I(t) = \delta K^*,\ t > 0, \qquad (6)$$

where K^*, the optimal level of capital, is given implicitly by the Euler equation:

$$R'(K^*) = (r + \delta)\left[\frac{1 - k - \tau Z}{1 - \tau}\right]. \qquad (7)$$

The effects of profit taxes on investment are entirely captured by the ratio $(1 - k - \tau Z)/(1 - \tau)$

in equation (7). This is the ratio of the marginal cost of investment divided by the marginal gain from additional revenue. As this ratio falls, the marginal revenue product of capital must decrease which implies, by the property of diminishing returns, that the profit-maximizing level of capital stock, K^*, is higher. Note that it is not the variable measured by Katz et al., total profit taxes, $T(t)$, nor the effective profit tax rate, $T(t)/R(t)$, which influence investment, but the combination of the nominal profit tax rate, τ, the rate of investment tax credit, k, and the depreciation allowance, Z, found in equation (7).

Investment and Income Distribution

The fact that it is not total profit taxes, $T(t)$, but the ratio $(1 - k - \tau Z)/(1 - \tau)$ which influences investment leaves open the possibility of separating, to some extent, investment policy from fiscal policy. For example, consider the tax reform favored by the Reagan administration and other believers in the free market: the abolition of the corporate profit tax as well as investment tax credits. This amounts to a tax schedule with $\tau = k = 0$, in which case the market will produce the level of capital stock given by:

$$R'(K^*) = (r + \delta). \tag{8}$$

However, it is apparent that exactly the same result can be obtained from any tax schedule that satisfies the condition: $\tau = k + \tau Z$. This condition is equivalent to levying a tax on uninvested profits only, or $T(t) = \tau[R(t) - I(t)]$. The Reagan program is to tax uninvested profits at the rate of zero, but whether the tax rate τ equals zero or approaches unity has no effect on the profit-maximizing level of capital stock nor, therefore, on investment. Of course, the effects on tax receipts of varying the tax rate can be substantial.

The example can be generalized by letting the government choose a target level of capital, denoted $K^*(\Theta)$, where Θ is defined by

$$R'(K^*) = (r + \delta)\Theta. \tag{9}$$

The parameter Θ would differ from unity if the government thought that the real interest rate was not the appropriate social discount rate. Note that $dK^*/d\Theta < 0$, because a decrease in Θ implies a decrease in the marginal revenue product of capital which, by diminishing returns, implies an increase in K^*. The government, in order to attain its target $K^*(\Theta)$, must choose a tax schedule such that:

$$(1 - \tau)\Theta = (1 - k - \tau Z). \tag{10}$$

Again, any tax schedule which satisfies equation (10) will have identical effects on investment. The total taxes collected from profits will equal:

$$T(t) = \tau R(t) - [1 - \Theta(1 - \tau)]\,I(t). \tag{11}$$

With Θ fixed by the government's target level of capital stock, the total taxes collected and, thus, available for income redistribution depends entirely on τ. Letting τ take any value greater than or equal to 0 and less than unity, there is associated with every target level of capital a range of possible total tax receipts:[1]

$$-(1 - \Theta)I(t) \leqslant T(t) < R(t) - I(t). \tag{12}$$

Note that if $\Theta < 1$, a tax schedule with a low nominal tax rate, (with $\tau \rightarrow 0$), implies a subsidy to firms. Thus the choice of investment policy is independent of the choice of fiscal policy within the bounds of equation (12).

The analysis is not quite complete, however, because the bounds on tax collections are not independent of the target level of capital stock. Both $R(t)$ and $I(t)$ depend on the government choice of Θ. It can be demonstrated that as the target level of capital increases, the lower bound on tax receipts in any period declines (or the upper bound on subsidies to firms increases). More interesting is the impact of the government's choice of investment target on the upper bound of tax revenues, $[R(t) - I(t)]$, for it is the upper bound that limits the possible redistribution that can be achieved through profit taxes. This can be read from the following derivatives:

$$d(R - I)/d\Theta = -(dK^*/d\Theta) > 0 \text{ when } t = 0, \text{ and} \tag{13}$$

$$d(R - I)/d\Theta = [R'(K^*) - \delta](dK^*/d\Theta) < 0 \text{ if } R'(K^*) > \delta \text{ when } t > 0. \tag{14}$$

In the initial period there is always a trade-off between the target level of capital stock, or equivalently, the target level of investment, and the maximum tax receipts from profits. In subsequent periods, however, there is no such trade-off. As long as $R'(K^*) > \delta$, the government can simultaneously induce a larger amount of capital formation and increase the taxes collected from profits.[2]

---

[1] This assumes that $-(1 - \Theta)\,I(t) < R(t) - I(t)$, or $\Theta I(t) < R(t)$. This is always true for $t > 0$: $R(K^*)/K^* > R'(K^*) = (r + \delta)\Theta > \delta\Theta$ which implies that $R(K^*) > \Theta\delta K^* = \Theta I$. It need not be true, however, for $t = 0$ if a firm initially invests more than its after-tax profits by borrowing. What would happen in such a case depends on whether or not the firm can sell unused tax deductions. It is possible that a higher τ would increase the value of the unused tax deductions and thus improve the firm's profits in the first period.

Katz et al. ask "Do lower marginal tax rates on . . . profits in fact spur sufficient private investment to promote steady, continuous growth? . . . Is there, indeed, necessarily a trade-off between the capitalist requirement for productive incentives and the democratic demand for a more egalitarian income distribution?" (1983, p. 873). The answers provided by the neoclassical theory of investment are yes to the first question and no to the second. Lower nominal tax rates on profits, higher rates of investment tax credits, and more generous depreciation allowances do induce greater private investment.[3] But this does not mean that greater investment must be purchased with reduced tax collections from profits and, hence, reduced financial support for government programs or transfers. A high rate of tax on profit together with high rates of investment tax relief can be as effective in inducing a rapid rate of capital formation as a low rate of tax on profit, and the former policy will yield substantially higher tax revenues. The social democratic program of using the tax system to induce firms both to invest and to help finance welfare programs is as compatible with neoclassical economic theory as Reagan's proposal to eliminate taxes on profits and allow the rate of investment to be set by the market alone.

ADAM PRZEWORSKI
MICHAEL WALLERSTEIN

University of Chicago

References

Almon, C., & Barbera, A. J. Investment in producer durable equipment 1976-1990. In G. M. von Furstenberg (Ed.), *Capital, efficiency and growth.* Cambridge: Harper & Row, 1980.

Auerbach, A. J. Taxation, corporate financial policy and the cost of capital. *Journal of Economic Literature,* 1983, *21,* 905-940.

Bischoff, C. W. Business investment in the 1970's: A comparison of models. *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,* 1971, *1,* 13-63.

Cameron, R. D. The expansion of the public economy: A comparative analysis. *American Political Science Review,* 1978, *72,* 1243-1261.

Cameron, R. D. Taxes, spending and deficits: Does government cause inflation? In L. Lindberg & C. Maier (Eds.), *The political economy of global inflation and recession.* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1983.

Castles, F. G. The impact of parties on public expenditure. In F. G. Castles (Ed.), *The Impact of Parties.* London: Sage Publications, 1982.

Hendershott, P. H., & Hu, S. Investment in producers' equipment. In H. A. Aaron & J. A. Pechman (Eds.), *How taxes affect economic behavior.* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981.

Hicks, A., & Swank, D. H. Governmental redistribution in rich capitalist democracies. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1983.

Jorgenson, D. W. Econometric studies of investment behavior: A survey. *Journal of Economic Literature,* 1971, *9,* 1111-1147.

Katz, C. J., Mahler, V. A., & Franz, M. G. The impact of taxes on growth and distribution in developed capitalist countries: A cross-national study. *American Political Science Review,* 1983, *77,* 871-886.

Shalev, M. The social democratic model and beyond: Two generations of comparative research on the welfare state. In R. T. Tomasson (Ed.), *Comparative social research* (Vol. 6). Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1983.

---

[2] If $R'(K^*)$ reflects the social as well as the private return from capital, it is irrational in any economic system to invest to such an extent that $R'(K^*) < \delta$. This would imply that the cost of maintaining the capital stock, the cost of replacing deteriorated plant and equipment, exceeds the marginal gains in production such a level of capital stock makes possible. Aggregate output, both present and future, could be increased by disinvesting. The equality $R'(K^*) = \delta$, in fact, is the golden rule of growth economics when the population is stable: This is the level of capital which yields the highest sustainable level of aggregate consumption.

[3] To be more exact, lower nominal tax rates on profits induce greater investment as long as $k + Z < 1$.

Reply to Douglas D. Rose
(Vol. 78, March 1984, pp. 204-205)

With his cordial comment on my article (Vol. 76, June 1982, pp. 239-258), Professor Douglas D. Rose has welcomed those findings that confirm "our prior expectations" and rejected those that do not. Thus, his analysis quietly discounts my thesis that politicians do not endorse rules of the game as reliably as is implied by traditional constitutional commentaries or by modern democratic theory. Although I readily accept parts of his criticism, and I would like to believe that politicians are indeed praetorian guards of representative government, I'm afraid that both my judgment and my data still better suit the cynicism of Lord Denning than the optimism of V. O. Key.

The British Constitution is unwritten, unprotected by judicial review, and exists mainly in the minds of the politicians. But my survey instrument found that the politicians were of two minds and held two quite different constitutional interpretations. This, I believe, is the target of Professor Rose's comment. The first and older interpretation, the deliberative, is strongly supported by Conservatives and appreciated by Labour. The other and newer interpretation, the representational, is admired more exclusively, although not entirely so, by Labour alone. Thus, constitutional dissensus seems to occur mainly with the newer representational view. And it is measures of these doctrines that Professor Rose finds flawed. If I understand him correctly, he holds that the inter-party dissensus here is the article's news, and that, if it is discredited successfully, we are left with "prior expectations," that is, with comparative consensus behind the deliberative interpretation. This is a little misleading, for the comparative consensus behind the deliberative interpretation isn't so very consensual at all. Inter-party disagreement on two of its three core beliefs is 20 and 29% (Table 2). Furthermore, intra-party disagreements among ideological groups run up to 50% on some of the attitudes (Table 3). Finally, orientations toward this supposedly consensual deliberative interpretation swim in a sea of political values such as strong government and social equality (Table 4). In short, even if Rose were to discredit his items successfully, the remaining data would still sustain the argument that the contemporary force of political bias in politicians' thinking about rules of the game has been underestimated.

I'm not convinced, however, that the items he singles out must be banished. They may be weak, but they are not at all as invalid as he claims. These measures, like the others, were constructed carefully with the help of British colleagues who specialize in the study of Parliament. They were also pre-tested with former MPs who were not included in the study's sample. Certainly they could be improved. Yet, despite their problems, they seem to me to shed considerable light on how politicians think about constitutional topics. Rose's objections to these items are twofold: one, they are not clearly connected to doctrines they purport to measure; two, they suffer from ambiguity. I agree with Professor Rose that, from a constitutional perspective, they have their ambiguities, but I think I can clear up some of the connections with the doctrines.

Part of the confusion may arise from the fact that there was no space in the article for interpretations of each item, and that rationales for the ones Professor Rose questions may not be so obvious because they have much to do with complaints and controversies at the time of the interviews. The three measures concerning "role of the electorate," for example, are not direct measures of a precise convention. Indeed, the convention itself has never been precisely defined. What is clear, however, is that a basic principle of the contemporary Constitution is that the public's views should be heard and should have a significant impact upon public policy. Thus, when strong and efficient government is overdone (Appendix item 4), as Prime Minister Heath was accused of overdoing it, the snap of decisive action curtails responsiveness to public opinion and dilutes commitments to majority rule. In the same vein, there was much controversy at the time about privacy and secrecy in government (item 5) which, as the Franks Report argued, dries up streams of information needed by citizens for serious participation in formulating public policy. If the constitutional position on the electorate's role is ill-defined, it nevertheless at least prescribes communication with constituents between elections as well as participation in parties and local government. Throughout the 1970s, there was much concern at Westminster over political alienation and lack of public involvement in political life. Hence, rejection of cynicism about increasing citizen control over governmental affairs (item 3) was interpreted as support for the norm. The fact that these three items also intercorrelated in predicted directions should add confidence to the judgment that they are tapping aspects of "role of the electorate" and can legitimately be combined in an index.

Three of the other items Rose criticizes address the doctrine of "individual responsibility" which holds that Ministers are answerable to the House of Commons for their Department's work and can, for serious errors, be compelled to resign. This norm is intended to insure ministerial accountability to Parliament. And there was considerable annoyance at the time over actions of some Ministers who, using various subterfuges, seemed to be eroding the doctrine. To buttress this principle and defend their own positions, MPs from all parties sought greater opportunities to question Ministers properly (item 8). They also demanded more information which could be used to examine the competence of Ministers and their Departments (item 9). It was further argued that individual responsibility was being undermined by the Prime Minister's rigorous approach to party discipline and by his ever-growing influence (item 10). As the balance of power seemed to be tilting towards the Executive, those most concerned about individual responsibility fought to preserve the few weapons they still possessed. Again, Rose is correct that none of the three items measures the literal doctrine. But each seems to me to assess significant aspects of dispositions toward it, and as these items were likewise correlated in predicted directions, they too were combined in an index. Moreover, their performance in the analysis is much the same as that of others which might be taken as more literal statements of constitutional norms (e.g., parliamentarism): both are viewed by politicians through lenses deeply tinted with political bias.

I hadn't supposed the findings were so very controversial. After all, they simply support criticism found in recent books, bills, early day motions, speeches and letters to *The Times*. Perhaps Professor Rose will be assuaged with the assurance that the data have already done their bit for "prior expectations" in another article where, consistent with the Dahl-Key theory, politicians' attitudes toward rules of the game were found to be much more robust than the public's. The present article merely adds that these attitudes are, at the same time, pulled and pushed about by political forces shaping politicians' outlooks. Yet British representative government stands firm. Apparently it can tolerate from its leaders more dissensus on fundamentals than had been thought.

DONALD D. SEARING

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Erratum

In "The Political Bases of Citizen Contacting: A Cross-National Analysis" by Alan S. Zuckerman and Darrell M. West (Volume 79, pp. 117-131), the last paragraph on p. 119 should read: "In order to test these models of citizen contacting, we examined data found in the seven-nation study conducted by Verba et al. These surveys contain a wealth of information about contacting as well as other forms of participation."

Forthcoming in September

The following articles have been scheduled for publication in the September 1985 issue.

Richard Arneson, "Marxism and Secular Faith: Was Marx a Bad Public Choice Theorist?"
Larry M. Bartels, "Expectations and Preferences in Nominating Campaigns"
Jonathan Bendor and Terry Moe, "An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic Politics"
James Ceaser, "Alexis de Tocqueville on Political Science, Political Culture, and the Role of the Intellectual"
Robert Goodin, "Vulnerabilities and Responsibilities: An Ethical Defense of the Welfare State"
Arthur S. Goldberg and John R. Wright, "Risk and Uncertainty as Factors in the Durability of Political Coalitions"
Joseph Greenberg and Shlomo Weber, "Multiparty Equilibria under Proportional Representation"
Jonathan Kelley, Ian McAllister, and Anthony Mughan, "The Decline of Class Revisited: Class and Party in England, 1964-1979"
Amnon Rapoport and Esther Golan, "Assessment of Political Power in the Israeli Knesset"
Steven B. Smith, "Althusser's Marxism without a Knowing Subject"
Karen Strom, "Party Goals and Government Performance in Parliamentary Democracies"
Eric Uslaner and M. Margaret Conway, "The Responsible Congressional Electorate: Watergate, the Economy, and Vote Choice in 1974"

BOOK REVIEWS

Review Essays

Development and the Politics of Administrative Reform: Lessons from Latin America. By Linn A. Hammergren. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983. Pp. xvi + 213. $19.00, paper.)

No Shortcuts to Progress: African Development Management in Perspective. By Goran Hyden. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983. Pp. xv + 223. $35.00, cloth; $9.50, paper.)

Development Projects as Policy Experiments: An Adaptive Approach to Development Administration. By Dennis A. Rondinelli. (New York: Methuen, 1983. Pp. ix + 167. $21.00, cloth; $9.95, paper.)

The themes of the three books under review deal with the problems and opportunities that exist for the field of development administration and management as this academic and practical field enters its fourth decade. These three books also provide distinct but complementary views of the history of development administration. Taken as a whole, the three works contribute to a better understanding of past experience, of the present, and of what might be the future environmental and institutional constraints to development, both globally as well as in specific regions of the world.

The descriptions, analyses, and prescriptions of these authors vary given their academic backgrounds and experiences. At the same time, there are interdisciplinary thrusts that the authors recognize and attempt to employ.

Dennis Rondinelli's work is more global than the works of Linn Hammergren and Goran Hyden. Rondinelli concentrates on development policies as they have affected development projects with the intention of reorienting development administration. On the other hand, Linn Hammergren tackles the issue of administrative reform within the context of Latin America, concentrating on three cases: Peru, Venezuela, and Colombia. Goran Hyden focuses upon still another theme in development administration: the contextual or environmental issue relating to Africa, in particular, sub-Saharan Africa. All three authors tend to have a pessimistic view of both the past and present, but also attempt to provide an optimistic future if certain conditions—particularly political and social—are met by both lending agencies and recipient countries.

Rondinelli's approach/focus is on a larger scale (in terms of issues dealt with) than the other two books. *Development Projects as Policy Experiments: An Adaptive Approach to Development Administration* is part of a Methuen and Company series on development and underdevelopment edited by Ray Bromley and Gavin Kitching. Rondinelli is a well-known and widely published development planner and has substantial consulting experience with international and bilateral lending agencies. His task, as he describes it, is to "explore . . . the growing divergence between the nature of development problems and the principles of development administration . . . as they have been defined by international assistance agencies and the governments of many developing countries over the past two decades" (p. 2). He contends that a major dilemma in this field is that planners and policymakers are control-oriented, and that these controls "inhibit the kinds of analyses and planning that are most appropriate" to dealing with the "increasing uncertainty and complexity of development problems" (p. 2).

After providing a critique of the experience with development since its post-World War II beginnings (chap. 1), emphasizing the control of development activities rather than facilitating the encouragement of "flexibility, experimentation, and social learning . . . essential to implementing development projects successfully" (p. 2), Rondinelli examines development policies as social experiments (chap. 2), the design of development projects (chap. 3), the implementation of development projects as policy experiments (chap. 4), and the need to reorient development administration (chap. 5).

Chapter 5 outlines the case he wants to make. Rondinelli rejects both the "transfer of administrative procedures and techniques from industrial countries" (the "tool-oriented" approach) and the transformation and modernization of political processes and administrative structures (the "Weberian model" approach) of the 1950s and 1960s (p. 116). His alternative approach for the future is "adaptive administration" (p. 120). This approach involves adjusting planning and administrative procedures to the political environment of public policymaking. It also involves increasing the responsiveness of organizations (through participation and market surrogate arrangements), using a learning based approach to planning and administration, increasing administrative capacity, decentralizing authority (for development planning and administration), building local organizational capacity and institutional service delivery networking, utilizing "adjunctive" and strategic planning, simplifying planning and management procedures, encouraging error detection and correction, and, finally, creating incentives for innovative management. Rondinelli's concluding note emphasizes his desire to make development planning and administration adaptive. "Let good managers manage . . . [and] . . . reward them for their efforts and results" (p. 148).

Rondinelli's contribution to the field is basically one of simplifying and synthesizing the issues involved in development project planning and implementation. Scholars familiar with the field will recognize his description of past and present development policies, but may disagree with both his prescriptions for the future and the extent to which all of his suggestions could be effectively incorporated by lending agencies and recipient countries. Regardless of one's possible disagreement with this book, it is well documented, and its bibliography and index enhance its usefulness in a classroom setting.

"Administrative reform, a central element of development strategies twenty years ago is today in so much disrepute that it has all but disappeared from the vocabulary of development theory" states Linn Hammergren in her introductory chapter (p. 15). In examining the three middle-income countries of Latin America—Peru, Venezuela, and Colombia—she traces their reform movements and attempts to generalize from their experiences. Several common themes for administrative reform success and failure are developed in the three case studies. In Peru, the reasons for failure include the counterproductivity of the experts' monopoly on the reform movement; the lack of political skills of the reform experts; and the isolation of the organization responsible for reform, which did not possess the power to act on its own. In Venezuela ("The Reformer's Reform" as Hammergren subtitles chapter 5), some change did occur, but the extent to which the majority of the population became aware of this was limited because the reforms did not directly affect "efficiency and efficacy at the point of contact with the bureaucracy" (p. 125). The Colombian reform experience (subtitled "Institutionalized Reform") was not dominated by experts as were the other two cases. The Colombian reforms were less ambitious and limited to reorganization of individual bureaucratic entities "rather than the bureaucracy as a whole" (p. 134). In addition, the Colombian reforms were drawn up by committees of politicians and administrators. The changes were incremental but, nevertheless, accomplished.

Hammergren's conclusions in chapter 7 focus on the policy process, the political variables, and the organizational variables that emerge from her three case studies. These must be related to the ends or objectives of reform. Most importantly, she emphasizes the need to relate the reform of institutions, in the name of efficiency, to the governments' (or regimes') desires to improve the effectiveness of government programs. The smooth internal functioning of a bureaucracy is no substitute for the timely, effective delivery of goods and services.

Development and the Politics of Administrative Reform presents documented, scholarly, and practically oriented material that buttresses what many in the field have begun to recognize: Administrative reform (as conceptualized in the 1950s and 1960s) is no universal panacea for the problems of public program design and implementation.

Goran Hyden presents still another theme in development management: the contextual, environmental issue. Although *No Shortcuts to Progress* was originally to be a textbook on African public administration in the mid-1970s, the focus changed to "a critical look at the context in which administration and related development management activities are being conducted" (p. ix). The book's content deals with "the historical macro context in which African management is being managed" (p. ix).

Hyden's chapters deal with African economy and society, governance and politics, policy-making and administration, decentralization and parastatals, participation and accountability, and local capacity. His final two chapters (7 and 8) present implications for donor agencies and prescriptions for change (titled "No Shortcuts to Progress").

Hyden's approach has elements of economic determinism. In the Introduction he states, "This book is based on a simple thesis, originally developed by Marx that the economic element is, in the broadest sense, determining human progress" (p. xiv). He concludes his work by stating, "The point made in this book is a very simple one, fetched straight out of a Marxist textbook . . . a society is the captive of its own history and that history has its own phases determined by the material conditions prevailing at any given time. . ." (p. 213). What is required, Hyden maintains, is for African countries to effectively institutionalize "structure which presuppose macro development" (p. 213). Interestingly, he is certain that Africa will not undergo socialist revolutionary transformations. He is also convinced that accelerated development will also not occur until African countries first establish the structures necessary for such development.

This is a broad ranging work that will not necessarily find a warm reception among certain African scholars or among those who advocate either the "tool-oriented" or Weberian theories of development administration. Both theories assume that structures or institutions predisposed to development do, in fact, exist. Hyden's analysis maintains that the structural development fundamental to the transformation of Africa from its pre-capitalist stage is absent.

Rondinelli and Hyden, and to a lesser extent Hammergren, deal with the fundamental problems confronting development administration and management, problems that have been recognized but not resolved by organizations such as the World Bank and USAID. (See, in particular, the *World Development Report, 1983,* Part 2, "Management in Development," Oxford University Press, 1983, pp. 41-127.) Reconceptualizing and refocusing development administration, as envisioned by these authors, is exceedingly difficult.

Currently, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, along with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), are providing approximately $34 billion annually in Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the less-developed countries of the world. But each year, it becomes increasingly difficult to secure these funds. Consequently, the changes proposed for recipient countries in these three books are worth consideration. Internal resource mobilization and administrative changes in development planning and implementation are agenda items that the world's poorest countries must consider and act upon.

ROBERT LAPORTE, JR.

The Pennsylvania State University

Media Politics: The News Strategies of Presidential Campaigns. By F. Christopher Arterton. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1984. Pp. xiv + 220. $27.00.)

Channels of Power: The Impact of Television on American Politics. By Austin Ranney. (New York: Basic Books, 1983. Pp. x + 207. $14.95.)

Over the Wire and On TV: CBS and UPI in Campaign '80. By Michael J. Robinson and Margaret A. Sheehan. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1983. Pp. xv + 332. $24.95, cloth; $8.95, paper.)

Students of media and politics have taken giant strides since their early efforts to describe their interrelationship. Generally, early scholars thought of the media as an outside influence on politics, and the conclusion was soon drawn that any influence involved was minor at best, despite arguments by Walter Lippmann and Douglass Cater. But contemporary scholars now view media as essential, not secondary, elements of the political system, and we are on the verge of integrating them into studies of the political process. So long as the impact of the media was seen as idiosyncratic and as essentially nonpolitical, much as the impact of weather on voting turnout, we could draw only an incomplete (and misleading) picture of the operation of the political system.

A more complete understanding of politics will only be possible when we have succeeded in incorporating all the basic elements into one theoretical scheme. But the incorporation of the media into a theory of politics has proven difficult: They are neither similar to interest groups, nor are they a "fourth branch of government." In the last decade, a spate of books and articles has dealt with the impact of media coverage on politics, arguing that it is not the event, but the report of the event, which shapes the political process, with Watergate and the Vietnam War frequently cited as examples. Further studies have examined the influence of the media's own preferences and goals on their news reporting, preferences and goals that make the media themselves political actors. The authors of the books reviewed here all take a somewhat different, and I think worthwhile, perspective: Media coverage changes the nature of the political process.

Arterton examines the impact of news reporting practice on the conduct of political campaigns and attempts to assess the consequences of this impact in *Media Politics.* His evidence comes from extensive interviews with campaign personnel and journalists during the 1976 and 1980 presidential campaigns. He finds that journalists and campaigners "interact on three conceptually distinct levels—personal, organizational, and substantive" (p. 37), each of which he treats in a separate chapter. He concludes that presidential campaigning in the late twentieth century differs markedly from that of earlier eras to the detriment of representation and coalition-building. Correcting these disadvantages to media politics, Arterton says, "will occur only when initiated by journalists" (p. 208).

Arterton proposes a theoretical framework for examining the media as an integral part of the political process. He accords the media a participant status in campaigns: The strategies and tactics of campaigners are directly affected by the media's practices. Organizational considerations of both the campaign organization and the media organizations exert a significant and reciprocal influence on each other. Campaigners treat the press as "more than simply a surrogate for the electorate" (p. 198); Arterton points out that "relations with journalists . . . shape what campaigners actually do in their attempts to mobilize electoral support" (p. 201). In contrast to the journalists' conception of themselves as outside the campaign process, campaigners view journalists as an essential element in campaigning. Readers will find the figures on pages 22 and 23 especially insightful on this point.

Robinson and Sheehan set a monumental task for themselves, "a twelve-month 'press watch' " (p. 10), to evaluate journalistic performance and to determine what differences, if any, exist between the new electronic media and more traditional print journalism in covering presidential campaigns. They find, generally, that both media adhere relatively closely to their explicit professional standards of fairness, objectivity, and access. But they point out major differences between these media as well: greater concentration on the presidency for television, more thematic coverage for network news, and a tendency for television to interpret even official presidential actions only in the context of the campaign. They conclude that "the commercial media did a better job in 1980 than most critics allowed, albeit a worse job than the media themselves pretended" (p. 304).

Robinson and Sheehan painstakingly characterize the differences in campaign coverage between the two media, noting that, compared with print, network journalism "is more inferential and hostile [and] shades markedly toward the didactic" (p. 216). Television news focuses more on the president than do newspapers, and it "politicizes news much more" (p. 212) than does print. These and other conclusions lead the authors to "speculate about politics under a new system of political reporting" (p. xiv). Their concluding section, titled appropriately enough, "Conclusions and Implications," is the most interesting part of *Over the Wire and On TV,* because here the authors treat media coverage not as an outside influence but as a major determinant of political events. Robinson and Sheehan stop short of formulating a theory of politics that explicitly incorporates the media (not, after all, their purpose), but they point out that "network journalism has played a part in changing the tenor of American mass politics" (p. 262).

Channels of Power goes beyond electoral politics; Ranney's attention is focused, as his subtitle suggests, on the impact of television on American politics. That impact is a result of the fact that for most of us, "televised political reality *is* 'real reality' " (p. 30), and that television (as well as other media) has an unavoidable structural bias that has a systematic impact on American politics. In contrast to the other two works, Ranney's monograph does not report research findings. Instead, it is composed of revised lectures delivered in 1981 at the University of Michigan School of Law. The lecture format gives Ranney the opportunity to explore the impact of television's portrayal of politics, and it leads him to ask a central question, "what is political reality in the 1980s?" (p. 5). It is because voters respond to political reality as portrayed on television that its patterns become significant; it is because politicians must act in the context created by that coverage that its portrayal becomes important.

The bulk of Ranney's analysis is devoted to speculating about television's influence, detailing changes in the American political culture, in the types of politicians who seek public office, and in the process of governing—all traceable in his view to the emergence of television as a dominant medium. He argues that television raises expectations about presidential action and about prompt resolution of complex crises, and that the "glare of television's attention has helped significantly to weaken the ability of presidents and congressmen to govern" (p. 154). He concludes with a call "to preserve and renew those values and institutions that we believe have been dangerously weakened in the television age" (p. 182).

Channels of Power is, in its scope, the broadest of the three books under review. Its main points are thought provoking (although personally I feel that the impact of television is overstated). Clearly, however, Ranney presents an attempt to bring the study of media politics within the purview of the science of politics. His conception of political reality has some promise of providing a focus for further research by political scientists interested in the media. The concept plays an important role in Arterton's analysis; campaigners necessarily worry about the political reality presented by journalists, and the campaign news reported by the media depends in large part on the activities of campaigners hoping to influence that presentation. And Robinson and Sheehan conclude that television and wire services present different pictures of political reality, traditional print treating national politics "descriptively and officially," and television news "analytically and critically" (p. 290).

Treating these works as representatives of a developing trend in media analysis, we can see clearly that the traditional question concerning the impact of the media on politics is mistaken; it is as misguided as asking what the impact of interest groups on politics is. The point is that the media are integral parts of the political system, not outside influences on it, and as such must be studied within that context. The political theories that explain, or purport to explain, political phenomenon must also be able to account for media influence. A careful reader of these books cannot help but conclude that research that treats the media in isolation from the political context misses the boat. Arterton's careful analysis demonstrates the centrality of media in at least one aspect of the political process; future researchers will, I am sure, discover complex interrelationships between policymakers and press in other areas as well.

JAN P. VERMEER

Nebraska Wesleyan University

American Government and Politics

Inside the Legislative Process: The Passage of the Foreign Service Act of 1980. By William I. Bacchus. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984. Pp. xxii + 148. $15.00.)

William Bacchus continues to contribute to our knowledge of the processes involved in organizing for foreign policy which he first elucidated in an essay in the *American Political Science Review* (1974, *68,* 736-748). Additionally, we gain insights into the nature of relations among bureaucrats, congressional actors, and White House officials in the formulation of legislation. The specific bill discussed is the first sweeping revision of Foreign Service legislation since the Foreign Service Act of 1946. Bacchus's book will be of interest to personnelists, foreign policy students, and congressional scholars.

Bacchus starts with the premise that political scientists should examine low-visibility legislation because it is the norm for the legislative process. He develops a piece of participant-observer work of the finest sort aided by his service as one of the two main congressional liaison officers in the Department of State responsible for passage of the bill. Bacchus nicely takes into account both formal and informal aspects of the legislative process.

He traces the development of the legislation from the passage of the Foreign Service Act of 1946 to the implementation of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 in 1981. Bacchus begins by presenting a chronology of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 and then lucidly elaborates on the difficulties of achieving an "appropriate personnel 'structure' for the conduct of the nation's foreign affairs" (p. 6). For example, how does one utilize civil service personnel overseas who have specialized skills needed for the conduct of foreign policy without slighting foreign service personnel or incurring the wrath of unions such as the American Foreign Service Association and the American Federation of Government Employees, and how does one classify individuals whose work influences foreign policy, but who never work outside of the United States?

Bacchus presents major elements of the personnel plan that began to emerge from within the State Department in 1979. There was an effort to complement the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 and to emulate its successful passage. Curiously, although President Carter was a strong advocate of the Civil Service Reform Act, he was indifferent about this legislation. It would have been useful if Bacchus had discussed in more detail why this was the case. Key components of the plan included a reduction in the number of Foreign Service categories, the exclusion of domestic-only employees from the Foreign Service system, and the creation of a new Senior Foreign Service.

The book is laid out in a systematic fashion. Chapter titles include: "Hearings," "Developing a Bill," "The Floor," "Conference," and "Enactment and Implementation." Although Bacchus does examine formal procedures in explicit detail as implied by the foregoing, his writing style is not dry and he highlights idiosyncratic factors that can influence the development of legislation, such as the ambivalent stance of Senator Claiborne Pell toward the bill and the dispute surrounding provisions protecting the interests of divorced spouses of foreign service personnel. Pell, a former foreign service officer and an advocate of reform of the foreign service personnel system, was opposed to performance pay and overtime compensation for foreign service officers. He deemed such payment demeaning because the assumption should be made that such elite individuals always perform at peak capacity. Attitudes of congressional negotiators toward the interests of the divorced spouses of foreign service officers were primarily determined by the friendliness or acrimony of committee members' own divorces.

In conclusion, *Inside the Legislative Process* is well executed and worth reading.

HENRY B. SIRGO

McNeese State University

Religion and Politics in the South: Mass and Elite Perspectives. Edited by Tod A. Baker, Robert P. Steed, and Lawrence Moreland. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Pp. xiv + 191. $23.95.)

Religion and Politics in the South is the third volume on Southern politics edited by Baker, Steed, and Moreland, and all three volumes are based on papers presented at the Citadel Conferences on Southern Politics. Unfortunately, this collection does not compare favorably to the two previous books in this series, *Party Politics in the South* (Praeger Publishers, 1980) and *Contemporary Southern Political Attitudes and Behavior* (Praeger Publishers, 1982). Although the first two volumes in this series provided a wealth of new data and insights into southern political parties and political behavior, *Religion and Politics in the South* tells us little that is new.

The book is divided into two sections, with the first containing four chapters concerning mass perspectives on religion and politics and the second, four chapters on elite perspectives. One problem concerns the blurred distinctions between southern masses and elites. Although elites in several cases are defined as party activists, many such activists obviously do not possess the economic, educational, and other characteristics frequently associated with the concept of elites.

In the first chapter, Michael Mezey tries to distinguish the attitudinal issues that distinguish southerners from persons who live in the rest of the nation. Mezey finds that racial issues most clearly delineate the South from the rest of the nation, but he finds less distinctiveness on moral and religions issues. Rural, white southerners are found to be the most distinct group, whereas urban, white southerners are most like the rest of the nation. Two other essays in the section of the book on mass perspectives deal with southern evangelicals. Unfortunately, the authors use slightly different measures in defining evangelicals. Corwin Smidt concludes that southern evangelicals are not the monolithic group that they are usually portrayed as. Less than one-third of southerners were classified as evangelicals, and only 30% of these classified themselves as conservatives. Jerry Perkins, Donald Fairchild, and Murray Havens compare evangelicalism among southern whites and blacks. Besides finding blacks much more likely to be evangelicals than whites (43% versus 25%), they find that race and not religion remains the dominant factor for blacks in the political realm.

Two of the four essays on elite perspectives are by the book's editors. In the first, they examine fundamentalism among party activists in two southern states and five not in the south, and in the second, they discuss political attitudes of party activists in Virginia and South Carolina. Steed and his colleagues discover no difference between party activists who are or are not southern in terms of social characteristics, but southern activists who are fundamentalists are more likely to be Republicans and conservatives. Among southern party activists, Democrats are more likely to take a "nonsouthern" issue position on military and minority rights issues, whereas Republicans more closely resemble their southern constituents.

The major finding from the essays is that evangelicals are not a monolithic group and that their influence on southern politics has been greatly exaggerated. Unfortunately, most of the findings are neither new nor noteworthy. I found myself concurring with one of the authors, Michael Mezey, who observes that his conclusions "will be obvious to those who have studied the South more persistently than I have" (p. 21).

DARRYL PAULSON

University of South Florida

Sectionalism and American Political Development, 1880-1980. By Richard Franklin Bensel. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984. Pp. xx + 494. $35.00.)

This book swims against a growing tide of literature that describes the United States as increasingly homogeneous politically, or nationalized. As Bensel notes, sectionalism is generally described as a "fading anachronism" (p. xix). Focusing on roll call voting in the House of Representatives from 1880 to 1980, Bensel documents the history of sectionalism and its impact on political development. His conclusion is that sectionalism endures in American politics and constitutes a fundamental force in structuring the party system, political ideologies, and the norms of political institutions.

One of the strengths of this impressive book is its thorough theoretical grounding. The concept of sectionalism is based on Immanuel Wallerstein's core-periphery distinction and then placed within a model of political development and change. Importantly, Bensel recognizes that sectional boundaries will change over time, and hence avoids the simplistic approach of dividing the nation into two fixed regions—the old slave states and the rest of the country. The empirical criteria used to establish the units of analysis are valid and display substantial creativity.

The bulk of the book traces the roll call voting behavior of trade areas (the units composing the core and periphery) over the last century to establish the outlines of political development as structured by sectional conflict. This effort has its strengths and weaknesses. The votes analyzed are selected on the basis of Bensel's measure of sectional stress which indicates trade area cohesion and conflict. Some political historians will doubt the representativeness of these votes for certain periods. The votes are then placed into a number of general policy categories. These categories serve as the basis for understanding the major political conflicts of the particular period. At this point, the skeptical reader may well cry circularity. That is, votes which manifest high levels of sectional stress are used to document the importance of sectionalism. To this end, a more systematic comparative approach (e.g., party versus sectional conflict) would have been helpful. If, however, Bensel's aim is more modest—to simply show the role of sectionalism in influencing politics—then this criticism misses the mark. These chapters provide a very well-researched and well-reasoned account of the way in which sectional conflict affected the agenda and political conflict in the House from 1880 to 1980. One of the strongest points of these chapters is the analysis of the changing nature of sectional conflict and how these changes altered the political agenda of the House and the structure of conflict.

Even in this regard, however, some problems remain with the book. The most important shortcoming is occasional reductionism, that is, all political conflict is explained by the divergent economic interests of the core and periphery. For example, racial and ethnic differences are considered as secondary or even ignored at some points, even though numerous analyses find these factors to be crucial during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, Bensel does occasionally examine the *exceptions* to his predictions in order to produce a fuller explanation of political conflict.

These criticisms should not obscure the value of this study. Its theoretical grounding, thorough research, and focus on change result in an invaluable study on a topic that has received little thoughtful research. In particular, the historical treatment employed by Bensel allows him to trace the dynamic processes in his model and thus better develop plausible explanations of political development. The two chapters that attempt to draw the links between sectional conflict, institutional norms, the party system, and political ideology to explain political development are more suggestive than definitive, but they raise interesting and important questions for further research. This book is a very important contribution to the literature on political development and change.

PATRICK A. PIERCE

Saint Mary's College

History of the Supreme Court of the United States: Vol. 9, The Judiciary and Responsible Government, 1910-21. By Alexander M. Bickel and Benno C. Schmidt, Jr. (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1984. Pp. xiv + 1041. $75.00.)

This magnificent volume, the most recent installment of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court, constitutes a brilliant and comprehensive account of the inner workings, politics, personalities, and policies of the Court during the chief justiceship of Edward Douglass White. No one who has studied this often-neglected era has approached the erudition or mastery displayed in this book, and no one is likely to do so in the near future. Based on archival searches all around the nation for letters, documents, opinions, and briefs—not to mention painstaking exegesis of the *United States Reports*—the research that Bickel and Schmidt have poured into this work is truly impressive. In the larger scheme of things, the books of the Holmes Devise provide an important and needed benchmark for scholars of the Court—a fine beginning of what we can hope will be a careful examination of the development of the Supreme Court as a political institution.

Bickel died in 1974, leaving seven essentially finished chapters, and his former student, Schmidt, then took over the chore of research for and writing of the final three. I cast no aspersions on Schmidt when I say that I found Bickel's chapters, especially 1 ("Mr. Taft Rehabilitates the Court") and 4 ("Appointment Cycles"), particularly graceful and compelling. For students of courts as small groups, Bickel retells the familiar story of President and later Chief Justice Taft's unparalleled, compulsive interest and role in nominations and appointments to the federal courts. Of course we have known the general outlines of Mr. Taft's exploits for many years, but

Bickel has unearthed a great deal of fascinating and often new material, much of which he published in the *Yale Law Journal* a decade ago. These days few law professors or political scientists can construct a lively and fluent narrative. Yet Bickel shows a fine flair for storytelling at many junctures in this book.

For those who like myself normally focus on the constitutional docket of the Court, chapters 2 ("The Rule of Reason") and 7 ("Federal Administration and the Federal Specialties") provide a refreshing and painlessly educational change of pace. In the former, Bickel leads us through a detailed analysis of the vagaries of the law and politics of antitrust before, during, and after the White Court. In the latter, he takes brief but helpful forays into such topics as the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, public lands and water rights, Indian affairs, patents and copyrights, and bankruptcy. Although the Court by the 1930s had become primarily a constitutional court, Bickel reminds us that during White's years in the middle chair, "the federal specialties still loomed quite large, and the Supreme Court had by no means ceased to be a common law court" (p. 650).

In Part 2, which includes chapters on Jim Crow, the Peonage Cases, and black voting rights, Schmidt quite persuasively argues that the "Supreme Court's race relations decisions between 1910 . . . and 1921 . . . constitute one of the Progressive era's most notable, and in some ways surprising, constitutional developments. Each of the Civil War amendments was given unprecedented application. . . . The fact of the matter is that the White Court breathed life into Reconstruction principles that had been left for dead by the Waite and Fuller Courts for three decades" (pp. 725, 727). In these decisions, the White Court sowed many seeds, the fruit of which Earl Warren and his brethren reaped nearly 40 years later.

At the risk of seeming overly defensive of our own discipline's *bona fides,* I do think that Bickel and Schmidt could have benefitted, especially in chapters 1 and 4, from some exposure to the better work of political scientists. That the text should reflect no contact with Walter F. Murphy's *Elements of Judicial Strategy* (University of Chicago Press, 1964) and David J. Danelski's work on the chief justiceship in coverage of internal politics, or with Henry J. Abraham's *Justices and Presidents* (Oxford University Press, 1974) and Danelski's *A Supreme Court Justice Is Appointed* (Random House, 1964) on the politics of appointments, simply mystifies me. Similarly, I suspect that our colleagues in history will cast a jaundiced eye on the failure of Bickel and Schmidt to take account of most of their previous efforts. For the most part, Bickel and Schmidt use historical scholarship to provide authentication for this or that fact or date rather than to place their researches in the broader context of historiography on the Supreme Court and American society. We read chapter and after chapter and find no attempts to create even the most rudimentary generalizations about the roles of the Court and the justices. Instead of interpreting these rich sources in the light of social science or of assigning historical meaning to the White Court and its decisions during the Progressive Era, Bickel and Schmidt have built a record, a veritable wealth of materials for other scholars. For even that much, we should give thanks.

GREGORY A. CALDEIRA

The University of Iowa

Protest Is Not Enough: The Struggle of Blacks and Hispanics for Equality in Urban Politics. By Rufus P. Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. Pp. xvi + 317. $27.50.)

Protest Is Not Enough is an important contribution to the study of urban and minority group politics because it explains the relationships among minority protest politics, mobilization efforts for local public office, incorporation into the dominant liberal governing coalition, and the policy responsiveness of cities. Because of the nature of benchmarks used to measure policy responsiveness and the reliance primarily on factors internal to the cities, the book is less successful in demonstrating that, where minority incorporation has occurred, minorities have done significantly better than nonminority residents of these cities in policy responsiveness, or that the policy gains compared to those in cities where minority incorporation has not taken place are significant enough to warrant the praises of democratic openness the authors make of cities where minority incorporation has occurred.

In the first half of the book the authors do an excellent job of describing levels of black and Hispanic incorporation and explaining reasons for the levels of minority incorporation found between 1960 and 1980 in 10 northern California, nonpartisan, reform cities. Incorporation is defined as the extent to which blacks or Hispanics or both are represented in coalitions that dominate city policymaking when they decide minority related issues. They find that by 1978, minority incorporation had occurred in the following cities listed in declining order of degree: Berkeley, Oakland, San Francisco, Richmond, and Sacramento. Stockton and San Jose had a few blacks and Hispanics on city council. They had limited influence because they were not part of a dominant government coalition. In Hayward, Daly City, and Vallejo, minorities were without significant influence in local politics.

Important findings include the following: minority protest and demand politics have no long-term negative effects on minority incorporation; minority incorporation was caused by white liberal support (as measured by voting on Proposition 14) and minority group efforts to gain public office, rather than size of black population in a city alone, the national civil rights movement, or relative deprivation of blacks compared whites in a city. Another important contribution is the complex, and at times brilliant, comparison of levels of incorporation and causation between blacks and Hispanics. Generally, blacks have been far more successful politically than Hispanics and have helped clear the way for Hispanic influence in several of the cities.

In the second half of the book, which focuses on the policy responsiveness of cities, the authors conclude that levels of incorporation, internal city factors, are significantly related to a city's policy responsiveness to minorities.

This book makes a contribution to our knowledge of federalism or intergovernmental relations. The authors conclude that the long-term effects of the federal government programs of the 1960s aided minority incorporation by providing resources to minority groups and white liberal supporters and issues around which minorities could be mobilized. Federal government programs of the 1970s overall resulted in less aid pinpointed to minorities. However, in the black-incorporation cities in the 1970s there was less of a decline in redistribution to minorities than in cities in which minority incorporation did not take place. Finally the authors find that bureaucratic implementation did not have an independent effect separate from the nature of the dominant governing coalition on a city's policy responsiveness to minorities.

The major problem with *Protest Is Not Enough* is the choice of standards of evaluation. Movement in the direction of increasing minority access to government, a process standard, is used as a benchmark along with policy responsiveness, differences among the 10 cities in support of civilian review boards, black hiring, the 1960s Model Cities, poverty, and urban renewal programs and responsiveness to federal programs in the 1970s. These benchmarks result in the impression that cities with black incorporation did far more for minorities, redistributively, than cities with no incorporation, and that local politics are important to the life chances of minorities.

These benchmarks lead to an overstatement of the positive effects of incorporation. Would it not be more valid to measure the result of incorporation on policies important to *both* minority and nonminority citizens? I wonder what the authors might have found if they investigated whether incorporation significantly changed policies central to the benefit-tax ratios of citizens, minorities and nonminorities, that is, redistributive and developmental policies such as tax policy or local economic support of physical development policies. These benchmarks, used along with those on process norms and specific policies discussed in this study, would more effectively demonstrate the independent effect and significance of local political context on urban policy, an important objective of this book. It also would add to our knowledge of the degree to which external economic versus internal and external factors affect the policy responsiveness of our cities to minorities, a major concern of modern scholarly inquiry.

RONALD KAHN

Oberlin College

Implementation of Civil Rights Policy. Edited by Charles S. Bullock, III and Charles M. Lamb. (Monterey, Calif.: Brooks/Cole Publishing, 1984. Pp. x + 223. $14.25, paper.)

Relying on existing literature on policy implementation, Bullock and Lamb identify 10 factors that may play a role in effectively carrying out civil rights policy.

Implementation might be aided, the authors suggest, if (1) policy goals are clearly stated, (2) precise standards are specified for measuring compliance, (3) a mechanism for monitoring compliance exists, (4) an implementation agency is established, (5) enforcement personnel are committed to civil rights, (6) superiors support enforcement personnel, (7) the beneficiaries of civil rights policy are organized and cohesively support implementation, (8) enforcement agencies coordinate their efforts, (9) cost/benefit ratios favor compliance, and (10) the federal government is active on behalf of civil rights.

Five essays examine seven areas of civil rights policy. From these, Bullock concludes that only federal involvement, specific compliance standards, commitment by agency personnel, support from superior officers, and favorable cost/benefit ratios are important for the implementation of civil rights policies. The clarity of policy goals adds somewhat to implementation, and the other factors are unimportant.

The implementation of voting rights has been largely successful, argue James Schur and Richard Button. Federal government involvement occurs under the Fifteenth Amendment, and especially the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The act provides specific standards for compliance and clarifies policy goals. Monitoring is relatively straightforward, measured by the extent of registration and voting by blacks. There has usually been enforcement by the Justice Department and strong support by the president, Congress, and courts.

Desegregation in higher education, according to Q. Whitfield Ayres, has not been effectively implemented. No federal policy specifically applies to higher education; colleges fall under other, broader policies. The Office of Civil Rights sometimes attempted enforcement, but other leaders have shown little interest. Blacks are torn between strengthening historically black institutions and desegregating formerly segregated white colleges. Student enrollment choices and the differing academic programs of institutions muddy the measures of desegregation in higher education.

Other essays show relatively successful civil rights implementation in elementary and secondary education (Charles Bullock), moderate success in fair employment practices (Harrell Rodgers, Jr.) and bilingual education (Bullock), and little success in housing desegregation (Lamb) or in combatting "second-generation discrimination" (various authors).

The authors candidly acknowledge analytical problems. Are the tested variables inclusive? What is the ordering of importance of these implementation variables? Do they work more strongly in certain combinations than separately? Are some variables surrogates for others? For example, is support for enforcement by elected officials actually a reflection of public attitudes toward enforcement?

Notwithstanding these reservations, this volume is generally useful. First, the authors identify variables that might be related to policy assessment and test them in specific policy areas. Second, each chapter is a helpful essay on a specific aspect of racial discrimination and civil rights policy in the United States.

DAVID ADAMANY

Wayne State University

The Reapportionment Puzzle. By Bruce Cain. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. Pp. xii + 202. $24.50.)

Bruce Cain argues that reapportionment is an inherently political process and that reapportionment done by legislatures is compatible with pluralist foundations of American government. He challenges the aim of good government reformers for a nonpartisan, nonconflictual reapportionment process. According to Cain, good government fair plans include criteria such as equal population, compactness, contiguousness, respect for city and county lines, observing communities of interest, avoiding racial gerrymanders, and creating competitive districts. But as Cain shows, not all reasonable people agree on the value of these criteria, which makes them political; conflict exists among them, and they cannot be ordered when there is conflict. Especially noteworthy is that even the aesthetic consideration of compactness is not necessarily always in the public interest, particularly when it clashes with affirmative action concerns.

Part 1 of the book is devoted to the centrality of politics and representation to reapportionment. Part 2 is a case study of the 1981 redistricting process in the California legislature, where Cain served as a reapportionment consultant to the Assembly Elections and Reapportionment Committee. His work consists of a solid, logical line of argument. He models the process at each point and presents real-world examples to support his case.

Although reapportionment may be inherently political, the implementation of partisan and bipartisan gerrymanders is more difficult than their critics assume according to Cain. Tension especially exists between individual incumbents and party leadership in pursuit of a partisan gerrymander because of divergent incentives. Incumbents seek a risk-averse strategy involving the maximization of the safety and familiarity of their districts. Party leadership seeks efficiency. This means lessening the number of wasted votes that may involve making previously safe seats riskier, thus producing a clash of individual and party incentives. Cain views incumbents' perspectives on the reapportionment process as a reversal of the Downsian model. Rather than voters choosing candidates closest to their own interests, candidates "compare voters and choose the ones closest to them, subject to a strong displacement constraint" (p. 117).

For the majority party to undertake a partisan gerrymander it must consider whether it has the votes in its legislative caucus to pass a reapportionment bill without minority party support and has the resources to fight in the more efficient seats it would be creating, and it must take into account its estimate of long-range political and demographic trends.

Bipartisan gerrymanders reduce the number of efficient seats in both parties, protecting as many incumbents as possible in doing so. Such redistricting is undertaken when conditions exist opposite to those favoring a partisan plan. The majority party does not have sufficient votes for the adoption of a partisan plan, party resources are nearly equal, and uncertain political and demographic trends exist.

Values important to Cain—affirmative action, political representation, and maintaining continuity or the status quo—make the legislature the appropriate implementor of redistricting. Large legislative size provides descriptive representation, its makeup is politically proportionate, and legislators' exercise of conflicts of interests promote caution and resistance to change. But Cain also makes suggestions for improvement of the process by making it more public, rational, and timely.

Cain has done an excellent job of weaving together theoretical concerns and description of one reapportionment process. His treatment of the clashes involved in the process is well argued and provides a strong challenge to good government reformers. He has made a thorough contribution to the reapportionment literature.

BARBARA BURRELL

State University of New York at Albany

The State and the Poor in the 1980s. Edited by Manuel Carballo and Mary Jo Bane. (Boston: Auburn House Publishing, 1984. Pp. xxiv + 328. $24.95, cloth; $16.00, paper.)

Recent reductions in federal spending on social welfare programs have resulted in new demands placed on state governments to respond to the needs of the poor. Manuel Carballo and Mary Jo Bane's edited volume, *The State and the Poor in the 1980s,* is therefore a very timely book. The state in this case is Massachusetts, and the "poor" are those who live in households with incomes below the poverty line, as determined by the federal Office of Management and Budget. The various chapters, most of which have been written by scholars affiliated with the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, contain careful yet critical evaluations of that state's response to the conditions and needs of its poor residents.

Although the contributors are critical, even at times sharply critical, potential readers should be aware of what this book is not. It is not a negative commentary on American society generally, nor on our economic and political systems more specifically. The contributors propose no radical restructuring of institutions, nor any dramatic redistribution of wealth. Indeed, Carballo states in the Introduction that the volume does not address the *causes* of poverty, except to note that they are multiple, and therefore the government's response must be multidimensional as well. Neither is the book an attack on the Reagan administration. Although I strongly suspect that most of the contributors would argue with Ronald Reagan over who should be considered "truly needy," the book is not used as a medium through which to express disapprobation. Rather, fiscal retrenchment at the federal level is accepted as a fact of political life, and a more sensitive and effective state-level response to the poor becomes the focus of concern. Finally, this book is in no way a progeny of the state policy output literature within political science. No effort is made to explain the programmatic choices made in Massachusetts, or to account for the different levels of funding across various programs. To the contrary, state policy output studies by political scientists have been completely ignored in this volume (probably with minimal, if any, harm).

Each chapter of the volume addresses a specific dimension of Massachusetts's programmatic commitment toward the poor. Areas covered include education, health care, job training, income assistance, housing, transportation, and crime. Additional chapters evaluate the taxation policies of the state (specifically the progressive and regressive nature of the state's different revenue-raising measures), and the role that centralized planning plays (or more accurately, does not play) in the state's efforts to respond to the needs of the poor. In each chapter existing programs are described, their impacts assessed, and recommendations for programmatic changes are offered. Although a reader who does not share the contributors' particular interest in Massachusetts may find the state-specific details rather tedious at times, almost all of the chapters report a wealth of informative data within distinctive yet heuristically useful conceptual frameworks. Among the best are the chapters on health care by David Blumenthal and David Calkins, income transfers by Bane, and transportation by Jose Gomez-Ibanez (who argues quite persuasively that subsidizing automobile ownership among the poor would be a more effective and efficient response to their transportation needs than the state's present subsidy for mass transit).

The authors are all appropriately cautious about generalizing beyond Massachusetts, recognizing that the poor in Massachusetts, compared to many other states, are disproportionately white (more than 80%; racial discrimination, as a consequence, receives major attention only in John Yinger's chapter on housing policies), and also disproportionately residents of metropolitan areas (close to 90%). Therefore, their recommendations, like their data, tend to be state-specific. But several phenomena that have been increasingly important across states are highlighted in this volume and should be of interest to a wide audience. One is the so-called "tax revolt" and the impact that it has had on programs assisting the poor. In 1980, Massachusetts's voters adopted Proposition 2½, which mandated local governments to limit property taxes to no more than 2.5% of property values. The consequences that this has had on services benefiting the poor, and on the redirection of attention toward the state as an alternative source of support for these services, are impressively demonstrated by Helen Ladd and Herman Leonard in their chapter on taxation.

Another topic of growing concern is the increasing "feminization of poverty." Bane, in an initial chapter on the demographics of Massachusetts's poverty problem, reports that by 1980 almost one-half of the poor in Massachusetts were members of female-headed households. In a later chapter on income security programs, she argues convincingly that it is this group among the poor that is least likely to be lifted out of poverty by current state and federal programs. Indeed, among the many needed policy changes identified in this volume, policy innovations in response to this group appear to be the most immediate challenge confronting all levels of government in this country.

The State and the Poor in the 1980s will not be exciting reading for very many, but few should fail to be enlightened by it. The various chapters are only minimally integrated, so students of specific policy areas can benefit from reading selectively among the contributions.

RICHARD L. ENGSTROM

University of New Orleans

The Spot: The Rise of Political Advertising on Television. By Edwin Diamond and Stephen Bates. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984. Pp. xiv + 416. $17.50.)

Those worried that political advertising on television is devouring democracy can relax, but not too much. After reading this book we learn that our fears are neither entirely imaginary nor real. The authors—one a distinguished media-watcher for many years, the other a relative newcomer—alarm us with disturbing illustrations, but reassure us with reports of contrary evidence and findings. Generally the bad news is followed by the good news.

At various points Diamond and Bates disturb our democratic hopes. We learn that national presidential and megastate elections increasingly are dominated by political commercials (or polispots) that are not only expensive, but can also transform and distort our perception of the world. We learn that radio listeners of the first Kennedy-Nixon debate thought Nixon had won, whereas television viewers awarded victory to the more photogenic Kennedy. We learn that their campaign advisers told Dewey in 1948 and Humphrey in 1968 that additional advertising in crucial states probably would have changed the outcome of those elections. We learn that a rich but unknown New York Republican seized the Republican-Conservative nomination for governor with the help of almost $10 million largely spent on aggressive polispots.

Diamond and Bates, however, inform us that candidates fail whose behavior departs from their television image, that polispots tend to reinforce attitudes rather than convert, that incumbency and voter partisanship explain more election results than political advertising, that advertising spreads candidates' messages widely and efficiently without manipulating, that free media is more important than paid media, and that, anyway, the media wizards themselves are uncertain about what works and what doesn't.

However, the authors offer only limited hope, for they point to the development of political advertising as a menace of considerable proportions. Politics may become a kind of spectator sport with voting "just one more activity being commended to us by television purveyors of goods and services" (p. 385). But Diamond and Bates spend virtually no time exploring this situation despite labeling it as "probably more serious" than the more publicized fears of media mercenaries selling candidates like bars of soap (p. xii).

Diamond and Bates are at their best in Parts 3 and 4 of their book, where they analyze media techniques and the effects of polispots. Their evaluation is precise, amusing, enlightening, but incomplete (the bad news and the good news are not sufficiently related to each other). Parts 1 and 2 involve a brief description of the Glenn campaign for the 1984 presidential nomination and a long description of the evolution of political advertising that includes much that is fascinating, but also so much detail that some readers may long for an edited version. Until it appears, such readers may wish to consult the authors' "The Political Pitch" (*Psychology Today,* November, 1984, *18,* 22-32).

This book is the best available study of political advertising on television. That's the good news. The bad news is that it easily could have been much better.

GENE WEINSTEIN

San Francisco State University

American Political Theology: Historical Perspective and Theoretical Analysis. Edited by Charles W. Dunn. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984. Pp. iii + 195. $12.95, paper.)

Dunn boldly sets out to consider the ways in which conflicting theological perspectives in the past and present have influenced politics in the United States. He focuses on three periods of past, the founding era, the decades around the Civil War, and the age of the New Deal, and then in a much longer section, on our own age. His basic thesis is that most of the divisions in American religion as it has affected our politics have revolved around the enduring conflict between what he terms liberal and conservative theologies. Dunn feels that what each has stood for has varied throughout the rich history of Christianity in America. Indeed, Dunn's sensitivity to changing and evolving theological perspectives in American Christianity is a welcome positive feature of his analysis. He argues that what has not changed, however, is the tension between theological conservatives and liberals, and he makes a good case that this division is at least one angle from which we might view conflict in the major religions in the United States. In the process he constructs an interesting analysis.

Dunn's major goal, of course, is to go on to show that this division has consistently had serious implications for public policy. Today we know this is no easy task, as serious students of American politics find themselves forced to confront theologies as diverse as the multitude of religious groups involved in American politics who espouse one or another theme. It is obviously even more challenging a task for eras in our past. The distance from a group's religious ideals to its political practice, much less to what role its action plays in the formulation of public policy, is enormous. Dunn knows this very well, and sometimes he has more evidence for theological impact than at other times. But his major effort is toward suggesting a framework for the long-run influence of clashing theologies on our politics, and in this he succeeds surprisingly well in so brief a work.

Dunn supplements his theoretical and analytic work with a generous selection of relevant documents and writings from American constitutional, political, and religious history. This makes his book doubly valuable, because it offers both a framework for analysis and plunges one into the primary sources that are essential to his argument. His selections show a great deal of care, insight, and balance. In the contemporary period, for example, he ranges from the *Humanist Manifesto* to Jerry Falwell, from the radical black theologian, James Cone, to Roman Catholic theology on the bomb among other perspectives.

For the contemporary era, as well as for the others, any scholar would have a personal list of crucial documents rather than that which Dunn presents. But I suspect that such a list would be small, because Dunn has chosen well. Some readers may be ambivalent about the frame of reference used in making the selections, one that coincides with Dunn's conservative/liberal theological division, but that is only to be expected, and his net is attractively wide. There is no doubt that the selections from primary sources are a great strength of *American Political Theology.*

In *American Political Theology,* Dunn emerges as one of the stimulating pioneers of the rapidly developing subfield of religion and American politics. His work deserves a close reading.

ROBERT BOOTH FOWLER

University of Wisconsin-Madison

Relief or Reform? Reagan's Regulatory Dilemma. By George C. Eads and Michael Fix. (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 1984. Pp. ix + 285. $19.95, cloth; $12.95, paper.)

In their compelling work *Relief or Reform? Reagan's Regulatory Dilemma,* George C. Eads and Michael Fix offer a detailed empirical analysis of the Reagan administration's regulatory relief promise and the factors affecting its ultimate decision to pursue more limited regulatory reform. The book provides insight into the Reagan regulatory strategies and offers a lengthy critical assessment of why the Reagan regulatory relief effort achieved few of its original goals. This analysis reveals that the president cannot merely rely on administrative changes through politically motivated appointments, budgetary cutbacks of regulatory agencies, agency reorganizations, limited enforcement of existing statutes, and the transfer of regulatory responsibilities to states and localities. If lasting regulatory change is to be implemented, the president needs the substantive legislative support of Congress.

The historical context for the Reagan administration's regulatory approach is established early in the book. Eads and Fix provide an overview of the Ford and Carter regulatory strategies and contend that these administrations, with the help of Congress, offered impressive economic regulatory reductions in the airlines and the trucking, railroad, and banking industries. Yet both administrations failed to achieve similar substantive legislative success in the social regulatory arena.

In 1981, the Reagan administration offered sweeping regulatory reforms and received widespread support from business interests, economists, and libertarians who agreed that excess economic and social regulation had threatened government efficiency and economic vitality. Yet despite this apparent support, the Reagan regulatory relief effort failed to forge the necessary congressional coalition that would make regulatory relief a reality. Instead, social regulation under the Reagan administration became a political albatross with the appointments of controversial pro-industry administrators James Watt and Anne Gorsuch Burford. Fix and Eads argue persuasively that these blatantly political appointments, coupled with the administration's inability to perceive the importance of securing legislative reform, ultimately stymied the Reagan regulatory relief efforts.

In the absence of congressional approval, the Reagan administration attempted to reform existing regulations through the administrative process. Opponents of the Reagan efforts appealed to the judicial system, and the Supreme Court handed the Reagan administration several key setbacks. Eads and Fix detail the proposed rule changes and court challenges in several cases: the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's decision to rescind the passive-restraint standard; the Department of the Treasury's decision to rescind liquor labeling standards; the EPA's attempt to alter the Clean Air Act's definition of "stationary source"; and the Department of Labor's decision to alter the Davis-Bacon regulations.

Although the authors are largely critical of the Reagan administration's regulatory strategy, they contend that Reagan accomplished meaningful legislative changes in intergovernmental relations and grant reform. The Reagan initiatives fostered state and local government discretion, justified reductions in federal grants, and legitimated rules changes as a part of the broader regulatory relief effort.

An excellent concluding chapter assesses the Reagan regulatory relief program critically. Eads and Fix suggest that the administration did achieve some economic success in the regulatory arena, but they are quick to point out that this success is not nearly as sweeping as Reagan had intended. The administration's inability to consider the important role played by Congress, the media, and the Supreme Court in the regulatory arena proved to thwart meaningful relief efforts. This well-researched study reveals that our checks and balances system will impede a president who attempts to bypass Congress and ignores the Court's key power of judicial review. Given these constraints built into the American policymaking process, it is not surprising that President Reagan was forced to settle for more limited regulatory reform.

CRAIG A. RIMMERMAN

College of Charleston

Western Public Lands: The Management of Natural Resources in a Time of Declining Federalism. Edited by John G. Francis and Richard Ganzel. (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, Publishers, 1984. Pp. 312. $39.50.)

This edited collection of 14 selections nicely focuses on the rich diversity of policy issues involved in natural resources in the American West. The recent past, the present, and some future prospects are observed and analyzed. Some prominent themes of changing federalism, roles of national and state governments, and the perspectives of private and public interests are woven together into the cloth of natural resources management. The frequent clashes between these themes and actors are an issue that runs through the essays.

This monograph is neatly divided into two sections. Part 1 examines "The Public Lands" including such elements as the Sagebrush Rebellion, privatization, the Bureau of Land Management, and state interests in federal and Indian lands. Part 2 then addresses "Selected Natural Resources Issues" including federalism and nuclear wastes, state models of water management, and regulatory management of multistate energy projects. Francis and Ganzel supply a good introduction to set the stage for the essays in *Western Public Lands.*

Refreshingly free of jargon or overspecialized analytical approaches, these essays offer an excellent overview of significant issues confronting western policymakers grappling with the competing facets of public lands and natural resources choices. Although not particularly written for the general reader in political science, *Western Public Lands* is a rich source of background and ideas for policymakers and scholars more specifically in this area. Much of this work would be suitable as readings for students of political science, public administration, and policy studies at the graduate and upper-division undergraduate levels for courses on natural resources and perhaps courses on intergovernmental relations or decision making.

For example, the chapter by Henry P. Caulfield, Jr. on U.S. water resources development policy and intergovernmental relations is an example of what the book accomplishes. Using a historical framework, Caulfield highlights public policy of the last century and then leads it to the present (1977 to 1983). He delves into such themes as federalism, the ebb and flow of national government dominance, and political policymaking. The essay then probes the future utilizing several contrasting scenarios to provoke thought on where this subject may be leading.

The contributions to *Western Public Lands* are logically sequenced, in most respects well organized, and supported with copious notes and sources. Two minor objections apply: Most of these contributors are well known in their own specializations, but a brief listing of author's field and current affiliation would be beneficial for some readers. A more severe difficulty with some of the essays is their dated quality. Although most of the research and findings are relatively timely, I find a slight tendency for a timewarp from the late 1970s to the early 1980s. The Sagebrush Rebellion, once so well known, seems now almost to have slipped from sight.

In an arena where action evolves so dynamically, this problem is not wholly solvable. However, it is challenging and rewarding whenever possible to emphasize where we may be going from the base of the past and present into the partly uncharted terrain of the next decade and generation. To political scientists and others involved with the future of western lands and natural resources, *Western Public Lands* is an essential source of information and issues.

DANIEL SLOAN

University of Colorado at Boulder

Congressional Women: Their Recruitment, Treatment, and Behavior. By Irwin N. Gertzog. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984. Pp. viii + 291. $29.95.)

Congressional Women is a significant contribution to the burgeoning literature on the House of Representatives. More particularly, it fills a considerable void by concentrating on the women who have taken their place in the 95% to 99% male-dominated House from 1916 to 1982.

The book is divided into five parts. The introduction and explanation of the content of each section is followed by congresswomen's recruitment patterns. Part 3 concerns women's treatment by their colleagues. Changing legislative goals and methods for attaining them is the focus of Part 4. The concluding section presents a typology of congresswomen and a discussion of their probable future. A succinct appendix contains lists of congresswomen, committee assignments, and a bibliography.

Part 2 has a tremendously valuable empirical presentation and analysis of widows who become members of Congress. Contrary to popular belief, most congressmen's widows (84%) chose not to run for their husband's seats. Also, southern widows have a greater chance for party nomination first time around, whereas widows outside the South have had to fight party-backed opposition. By the second term, northerners were likely to be renominated, but not the southerners who were expected to serve only one caretaker term.

The backgrounds of congresswomen show a temporal progression from ascribed status of family wealth and connections to achieved law degrees and prior public service. Is this also the general longitudinal pattern of congressmen's backgrounds? One suspects that it is, and that women's recruitment follows the prerequisites of men's with regard to occupational acceptability and holding prior office.

At first ignored or patronized, congresswomen now are more likely to be treated equally by their male colleagues. Yet they have not been allowed into the informal inner circles of power. Gertzog argues that this exclusion has deleterious effects on getting congresswomen's legislation on the House agenda. Moreover, House leadership positions remain a male-only preserve.

Changing legislative goals, achievements, and strategies are traced over the 66 years women have been members of Congress. Legislative goals have evolved from reinforcement of traditional roles, to egalitarian concerns, to measures to assist women such as victims of domestic violence. The Congressional Caucus for Women's Issues has emerged as a successful instrument for achievement of current legislative objectives.

Chapter 12 discusses changing gender and legislative roles. In conclusion, Gertzog is cautiously sanguine about future increases in numbers of congresswomen. Although he has cogent arguments, it is quite possible to reason otherwise. The fault lies not in gender roles that do not vary much in the western democracies, but in the constraints of our single-member district system. European nations with multimember systems—even Ireland and Portugal, to say nothing of the Scandinavian countries—have much larger women's representation in parliament than obtains in the United States. The day when these women will approach equal numbers with men in their parliaments is in reach within their lifetimes. The evidence is otherwise for the United States.

Congressional Women is the definitive work on the subject. It would be useful as a supplementary text for introductory political science or a class on Congress. Women and politics courses will find it meritorious as a text or supplementary volume. It also is highly recommended reading for specialists in American politics.

WILMA RULE

DeKalb, Illinois

Processing the News: How People Tame the Information Tide. By Doris A. Graber. (New York: Longman, 1984. Pp. xiii + 239. $27.50, cloth; $15.95, paper.)

No study of public opinion is without its major frustrations. The marketplace of ideas, the macro world of opinion analysis, remains as ephemeral as ever, based as it is on the need to observe and measure the activities of both producers and consumers who are largely beyond the scope of the tools at hand. Attempts to use statistical correlations to interpret past events provoke disputes about validity, methodology, and the applicability of the interpretation to other similar events.

Fundamental to these differences about the impact of opinion lies a vast ignorance about the nature of the cognitive processes through which individual opinions are formed. Micro analysis attempts to create a clinical world in which some of the external manifestations of thought processes can be examined, that is, individuals are tested on what they have learned and asked to report on how they think they have learned. Unfortunately, there are no set standards for clinical conditions. Reviewers of findings may have participated in similar studies in which an entirely different methodology was employed or, more likely, never participated in any such study. Consequently, a reviewer of the particular techniques described in a report may be tempted to quibble, argue, and nitpick at points that gained easy acceptance among those who conducted the study. Some readers may have such difficulties with Doris Graber's useful and interesting study describing her observation of a panel of participants as they absorb the cacophony produced by the media, or as she puts it, *How People Tame the Information Tide.*

What this book provides in the way of informative discussion and theorizing is more important than the faults to be found with it. Graber analyzes the impact of the media by focusing on the subjective reaction of its consumers. An analysis of the process by which the news is made, as well as the theoretical devices that are used in the process of transmission, requires that we gauge the reactions of those who receive the transmission. Content analysis in the form of categorizing the words and symbols transmitted by the media provides a great deal of useful information about the media, but not necessarily about the media's impact.

The setting for this study was Evanston, Illinois, where 200 respondents were interviewed and categorized until a final group of 21 panelists were selected as continuing participants. They were followed through 1976 in a series of interviews in which they were asked open-ended questions about what had appeared in the media. Efforts were made to ascertain that participation in the study did not induce significant changes in respondents' behavior by comparing the observed habits with those reported in initial interviews. The media sources that the respondents used were analyzed by the interviewer so that she could compare a panelist's version with her own.

What was found was that the model of the media as agenda setter for the public does not apply to those areas where an individual is able to examine a report by analogy to his or her own experiences, beliefs, observations, or what they have previously learned from the media. One interesting example of the latter was the reaction of several panelists to reports of a 1976 ceasefire in Lebanon. "Rather than processing the story as part of a schema on problems in the Middle East, the panelists called on their knowledge of ceasefires in Northern Ireland. Since these had not worked well, the panelists reasoned that ceasefires never worked and that they would, therefore, fail in Lebanon, too" (p. 131).

Graber asserts that an individual's schema explains the processing of news, that is, that knowledge abstracted from experience processes new information and makes it possible to retrieve stored information (p. 23). Anything that doesn't fit the schema tends to be disregarded. This tends to complement the notion of opinion lag as developed in the 1950s and 60s by Robert Lane, David O. Sears, and others.

There are problems concerning the anecdotal evidence used to illustrate the book's empirical theory. For example, Graber's four categories are based on high and low interest in politics and easy and difficult access to information sources. Yet in the portraits of the panelists and in the discussions of their reports throughout the book, individuals seem to move among categories; for example, people with low access to information sources knew more than they should have if the ideal typology fit.

In the final analysis, what *Processing the News* indicates is that we need many more broadly based studies of how individuals respond to the news, a conclusion that Graber shares. In an era of sophisticated methodologies and abstract models, strong empirical studies of this sort provide evidence with the explanatory power to build a strong theory of public opinion.

MICHAEL BARUCH GROSSMAN

Towson State University

The Uncertain Triumph: Federal Education Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Years. By Hugh Davis Graham. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984. Pp. xi + 280. $22.00.)

One of the most important legacies of Lyndon Johnson's Great Society was the creation of a major federal role in education. Federal initiatives launched during this period financed programs that stretched from preschool to graduate school. The creation of these efforts is the subject of Hugh Davis Graham's *The Uncertain Triumph: Federal Education Policy in the Kennedy and Johnson Years.*

Graham begins by recounting the inability of the Kennedy administration to enact a general aid to education law, a failure he attributes to a lack of commitment. But, just weeks after Kennedy's assassination, Congress enacted both the Vocational Educational Act and the Higher Education Facilities Act and broke the legislative logjam.

The great expansion of federal aid took place in the Johnson administration when education was a key component of the War on Poverty. Much of the education policy development was done by external task forces brought together by White House aides Bill Moyers and Joe Califano. Graham focuses on these groups and their role in generating ideas that became legislative proposals and, sometimes, legislative enactments. The most successful education task force was John Gardner's 1964 group, which articulated the priorities that were codified in the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA). Other major education task forces of this era included Frederick Hovde's task force on education (1961), Joseph Hunt's task force on child development (1967), and William Friday's task force on education (1967). These external groups were supplemented by dozens of interagency task forces composed largely of federal officials.

Graham's detailed analysis of the task forces as an instrument of policy formulation is a welcome contribution to the literature on the Great Society. The volume illustrates both how much government has changed in the last two decades—and how little. On the one hand, some of the key issues in today's education policy debates—merit pay, whether to create a U.S. Department of Education, the quality of teacher education programs, how to improve education in urban areas—were also debated in the 1960s. On the other hand, some of the changes are striking: The legitimacy of federal aid to schools is no longer questioned. The changes in the political process are even more noticeable. The Johnson task forces operated in secret, and there was no outside review of their proposals. Today's emphasis on open meetings and instant analysis provides a far different environment.

Although the volume is very useful, there are two important limitations. First, enactment of federal education legislation was, to a large extent, a triumph of political brokering. Longstanding controversies—aid to religious schools, aid to segregated schools, and fears about possible federal control of education—had to be settled before any federal programs could be authorized. The legislative histories of federal education aid describe these issues in some detail. However, because executive branch policy planners were not always concerned with political calculus, these issues do not assume as prominent a role in this volume as they did in reality. This will not be a problem for those familiar with the political history of federal aid to education, but it may mislead the reader who lacks such knowledge.

A second problem stems from the author's effort to summarize the policy impact of the federal programs. Graham argues that the programs failed to achieve their goals and were an administrative burden for state and local governments. There is considerable research to support that position, and there is no doubt that advocates of federal aid promised more than the schools could deliver. But there is just as much evidence to suggest that the federal efforts increased access to educational services, improved educational achievement, and imposed only a modest burden on state and local officials. Graham, however, devotes very little attention to the research that illustrates the more positive consequences.

Part of the difficulty facing anyone who attempts to describe the impact of federal education spending is that the topic involves a great deal of evidence, much of it contradictory. An effort to briefly summarize this evidence is bound to suffer; this is no exception.

These shortcomings are relatively minor problems. Graham's well-written and thoroughly documented book is an important addition to the literature on the creation of the federal role in education and will be a valuable source for those concerned with that issue.

TERRY W. HARTLE

American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research

Productivity and Public Policy. Edited by Marc Holzer and Stuart S. Nagel. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1984. Pp. 296. $28.00, cloth; $14.00, paper.)

American political rhetoric is as subject to fads as most other aspects of life. A current fad is an almost obsessive concern for economic productivity. This trend manifests itself in such agenda items as industrial policy, international trade, privatization initiatives, tax reform, and budget-cutting. This volume, which is the twelfth in the Sage Yearbooks in Politics and Public Policy series, offers sober and sobering assessments of the interaction between productivity and public policy.

Political discussions of productivity tend to engage in, if not be dominated by, finger-pointing. Greedy unions, lazy workers, bottom-line-oriented managers, and government regulations are the most common targets of the critics. However, this book contains 11 analyses which, while acknowledging these popular targets, examine the concept of productivity and the multitude of related public policy issues from a variety of analytic perspectives and in a wide variety of practical applications. Because of this combination of characteristics, the book is best described as a heuristic device rather than as a polemic. It maintains an intellectual suppleness and eclecticism throughout.

The 11 analyses tend to focus around three themes: the conceptualization of productivity, specific public policies and productivity, and environmental constraints on productivity-oriented policies. Ellen Rosen's opening chapter on the concept of productivity sets the framework for the remainder of the volume. She carefully examines the difficulties involved in measuring productivity within the context of a broader discussion of the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of this issue. She does an excellent job of connecting methodological concerns to substantive policy issues. The sensitive approaches to the concept of productivity, and its measurement, contained in the 10 chapters that follow, explicitly or implicitly, address the issues raised by Rosen.

Specific public policies are examined in many of the chapters. Raymond Duch examines economic subsidy programs in France, the United Kingdom, and Japan. He concludes that a highly selective subsidy strategy has the best chance of success. He also includes a fascinating discussion of the differences between new industries, mature industries, and high-growth competitive industries. Howard Leichter examines the impact of public policy strategies on national productivity by focusing on the Japanese, Western European, and British experiences. He concludes by contending, "It may very well be that the United States must first recognize, as our Western European competitors have, that there is a positive relationship between socially supportive policies and increased productivity" (pp. 65-66). Eli Noam contributes a rigorous analysis of the public policy implications of the characteristics of the cable television industry in the United States.

The larger environmental constraints on attempts to use public policy to improve private- or public-sector productivity are examined throughout the volume. Holzer offers a particularly provocative discussion of the impact of public attitudes toward public-sector administrators. Howard Leichter identifies cultural variables that are distinctive to the United States. Daniel Mitchell analyzes the impact of macroeconomic policies and economic growth cycles on productivity performance. Finally, Rupert Chisholm contributes a description and discussion of the "sociotechnical system" (STS) approach to productivity. This is a very ambitious and comprehensive attempt to capture the major environmental forces impinging on productivity in organizations. Furthermore, it is an attempt to reconceptualize productivity in light of the movement from an industrial to a postindustrial society.

This sampling of the main themes of the book cannot do justice to the richness of its discussion of productivity and public policy. This is a volume that both documents the present heightened concern for produtivity and points the way toward innovative analytic perspectives and practical strategies.

CRAIG RAMSAY

Ohio Wesleyan University

Legislating Bureaucratic Change: The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. Edited by Patricia W. Ingraham and Carolyn Ban. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984. Pp. vii + 405. $14.95, paper.)

The editors of this volume have passed judgment on the reform that was the centerpiece of the Carter administration: The results did not match the objectives. What went wrong? Is it just the lack of resources essential to the implementation process, as most of the contributors tell us? Any understanding of the implementation problem requires a much more sophisticated model than those suggested in this volume. The literature on public policy implementation has increased since Aaron Wildavsky and Jeffrey Pressman blazed the trail. George Edwards has suggested three other controlling variables that could make the difference: leadership, communication, and psychological disposition of implementers. Paul Sabatier and Daniel Mazmanian have added problem tractability, continuing support of the sovereign, and changing socioeconomic and political conditions to the list. Referring to these scholars' works and adapting some of their concepts would undoubtedly sharpen our focus and enrich our understanding of this important policy area. Nevertheless, Ingraham and Ban have put together an excellent piece of scholarship, authentic in originality, fresh in insights, and provocative in observations.

Incrementalists have a penchant for evaluating the impact of public policy early enough in the implementation game for purposes of midcourse correction. Through trial and error, we learn from mistakes and profit from experience. But mistakes can also be deceiving, for they sometimes send the wrong signals for remedial action. Some policies have sleeper effects, like Roosevelt's land reform program during the New Deal. The positive effect of this program was delayed until 30 years later in the form of a viable black middle class that became the back bone of the civil rights movement in the 1960s.

The establishment of the Senior Executive Service is a rejection of the Wilsonian doctrine of the politics-administration dichotomy. But scholars are now having second thoughts on the wisdom of a symbiotic relationship between the two. A senior executive in the federal public service is no longer a source of independent judgment about the substance and thrust of public policy. Before jumping "for the jellybean (bonuses)" (p. 31), Frederick C. Thayer feels that the executive must now obey the orders of a political superior, dance to the tune of a different musician, and march to the beat of a different drummer. Will the New Public Administration now stop blaming Wilson for all the urban uprisings of the late sixties because bureaucrats were neutrals in the public policy process instead of advocates?

The bull that Carter took by the horn has now become a sacrificial lamb in the Reagan corral. Gone are the hopes of motivating career administrators with bonuses and rewarding mid-career executives with merit pay. As Carolyn Ban writes (p. 54), the "hundred flowers" that were supposed to bloom from the Carter reforms got caught in the quicksand of budget cuts, policy terminations, and personal retrenchments. What a disappointment it must have been to that young man who promised in testimony in 1978 before the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee that the Senior Executive Service would be a spark plug that could turn on the best and the brightest to their highest level of performance.

What is really the philosophy behind all these public personnel administration reforms? Is it not to democratize public administration by making bureaucracy more accountable, responsible, and responsive? If that is the end result, Frederick Mosher has raised this question: Is civil service reform the way to enshrine democracy in a bureaucracy? Would not broadening, lengthening, and humanizing the educational preparations of career administrators in the super-grades be a better way? And external and internal controls another way? If civil service reformers were less than sanguine about this aspect of public personnel management, it is because they were more than obsessed with the idea of Theory X and its transferability from the business world into the public sector. Wallace Sayre was right: Technique has again triumphed over purpose.

A. B. VILLANUEVA

Western Illinois University

Public Policy and the Aging. By William W. Lammers. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1983. Pp. xv + 265. $7.95, paper.)

Lammers, of the Andrus Gerontology Center at the University of Southern California, has written a succinct overview of American public policy toward the aging during the last two decades. The brevity and bland evenhandedness of this volume will be a strength for some potential readers and a weakness for others.

In separate chapters, the author gives a brief history of government policy toward the aged and surveys the arena within which public policy toward the aged is made. Demographic and voting behavior data on the aged are also surveyed. Much of the remaining portion of the book is given to analysis of specific policy areas that have impact on the aged. Each of these chapters, which focus on Social Security, retirement, health, and housing respectively, begins with a description of the environment and outcome of recent policy discussions followed by a discussion of what Lammers views as the chief policy problems associated with that topic.

Lammers's discussion of Social Security would have been improved by the use of more sophisticated tables. His treatment of the impact of reductions of the minimum benefit seems particularly weak, as does his treatment of the likely utilization and impact of independent retirement accounts. On the other hand, the treatment in this book of changing retirement patterns and alternative housing options for the aged is quite informative.

Perhaps the chief failing of *Public Policy and* *the Aging* is its failure to acknowledge that the "problems" of aging in the United States today are essentially the product of earlier successes. Although laws preventing mandatory retirement rules preserve continued employment as an option for many elderly persons, more and more workers are retiring at a younger age, and fewer than was once the case are quitting work due to problems of health. Although Lammers does call for an increase in the eligibility age for Social Security benefits, most of his policy agenda items call for additional federal spending or regulation. But as he admits, the politically active middle- and upper-middle class retirees and the groups to which they belong are hardly likely to seek the federal programs and regulations that will be of the most benefit to the poorest and most frail among the elderly. As one alternative, perhaps a study of the causes of the successes mentioned previously might yield a more feasible policy agenda that might better meet the needs of the most deserving elderly.

GAYLE R. AVANT

Baylor University

Health Politics and Policy. Edited by Theodor J. Litman and Leonard S. Robins. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1984. Pp. xvii + 403. $23.95.)

This is a collection of 16 essays by practitioners and academicians in the field of health care policy. The editors who solicited and assembled these essays intended that the volume provide a "comprehensive overview of the politics of health" (p. xiii). This is a bold objective but one well worth undertaking for two reasons. First, since the enactment of Medicare 20 years ago, the federal government has been searching for ways to cope with the ever-expanding fiscal demands of that landmark health care financing program. This quest has added great complexity to the mix of health policies and to the character of health politics at the federal level, making this policy arena far more opaque than casual observers would suspect. Second, for the most part the opacity has been compounded, rather than reduced, by the social science literature on the subject, much of which is conceptually muddy and surprisingly little of which, until relatively recently, was the product of political scientists.

The contributions to this volume have been organized into five parts of unequal weight and scope. The essays in Part 1—led by Litman's introduction that nicely summarizes some of the lessons of governmental involvement in the health care system to date—aim to provide a general overview of health politics and policy. Particularly noteworthy is a thoughtful essay by Roger Battistella and James Begun examining the influence on the health policy environment of different political and economic orientations whose influence has varied over time. Their review of what they call the normative, rationalist, neoconservative, and neo-Marxist approaches is an instructive survey of the intellectual landscape of this policy field.

The eight essays that make up parts 2 and 3 focus on the major political actors and institutional mechanics relevant to an understanding of health policymaking. Here we find discussions of (among other things) the fragmented structure of programmatic control within the executive branch, the consequences for health policy of reforms in the structure and process of congressional decision making, the problems of implementation, the role of the states in health policymaking and health services delivery, the relative success of professional provider groups in improving their monopolistic positions through legislation, and the limits and possibilities of citizen action in reforming the health care system. Although there is nothing very original in these largely descriptive (and, in some cases, pedestrian) essays, together they provide a reasonable guide to the institutional and political environment of health policymaking. What is generally lacking, however, is any insight into the ways in which policymaking structures and processes vary from one health program area to another.

The balance of the book consists of four chapters: a brief history of the evolution of public health activities in the United States by Milton Roemer; a nicely crafted overview of the politics of health care regulation by Thomas Bice; a curious flogging of this policy arena's dead horse, national health insurance, by Theodore Marmor; and a lone essay devoted to understanding health politics from a cross-national perspective by William Glaser.

The field of health policy is littered with two kinds of debris: narrow and tedious work by economists and health care administrators on the one hand, and overgeneralization by medical sociologists on the other. There is little of either in this book. That alone makes it praiseworthy. (It also contains an exceptionally fine bibliography.) Nevertheless, specialists in the field of health politics and policy will find little new information here nor much in the way of analytically distinctive slants on the subject. The primary virtue of *Health Politics and Policy* is its potential for use as a background text in health politics courses

—no small virtue in light of the persistent dearth of such books.

JOHN T. TIERNEY

Boston College

Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot Propositions in the United States. By David B. Magleby. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984. Pp. xi + 270. $27.50.)

David B. Magleby has written a book that is both interesting and important. It is interesting because of the craftmanship with which he manipulates a number of survey and aggregate data sets (more than a dozen in all, including the Michigan data, four state data sources, and two national surveys that Magleby conducted himself) in a straightforward statistical manner with a view to building a composite portrait of a typical participant in initiative and referendum elections not bound by issue areas, locations, and time. It is important because it makes a solid contribution, in my opinion, to the voting literature in general. Much of what we know about voting behavior derives from the partisan/candidate context, and Magleby's work by definition goes beyond that context. In addition, his attempt could and should easily provoke further thoughts on the classical tensions between the competing models of mass and representative democracy.

Most of Magleby's findings can be grouped in terms of the assumptions made for the argument favoring adoption or expansion of direct legislation: increased citizen participation, improved representation of voter preferences, informed voter decision based on increased interest and information, a less ambiguous interpretation of individual voting preferences, and an effective check against special interests and party machines. Most of the main features of these assumptions are, however, rejected by Magleby's analysis. Direct legislation does not increase turnout except on salient issues such as California's Proposition 13. Citizens who vote on ballot measures are much less representative of the general electorate than those who vote in candidate races because of the heightened level of knowledge, sophistication, and sense of efficacy that it takes to understand and survive the complicated issues, ballots, and the excessive number of voting decisions. Voters are confused over the meaning of the vote because they are no better informed about the propositions than they are about candidates, except again on salient propositions such as California's nuclear and rents control initiative and the Massachusetts vote on graduated income tax. The decision concerning which outcome ought to be read as a popular mandate is often difficult because of the low participation rate, voter irrationality, and emotional reaction to the media campaign. The overall influence of special interest groups remains strong in the direct legislation process because of their heavy involvement in referendum politics.

All of this constitutes an important body of findings. Its significance goes beyond that of a mere description in that it expands and adds different dimensions to the contents of the existing general literature on voting, notably the Michigan studies and the work by Raymond E. Wolfinger and Steven J. Rosenstone. One could quarrel with Magleby's use of different comparative referent in arriving at the negative conclusions about those who participate in direct legislation. Given what we know about voting behavior in general, it does not seem appropriate to compare voters in candidate elections with those in initiative and referendum elections. Thus, comparing the "dropoff" rate (the proportion of voters who cast ballots but who do not vote in a particular candidate race or on a proposition) with the concept of "rolloff" or "falloff" rate (the proportion of voters who vote for the office listed first on the ballot but do not vote in a subsequent candidate race) as a measure of participation on candidate elections is a rather harsh way of evaluating the assumption about the level of participation on propositions. Besides, Magleby does confirm even a higher rate of participation when voters decide on propositions in primary elections than for about one-half to two-thirds of the candidate races. In addition, salience of issues involved visibly improves both the participation rate and the information level of the voters.

There are other minor objections to be sure. Linking the direct legislation process somehow with the atrophying party system seems at best to be an exercise in building a spurious relationship, especially when Magleby demonstrates some highly charged partisan involvement in direct legislation resulting in unmistakably partisan division of votes later. Conversely, it borders on a tautological statement to say that most of the apartisan or nonpartisan referendum elections generate a situation in which the voters act without partisan cues.

Finally, when discussing direct legislation and its relevance to the theory of mass democracy, the book might have taken on even a greater theoretical significance with a perhaps more thoughtful analysis of the Progressive reform ideology as the background factor and the so-called Swiss model that, in part, defines the voting universe in terms other than a simple numerical size. After all, Magleby's point about whether "all voters participate in deciding ballot propositions" (p.

34) is a misreading of the model of mass democracy. For one thing, one may view as an encouraging indication the fact that direct legislation, at this stage of its development, improves certain attributes of particular sectors of the general electorate including the issue public.

These reservations aside, Magleby has made a significant foray into an important issue area in political science today and has added much to the developing literature on the subject of direct legislation, most importantly using it as a linkage to a greater body of empirical findings about voters in general and the normative literature on democracy.

JONG O. RA

Hollins College; Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

The American Elections of 1982. Edited by Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein. (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1983. Pp. xi + 203. $16.95, cloth; $8.95, paper.)

Add this book to the small but growing list of works on midterm elections. Like the American Enterprise Institute's book on the 1980 elections, this volume emphasizes description over analysis and provides basic facts and background on the congressional campaigns, political action committees (PACs), redistricting, and state elections. The book recounts a nice summary of the 1982 elections, but it provides little in terms of placing these elections in historical context.

Albert Hunt's chapter on national politics and the congressional elections covers the issues and major factors that influenced these campaigns quite well, but none of this information is new. Hunt gets down to specifics occasionally, detailing how some of these factors affected individual races. This is a valuable contribution because most works on national elections rely on aggregate data.

Curiously, Hunt gives little attention to a phenomenon that received a great deal of attention at the time—the so-called gender gap. Hunt discusses the gender gap strictly in terms of attitudes toward President Reagan, and then writes, "There was little doubt that this problem was affecting other Republicans" (p. 21). In fact, there is some evidence to suggest that the gender gap had little impact on the outcome of the 1982 races.

The effects of reapportionment are examined by Alan Ehrenhalt, who demonstrates how federal courts and the Voting Rights Act helped to protect Democrats and minorities in spite of anticipated Republican gains. John Bibby presents data on gubernatorial and state legislative races and provides some brief analysis and speculation on what the results entail for the future.

Larry Sabato assesses the role of PACs, independent groups, and parties on the 1982 elections and concludes that, due largely to the efforts of the Republican National Committee, we may be entering an era ripe for a party-responsibility system. Sabato may well be correct about this, but in concentrating on the details of 1982 campaign contributions, he ignores several major questions about PACs, including the targeting of contributions to members of specific committees and the way many incumbents build up massive war chests in order to discourage credible opponents. Sabato's optimism about party resurgence is offset by the comments of the editors in their chapter on voters and Congress. Mann and Ornstein point out that few Republicans ran as Republicans and few Democrats as Democrats. They write, "The use of party in campaigns in 1982 strongly underscores the notion that dealignment, rather than realignment, is the prevailing trend in American politics" (p. 148).

The editors have provided a handy summary of the 1982 elections, including useful appendixes, that will be of value to those who study elections. It is good to see a chapter on state races included, as these are often slighted in election studies. Those who wish to place the events of 1982 into a more theoretical context have several other works to turn to, notably Barbara Hinckley's *Congressional Elections* (Congressional Quarterly Press, 1981) and Gary Jacobson's *The Politics of Congressional Elections* (Little, Brown, 1983).

PAT DUNHAM

Duquesne University

Special Interest Groups in American Politics. By Stephen Miller. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1983. Pp. xiii + 160. $19.95.)

A clear understanding of how interest groups fit into the landscape of American politics is not easily achieved. Scholarly literature on the topic is disappointingly slim, and media attention is frequent but often sensational or exaggerated. As a result, a debate has ensued, without reference to a sound theoretical base, as to whether interest groups are beneficial to the achievement of the public interest or whether they are detrimental to good public policy. Stephen Miller's book is a significant contribution that sheds light on this complex aspect of American political behavior by providing a needed theoretical statement that helps explain how faction and special interest are incorporated into the whole of the American political experience.

The central theme of this work is a description of how the framers of the United States Constitution perceived the problem of balancing private interests with the public interest, and how, through institutional arrangements in a federal form of government, they addressed the problem. The book consists of three main parts: the intellectual and historical influences that shaped the rationales of the Constitution's framers; how *The Federalist* dealt with special interests; and how three distinct periods of American political history have tested the solution to special interests proposed by the Framers.

A valuable feature of this book is Miller's careful tracing of the intellectual currents that shaped the thinking of people like Alexander Hamilton, George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and especially that of James Madison. Relying on the works of political theorists like Hobbes, Hume, Burke, Montesquieu, Bolingbroke, and Pope, and, accounting for the political and cultural environment of colonial America, Miller provides insight into how "interests" should be regarded, and how government can accommodate them.

The substantial assessment of *The Federalist* and the genius Miller ascribes to Publius may be overstated, but it does offer a model for gauging the place interest groups occupy in American politics. Clearly, the problem is not with special interests, Miller argues, but with electing to public office, especially the national legislature, "enlightened men" who will render special interest subservient to the public good. The threat to the public interest is not special interest, but public opinion fanned by emotion. The 1790s, the first of three American history periods examined, is an example of how emotional factions—the Federalists led by Hamilton and the Republicans led by Madison—nearly destroyed the Union.

The second period studied to test the Publius model for regulating special interests is that of the 1870s and 1880s. There the politics of disinterest practiced by reformers considered to be intellectuals and "the best men" threatened the common interest because of the scorn they had for popular opinion and individual interests. Professional politicians who exercise a politics of pragmatism and accommodation more closely approximate the Publius model by heeding to popular opinion and channeling special interests through political parties and local politics.

The emergence of public interest groups in the 1970s is the final period Miller evaluates in light of the Publius model. As expected, Common Cause and Public Citizen are identified as "disinterested" groups that failed the Publius test because they are judged to be self-righteous, prescriptive, nonresponsive to public opinion, and to exercise patriotic rhetoric. Such a scathing review of the 1970s makes one wonder what Miller would say, and why he did not, of the political behavior of the New Right, especially the religious right, in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Miller's critique of the theoretical problems associated with special interests in American politics is well done. However, his conclusion—that special interests are not as influential in policy formation as publicly perceived—is a generalization woefully in need of empirical documentation. Based on that generalization is the identification of the central problem of special interests, namely the misconception of the public regarding interest group influence. I am doubtful that that is the central problem, and I find Miller's recommendations for solving the perception problem to be both weak and unimaginative. I feel that the Publius idea of "regulating" special interests takes more than changing legislators and their environment.

TIMOTHY J. O'BRIEN

Marquette University

Public Sector Performance: A Conceptual Turning Point. Edited by Trudi C. Miller. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984. Pp. ix + 276. $27.50, cloth; $12.95, paper.)

This collection of nine essays evolved from a review of the literature commissioned by the National Science Foundation, but most of the authors move well beyond review to critical analysis. Although some of the essays hew more closely to the book's topic than others, between them they cover many important aspects of public-sector performance.

For example, J. Richard Aronson and Eli Schwartz ably evaluate a number of public finance tools for measuring and improving government performance. Ronald W. Johnson and Arie Y. Lewin examine performance measurements for service delivery. They note that the development of a single measure of overall organizational performance is not in sight, but they point out a number of promising developments. In a chapter titled "Information Systems and Intergovernmental Relations," John Leslie King and Kenneth L. Kraemer find considerable progress in applying information technology to very simple governmental operations such as billing and accounting. However they conclude that "it is difficult to find advanced [information] systems for planning and management that significantly affect how planning and management are done" (p. 122).

Thomas J. Anton argues that most of the broad conceptual literature about intergovernmental change in the United States manifests a "disdain for data" and uses "politically loaded symbolism" (p. 32). He maintains that empirical analyses impicitly refute much of the conventional wisdom. For example, despite frequent charges that the current intergovernmental system is becoming too complex, "only 100 of the grant programs provided fully 95 percent of total grant funds available, hardly an impossible number to comprehend. At the state and local level, meanwhile, the intergovernmental system has become significantly *less* complicated over the last three decades" because of the elimination of a large number of townships and school districts (p. 40). Similarly, Anton presents evidence to refute charges that federal grants greatly distort local priorities, and he argues that grant-financed programs have been much more successful than usually perceived.

Patrick D. Larkey, Chandler Stolp, and Mark Winer evaluate the literature on "Why Does Government Grow?" Like Anton, they find that a normative (antigovernment) bias distorts many of the analyses. They conclude that "in this literature, as in many social science literatures, the inductive work lacks theoretical rigor and the deductive work lacks empirical relevance" (p. 90). Among a series of quite useful suggestions for further research in this field, they propose that academia reward the unglamorous work of data gathering more highly and provide fewer rewards for "theorizing about concepts that cannot be represented empirically and devising increasingly arcane methods for analyzing fundamentally bad data. . ." (p. 92).

John J. Kirlin argues for a greater emphasis on the political aspects of government performance. He reviews the literature on policy implementation and on federalism, and, premising his analysis on the work of Charles Lindblom and especially Aaron Wildavsky, he calls for designing governmental systems to encourage a more flexible "strategic" rationality rather than synoptic rationality.

Trudi C. Miller's concluding chapter asserts that we have reached a turning point in practice and thought about government performance, in large part because previous work on this topic has been based on false "natural science" assumptions. The natural science model assumes that "(1) the laws that govern human behavior exist independently of human control, and (2) the units of analysis in social systems are highly similar over time and space" (p. 253). Miller argues that much of the research reviewed in the preceding chapters refutes these two assumptions. She calls for political science to model itself less on such natural sciences as physics, and more on engineering oriented sciences such as computer science, because political institutions are to a large extent man-made and manipulable—more like computers than like stars. Parts of Miller's proposed "design science" bear a strong resemblance to decision and management sciences. Her short essay understandably does not detail the exact shape of the new design science. Nonetheless, like a number of the chapters in this collection, it raises interesting issues for future consideration.

JAMES E. SWISS

North Carolina State University

Communists in Harlem during the Depression. By Mark Naison. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983. Pp. xxi + 355. $22.95.)

Mark Naison makes an important scholarly contribution in this volume. His objectives are to describe and analyze the interrelationships between blacks and the Communist party in Harlem during the Depression, to provide an understanding of how those interrelationships were forged and how they evolved over a relatively brief span of years, and to assess the impact of communist influence on the political and civil rights protest efforts of blacks in Harlem.

Naison judiciously uses primary materials to assemble the information base of his study, including interviews with many of the leading black communists of the 1930s and documentary resources.

The book's 12 chapters are grouped into three parts. Part 1, which is organized chronologically, traces the growth of the Harlem Communist party from its formation in the early 1920s to the founding of the National Negro Congress in 1936. This section focuses on the tensions that resulted from the largely successful efforts of the early black recruits to the Communist party to transform the Harlem Communist party from an organization dominated by the problems and perspectives of foreign-born members (largely European ethnics) to an organization more committed to addressing the problems of American blacks.

Part 2 examines in thematic format the Harlem Communist party during the period known as the Popular Front, a period characterized by a new strategy of the Communist party that called for the incorporation of the entire black community (including the NAACP, the Urban League, and the black church, all of which the Party had previously criticized) into alliances with white liberals and radicals to oppose fascism. This section examines efforts by the Communist party leadership to improve its ties with black organizations and to increase its influence within the Harlem black community in general.

Part 3 examines the erosion of the Party influence in Harlem between the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the United States entry in World War II. The significant development in this section is the emergence of an indigenous protest leadership in Harlem capable of executing mass protest operations without assistance from the Communist party.

Perhaps the principal strength of the book is that it provides, for the first time, a scholarly, mature account and analysis of an important development in the twentieth-century history of urban racial/class mass protest movements. Naison has no difficulty in placing his research in a stream of previous scholarship that examines the influence of the Communist party in black protest movements in the United States, which indicates that his study has a fairly rich theoretical base. Naison's findings on the personal dimension of black membership in the Party and the evolution of the Party's racial policies are very clear: The Communist party, including some black communists, did play a major role in mass protest movements in Harlem between the late 1920s and early 1940s. Naison is equally as clear in his position that the attraction of the Communist party to Harlemites was always stronger among black artists and intellectuals rather than rank and file blacks. Even among those blacks attracted to the Party, the basis for their collaboration was not an embrace of the communist ideology, but rather a calculated recognition that the human and financial resources offered by the Party were important to their efforts to use protest strategies to extract political, social, and economic benefits from political and economic elite structures. Another important point that Naison makes is that although many blacks in Harlem appreciated the Party's support of black causes, even at the height of Communist influence in Harlem in 1938 the Harlem branch of the Communist party had less than 1,000 black members.

Other strengths of the book include the author's detailed description of relevant developments, meticulous analysis, careful documentation, and reasoned conclusions. Regarding the latter, Naison is careful to draw only those conclusions that are well within the limits of the data consulted.

The weaknesses of the book are relatively minor. For example, although Naison thoroughly accounts for the early difficulties the Communist party had in winning influence among black Harlemites in the early 1920s because of the relative prosperity of the decade—and the Party's subsequent success in attracting support among blacks in the 1930s because of the economic and social malaise of that decade—he does not provide an explanation as to why blacks were able to develop an independent mass protest capacity in the early 1940s as opposed to an earlier or later time.

A special feature of the book is a chapter in the Appendix that focuses on black-Jewish relationships within the Communist party in Harlem. This is a very enlightening chapter, which provides an important historical perspective to the transformation of the interrelationships between blacks and Jews which has occurred since their collaboration in the civil rights movement in the South in the 1950s and 1960s.

Communists in Harlem during the Depression is an excellent book. I believe that it will stimulate further research into the role of the Communist party in other twentieth-century mass protest movements in the United States.

HUEY L. PERRY

Southern University

Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation. By David F. Noble. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984. Pp. 409. $22.95.)

One of the most intractable challenges facing us in the social sciences is to *explain* technological development. We all tend to objectify technology, to see it, in Noble's words, as "an irreducible brute fact, a given, a first cause" (p. xiii). Even those few who have argued that technology is determined by socioeconomic forces have been unable to support their assertions with detailed and convincing evidence, thereby reinforcing the hegemony of the technological determinists. Given the absence of significant alternative technological approaches among advanced industrial societies (including state socialist ones), antideterminists are left with but one recourse in making their case: to reconstruct the range of options available at the birth of various technologies and to identify the forces propelling the development of one option and the demise of others. It is this "travel down roads not taken" (p. 146) that makes Noble's book such a pathbreaking work.

To make his case against the technological determinists, Noble selects to examine the birth, development, and implementation of automatic control in the machine tool industry. At the end of World War II there were two principal options available for the design of automatic control: "record-playback" (R/P) and "numerical control" (N/C). Each was designed to produce a variety of parts under the instructions of various programs stored on a permanent medium—in other words, to be "self-acting," or automatic. Each, therefore, reduced the amount of skilled labor required in the production process. There was, however, an essential conceptual difference between them. Whereas R/P depended on, and thereby acknowledged, the skills of the machinist by recording and making a program of his movements as he put the machine through its paces, which could then be played back indefinitely, much in the manner of the player piano, N/C eliminated "altogether" (p. 84) the need for the machinist by having the program produced by computer programmers working directly from management blueprints.

Noble argues that N/C "won" not because it was necessarily the "best" design in terms of technical efficiency, cost-effectiveness, or commercial viability, but because it dovetailed neatly with the separate and complementary interests of key groups in the society. The military (in particular, the Air Force) and the scientific community (in particular, MIT) play a crucial role in this story. The Air Force, with their requirements for parts fabricated to extremely close dimensional tolerances (necessitated by the development of high-performance aircraft), pushed hard for N/C, which they hoped would produce machining free of human error. The scientists at MIT, already predisposed to prefer abstract, formal, and deterministic solutions to problems and seduced by the largess displayed by the Air Force, were willing accomplices in the promotion of N/C.

Nevertheless, according to Noble, R/P had several commercial advantages over N/C and could well have been attractive to the vast majority of machine tool firms that did not need the capabilities of N/C. Why, despite the relative simplicity and cost-effectiveness of R/P, did it languish? Noble's answer is straightforward and expresses the central thesis of the book. R/P lost out because it threatened to undermine the existing power relations in the society by lending itself "to programming on the shop floor, and worker and/or union control of the process" (p. 151). N/C won because it "held out the promise of greater management control . . . [and] seemed a step closer to the automatic factory" (p. 167).

Noble has accumulated a great deal of documentation in support of his thesis, much of it of a primary nature. Clearly, there will be disagreements with his interpretations. I, for one, am not persuaded by his reading of the GE experiment in worker participation with N/C, which he claims was abandoned because it threatened management control even though it was profitable. The dichotomy Noble sets up between productivity and profit on the one hand and control and domination on the other seems forced, and his assertion that capitalism is not and never has been a "system of profit-motivated, efficient production" (p. 321), but is rather a system whose goal is "domination," is unproductive. What differentiates capitalism from other modes of production is not the goal of class or group domination—all have had that in common—but precisely the means by which the domination is established and preserved.

Disagreements notwithstanding, this is a magnificent achievement in social history. Noble has now pointed the way for all students of technological development, and it would be criminal indeed if the current technological revolution should be accepted passively, mouth agape, without some examination of the multiplicity of roads before us.

LEON GRUNBERG

University of Puget Sound

Citizen Participation in Science Policy. Edited by James C. Peterson. (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1984. Pp. 244. $23.50, cloth; $9.95, paper.)

The role of mass participation in highly complex science and technology policy areas is a topic that interests both the democratic theorist and the public policy analyst. Fortunately, *Citizen Participation in Science Policy* is a collection of essays that might satisfy both audiences. James Peterson has carefully integrated works on democratic theory, participation, and policymaking, all with a science policy focus.

The volume begins with an overview by Peterson that is followed by Dorothy Nelkin's discussion of science policy and the democratic process. She examines the role of the technical expert and argues cautiously for greater public scrutiny and citizen involvement in science policy. Her discussion precedes four chapters that fall under the heading, "Varieties of Citizen Participation." They provide the reader with an instructive, straightforward "how-to" guide for potential activists in science policy.

The final section of the book is a series of three case studies of health policy and three case studies of nuclear policy. The health section includes a fascinating look at the "over selling and buying" of the U.S. war on cancer, a useful overview of the role of consumer groups in health planning, and an integrative evaluation of the impact of participation in biomedical policy. In the biomedical policy article, Diane Dutton effectively addresses some issues that characterize the appeal of the book. First, she questions whether participatory democracy is possible in the modern context of mass organization and technological interdependence (p. 149). She also pointedly asks, "In the present society, do ordinary people—people from all walks of life—really have anything useful to say about technical issues whose intracacies defy even the experts?" (p. 149). Her thoughtful four-case study reviews the constraints on public involvement and disadvantages of mass participation in biomedical policies; however, she concludes that "with confidence faltering in science along with other major institutions" (p. 172), citizen involvement should be encouraged.

The section on nuclear policy begins with an essay by Randy Rydell on points of public interaction in the research and development process in three nuclear power controversies. When dealing with the utility of public participation in science policy, Rydell is less optimistic than Dutton's. He concludes, "There should . . . be no delusions about public participation in the R&D process: at times it will delay needed projects, exacerbate conflicts by rendering issues more difficult to disentange, legitimize prior decisions, and advance special interests" (p. 194). Jane Kronick, in her article on participation in congressional hearings on nuclear power development, is dismayed by the ineffectiveness of participation in that setting. John Hunt and Neil Katz conclude the section on nuclear policy with a generally positive view of protest participation: Their observations are based on an analysis of a telephone survey of community residents after the Seabrook, New Hampshire Antinuclear Power protest.

Even though the chapters are uneven, I can recommend this book not only in writing style, but also in perspective; many of the authors are practitioners, while the remainder are academicians both inside and outside of political science. There are no pathbreaking contributions or single outstanding conclusions found in the volume; rather this is simply a useful compilation of readings that can introduce the newcomer to some important questions concerning democracy and science policy.

T. Wayne Parent

Louisiana State University

The Leadership Question: The Presidency and the American System. By Bert A. Rockman. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984. Pp. vii + 253. $29.95, cloth; $14.95, paper.)

The ambiguous concept of presidential leadership may be approached in two ways. One approach (e.g., Barbara Kellerman) emphasizes personal aspects, while the other focuses on the formal powers of the office itself, organizational, or contextual variables. *The Leadership Question* considers both avenues, but ends up arguing that personal factors are not critically important. Rockman helps to flesh out and synthesize research on a concept that has too often been equated simply with the equally ambiguous notion of power. He begins by defining leadership as "the capacity to impart and sustain direction" (p. 6), but later adds two other components: effectiveness and acceptance. He sees no simple relationship among the three components or formula for employing them to assert leadership. However, through such a definition, he avoids the criticism leveled at Richard Neustadt—focusing only on means and not ends.

The Leadership Question is a broader study than it first appears to be. More than any other, this book places the presidency in the larger context of government and society, both in America and elsewhere. This is the best study yet of the overall influences on the president. Political philosophy and comparison are incorporated; thus it is more than a book on leadership or even the American presidency. Although Rockman sees presidential leadership as composed of luck and opportunity, constraints are the dominant characteristic. The focus is mostly on external constraints such as political parties (which seem overemphasized), elections, the media, public opinion, constitutional and historical factors, and political culture. Some attention is given to Congress in the internal governmental structure, but virtually none to the courts, staff, or bureaucracy—elements of leadership potential that Neustadt feels more important. This concentration on Congress (chap. 4) seems a bit forced, perhaps because useful illustrative data are available.

If one can criticize the relative mix of constraints, the comparative focus is not always as systematic as it first appears. Much of the comparison is cross-national, a worthwhile enterprise rarely found in presidency books. Rockman correctly points out that concepts like acceptability and individual liberties are more important in the United States than elsewhere, but more methodical within-nation comparisons are needed as well. Obviously, political culture is a more operative variable when comparing executives cross nationally rather than internally. Rockman discusses several cycles of presidential leadership potential but draws no conclusions as to which are most important and why. Some effort should be made to integrate meta and term cycles with the epochal one. Also, little evidence is provided for the assertion that personal skills are less important than contextual factors. Surely personal styles account for much of the leadership differences between presidents Carter and Reagan because the constraints were not all that different. Perhaps the seemingly limited influence of presidential skill is attributable to inadequate systematic measures.

Much of my criticism of this book deals not with what is said, but rather with the way in which it is said. Rockman is a careful craftsman, but the book is ponderous at times. It contains a lot of difficult verbiage, and difficult methodological terms are incorporated outside of their normal context. Thus, *The Leadership Question* is essentially a monograph with some appeal in graduate courses on the presidency, American government, and perhaps even political philosophy.

Occasionally, clever turns of phrases seem to be made for their shock value alone, for example, "politicians, being more resourceful than political scientists, rely on other readings [apart from public opinion polls] as well" (p. 117). Generally well edited, the book is relatively error free, except for a few incorrect or incomplete citations. The index could have been more thorough, for example, it fails to mention some authors mentioned in the text and works cited in footnotes.

The data presented often are more illustrative than definitive. Frequently, data are not developed, and we are not always told what the tables reflect. Some tables are incomplete (e.g., year axis in Figure 4.6), and most are quite dated (e.g., Tables 4.1-3). Rockman is better at model-building than in presenting data simply, for example. Finally, one wishes for more consistent and precise uses of policy terminology.

Although much of this review may seem critical, *The Leadership Question* is an important study. It has flashes of brilliance and is a stimulating and thoughtful analysis. Rockman nicely contrasts extant theories of leadership, and if he is not yet able to explain or predict leadership, he describes it very well indeed. In better specifying the components of a model of leadership (if not always telling us which elements are most important), the book is perhaps as close to a theory as political scientists have come. Rockman is quite aware that he has not yet arrived at theory but has begun the necessary linkages.

Although this book contains no explicit hypotheses, and by definition no validation, it does contain interesting assumptions and propositions that are the first steps in theory-building. The difficulty lies in seeing how some of Rockman's assertions could be tested, and the study provides no directions for future research. Rockman is aware that he has not answered the leadership question, but he has given us a better understanding of it. With this study, he has made a definite contribution and has established himself as one of our most thoughtful writers on the American presidency.

STEVEN A. SHULL

University of New Orleans

Drastic Measures: A History of Wage and Price Controls in the United States. By Hugh Rockoff. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984. Pp. xi + 289. $29.95.)

Economic historian Hugh Rockoff argues that many criticisms of wage and price controls are often based more on anecdotes about black markets and isolated market distortions than on the historical record. His own assessment of the performance of controls during the colonial and revolutionary periods, the two world wars, the Korean conflict, and the Nixon administration persuades him that a system of temporary, across-the-board controls is a viable alternative to the political costs of a recession. He is only marginally successful demonstrating this.

Rockoff's original goal was to adapt the lessons of wartime inflationary crises to the persistent inflation of the post-Vietnam era. His assumption that the latest inflation had reached crisis proportions similar to those of wartime is questionable. But his use of those earlier periods as "natural experiments" typified by "rapid and extensive change" (p. ix) strengthens the comparison. Whether such inflations will again reappear is a good question. But the broader value of Rockoff's book is that it suggests much about the response of the American political economy to crisis. Although his focus is economic, his analysis also highlights the extreme pressures borne by the American political system.

Drastic Measures is both historical and analytical. Each substantive chapter consists of a historical narrative recounting the particular episode and an assessment of the accuracy of four major criticisms of wage/price policies. Although the historical accounts are informative, although sometimes incomplete, it is the evaluation of these episodes that constitutes Rockoff's major thrust.

Two criticisms of controls assessed by Rockoff concern the economic effects of controls. Reviewing the success of controls in slowing inflation, Rockoff finds that across-the-board controls, when supported by restrictive monetary and fiscal policies, work much better than critics allow. Furthermore, he argues, the costs to productive efficiency of controls are often no worse than those that occur in a freely operating market (p. 237). Finally, he says, the protection of fixed-income groups afforded by controls is conducive to public support as well as humane (p. 320).

A third criticism of controls tested by Rockoff concerns the size, costs, and efficiency of the ensuing controls bureaucracy. Unfortunately, he uses an inadequate standard of measurement. We learn little about these characteristics of the controls bureaucracy when they are compared with the postal service. A comparison with an analogous regulatory agency would have been more fruitful. It is also disappointing that there are only suggestions of the role played by the states in the controls program. Despite these flaws, however, one is persuaded that the fear of bureaucratic giantism stemming from controls is somewhat exaggerated.

In evaluating the charge that evasion will be extensive under controls, Rockoff gets to the crux of the controls debate: cooperation. Again, in relying on reported numbers of court cases and sanctions, Rockoff's standard of measurement is inadequate. It overlooks those who got away. Even with the survey data he cites and his documentation of evasion incentives, Rockoff can only tentatively conclude that evasion was not all that pervasive. Without a major national crisis, it will be "politics as usual" (p. 183).

Drastic Measures contains an admirably extensive bibliography. Unfortunately, Rockoff's conclusion fails to offer a new solution to the political problem of controls. His proposed "Board of Stabilization Overseers" (p. 250), intended to facilitate cooperation between monetary, fiscal, and control authorities, does not solve their conflicts but merely institutionalizes them. Although the Reagan administration appears to have made recession a politically survivable inflation policy, *Drastic Measures* will provide valuable information both to policymakers who secretly contemplate controls and to social scientists interested in the response of a market-oriented political economy to crisis-induced regulation.

GORDON P. HENDERSON

Purdue University

PAC Power: Inside the World of Political Action Committees. By Larry J. Sabato. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1984. Pp. 272. $15.95.)

Larry Sabato has written a fitting companion to his excellent study, *The Rise of Political Consultants* (Basic Books, 1981). Indeed, the growth of political action committees is an integral part of the "new ways of winning elections." The subtitle of *PAC Power, Inside the World of Political Action Committees,* is, however, too narrow: Sabato provides an invaluable description of all aspects of PACs, not just their inner workings. A more accurate subtitle might be "everything you wanted to know about PACs and were afraid to believe." Sabato helps sweep away the cobwebs that obscure the debate on campaign finance.

The great strength of *PAC Power* is the detailed factual information it contains. The book draws on three skeins of data, each of which would be worth a book on its own. First, Sabato reports on an extensive mail survey of a random sample of 399 multicandidate PACs. Second, some 60 personal interviews with key participants and observers of PACs cover nearly every phase of their operation. And third, *PAC Power* includes a thorough compilation of recent scholarship, journalism, and anecdotes relevant to campaign finance. Sabato stitches these disparate strands of evidence into a rich and stimulating tapestry.

What emerges from Sabato's analysis is the thick "web of politics" that enshrouds PACs. Campaign contributing is only one of the many political activities in which PACs engage. For example, more than three-fourths of PACs surveyed were involved in some other kind of political education program such as voter registration drives. And most large PACs spend as much effort mobilizing their members as currying favor with officials. The influence of money is closely entwined with the power of these other resources.

The web of PAC politics extends beyond their entangled activities to the connections between committees. As a whole, PACs are very diverse in terms of internal organization and interests; even within well-defined sectors such as labor and the New Right, PACs specialize to a bewildering degree. These variegated groups are tied together by complex and subtle networks that share political intelligence and tactics and develop common strategies. In this regard, Sabato sees PACs as a source of party strength and renewal, for even competitive interests must ultimately bind themselves together to be effective, and the major parties still hold the ties that bind best. PACs have power as much because they weave strong coalitions as because of their financial prowess.

Sabato is basically a reformer: "The need for campaign finance reform remains undeniable" (p. 171). But successful reforms must take into account the politics that enmesh PACs. Political money cannot be willed away, Sabato argues, no matter how sincere the will or how severe the way. The object of reform should be to minimize the less desirable aspects of PACs while encouraging their many positive attributes. The spiders that inhabit the political webbing of campaign finance are certainly ugly, occasionally poisonous, but they can be made to catch flies. Towards this end Sabato proposes a number of modest reforms that ought to be taken seriously.

This book has only a few weaknesses. Some readers may find Sabato's use of aggregate data frustrating: Much of his work begs for individual-level analysis connecting the characteristics of PACs to their behavior. Likewise, students of Congress and parties may find Sabato's interviews and anecdotes a poor substitute for systematic evidence of the patterns he alleges. However, none of these points mars the fabric of the study. Indeed, scholars pursuing these issues will find *PAC Power* indispensable to their work.

JOHN C. GREEN

Furman University

America's Hidden Success: A Reassessment of Twenty Years of Public Policy. By John E. Schwarz. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1983. Pp. 208. $5.95, paper.)

This is a timely book. John Schwarz's basic objective is to take issue with what has become the conventional political wisdom that during the post-Eisenhower years (1960 to 1980) the American political economy failed to live up to expectations, and that in particular the social and economic programs pursued by the welfare state had failed to alleviate the problems they were designed to address.

Schwarz begins by examining the claim that liberal programs failed to achieve their goals. Scrutinizing the results of liberal governmental programs to reduce poverty; improve housing, health, and nutrition; and to halt and reverse the degradation of the environment, Schwarz produces an impressive array of evidence to demonstrate that government efforts were in fact very successful. For example, Schwarz marshals evidence (pp. 34-38) to show that antipoverty programs reduced poverty at a rate that could not have been achieved by the private sector alone, and the programs did so without significantly reducing the incentive of Americans as a whole to seek work. Similarly, Schwarz shows that "the government's nutritional programs were almost fully effective in reducing flagrant malnutrition among Americans in locales of concentrated poverty across the nation . . ." (p. 45). Similar successes emerge in the areas of housing, health, and the environment. Although government programs never totally eliminated any of these problems, they more successfully alleviated them than is commonly believed. Moreover, the programs achieved this success with relatively little waste. Citing figures drawn from the Republican Study Committee of the House of Representatives and President Reagan's Council on Integrity and Efficiency, Schwarz demonstrates that the amount of waste in social welfare programs amounts to somewhere between one-half of 1% and 3% (pp. 69-72).

Schwarz then turns to the claim that the American economy was stultified in the 1970s as a result of government regulation, taxation, and support for social programs. Once again, the image that emerges as a result of Schwarz's examination of the record is markedly different from the popular myth of conservative conventional wisdom. "No unbridled growth of the nation's government took place from 1960-80; instead, in most respects, the government grew very slightly in the 1960s and 1970s in relation to the size of the nation's economy. This is the case whether one considers taxation, deficit spending, the size of the bureaucracy, or the amount of regulation . . ." (pp. 80-81). The result was a relatively strong economic performance, one comparable to that of the 1950s.

What then was responsible for the perception that the American political economy had floundered in the post-Eisenhower years and that government was responsible? Cynicism resulting from Watergate and Vietnam cultivated by the new conservative ideology helped perpetuate the myth of government incompetence and responsibility for a failing economy (pp. 117-122). But most importantly, there were demographic and cultural developments that overwhelmed even the relatively strong economy of the 1970s. Specifically, the entrance of the baby boomers into the work force and the increase in the number of women seeking jobs combined to increase the number of new workers seeking jobs (by 40%, or 30 million workers, between 1965 and 1980) at a faster rate than even a strong economy could provide for (pp. 123-124). And this in turn increased aggregate demand to put upward pressure on prices, while many new workers found work in jobs that only marginally increased productivity.

According to Schwarz, this new understanding of the source of America's political-economic troubles requires that we reexamine new conservative policies. Because it is based on a false image of the past (i.e., that welfare state programs did not work and that government actions constrained the efficiency of the market), the conservative agenda threatens not only to undo the successes of the past, but also to result in policies that "will consign many millions of Americans and their families to unemployment for a number of years down the road, and leave more underemployed" (p. 152). In addition, we must reexamine our national investment policy. Schwarz concludes that, "The government could, and should, do more than in the past to channel a larger percentage of the funds available for investment into those areas for which the productivity payoffs to the country are likely to be at a high level" (p. 155).

Schwarz's argument is an impressive challenge to many of the current interpretations of American political economy. But it is not clear that it refutes the arguments of reindustrialization and deindustrialization theorists. Although Schwarz provides evidence that investment remained stable from 1950 to 1980 (pp. 108-109), he later admits what both deindustrialist theorists and reindustrialists argue, that what is important is the composition of that investment (p. 155).

Finally, according to Schwarz the crowded generation is in some significant part a result of many of those previously excluded from full or equitable participation in the American political economy now realizing the promise of that political-economic ethos. But this seems to imply, as crisis theorists argue, that the welfare state cannot deliver on the promise of advanced liberal society without at the same time producing pressures that undermine the economic performance.

These arguments do not necessarily prove Schwarz's account of the problems wrong, but his argument would have been strengthened by addressing them in detail. Had he done so, the result might have been a truly outstanding book. As it is, the book is still a strong challenge to the now-conservative conventional wisdom that all that is wrong with the United States is attributable to the welfare state.

MICHAEL T. GIBBONS

University of South Florida

The Decline of American Political Parties, 1952-1980. By Martin P. Wattenberg. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984. Pp. xix + 160. $15.00.)

Few political phenomena have undergone the intense scrutiny that has been focused in recent years on the purported decline of American political parties. Analyses have probed the successive reforms of party rules and procedures, the increased use of primary elections and personal campaign organizations, and the impact of direct access to media for the purpose of reaching voters and mobilizing support. A great deal of attention also has been paid to the intriguing but elusive contours of voter opinions and behavior in light of this apparent institutional degeneration.

Wattenberg's small volume explores the attitudinal profile of American voters in an attempt to "assess the extent of the decline of political partisanship in the electorate, the nature of the decline, and the reasons for it" (p. 5). The author readily concedes the difficulties of defining the concept of partisanship, but he argues that the attempt is preferable to relying solely on measures of party identification as many scholars have done. In fact, the very vagueness inherent in the term *partisanship* makes it more useful, according to Wattenberg, because it covers a far broader range of public attitudes toward parties. By contrast, the typical party identification scale identifies only the direction and strength of the respondent's affiliation without shedding any light on the underlying voter perceptions of parties or on the reasons for those perceptions. These missing pieces of the attitudinal puzzle are the objects of Wattenberg's search.

As recognized by the author, the task of clearly differentiating partisanship from more traditional measures of party identification is the most difficult step in this analysis. Rather than attempt a stringent, operational definition of partisanship, Wattenberg gives us a set of loosely woven indicators including party identification, party-line voting, split-ticket voting, and—most importantly for his purposes—measures of normative attitudes toward parties as institutions. Using survey data from the Survey Research Center/Center for Political Studies, Wattenberg reexamines conventional diagnoses of the symptoms and causes of declining participation, voter disaffection, and increasing numbers of independents. The result is a useful and clearly comprehensible synthesis of a sizable body of literature on the evolution of American electoral behavior. More importantly, Wattenberg states a significant, new interpretation of the survey research record in the familiar "good news/bad news" format: The good news is that voters have *not* become more negative in their attitudes toward parties; the bad news is that voters *have* become more neutral (read apathetic) toward parties. Furthermore, this decline in positive—and negative—views about parties has been underway for at least three decades, according to Wattenberg.

In the face of this new reading of voter surveys, one is tempted to ask the eternal question, So what? Does it make any practical difference that a prospective voter declines to identify with a political party not because the voter dislikes parties, but because the party seems irrelevant to the voter's world? Without addressing this question directly, Wattenberg does offer a partial answer. He feels that, if anything, voter neutrality would be harder to transform into positive participation than would attitudes of antagonism toward political parties. In his view, the decline in parties has been associated with a secular trend toward voter disinterest and is thus more deeply ingrained and more resistant to change than has been indicated by previous research.

Wattenberg's argument that voters are more neutral than negative is innovative and persuasive. However, his analysis of the causes for voter dispassion covers previously explored territory: candidate-centered politics, loyalty to personalities rather than to parties, campaign finance reform, and media encouragement of these political values. What is new is that all of these factors are examined for their contributions to the increase in voter neutrality toward parties.

One possible weakness in Wattenberg's analysis is the cursory attention he pays to recent literature on the emerging revitalization of party organizations at all levels. Although he briefly notes the work of Malcolm Jewell and David Olson on state party organizations and of Cornelius Cotter and John Bibby on the national level (p. 3), Wattenberg does not consider the possibility that better organized, better managed party organizations could begin to reinvigorate voter interest and affiliation. Republican organizations in particular have shown in recent years that grass-roots organization, technological innovations, and strong ideological themes can translate into electoral successes at all levels of government.

Nevertheless, Wattenberg's study is an important contribution to the ongoing attempt to understand the interplay of voter attitudes and the institutional parties. His book is well-written and highly readable, and its moderate length (131 pages of text) will make it an attractive supplement for courses on American parties or electoral behavior.

ROGER G. BROWN

Iowa State University

Making Campaigns Count: Leadership and Coalition-Building in 1980. By Darrell M. West. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984. Pp. xii + 198. $29.95.)

The study of elections has produced a copious amount of work centered on the voter. Little effort has traditionally been directed at understanding elections from the perspective of candidates. Darrell West puts forth a refreshing attempt at examining the 1980 presidential election and nomination process by researching candidate motives and actions. West's fundamental thesis is that candidates and their campaigns not only are an integral part of elections, but they also define voter choice, influence political realignments, assist in shaping the nation's political agenda, and play a crucial role in coalition formation.

West's analysis of the 1980 election is an exploratory study. Building on Richard Fenno's inductive research design, West utilizes six data bases in which to draw inferences: public and private interviews with the top campaign advisors, traveling with various candidates, a content analysis of campaign rhetoric, an examination of candidates' daily travel schedules, an analysis of press coverage, and a study of audience reactions to candidate presentations. This innovative and extensive research yielded several fundamental conclusions.

First, although the post-1968 nomination process provided unprecedented opportunities for candidates, they also faced risks. Campaign strategies, developed years before the presidential elections, may be tactically incorrect, but quite likely they may be entirely ill-conceived. West argues that Baker's and Connally's campaigns in 1980 were unsuccessful because they pursued strategies that were based on assumptions that proved to be incorrect.

Second, candidates build their electoral coalitions based on three specific forces: their own electoral history, their party history, and their policy interests. West asserts that these three forces develop over years, and that "presidential coalitions [do] not arise full blown or by accident" (p. 36).

Third, candidates use rhetoric to establish agendas, effect party realignment, and form coalitions. Campaign rhetoric can provide a valuable clue to eventual presidential performance. West argues, for example, that Reagan's presidential agenda and his campaign rhetoric in 1980 were remarkably similar.

Fourth, an analysis of audiences on which candidates allocated precious time provides clues about the electoral coalitions they were attempting to form. West concludes that "candidate travels were not just media events; they were a vital technique for building coalitions" (p. 112).

Fifth, candidate symbolism is critical to developing coalitions because of the current era of open nominations. West writes that "it was apparent that they [candidates] devised symbolic appeals that communicated their coalitional strategies" (p. 130).

Sixth, campaigners and the media rely on audience reactions to provide crucial feedback as to whether a candidate's message is popular or well received. West also found that crowds are more receptive to nonpolicy speeches than policy appeals.

Seventh, the study of candidate coalitions can provide assistance in predicting presidential behavior. West asserts, for example, that Reagan's rhetoric, symbolism, and his coalition formation demonstrated that "he meant to undertake a major reassessment of the national political agenda . . ." (p. 157).

The notion that candidates work tirelessly at forming winning coalitions during the general election is not new. West's analysis provides excellent insights into some of the techniques candidates use to build these coalitions. However, I disagree that coalitions are being formed in the nomination process. In *Consequences of Party Reform* (Oxford University Press, 1983), Nelson Polsby argues that a nominating system dominated by primaries encourages candidates to mobilize factions rather than build coalitions. The main goal of presidential aspirants during the nominating season is not to win with majorities, but to simply survive. Survival in the fast-paced serial nature of multiple candidate primaries means garnering a relatively small percentage of the vote. The winner of the primary often captures less than one-third of the possible votes. Polsby argues that this type of nominating system encourages factional candidates. Coalition-building is not necessary to capture the nomination. West's argument that candidates pursue coalition strategies throughout the nomination process is in direct contrast to Polsby's thesis. A cursory glance at nomination struggles since 1968 reveals that Polsby is indeed correct.

Even with this theoretical disagreement, the book is well worth examining. This type of inductive research reveals numerous aspects of elections that are routinely missed by only examining voters.

PATRICK J. KENNEY

Wichita State University

Comparative and Other Area Studies

Against the State: Politics and Social Protest in Japan. By David E. Apter and Nagayo Sawa. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984. Pp. 271. $22.50.)

Three basic themes are developed in this comprehensive and careful study of the protest movement against the building of the airport facility at Narita, Japan. The first and most extensively developed theme centers on the struggle itself. The confrontation at Sanrizuka over the building of a new airport facility is representative of many other protests. Protest in Japan is characterized by experience and ritualization. Not only is there ritualization in techniques used by protestors, but also by the government in response to protest. Eventually the government prevailed at Sanrizuka, but the protest continues in truncated form. The levels of participation in the early months was quite high, attracting a large number of diverse groups and individuals in support of a narrowly defined objective—opposition to the construction of the airport. In time, however, the movement became a catalyst for other protests of wider import. The building of the airport at Narita became the symbol of state power in its most overwhelming, expansive, and oppressive form.

The displacement of the farmers and the challenges to traditional values gradually became subordinated to other causes such as state imperialism, economic penetration of Japan into Southeast Asia, war, U.S. defense policy, pollution, education, human rights, and religion. As the causes became more diverse, polarization among the protestors occurred resulting in unity of purpose giving way to fragmentation.

The Narita protest, as presented in *Against the State,* provides considerable insight into the more negative side of the Japanese miracle. The social overhead costs of the protest have been great. Modernity is suddenly thrust into the quietude of traditional order and society. "In a world of households, farms, and other small-scale enterprises, the construction of any large facility intrudes. Social space is violated; livelihoods are affected" (p. 79). The disruptions have been significant. Politics as protest protrude into a patron-client political system. Women and children are politicized. In this sense the Narita protest is unique. Seldom is a protest of such magnitude found in the serenity of a traditional stronghold of the ruling Liberal-Democratic party.

A second, yet less developed, theme derives from the first. Questions are raised as to the role of violent protest in democratic societies, specifically in Japan. Citizen protest is endemic to Japan. Extra-institutional protest becomes very common, especially in the closed, political system of Japan. Japanese politics is not necessarily the politics of accommodation and compromise. As Apter and Sawa state, once deeply felt principles are invoked and become rigid, compromise and reconciliation are impossible. As the protest lengthened, the more fixed became the issue positions of the various participants. The Narita protest transcends Japan's movement from an industrial society to a postindustrial society. The evolution of the protest and the movement into a postindustrial era not only challenged the basic assumptions of democracy, but they also challenged the validity of the protest itself which became somewhat anachronistic in the process.

The final theme is really an implicit criticism of social science theories. These theories "omit what might be called the cognitive dimension of daily life and action in favor of overkill theories in which case materials become merely illustrative" (p. 13). No such problems arise in this study. The people, the protest, and the inevitable outcome take priority throughout. Not since George W. Packard's *Protest in Tokyo* (Princeton University Press, 1966) has there been a study so significant in its contributions to our understanding of protest politics in Japan.

L. JEROLD ADAMS

Central Missouri State University

Elections in Israel-1981. Edited by Asher Arian. (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1983. Pp. 300. $19.95, paper.)

In democratic societies, elections appropriately have had a privileged position as a topic of research. Elections embody philosophies of politics. They function as political institutions. They reflect social processes. They support economic interests. They emerge from particular histories and foster distinctive paths of development. Elections are studied both because they delineate the nature of a political community and because they appear to measure its well-being.

Although material that instantly clarifies these deep and fundamental concerns is not easily recoverable from election studies, such concerns cannot be properly addressed without uncovering the relationship of the election process to the democratic citizen and to the democratic political community. It behooves political scientists to examine elections with these issues in mind and with instruments capable of registering more than media coverage and tabulated returns. American political scientists have pioneered in creating sophisticated behavioral modes for explaining elections, and Israeli political scientists have excelled in applying these techniques. If the advantage of such techniques (the disposition to quantify) also constitutes their major deficiency (the avoidance of issues not subject to measurement), this has not been true for the particular case of Israeli election studies.

Asher Arian has coordinated a team of political scientists that has produced monographs on every national election in Israel since 1969, examining the campaigns and interpreting their results. The framework of analysis is American, but the flesh and bones are Israeli. Although not every issue central to Israeli political life is covered in the volumes, no one can understand Israeli politics without them. Taken together, they have become the analysis of record. Not all volumes address identical issues, nor do they all deploy the same techniques. The essays reflect not only growth in political science, but also the ways in which each historical moment can bring different issues into salience.

The Elections in Israel-1981 maintains the same high scholarly standard set in the previous volumes: Many of its essays are simply superb. Arian's introduction recreates the tone of the election and delineates its political and economic ambiance. Michal Shamir, Asher Arian and Hannah Herzog, in two separate contributions, place the ethnic dimension in its proper perspective, noting that although ethnic political organizations are marginal in Israeli politics, "ethnicity" itself is an important political resource. With sensitivity and astuteness, Herzog writes that ethnic parties have always emphasized the temporary nature of their organizations, justifying them as the only means of redressing social injustice. She adds that many successful Israelis of non-European origin tend to discuss social and economic problems under the rubric of ethnicity. Avner Yaniv and Majid al-Haj have written an insightful overview of the patterns of Arab voting behavior. Giora Goldberg and Steven A. Hoffmann, expanding the latter's work on the process through which political party leaders are selected, have produced a comparison of the nominating processes employed by Israeli parties before the 1981 election. Notwithstanding the recent 1984 elections, this volume is still relevant and informative. Above all, regardless of scholarly approach or perspective, students of Israeli society will find this book indispensable.

DONNA ROBINSON DIVINE

Smith College

Venezuela: Politics in a Petroleum Republic. By David Eugene Blank. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984. Pp. xi + 225. $27.95.)

Ironically, at a time when the focus of analysis of Latin American politics is shifting from the study of the nature and dynamic of authoritarianism toward the examination of the prospects of redemocratization, many still regard the Venezuelan democracy as either at the verge of collapse or with its survival very much at stake. Blank's book is, in a way, an answer to this faulty perception. He "expects to see Venezuela's nonspectacular democracy survive the challenges of the 1980s" (p. 6), and does so happily, because "the worst democracy is preferable to the best dictatorship [and] Venezuela's democracy, with all its faults, is far from being the worst" (p. 10). This conclusion is the result of a solid analysis and his many years of incisive study of the Venezuelan political system.

Blank's objectives are more ambitious, however. He attempts to elaborate a systematic explanation of the Venezuelan polity based on the refinement of a scheme he developed in the early 1970s. His framework of interpretation is based on the assumption that three systems (planning, representative or populist democracy, and praetorianism) lie behind the Venezuelan political structure, each having a specific dynamic, occupying a distinct space, and meeting different demands. Although basically sound, there are some problems with Blank's framework. First, the praetorian system appears in clear decline, because political violence in Venezuela today has become a marginal phenomenon. Second, although the "planning" system may assume the form of a technical arena designed to deal with public policy problems in a nonpolitical fashion, it is the arena preferred by business elites, and not because of the "complex, technical reality of public policy making" (p. 7), but rather because business leaders can press their demands more effectively in the absence of the constraints associated with electoral politics. Thus, the existence of a dual policy arena (parliament/planning) reflects not the nature of the decisions (technical as opposed to political), but rather the uneasy but stable coexistence of two political logics: that of the general public, best represented by party and parliamentary politics, and that of the business elites, best served by ad hoc government-business committees. Finally, to label the third system populist is, at least, confusing. Parties in Venezuela act out of electoral considerations and develop extensive clienteles, but this is a characteristic of most representative democracies.

A study of the functioning of these three systems, or "impulses," this book is useful not only because of its attempt at developing a theoretical framework of understanding, but also because Blank is well informed and relies on many valuable but often neglected Venezuelan sources including magazines and newspapers. He updates the analysis of the political process up to the election of President Jaime Lusinchi in December, 1982 and includes two chapters dealing with the management of the oil industry. The chapter covering the period that followed the 1976 nationalization is a welcome contribution to the study of a process that, despite its importance, has so far received only scant attention.

In brief, Blank has written a useful volume, a needed contribution to the understanding of the political system of Venezuela.

Diego Abente

Miami University

Parties and Democracy in Britain and America. Edited by Vernon Bogdanor. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984. Pp. xviii + 282. $25.95.)

In this collection of essays by leading British and American political scientists on the respective countries' party systems, Bogdanor wishes to examine the role of political parties in the "world's two leading democracies" (p. ix). In his introduction, he characterizes the two countries as "examplars" of two contrasting models of democratic government, parliamentary and presidential. Recent years, however, have seen the erosion of many of the conditions that historically have underpinned the stability of the respective systems. Consequently, the book's two main aims are to analyze how "the process of social and electoral change [has] altered the role of party in Britain and the United States, and how the British and American parties [have] reacted to the social forces that press upon them" (p. xi).

On this two-pronged score, however, *Parties and Democracy in Britain and America* has mixed results. At least one-half of the essays concentrate on descriptions of the first of these two aims, while not emphasizing the second, the relationship between social forces and political parties, strongly enough. As Bogdanor himself states, "Political parties are, to a considerable degree, dependent variables. Their power to influence the direction of social change and of electoral loyalties is, under modern conditions, severely limited" (p. xvii). Therefore, given this characterization of political parties, one would expect *Parties and Democracy in Britain and America* to offer a much stronger treatment of the interaction between dependent and independent variables in order to deal with the issue of causation. Unfortunately, Bogdanor has not taken this approach.

A number of essays fall into the first, or descriptive, camp. S.E. Finer's short chapter on the decline of party is primarily an extended outline that only hints at such important themes as the marginalization of the parties and the "departifying of public policy" (p. 2). Leon D. Epstein's chapter on the redistribution of power in British parties concentrates almost exclusively on the Labour party, and only during 1980 and 1981. The chapters by Bogdanor and David Adamany on party financing offer a wealth of detail on the processes by which parties in the two countries finance themselves, but offer little in the way of prescriptions on how the respective disadvantages can be overcome. Finally, Larry Sabato's chapter on new campaign techniques and the American party system provides an extensive account of this phenomenon. It misses, however, an opportunity to address whether this new "style" of campaigning is at all helpful in getting at the substance of electoral politics.

The remainder of the essays deal more successfully with both of the book's aims. In a chapter titled "Power and the Parties: The United States," Philip M. Williams offers a nuanced and dynamic account of the erosion of the American parties. In a chapter on American antipartisanship, William Schneider locates its causes in the distrust of institutions and an American ideological belief system, both of which became more sharply drawn after the mid 1960s. David Butler and Austin Ranney give an enlightening account of the role of the media in both countries. And, in concluding essays, Bogdanor and Gerald Pomper hint that institutions that ensure stability during tranquil times (first-past-the-post single member constituencies, for example) may prove much less representative during times of turmoil.

Ultimately, *Parties and Democracy in Britain and America* remains uneven because too many of the essays fail to appreciate the magnitude of the recent changes that have affected both countries. In fact, these changes may call into question whether both still remain the same exemplars of democratic government that they once were during more tranquil periods.

CHRISTOPHER S. ALLEN

Harvard University

The State and Nuclear Power: Conflict and Control in the Western World. By J.A. Camilleri. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1984. Pp. xiv + 347. $25.00.)

Avoiding the cases for and against nuclear power, this study analyzes the political, cultural, and international dimensions of civil nuclear energy since the atomic age began. Camilleri focuses on the mode, extent, and efficacy of the liberal capitalist state's part in nuclear decision making. To Camilleri, the entire nuclear experience has been one of increasing regime intervention, the state's emergence as an arena for nuclear disputes, a shift from U.S. hegemony to imperial rivalry in nuclear markets, and a decline in capitalist policy effectiveness everywhere.

The state's use of "national interest" appeals and police powers is illustrated. The state was typically able to secure worker and union support for pro-nuclear policies in several countries. In effect, the workers supported their own interest, not the interest perceived by Marxian analysts to be the workers' interest. The bulk of the study focuses on Britain, the United States, France, West Germany, Sweden, and Brazil. A chapter is devoted to the adverse impact of the recession of the 1970s on the nuclear option. If the American state had the power attributed to it, the nuclear depression would not have become so severe. Also, if the oil problem had become worse, the nuclear option would probably be healthier today.

To limit his inquiry, Camilleri excluded the nuclear Marxist state. He comments that a comparison would probably reveal "a qualitative difference in the scope and mode of [state] intervention" (p. x). A comparative study would also presumably reveal that nuclear decision making is monolithic in Marxist states and pluralistic in capitalist states.

Notice is taken of the vital role of the ecological movement, especially in the United States, in challenging the nuclear preferences of industrial and governmental elites. Yet the decentralized nature of environmentalism is also stressed as a factor aiding the state's ability to cling to pro-nuclear policies despite setbacks such as the Three Mile Island accident. The state's policies included the Carter reversal of plutonium recycle followed by the Reagan reversion in principle to recycle orthodoxy.

International currents and nonproliferation issues are addressed in one chapter. Camilleri aptly finds that neither Carter nor Reagan was able to impede the decentralizing trend in world nuclear commerce found in the growth of new enrichment and reactor production facilities in Western Europe that have developed overcapacities. Much the same is true of proliferation-proneness. Yet no state has begun a nuclear-weapons program since the Non-Proliferation Treaty came into force in 1970.

Marshaling data from a variety of sources, Camilleri concludes persuasively that the antinuclear movement did not "succeed in disrupting the technical apparatus of the state, much less in undermining the normative integration of the social system" (p. 282). Although not mentioned, much of the protest in the United States at least appealed to basic norms. There may be a discontinuity between protesters in America and antinuclear groups in France and West Germany.

According to the book, nuclear controversy "was the symptom of a deeper crisis, which itself reflected a contradiction between a capitalist system integrated by a single division of labour and a capitalist system divided between rival corporations and nation-states" (p. 293). These are declarative findings subject to ideo-analytical disputes. Although there is nothing preordained about the future of the less-than-ideal liberal capitalist state, it gives signs of not only surviving nuclear energy controversies however they turn out, but also of Marxist attempts to pour the history of the liberalist capitalist state into a mold of the kind this book posits.

PAUL F. POWER

University of Cincinnati

Local Politics and Development in the Middle East. Edited by Louis J. Cantori and Iliya Harik. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984. Pp. xii + 258. $25.75.)

It may be accurate to assert that economic development has been uneven in the Middle East. In fact, over the past decade Arab states that do not produce oil experienced significant socioeconomic hardships similar in nature to those of other developing countries. Much of these difficulties occurred because of poor planning at the state level and poor implementation at the local level. As a result, most of the assistance provided by central governments for the construction of industrial projects or the establishment of agricultural cooperatives lacked relevance to indigenous populations whose needs were not necessarily served. Perhaps more importantly, local leaders feared that government-sponsored activities would bypass the traditional decision-making process resulting in the erosion of "their" power base.

Based on extensive field research, the 11 essays assembled here attempt to discuss how local politics influence development in Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, North Yemen, Tunisia, and Turkey. To a large extent, they succeed in describing the nature of the center-periphery issue in these countries, mostly by examining specific case studies at the local level. They also reveal a number of interesting contradictions in the relationship between local and central governments.

For example, Louis J. Cantori and Peter Benedict illustrate how limited the influence of local leaders may be in a blue-collar suburb of Cairo, while Iliya Harik and Nirvana Khadr discuss the relative socioeconomic freedoms enjoyed by Egyptian farmers and fishermen. In fact, at the urban level while local leaders affect the initiation and development of local politics, their influence does not seem to extend beyond the occasional mediation effort. At the rural level, on the other hand, by pursuing independent marketing strategies in their businesses, often contradicting government-dictated policies, it is revealed that local leaders succeed in pursuading central authorities to adopt positions perceived to be more beneficial to the periphery. Yet, despite such accomplishments, rural dependence on the center's financial and technical support continues to guide local development strategies. This second point is best illustrated by Peter Gubser and Barbara K. Larson in discussing agricultural cooperative cases in Jordan and Tunisia.

In both instances, the technical support of an international organization and a central government was essential. Acknowledging that the required expertise for such ventures was beyond the means of the villagers, local leaders provided their assistance to facilitate the completion of the projects. But when the international agency withdrew its technical support from the Jordanian project, Amman could not shoulder the added burden by itself, and without the required technical backing, the cooperative failed. Larson, for her part, skillfully reports how village leaders in Tunisia offered their political support to the Destour party in exchange for technical and financial assistance. This arrangement proved quite fruitful for all involved because it guaranteed prosperity for the villagers and permitted the government to consolidate its regional power bases.

Richard Tutwiler describes a similar situation in his study on North Yemen, where village leaders persuaded the government to finance the construction of a road connecting Mawhit to the Sana'-Al-Hudayda highway. Interestingly, although Mawhit officials accepted the government's technical and financial cooperation, they initiated work on the project before arrangements could be finalized. This unorthodox development presented the Sana' government with a *fait accompli*, forcing officials to commit themselves to the project.

A third point of interest is the impact that education has had on the relationship between local politics and development. Raymond A. Hinnebusch, for example, looks at how higher literacy rates permitted the Ba'th party to enhance its political position in Syria. Reportedly, the party's elaborate patronage system permits Damascus to channel development funds to those areas of the country where party leaders exercise considerable leverage. Nevertheless, despite these visible signs of strength, local officials do not seem to exercise much influence at the national level. Increasing levels of literacy, however, raise critical questions for the future should the party suffer political upheavals.

Education also seems to have made a definite impact in Turkey. In the only study using extensive statistical data, Mubeccel Kiray documents how Taskopru officials banked on local know-how to enhance the area's economic situation.

Finally, Suad Joseph's discussion of local political influence in Borj Hammoud, a suburb of Beirut, illustrates how ethnicity in Lebanon further heightens the disparities between the haves and have-nots.

As Nicholas S. Hopkins points out in his introductory chapter, local leadership figures exercise considerable, albeit limited, influence on central governments in the Middle East. Yet, although it has indeed been possible for many states to initiate development projects, the political costs have been very heavy, particularly when self-imposed limitations curtailed anticipated results.

This highly recommendable book suffers from too many typographical errors that distract the reader from the interesting and provocative discussions. It is also regrettable that no maps are provided to locate the numerous villages referred to in the text. Although useful references are included in most studies, Tutwiler's essay lacks its final three footnotes.

JOSEPH A. KECHICHIAN

University of Virginia

The Roots of Begin's Success. Edited by Dan Caspi, Abraham Diskin, and Emanuel Gutmann. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. Pp. iv + 297. $25.00.)

Perhaps Menachem Begin waited longer than any other modern leader to become head of government. Not only was he the fiercist opponent of the 28 years of Labor party ascendency in Israel (1948 to 1977), but he was also the most persevering. He joined, and then departed from, a wall-to-wall coalition (1967 to 1970). In the end, Begin became a remarkable testament to political democracy by patiently waiting three decades and nine national elections before finally assuming the prime ministership.

The mechanics of Begin's elevation are as interesting as his long career. He was regarded as an almost illegitimate figure (and sometimes an irrational one) by many of his contemporaries including David Ben-Gurion. But he also developed into a nonestablishment hero to the "second Israel," the non-European Jews who favored Begin's hard line (because they had been forcibly expelled from several Arab states) and his opposition to the Labor establishment (because it was primarily composed of European Jews). As these non-European Jews became a numerical majority of Israel's electorate, they helped catapult Begin forces (the Likud) and allies into a parliamentary majority.

The ethnic and religious concerns that motivated Likud supporters to continue to support Begin and his party in 1981 were not dissimilar to those that brought Begin to power in 1977. The data in several of the chapters clearly demonstrate that Israeli Jews of Middle Eastern background still appreciated the Likud government's approach to hostile Arab governments, as illustrated by the Israeli raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in Baghdad shortly before the 1981 election.

Unfortunately, Begin's political philosophy, which apparently inspired the votes of hundreds of thousands of Israelis, is only briefly explored (for two pages) in the first chapter, "Critical Aspects of the Elections and Their Implications." This is a pity because such an inclusion would help to provide a thematic quality for the various well-written but somewhat isolated chapters; in this respect the book's title is somewhat misleading. Much of the material does indeed provide substantial explanation of Begin's political abilities. What is lacking is an appreciation of Begin's political personality. It is certainly a pertinent consideration to explore in view of the Likud's narrow victory in 1981. Begin, for example, was assumed in the months before the election to be apathetic and resigned to a Labor victory—an apathy that returned in 1983 when in the wake of the proximate deaths of close friends and his wife Begin's depression returned, and he quit politics altogether. When Begin revived in 1981 so did the Likud's electoral chances.

This volume includes a useful variety of 11 original essays by 12 Israeli scholars, three of whom are the book's co-editors. In themselves, the essays are of substantial worth to scholars whose research and/or teaching take them into the dynamics of Israeli politics. Collectively, the essays tend to explore the current status and the changing quality of Israeli politics. Ethnicity (chaps. 2 and 4), the religious variable (ch. 6), and the increasingly important and less predictable Arab vote (ch. 7) are among the crucial considerations in understanding the difficult time major parties have come to have with an increasingly unstable electorate.

In this respect, chapter 5 is of special import. Instead of realignment, "Polarization and Volatility among Voters" may best explain what is going on in Israeli politics. It does seem safe to conclude that political parties in Israel are dealing with a very fluid situation. Even the communists can no longer count on receiving at least half of the Arab vote.

Each chapter is a worthy example of exacting research. Several of the authors also contributed to *The Elections in Israel-1977* (Jerusalem: Academic Press, 1980) edited by Asher Arian. For that reason as well as the availability of updated material the present volume is an excellent supplement.

MARTIN SLANN

Clemson University

The Southern Cone: Realities of the Authoritarian State in South America. By Cesar Caviedes. (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld, Publishers, 1984. Pp. x + 212. $34.95.)

This is an important interdisciplinary effort to synthesize the nature and prospects of authoritarian states in the Southern Cone, defined here to include southern Brazil as well as Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. Caviedes is a professor of geography, which leads him to provide an interesting exposition of trends in physical and political geography as well as trends in classes and hierarchical institutions. His pleasant writing style reinforces his obvious competence in Southern Cone affairs.

Nonetheless, so much ground is covered from various disciplinary perspectives that the narrative does tend to devolve into a summary of the literature on different topics rather than providing a genuine interdisciplinary synthesis. Examples of topics discussed that do not go beyond the existing literature are the role of the contemporary church in the Southern Cone states, the role of unions, the tendency towards centralization, and the impact of the national security doctrine and geopolitics.

A related problem is that each of the four main chapters examines the Southern Cone authoritarian states from a different perspective without any clear theoretical unity between them. The Conclusion might have provided a synthesis, but instead is limited to an impressionistic prognosis of military rule and is the weakest part of the book.

Nor does the book's central theme—the durability and pervasiveness of the authoritarian state as reinforced by militarism—ever adequately explain recurring pressure towards democracy in the Southern Cone. Only in the last few pages of the Conclusion are the Brazilian political *abertura* (opening) and the new democratic government in Argentina finally mentioned. Because the book does purport to explain the nature of political realities in the Southern Cone states, this is a serious defect.

The treatment of Argentina is also less than satisfactory. What have become standard explanations of the alleged innate aggressiveness of the Argentine military are repeated here, whether expressed through an unprovoked attack in 1982 on the Falklands/Malvinas islands or through bullying of Chile over much of the last decade on the Beagle Channel issue. Of course, the record of the Argentine military has been severely marred on these as on other matters, but the reader is disturbed that a supposedly impartial analysis of regional militarism practically acquires an anti-Argentine bias. For example, the Argentine cases regarding the Falklands/Malvinas and Beagle Channel issues are not mentioned, although Argentine conduct in each case is roundly criticized.

The treatment of Brazil poses other problems. Caviedes does present a cogent case for including southern Brazil as part of the Southern Cone, but Brazil is generally given short shrift in the analysis. This is particularly troublesome because the implications of Brazil's emergence as the leading state in the region are not carefully explored.

Although these problems detract from the overall impact of the book, Caviedes has gone well beyond previous studies in presenting an interdisciplinary analysis of Southern Cone political trends. It is hoped that others will follow his example.

MICHAEL A. MORRIS

Clemson University

Political Cohesion in a Fragile Mosaic: The Yugoslav Experience. By Lenard Cohen and Paul Warwick. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983. Pp. 186. $18.00, paper.)

In attacking a perennially explored topic, the viability of multinational Yugoslavia and its continued cohesiveness, Cohen and Warwick have pooled their expertise in Communist political systems and in legislative behavior respectively to develop an eclectic approach complete with sophisticated methodology.

First, they deal with the country's entire 65-year existence as an independent state and utilize the concept of a "single entity" (p. xi) and system to bridge and transcend changes in regime, ideology, and the various strategies to manage cultural diversity worked out by nonsocialist and socialist elites. Second, the authors focus upon upper-level legislative elections and voting behavior, primarily as sources of a quantitative data base, but also as phenomena worth considering in themselves. Last, they attempt to apply the "entropy measurement" developed by Stephen Coleman in *The*

Measurement and Analysis of Political Systems (Wiley-Interscience, 1975) by utilizing data on voter choice and turnout in order to "assess the degree of political incorporation of the various geographical units of the political system and its likelihood of survival" (p. 4). If a state is well-integrated, its "entropy" levels throughout its territory should be uniform, or at least harmonically distributed. The results of their statistical tests and schematic analyses are combined in a final, largely qualitative, chapter that brings the Yugoslav experience up to date. The latest quantitative data used relate to 1969 federal and republican elections.

Cohen and Warwick claim that the "entropy hypothesis" is most useful in analyzing electoral behavior in the kingdom between world wars. Nonetheless, conclusions reached do not appear particularly startling. By the 1920s, "the Yugoslav polity . . . was demonstrating an increasing resemblance to a collection of distinct subsystems" (p. 37); moreover, the more restricted elections held during the following decade "did not have the intended effect of decreasing the centrifugal tendencies in the country" (p. 46). The postwar Titoist regime, however, managed to induce a "process of convergence" enabling "national stimuli such as the purging of the secret police . . . [to] produce a common response across all regions of the country" (p. 87).

More provocative are results obtained when ballot invalidation is used as a measure of dissent: Increased candidate choice during the "liberal era" from 1965 to 1969 did have the effect of checking the percentage of invalidation wherever choice was provided, although this option was increasingly used wherever choice had been reduced or remained nonexistent. The authors note that the elections of 1969 marked "the end, rather than the beginning of pluralistic socialism" (p. 98); elections held under the delegate system in 1974 and thereafter were controlled by the regime and "safe" (p. 15).

One might doubt the implied contention that mass electoral behavior during the 1960s, and further expectations "for a wider expression of preferences that would probably not be compatible with a one party state" (p. 143), were major reasons behind the reassertion of party control over the electoral process. As Cohen and Warwick point out, the repoliticization of the "national question" as evidenced through Serbo-Croatian language disputes, revolt in Kosovo Metohija, enlarged autonomy for the Republican parties resulting in federal governmental stalemates, and Croatian student unrest, supplied ample justification for the leadership's fears that liberalization had gone too far.

In socialist and nonsocialist Yugoslavia, elections and the corresponding selection of upper-level legislative bodies have rarely been central in one determination of policy outcomes. Real political power has traditionally been exercised, if not at present by professional bureaucratic elites serving on federal executive and administrative bodies and their republican counterparts, then by partisan professionals ensconced in the higher party. An analysis of the operations of these institutions might therefore be more useful in determining whether the country can be governed as an integrated whole. In socialist Yugoslavia, latitude for autonomous "legislative" activity has been greatest at grass-roots levels such as in the communes and self-managing economic enterprises. The authors do not study these arenas. Furthermore, because they are concerned only with statistically measureable aggregates, Cohen and Warwick are unable to explore the particular dynamics of the electoral contests during the 1960s that were sharply competitive and/or resulted in the election of maverick deputies.

Nonetheless, the terse, historical, and objective commentary with which the authors surround their statistical analyses demonstrates the difficulties encountered by Yugoslav elites during the course of nation-building. Particularly useful is Cohen and Warwick's exposition of the CPY's labile nationalities policy and their attempt to match cultural diversity management strategies with particular eras of the Yugoslav example.

Empiricists might be attracted to this book by the authors' attempt to apply sophisticated quantitative techniques to the study of a multicultural and presently socialist system in development. Others, however, might find the book's qualitative parts more cogent and successful than the whole.

KAREN ROSENBLUM-CALE

Mount Holyoke College

The Independence Movement in Quebec 1945-1980. By William D. Coleman. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984. Pp. xii + 274. $30.00, cloth; $12.95, paper.)

This unpretentious book provides a new view on Quebec's Quiet Revolution and the ensuing rise of an independence movement by relating the provincial government's economic policies to its cultural policies. According to Coleman, the Quiet Revolution resulted from a coalition of forces distressed, after World War II, by the gap between traditional French-Canadian institutions and the demands of an increasingly industrialized economy. Before the Quiet Revolution, the provincial government had not attempted large-scale economic planning, and educational and social-welfare institutions had been controlled by the Catholic Church. Faced with the continuing economic dependence of French Canada vis-à-vis anglophone North America, coupled with the inability of the Church to respond to the social problems accompanying industrialization, francophone businessmen, organized labor, and elements of the intelligentsia united to demand increased governmental activity in economic planning and social services. The Quebec Liberal party, which came to power in 1960, represented the shared interests of these "class fractions" (p. 111) and implemented programs intended "to create viable and competitive capitalist enterprises, controlled by members of the francophone community" (p. 92). Assessing Quebec's economic policies between 1960 and 1980, Coleman argues that the government has been only partially successful in increasing the economic clout of French-speaking Quebecois; nonetheless, the result of its attempts has been to bring Quebec society into the North American mainstream.

This assessment leads to Coleman's most interesting hypothesis: "the more the francophone community becomes integrated into the North American economy at the level of management and of consumption, the more difficulty it will experience in defining for itself and maintaining a distinctive culture" (p. 132). In several comprehensive chapters on indigenous philosophies of culture and their relationship to cultural policy-making, Coleman argues that government programs in these areas have undermined rather than strengthened Quebec's cultural distinctiveness. For example, educational reform destroyed the province's religiously based educational system (which had been unique in North America) and replaced it with one focused on the technical skills needed by citizens of advanced industrial economies. And language legislation, which has made French the primary language of business in Quebec, has facilitated the integration of francophones into a world that has nothing to do with traditional French-Canadian values. In sum, seemingly nationalistic cultural policies have complemented integrative economic policies and hastened the demise of a distinct Quebec culture, rather than creating the institutional structures necessary to protect it.

Coleman's book is useful as an analysis of the recent history of cultural policies in Quebec, but it has two theoretical failings. First, Coleman's discussion of class promises much but delivers little. At the outset he rightly criticizes theories that explain the Quiet Revolution and separatism in terms of the interests of a specific class; Coleman argues that these social movements sprang from coalitions of classes and subclasses. Yet he is as uncritical as those he attacks when it comes to identifying relevant classes: He assumes that the ideological texts he analyzes represent discrete classes, but never gives evidence to show how he has correlated text and social grouping. In the absence of such arguments, one could use Coleman's data to construct a history of class conflict that would differ from that proposed by him. Second, Coleman is never clear in his use of the notion of cultural distinctiveness. At times he writes as if a distinctive traditional culture once existed but has now been destroyed; yet elsewhere he speaks of the "intellectualized" vision of a French-Canadian culture that clerical elites "felt" to be authentic (pp. 46, 157). In sum, Coleman points out the difficulties of legislating authenticity, but he uncritically uses a notion of authenticity as a baseline for the study of social change.

RICHARD HANDLER

Lake Forest College

Democratic Theory and Practice. Edited by Graeme Duncan. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Pp. 262. $39.50, cloth; $10.95, paper.)

This book contains 16 essays on the theory and practice of democracy in contemporary political life. Most of the contributors would agree that democracy has fallen on hard times. The frontiers of democratic politics are contracting, the rate of political participation is waning, and most citizens are neither acutely informed nor highly interested in political affairs. It is Duncan's hope that the essays in this volume will offer a basis "for a more hopeful picture of democratic futures than much of modern life seems to warrant" (p. 12). Despite the high quality of several of the contributions, the hope remains a modest one.

The book has several themes that bind the essays together. First, essays on Mill and Rousseau, Madison and Tocqueville, Marcuse, and Marx, make it quite clear—if it ever was in doubt—that what is referred to as "classical democratic theory" is subject to various and varied expressions.

Second, the contributors urge readers to reconceptualize democracy in light of changing political practices. The operative assumption seems to be that our moral and political concepts are basic constituents of our moral and political practices, and as our practices change, our concepts must be revised. Thus Dennis Thompson's essay on bureaucracy and democracy offers some guidelines to enable democratic theorists to explain what none has yet adequately explained: how democratic politics can be reconciled with the imperatives of modern bureaucracy. And Paul Nursey-Bray maintains that neither liberal nor Marxist perspectives are sufficient for an understanding of African democracy. African one-party democracy is a peculiar product of African social and political experience and, as such, it is a valid contribution to "a specifically African vision regarding political life and the processes of government" (p. 111).

Third, the contributors seek to broaden our conception of politics and to enlarge our vision of democratic possibilities. Duncan's essay on human nature and radical democracy illustrates this theme. Duncan suggests (p. 197) that "people have significant and unrealized potentialities, and could be more than they are with more favorable conditions (more or better material resources, education, information, and the like)." Carole Pateman's commentary on feminism and democracy is an effort to place such issues as the relations between the sexes, the problems of the family, and the status of women in the economy at the center of debates about modern democratic practices.

So, as we might anticipate from thinkers broadly sympathetic to participatory models of democracy, there is a general dissatisfaction expressed with liberal democratic concepts and categories. But the criticism is by no means limited to liberal democracy. Indeed, one of the strengths of this book is its all too rare scholarly self-criticism. Paul Corcoran, for example, reminds readers that democracy has not, at least until recently, been considered a praiseworthy form of government. Corcoran thinks that the perspective of 25 hundred years of Western political thought cannot be casually dismissed. He thus proceeds to question directly one of the volume's primary objectives (e.g., to provide a basis for democratic futures) by asking, "What if the modern democratic tradition in political theory is fundamentally *wrong,* both in its presuppositions about social and political values and in its labors to purify democratic theory and apply it in social practice?" (p. 15).

In a similarly self-critical spirit, Pateman singles out participatory democrats (including herself, as represented by an earlier work) for special criticism. She finds it somewhat ironical that proponents of a democratic model that takes into account social inequalities would have so systematically overlooked the domination characteristic of sexual relationships. She adds, "the present volume at least acknowledges that feminism might have something significant to say to democratic theorists or citizens, albeit in a token paper by a token woman writer" (p. 204).

This volume successfully identifies major issues demanding the attention of contemporary democratic theorists. And if one is not left hopeful about the democratic future, neither is one given grounds for total despair. For as Henry Kariel observes in the volume's closing paper, we "can still use what wit we have to engage in enterprises like the one engaging me at this very moment . . . to keep *enacting* the theory of democracy during times that deny this possibility" (p. 262).

GREGORY LEYH

Illinois Wesleyan University

Constitutional Democracy: Essays in Comparative Politics. Edited by Fred Eidlin. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983. Pp. viii + 516. $25.00, paper.)

This extremely broad-ranging collection of essays is a *Festschrift* in honor of Henry W. Ehrmann. Five of the 23 essays deal with the role of interest groups in constitutional democracies, the area which marks Ehrmann's major contribution to the discipline. He also maintained a strong interest in constitutional law, which is represented in four essays. The remaining 14 contributions deal with topics as diverse as rational choice and culture (chap. 9), politics and faith (chap. 6), voting behavior (chaps. 14 and 15), and the problem of transition from authoritarian regimes (chap. 23). This variety results from the editor's selection of friends, colleagues, and students of Ehrmann as contributors. Coming from the United States, France, Germany, and Canada, they represent the countries in which he has lived and worked.

Whatever one may think of this approach, its result is a work that exemplifies the broad range of political research, excluding, however, examples of more methodologically oriented research like formal modeling or positive theory. Francois Goguel's essay on the evolution of the institution of the French presidency (chap. 2) combines analysis of constitutional provisions, historical events, and personal observations to provide a rich picture of an institution and the leaders who shaped it to achieve their ends. Roger D. Masters (chap. 5) draws on etiological research to assess the validity of Rousseau's psychology. Fred Eidlin's contribution attempts to resolve the controversy about the scientific status of area studies. These are just a few examples of the different variants of political science covered in this volume.

The most exciting essays are those focusing on interest groups. Wolfgang Hirsch-Weber's comparative study of labor unions in Britain, the United States, and West Germany (chap. 16) examines relationships between membership, structure, and strike behavior. One wishes that an example of the quantitative research approach focusing on these questions (i.e., Douglas Hibbs) could have been included to clarify the interesting hypotheses spelled out by Hirsch-Weber. Kay Lawson (chap. 18) elaborates the articulation of corporatist themes and policies under different presidents during the Fifth Republic. William Safran's study of interest groups in France, West Germany, and the United States (chap. 17) analyzes the relationship between interest groups and the state. These essays (and a few others) cohere in a way that a large part of the book does not: They share a focus on interest groups, their relations with each other, and with the state. They analyze those relationships in a particular context, and they contribute to an ongoing debate about the usefulness of concepts like corporatism or neocorporatism for the study of interest groups in postindustrial societies.

Although the norms regarding the format of a *Festschrift* seem to be fluid, one might expect that its contributors would focus on the opus of the honored scholar. Instead, Eidlin has chosen an approach that covers a good deal of the intellectual territory claimed by political scientists. Only four contributors even quote from Ehrmann's works, and even fewer reflect on its continuing relevance. Ehrmann's contribution to our discipline could have been acknowledged in a more meaningful way than by the ill-defined selection process represented in this volume.

JUTTA A. HELM

Western Illinois University

Local Organizations: Intermediaries in Rural Development. By Milton J. Esman and Norman T. Uphoff. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984. Pp. 391. $35.00.)

In the comparative and development administration literature, Esman and Uphoff's analysis of the role of community-based organizations in the development process clearly stands out as one of the most significant studies published to date. Drawing on more than a decade of field work, the authors survey systematically the universe of local organizations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. They also submit to rigorous analysis the factors that explain why such third-sector organizations as cooperatives, clubs, interest groups, and citizen associations constitute a crucial ingredient in explaining those instances where success characterizes rural development programs. As a consequence, their book brings together theory and practice far more successfully than do most other studies in this field, since the quest first began for works in public administration, more attuned to third-world realities, which would transcend the limits of single-country case studies. At the same time, it meets the standards of quality work in general political science and draws upon the best traditions of empirical research in the social sciences.

Beginning with the findings of their 1974 study, Esman and Uphoff establish at the outset the premise that where local organizations involving the rural poor exist, they fill a vital function as intermediaries between state and society. Through their review of the development literature, they clarify why participatory local organizations constitute a crucial part of rural development programs. They also state straightforwardly their own position as advocates of a "structural-reformist" approach to the problems of underdevelopment. From there, Esman and Uphoff move on to define comprehensively the types and tasks of local organizations. They then proceed to a quantitative assessment of those indicators that best explain economic, social, and political gains in rural communities. To accomplish this they select 150 cases from the available literature; this data set, once converted from isolated qualitative assessments into uniform quantitative measures, is then submitted to correlational and multiple regressional analysis.

Esman and Uphoff's most significant finding concerns the importance of internal structural variables as the primary source of successful program performance and the relative insignificance of exogenous or environmental variables linked to more accepted theories of development. These data are evaluated in terms of their capacity to account for the difference between success and failure in sustained development activities at the community level. With this finding in mind, and after detailed discussion of its implications for development strategies, the authors next consider questions of organizational strategy—those actions that most hinder or assist rural residents in their ability to establish, maintain, and promote effectiveness in local organizations serving the poor. This portion of the study embraces chapters on the vulnerabilities with which local, rural organizations must contend; the sources of improved organizational performance; the strategies that have produced the greatest results; and those external contributions that have had the greatest impact in helping to improve the performance of community-based organizations.

In the process of moving from general development theory to measurement of those variables most conducive to explaining developmental results to concrete questions of alternative strategies, the reader is exposed to the complexities of the development process at the local level with a concreteness that is generally missing in the whole of the comparative politics literature on developing countries. At all levels of their analysis, Esman and Uphoff provide excellent insight into the intricacies of the development process through the eyes of local organizations and from the vantage point of the rural poor. In so doing, they present a convincing argument for using grass-roots, participatory approaches to promote social change. *Local Organizations: Intermediaries in Rural Development* is, in short, a superb study in design, in comprehensiveness, in relevance to core developmental issues, and in linking sophisticated analysis of a complex set of variables to concrete discussion of alternative strategies designed to produce results at the grass-roots level.

LAWRENCE S. GRAHAM

University of Texas at Austin

Bureaucracy and Democracy: A Political Dilemma. By Eva Etzioni-Halevy. (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983. Pp. xi + 266. $29.95.)

The uneasy relationship between bureaucracy and democracy has long been a central theme of Western administrative theory. A large, expansive literature on administrative responsibility and accountability has its roots in this most basic of governmental concerns. Thus, one approaches a new book on this subject with great anticipation, hoping for an injection of clarity into a continuing and frustrating debate over the proper role of administration in modern democracies. This anticipation is well, but partially, met by Etzioni-Halevy. That this subject is both complex and paradoxical, and therefore makes the author's job well-nigh impossible, is clear. Many have been, and will be, daunted by a task that resembles an academic Gordian knot.

This interesting volume attempts to defend a common thesis: "bureaucracy is necessary for democracy, yet is also a constant source of tension, friction and conflict in it" (p. 2). This is indeed the bureaucracy-democracy paradox known to most who teach or research in this area. However, the book's utility derives from the detailed analysis that it gives to a problem that is normally subjected to article or chapter-length treatment. Rather than treating the topic as merely the context for the discussion of a wider range of administrative theory concerns, Etzioni-Halevy has elevated the study of the bureaucracy-democracy paradox to a more central and vital place in the literature.

The first half of the book provides a review of a number of theoretical perspectives, such as those held by Weber, Marx, Mosca, and the pluralists. The most interesting and least conventional of these reviews are those dealing with the technocratic and corporatist views of bureaucracy in the democratic state. The drawing out of this view from a body of corporatist literature, which tends to neglect the special role of the bureaucracy, is particularly useful. Part 1 terminates with a chapter titled "Bureaucratic Power—Democratic Dilemma," which provides both a fitting conclusion to the arguments of the first six chapters and the theses to be examined in the second half of the book: that bureaucracy generates a dilemma for democracy, that democracy generates a dilemma for bureaucracy, and that these dilemmas create strains and power struggles on the political scene (p. 87).

Part 2, "Empirical Perspectives," uses essentially a qualitative analysis to substantiate the basic theses. This effort, even when combined with modest quantitative analysis, is only a mixed success. Although Etzioni-Halevy capably elaborates such familiar themes as the proliferation and growth of bureaucracy and the countervailing influence of the New Right, the net effect of chapters 8 and 9 is ambiguous. For example, the notion that the New Right's campaign against bureaucratic growth has been ineffective (p. 143) is not clearly substantiated by the author's data. This is largely because the effect of the New Right can only be seen clearly in data from 1980 onward. Where such contemporary data are shown by the author (e.g., pp. 137 and 139), they seem to support the argument that bureaucracy is contracting, if only slightly. In other words, Etzioni-Halevy's conclusion on this point may be simply and—for those who support government's social-service role—unfortunately premature. Current developments in the United States, Britain, and British Columbia seem to contradict her position.

Similarly, Etzioni-Halevy's criticism of Marxist theory as ignoring the rift between the bureaucracy and elected politicians (e.g., both share the same values as part of the ruling bourgeoisie) is correct but somewhat overdrawn. The effectiveness of her argument is blunted by her failure to challenge the standard Marxist assertion that disagreements, like those illustrated in chapter 13, are minor spats among "family."

Finally, the conclusion is unnecessarily limp. This is partly due to Etzioni-Halevy's unwillingness to specify possible actions or solutions. Surely there are, for example, institutional arrangements that might assist in keeping the bureaucracy-democracy conflict within reasonable limits. Or failing that, there may be other helpful methods such as the embodiment of a

British-style neutrality among civil servants. Without such suggestions, readers—especially advanced students—are left in the air. Nevertheless, the book is a solid theoretical contribution, even if it borders on the ethereal. One can only hope that the author's considerable talent will move in a slightly more pragmatic direction in the future.

KENNETH M. GIBBONS

University of Winnipeg

Soviet Jewry in the Decisive Decade, 1971-1980. Edited by Robert O. Freedman. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1984. Pp. xvi + 167. $34.75.)

One of the most significant occurrences in Soviet politics and foreign policy since World War II was the exodus of a quarter-million Jews from the USSR from 1971 to 1980. The emigration of Jews became a point of contention between the United States and the Soviet governments. It also represented a serious brain drain for the Soviet economy. The departure of one-tenth of the Jewish population of the Soviet Union during the decade was also unprecedented in Soviet nationality policy, raising concerns among other nationalities about their right to emigrate and prompting a backlash against Jews remaining in the USSR. Finally, the exodus also provided Western observers with the opportunity to scrutinize various facets of Soviet life through the accounts of these former Soviet citizens.

Yet, despite its significance, the emigration of Jews from the USSR has not been adequately examined by Western scholars. This study, the result of a conference held in 1981 at Baltimore Hebrew College, provides the most detailed analysis to date of the phenomenon of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union and the process of resettlement in Israel and the United States.

In the past there has been a tendency to view the emigration of Soviet Jews as a relatively uniform phenomenon that only varied over the decade in terms of the numbers allowed to emigrate. However, in Jerome Gilison's excellent overview, we see at least two distinct waves of emigration, one from 1971 through 1973, and the other from 1974 to 1980. The first group of emigrees tended to come from Central Asia and the Caucasus, were motivated by Zionist sentiments and chose to resettle in Israel. In contrast, emigrees leaving the Soviet Union after 1973 tended to come from the Ukraine, the Baltic republics, and urban centers of central Russia, were motivated by the deteriorating quality of life in the USSR compounded by a mounting anti-Semitic campaign and chose to settle in the United States. The latter group appears to have a higher level of education, but may not necessarily have an easier process of acculturation to Western society.

Jerry Goodman explores trends in the treatment of *refuseniks*—those Jews who are denied exit visas by Soviet authorities. Here too we see dramatic differences among republics and even among different cities in the same republic. Goodman attributes these disparities to the varying dispositions of local authorities, who appear to enjoy some degree of discretion in awarding exit visas.

According to William Korey, one of the chief causes of Jewish emigration from the USSR during the last half of the 1970s was a rising tide of anti-Semitism. He notes that oral entrance examinations to the major universities appeared to exclude Jews. Officially sanctioned publications, which depicted Zionists as traitors and repeated racial stereotypes, flourished. The increased anti-Semitism among average Russians may have derived in part from resentment that the Jews were being allowed to emigrate while other nationalities did not enjoy that option.

Robert Freedman provides a comprehensive analysis of the place of the Jewish issue in Soviet-American relations. He demonstrates that since the Stalin era, Soviet leaders have been sensitive to Western pressure for easing Jewish emigration. Freedman's conclusions are reinforced by Gilison's finding of a positive 0.62 correlation coefficient between the volume of U.S.-Soviet trade and the annual number of Jewish emigrants during the period from 1969 to 1980.

The second half of the volume concerns the problems of absorption of Jews. Theodore Freidgut's chapter on acculturation to Israeli society shows marked contrasts to those offered by Zvi Gitelman and Ilkya Levkov in their studies of acculturation of Soviet Jews in the United States.

This is an important and balanced study of a complex social and political phenomenon.

GORDON B. SMITH

University of South Carolina

Political Repression in Nineteenth Century Europe. By Robert J. Goldstein. (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes & Noble Books, 1983. Pp. xv + 400. $27.95.)

Echoing the general expectations of the age, the early nineteenth-century Greek liberal Adamantios Korais described his time as "the century of the liberation of nations." Goldstein's book comes to alert us to the fact that the nineteenth century was as much a period of repression as it was an age of expanding freedom and civil liberties. The author's main thesis is that political repression, especially in the form of severe suffrage discrimination, was one of the major forces shaping the political development of nineteenth-century Europe. Through a wide-ranging survey of historical trends and modes of political behavior, the narrative attempts to show the extent to which political repression determined the character of political and social change as well as the policy orientations of European governments.

The first part of the book discusses a variety of techniques of repression. Besides suffrage discrimination for lower and upper legislative chambers and local elections, they include more direct measures such as oppression of the press, restrictions on freedom of assembly and association, academic freedom, and labor unionism. As Goldstein reminds us, European governments did not hesitate to resort to more drastic means as well like the use of violence against dissidents and the employment of "dirty tricks" by secret police and *agents provocateurs*.

The second part of the book presents a political history of repression in nineteenth-century Europe. Goldstein organizes his narrative around a convincing periodization in three phases (1815 to 1850, 1850 to 1870, and 1870 to 1914) according to the character of policies followed by European governments in facing the pressures of political change.

One of the most attractive aspects of the book is the extension of its purview beyond the four or five major European countries to consider developments in the historical evolution of smaller nations. This enriches significantly the empirical basis of the argument and allows Goldstein to trace overall trends and commonalities without losing sight of fundamental regional specificities and differences. Exclusive reliance on secondary sources in English, however, leads to a certain degree of schematization. Furthermore, the analytical weakness of the book leaves the reader with an inescapable sense of being bombarded by "news from everywhere." This weakness is characterized by the bibliography's absence of theoretical sources and analytical studies of political change. Thus, some important insights, such as the suggestion that twentieth-century authoritarianism and totalitarianism can be connected with nineteenth-century repressive antecedents in certain regions of Europe, are not exploited as they might have been. Instead of pursuing these theoretical possibilities, the book remains within the confines of an anecdotal approach to political life and historical change. Where this can lead is illustrated by the surprisingly rosy description of the prison experience of some famous dissidents, which is obviously incompatible with the thrust of the general argument. Thus, the convincingness of perhaps the most intriguing, and potentially one of the most important, chapters of the book is considerably diminished: Instead of offering a sense of repression as social and human experience, it simply recounts some picturesque anecdotes. A parallel observation can be made about the neglect of ideological and cultural reactions to political repression, which formed such an important part of European civilization in the nineteenth century. Consequently, the promise of a historically based political science, which is hinted at by the subject matter and structure of the book, remains unfulfilled in this particular contribution.

PASCHALIS M. KITROMILIDES

University of Athens

Groups and Politics in the People's Republic of China. Edited by David S.G. Goodman. (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharp, 1984. Pp. vi + 217. $25.00.)

This is an effort to apply the interest group model to the study of Chinese politics. The volume is divided into chapters that employ social and occupational groupings as the units of analysis. There are seven chapters on various groups—economists (Barbara Krug), provincial first secretaries (David S.G. Goodman), the military (Gerald Segal), teachers (Gordon White), peasants (John P. Burns), workers (Tony Saich), and intellectuals (James Cotton). Goodman, Peter Ferdinand, and Michael Waller discuss the group perspective and define interest groups in the Chinese context. Jurgen Domes attempts to improve the understanding of factions by providing an elaborate typology of "intra-elite conflict."

The "group" chapters provide few new insights or fresh empirical material, but on the whole they are solid and useful descriptions of these segments of Chinese society. The book as a whole is not consistently analytical, nor does it offer much that is new theoretically. The clearest point to emerge from the book is the insistence that notions of pluralism and lobbying be divorced from the idea of group politics when speaking of a communist setting. The authors try to address two major problems of group theory as applied to communist systems: how to define a group, and whether the presumably shared group interests are really pursued through collective group action. To get around the problem of defining groups that genuinely share interests, the authors make finer gradations in the defined group. They simply use smaller segments as their unit of analysis: schools of thought among economists, branches of the military, peasants who live in different communes and production teams or who are members of different lineages, and teachers at different levels of the educational system. These smaller groups may be more uniform in their presumed interests, but we still do not know if people within these groups act collectively to pursue a common interest. These authors do what Griffiths cautioned against long ago: They reify the group.

Interestingly, with the exception of Domes who examines elite factions, none of the authors seems confident that their group(s) (broadly defined) act politically as groups. What the authors describe is what Franklyn Griffiths called "tendencies of articulation"—not group politics, but "countless parallel individual articulations." Segal is the one author to address the analytical question directly, and he concludes that "the group politics approach confuses more than it clarifies" (p. 98). Yet almost all the authors portray their groups as articulating interests insofar as they have support from some leadership faction. That factional politics at the top allows groups the opportunity to pursue their interests is the main theme that emerges from the volume and is at the center of its perspective on group politics. This is not the conceptual advance that a number of the authors claim, but a reiteration of the dominant group model employed in the China field since the beginning of the Cultural Revolution.

What is most unsatisfying about the book is its limited conception of politics. It focuses almost exclusively on articulation and influence on policy-*making*. Most of the essays simply describe the ways in which the various "groups" are *allowed* to articulate their interests through approved channels, along with some speculation about the success that groups have in the pursuit of their interests, which in some instances are only imputed. It is unfortunate, especially in light of the authors' own sensitivities to the limits of interest articulation, that most of the essays end rather than begin with the finding that interest articulation is limited by elite-level factional support. The chapters could have benefitted from the large comparative literature on the importance of participation at the stage of policy implementation in countries with poorly developed pluralist institutions. That interests may be pursued through individual strategies, personal ties, and corruption receives little consideration, except in Burns's essay. Perhaps this is an instance in which the group model restricts our vision of politics.

In the final analysis, this book does not grapple with the difficult criticisms that have been raised about the group model, beginning with *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics* (Princeton University Press, 1971) by H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths. The book thus lags a decade behind the comparative politics literature. But more surprisingly, the volume has benefitted surprisingly little from the mainstream of China research on the topic. Goodman claims that the collection fills a large gap and thus will advance China studies. This statement fails to acknowledge the past efforts of China scholars who have used the group perspective in studies of participation and interest articulation, including the past work of Burns and White. Although it is true there has been no volume on China comparable to Skilling and Griffiths', it is far from the case that "most approaches to the study of politics in the PRC . . . rest on the vestigial totalitarian vision which has changed little since before the Cultural Revolution" (p. 5).

JEAN C. OI

Lehigh University

Unions and Economic Crisis: Britain, West Germany and Sweden. By Peter Gourevitch et al. (Winchester, Mass.: George Allen & Unwin, 1984. Pp. viii + 394. $30.00.)

Unions and Economic Crisis is the second of two volumes sponsored by the Harvard Center for European Studies on the response of European trade unions to the economic crisis of the 1970s. The first volume, which was published in 1982, examined how trade unions in France and Italy interpreted the economic crisis and what programs and strategies they adopted in response to it. The present volume asks the same questions as the first, only for trade unions from the northern, social democratic tier of Western Europe. Stephen Bornstein and Peter Gourevitch analyze the response of British trade unions to economic decline, Andrei S. Markovitz and Christopher S. Allen review the German case, and Andrew Martin examines the reactions of Swedish trade unions. A concluding chapter by George Ross and Gourevitch summarizes these case studies and probes the future of European trade unions in a period of challenge and uncertainty.

The case studies provide a detailed description of trade union activity over the entire postwar period, and not simply for the 1970s when economic growth ended. They trace the rise and decline of the postwar settlement between unions and social democratic parties in which the unions offered parties political support in exchange for "aggressive demand management on behalf of full employment, social welfare programs, and union voice in party and governmental decision making" (p. 366).

In their chapter on Britain, Bornstein and

Gourevitch claim that the behavior of the Trades Union Council (TUC) after the war was shaped by voluntarist traditions and Depression memories. They argue that the TUC wanted the Labour party to adopt Keynesianism, and thus create favorable conditions for the unions to exert their market power in collective bargaining. But the weak state of the British economy could not support both a Keynesian program of full employment and free collective bargaining. Based on their memories of the 1930s, the unions were caught between their fear of what the Conservatives might do if returned to office and a Labour party that demanded wage restraint. The unions responded to their predicament with strikes, a program of structural economic reform, and greater activism within the Labour party. But as the economic crisis deepened, the TUC was divided over which of these approaches, an industrial or political response, was more appropriate.

Markovitz and Allen argue that German trade unions were staunch Keynesians precisely because they experienced little Keynesianism under either CDU-CSU or SDP governments. Thus, German trade unions advocated Keynesian solutions to the crisis further into the 1970s than other union movements. It was not until 1977 the DGB recognized the roots of growing unemployment as structural and technological and not just cyclical. At this point, the unions adopted what the authors refer to as a Keynes-plus strategy. The SDP was to stimulate the economy, but this was to be supplemented by union efforts through collective bargaining to curb technological unemployment.

According to Martin, the Swedish labor movement has been able to devise solutions to economic problems that are consistent with its ideology and organizational needs. The Swedish labor movement was the first to adopt Keynesianism and the first to recognize its inflationary consequences. Their solution was a solidaristic wage policy. But this policy squeezed profits that could result in a lack of investment capital. This problem finally emerged in the 1970s, when "irreversible changes . . . in the international pattern of comparative advantage" (p. 303) made new investment in new sectors and products necessary. In response, the labor movement proposed "wage earner funds" as a progressive solution to the shortfall in equity capital. The problem in Sweden now is one of strategy: how the labor movement can sell its solution in the midst of a vigorous employer campaign against it.

The analysis in these case studies is subtle and detailed. Martin's essay, especially, goes beyond the existing literature in English to add considerably to our knowledge of Swedish trade unionism. But *Unions and Economic Crisis* is not without flaws. The approach of the authors to their material is overly institutional. The activity of peak labor organizations is divorced from larger social forces. As a result, the reasons why unions chose the programs and strategies they did is unclear. Second, these essays are historical and descriptive with little theoretical content. The conclusion, which was to compare the results of the two volumes, is especially disappointing in this regard. Still, as history and description, the accounts in this volume are not likely to be surpassed.

Alan Draper

St. Lawrence University

Totalitarismes. Edited by Guy Hermet, Pierre Hassner, and Jacques Rupnik. (Paris: Economica, 1984. Pp. 254. 125 FF, paper.)

We are witnessing the second coming of totalitarian theory. Whereas in its heyday the concept of totalitarianism was developed primarily in the United States, it is now alive and well in France. Ignored for 30 years (Hannah Arendt's classic has only lately been translated in its entirety; Raymond Aron's voice was a lonely one), totalitarianism is now the rage on the Left Bank.

This is the context in which a number of French academics, as well as two outsiders (Juan Linz and Richard Lowenthal), have assumed the responsibility of putting the French discussion concerning totalitarianism on a scholarly level. The year of 1984 seemed an appropriate moment to do so, and the volume under review with its paradoxically plural title is the result of a colloquium held early in the year. The 11 essays deal with images of totalitarianism among Western theorists (Pierre Hassner) as well as among Soviet and East European dissidents (Jacques Rupnik); historical, philosophical, and cultural explanations of totalitarianism (Blandine Barret-Kriegel, Pierre Manent, Bertrand Badie, Pierre Birnbaum); possible applications of totalitarian theory to the most diverse cases ranging from a comparative essay on the classic examples of Italy, Germany, and the Soviet Union (Guy Hermet), through separate examinations of the Soviet Union (Aleksander Smolar), China (Jean-Luc Domenach), Africa (Jean-Francois Bayart), and the Arab countries (Jean Leca). Linz and Lowenthal contribute epilogues.

Obviously, such a collection contains various points of view. Generally speaking, however, the contributors agree in their definitions: The essence of totalitarianism lies in the absorption of civil society; usually, society is absorbed by the state, although several contributors (e.g., Birnbaum and Hermet) remind us, citing the example of Nazism, that totalitarianism can be fundamentally anti-statist. The contributors also insist that other characteristics traditionally associated with totalitarianism—terror, a single party, charismatic leadership, an official ideology—are neither sufficient nor necessary concomitants of totalitarianism. Finally, the contributors agree in their overall attitude to totalitarian theory. They attribute a heuristic value to the concept at least comparable to that of other social science approaches. In short, they approach the concept of totalitarianism with openminded, although not uncritical, sympathy.

The definition of totalitarianism adopted here and the openminded attitude of the contributors lead to some unexpected and probably unintended conclusions. As Linz notes, many specialized studies seek to show that individual regimes are not "as totalitarian as we thought" (p. 243). In fact, this is what happens here. Domenach concludes his chapter with the carefully qualified hypothesis that China may be abandoning totalitarianism; he thus calls into question one of the accepted verities distinguishing totalitarian regimes from authoritarian ones (only the latter can evolve toward pluralism or democracy). After carefully sifting the evidence, both Bayart and Leca conclude separately that in spite of "bits and pieces" (*bribes*, Bayart p. 209) of totalitarianism, this term does not really apply to Africa or the Arab world. Hermet denies the designation of "totalitarian" for Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, preferring to call even the former "an almost complete modern absolutist regime" (p. 150). Smolar does staunchly insist that there is a totalitarian regime, and it is the Soviet Union. However, the evidence he marshalls could just as easily lead one to the opposite conclusions, and even Smolar dilutes his argument by distinguishing between an (extinct) totalitarian movement and a (surviving) totalitarian system.

All the essays offer sound scholarship and intellectual originality, but the most thought provoking are those by Hassner and Manent. Hassner measures the ebb and flow of totalitarian theory, reserving his strongest criticism for post-totalitarian sovietology. He suggests that "the error of the theory of totalitarianism would lie in the passage from Arendt to Friedrich and Brzezinski, in the translation into a series of empirical criteria of something which can only be grasped through a totalizing perspective inseparable from political philosophy" (p. 36), and he concludes that the concept of totalitarianism reveals the limits of political science. Manent pursues this theme further by focusing on the modern separation of society and state and on the relation between legislator and subject, seen here as the problem of representation, in modern political philosophy. He suggests that "the absorption of civil society by the state is but the appearance of a transformation which in its essence is the absorption of the state by civil society" (p. 99).

One wonders whether this rich and stimulating volume will have the impact it deserves in France. It is unlikely that the *nouveaux philosophes* showmen of totalitarian theory will be deflected from their course by it, although the book may provoke a debate with serious theoreticians of totalitarianism such as Claude Lefort. Whatever its impact on its home ground, the book is well worth reading on this side of the Atlantic as well.

ANDRÉ LIEBICH

Université du Québec à Montréal

Parliamentary Democracy and Socialist Politics. By Barry Hindess. (Boston: Routledge & Kegan, 1983. $9.95, paper.)

In *Parliamentary Democracy and Socialist Politics,* Barry Hindess states his deep concern over strategic thinking on the Left in Britain. He feels that if the Labour party continues with its "inadequate response to current political conditions" (p. 7), it will lose its chance to direct British politics in the near future.

Hindess identifies several basic problems in socialist thinking that have led to the declining strength of the Labour party in Britain. He traces some of these difficulties back to fundamental conceptual weaknesses in Marxism itself. Marxism's inability to conceptualize economic agents other than human, and its conception of society as a structured whole, limit its usefulness in an age of multinational corporations and competing interest groups. Much theoretical discussion is spent on Marxist debates concerning the class character of parliamentary democracy and the possibility of a democratic road to socialism. These debates are reinvestigated in order to show Marxism's inadequacy as a theory of politics. Hindess regrets that this inadequacy is adversely affecting Labour politics today. For example, the Labour party has not tried to build broader coalitions between competing groups on the Left because of the Marxist conception that the working class is a large part of the electorate and will automatically vote for a socialist party.

The next section of the book probes the democratic mechanisms through which socialism must work. Tony Benn and others on the Left in the Labour party have argued for some time that the role of Parliament needs to be strengthened in order to achieve a truer socialist state. Hindess shows why a more democratic parliament might actually hinder the effectiveness of a socialist state. He states, "there are inescapable limits to the control of state apparatuses through parliamentary mechanisms alone" (p. 81). Furthermore, one cannot avoid conflicts between the various organs under democratic control without reducing the level of democratic control. The whole question of democracy has confused Labour's strategies, and many socialists do not realize that the extension of democracy in Parliament might raise many more problems for socialism than it would solve. Other disputes about democracy in the Labour party have considered the relations between parliamentary democracy and party democracy. The remaining chapters consider the implications of these theories on current socialist politics in Britain.

Hindess presents his theses logically and carefully. Although the book tends to be a little too theoretical, many of his points are very convincing. Those who are concerned about the future of the Labour party will applaud his attempt to awaken socialists in Britain to some of the possible causes of Labour's declining power and to the need for restructuring their party with broader-based coalitions.

On the other hand, Hindess might have spent less time discussing his former book and more time on recent events and on developing his promise, "positive policy positions" (p. 154), in order to give more force to his arguments. One is left with a feeling that much more could have been said. Furthermore, Hindess's often long and cumbersome sentences require rereading and hinder the flow of his ideas. Old-line socialists, as he recognizes, will identify him as a traitor and revisionist for opting to gain votes at the expense of remaining true to the basic tenants of Marxism.

In the end, however, perhaps it is enough to carefully identify the fallacies in present socialist strategies. If others can recognize why Labour is losing votes, they will be in a much stronger position to reverse that trend. *Parliamentary Democracy and Socialist Politics* makes a contribution to the study of modern socialism in democratic settings and to the understanding of socialism's declining appeal in Britain today.

Eleanor E. Zeff

Iowa State University

The Harmonization of European Public Policy: Regional Responses to Transnational Challenges. Edited by Leon Hurwitz. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1983. Pp. xviii + 264. $37.50.)

Although Hurwitz assures the reader in the Preface that the original essays in this book "reflect a balance among theoretical overviews on the nature of the policy harmonization process, empirical data analyses, and descriptive-narrative case studies" (p. xi), the last category best describes the nature of the volume's 11 contributions. Indeed, the strength of this book is the information it contains about various efforts by Europeans and some non-European countries, for example, Canada, that have joined the Europeans to achieve a harmonization or coordination of public policy concerning a wide variety of issues. A number of scholars and practitioners have been brought together to describe or report on the successes and failures of harmonization efforts in foreign policy (Werner J. Feld), space research (Roy Gibson), terrorism (Rodger M. Govea), scientific research (John Goormaghtigh), and the regulation of multinational enterprises (Joseph Rallo). Other chapters describe the recruitment of higher civil servants into the European Community (David M. Wood), the European Monetary System (Harmen Lehment), the extent and nature of bloc voting in the European Parliament (Hurwitz), and the tentative development toward a European Bill of Rights (Jonathan M. Miller). Perhaps to demonstrate the completeness of the enterprise, there is even a final essay, "The Evolution of the European Pharmaceutical Profession" (J.-Albert Verreydt).

There can be no question about the qualifications of the authors, all of whom have written informative but at times rather technical and dry chapters. For serious students of intergovernmental organizations in general and of European organizations in particular, the book will be a welcome addition to personal or institutional library holdings. For both the specialist and nonspecialist, the book can serve also as a useful handbook for a review of the background and status as of the early 1980s of a number of well-known, and not so well-known, European efforts to achieve policy harmonization. The contributions that do not deal with policy harmonization but with the European Parliament or civil service recruitment in the European Community contain the best examples of the empirical data promised in the Preface. The chapter on the European Parliament and the evidence that shows that in general ideology is more important than national origin in voting on the relatively few controversial issues that come before the Parliament is perhaps of broader interest than most of the other selections in the book.

The book contains an index, a long and necessary list of abbreviations and acronyms, and a bibliographical essay. An unfortunate error exists in chapter 5, however, where several pages are out of order (the correct order is pages 108, 110, 109, and 111).

ARTHUR B. GUNLICKS

University of Richmond

Undermining Capitalism: State Ownership and the Dialectic of Control in the British Coal Industry. By Joel Krieger. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983. Pp. xii + 321. $27.50.)

Joel Krieger's study of the British coal industry is an important and significant contribution to understanding the realities of political power in industrialized societies. He begins with the argument of many Marxist and Weberian analysts that capitalism and bureaucracy resemble each other and will prevail over more traditional, parochial patterns (even if Marxists assume that further change will result in the overthrow of bureaucratic capitalism). In the United Kingdom, congruence between capitalism and bureaucracy resulted from the Labour party's nationalization efforts that followed the Fabian tradition and the London Transport model created by Herbert Morrison. Although social democrats argued that state ownership was a precondition of social and economic equality (p. 3), some contemporary Marxist analysts have begun to question the validity of this assumption and its implication that a state bureaucracy would differ from capitalism in serving working-class interests (pp. 26-36).

Krieger examines the degree to which workers' perception of their interests as shown in their normal work patterns differ from, and have the capacity to hinder, the efforts of central authorities to rationalize industrial relations. The National Coal Board's (NCB) effort to impose a uniform daywage system throughout the industry in the form of a National Power Loading Agreement (NPLA) in 1966 is the focus of Krieger's study. British mining, with its traditional pattern of residential isolation and particular work relationships in each mine (and shift) depending on the geological conditions at the coal face, is especially useful in demonstrating the limits of central authority.

Nationalization of the coal industry was a goal long sought by British miners and British socialists. Success in 1947 seemed to mark the start of a new era. But what Krieger describes as a perfect Weberian bureaucracy in the NCB (pp. 19-20, 29, 33, and 207) was soon confronted with the reality of uneven regional development that proved the wisdom of Robert Burns's sentiment that "The best laid schemes o'mice and men gang aft a-gley."

Following John U. Nef's *The Rise of the British Coal Industry* (Routledge, 1932), students of British mining have long been aware of the importance of regional diversity in industrial practices. Even the miners' union, the National Union of Mineworkers, and its predecessor, the Miners Federation of Great Britain, had recognized these differences. Although not citing Nef's work, Krieger examines variations in work patterns in Durham and in Nottinghamshire and their impact on the NPLA. The contrast between the team-oriented "cavilling/mara" system in Durham (pp. 80-90) and the "butty system" of subcontracting in Nottingham (pp. 90-94) illustrate the impact of local variations on the centralized bureaucracy of the NCB.

The heart of Krieger's analysis is found in detailed anthropological studies of five Durham collieries (chap. 4) and five Nottingham collieries (chap. 5) including examination of actual work patterns before and after the imposition of the NPLA and its impact on productivity in each of the 10 mines. Krieger clearly demonstrates the limitations on the NCB to change work practices within the mines (Table 4.4, p. 171; Table 5.7, p. 257).

The implications of Krieger's analysis are clear. Rationalized central bureaucracies face significant limitations in an industry where traditional patterns of work are slow to change and the formal rules governing industrial relations may be quite different from the actual rules governing behavior at the coal face. And the NCB (or other central authority) will face serious resistance to its efforts to rationalize the industry, as seen in the coal strikes of 1972, 1974, and 1984.

There are two minor criticisms of the book. First, despite Krieger's conceptual framework, the title would have been more descriptive had it been "Undermining Bureaucracy," as he admits when discussing the ineffectiveness of the NPLA in a section titled "A Failed Weberian Bureaucracy" (pp. 18-20). And second, the degree to which we can generalize from Krieger's findings is limited by the special nature of coal mining and the problems of supervision of the coal face. But mechanization and power loading may end that limitation in the long run.

WILLIAM D. MULLER

State University of New York, Fredonia

The Critique of Ultra-Leftism in China. By William A. Joseph. (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1984. Pp. 312. $35.00.)

This book, a product of a doctoral thesis submitted to Stanford University, is perhaps too schooled and technical for a political science generalist. It focuses on a narrow subject—an analytical description of the Chinese ultra-Leftists from 1958 to 1981, a period commencing with the Great Leap Forward and ending with the trial of the Gang of Four. Simply put, the ultra-Leftists are the "impatient revolutionaries" (p. 10). Contrary to common conception, the author attributes the origin of ultra-Leftism partly to the petty-bourgeois ideology (p. 51). One wonders whether, in reality and in realpolitik, the ultra-Leftists simply exploited the political situation to gain and retain power without, as Joseph would like his readers to believe, invoking such exalted notions as dogmatism (pp. 33-39), subjectivism (pp. 39-47), and sectarianism (pp. 48-51). If parallels could be drawn with past dynastical political struggles in Chinese history preceding the existence of the doctrines of Marx, Engels, Lenin, et al., it may not be at all necessary to interpret political events from 1958 to 1981 on such an ultrasophisticated theoretical plane.

The most important contribution that Joseph makes to our understanding of the political history of the relevant period is his imaginative analysis of the ambivalent role played by Mao Zedong, whose thoughts constituted the cornerstone of the ultra-Left line, but who both actively encouraged and vehemently criticized the ultra-Leftist activities at different stages (pp. 223-228).

Two meaningful and prognostic messages emerge from the book. First, the ultra-Leftists failed because they "seriously misjudged the political methods and policy priorities appropriate to the task of building a socialist society" (p. 228). Second, the post-Mao Four Modernizations advocates' negative assessment of the past is insufficient to ensure enduring stability: "China's future will be determined by how successful its leaders are in promoting healthy change in both the political and the economic life of the nation" (p. 244).

Readers who are not familiar with events of intrigues, political personages, and power struggles in contemporary China would perhaps be puzzled by quaint terms and expressions scattered throughout the text, which demands intensive and careful reading and not casual perusal in order to decipher and appreciate Joseph's intricate analysis and complex methodology.

Indeed, I do not share many of Joseph's views. Their major departure is that the events that took place during the period of more than 20 years can be conveniently interpreted as much as a series of conflicts between politically ambitious factions and personalities as conflicts in their underlying ideologies. Perhaps an equally tenable hypothesis, devoid of any ideological connotations, can be advanced to explain such political struggles because similar ones also took place in other eras of Chinese political history. Nevertheless, my espousal of a more parsimonious and atheoretical view should not be taken as a deprecation of Joseph's intellectual efforts in analyzing political development using a totally different frame of reference.

To Joseph's credit, much reliance has been placed on diverse primary Chinese sources; both the notes and the bibliography of his book are thorough and exhaustive. To a political scientist interested in China, this book is a delight to read and keep.

FRANKIE FOOK-LUN LEUNG

Hong Kong

The Legislative Connection: The Politics of Representation in Kenya, Korea and Turkey. By Chong Lim Kim et al. (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1984. Pp. xvii + 237. $39.75.)

The Legislative Connection reports the results of the most ambitious research project undertaken in the area of comparative legislative studies since John Wahlke et al.'s *The Legislative System* (John Wiley & Sons, 1962). The authors, working with a host of collaborators, have collected parallel interview data from samples of legislators, their constituents, and local notables in Turkey, Kenya, and Korea. This huge data set is used to assess the nature of representation in these three nations, the role that their legislatures play in the policymaking process, and the determinants of public support for these legislatures.

Most previous studies of third-world legislatures have been characterized by their single-nation focus and by data bases that have been either journalistic and anecdotal or composed of "easy data" such as election returns, background characteristics of MPs, or constitutional provisions relevant to the legislature. By contrast, *The Legislative Connection* is comparative and reports rich new data on legislators' perceptions of their roles and constituent perceptions of the legislature and its members. The three countries analyzed, while selected primarily for the convenience of the researchers, nonetheless offer sufficient regional and political diversity to provide the grounds for tentative generalizations if not definitive findings. And, although the thrust of the work is clearly toward these comparative findings, the authors also carefully identify and consider relevant contextual variables in their explanations of national findings rather than extracting the legislature from its political setting as is so often done in legislative studies. Methodologically, the authors have in general made prudent and wise decisions as they have dealt with the enormous problems involved in implementing a cross-national research design in three third-world countries. Although some variables are operationalized in a rather slapdash manner the data are, for the most part, carefully presented and appropriately analyzed. On the theoretical front, the concept of a "legislative culture" is explicated and will prove helpful to legislative scholars, and the categorization of legislators into "internals" and "externals" is also quite useful. The brilliant causal analysis of legislative support in the last one-third of the book is also worthy of special note.

Many students of developing nations, however, will be disappointed by this study. Although the relevance of the legislature to creating links between the center and the periphery is explored, the book never really gets at the role of the legislature in dealing with problems of economic and social underdevelopment. This is in part attributable to the authors' specific adoption of the "mainstream" or SSRC approach to political development, as opposed to what they call the "neo-Marxist" or dependency model, a decision that guarantees that the questions of political economy so intrinsic to the politics of the Third World will be slighted.

The connection between this study and the literature on legislatures is also peculiar. The research design is clearly informed by the past work done in the field. However, in presenting their findings, the authors follow the pattern of selectively citing this literature in the beginning of each section, presenting their data, summarizing what they have found, but making no attempt at all to connect their findings with what we already know about legislatures.

The concluding chapter of the volume, instead of attempting such a synthesis, contents itself for the most part with a summary of what has been discovered about these three legislatures. At this point, we know more than we care to about Kenya, Turkey, and Korea and what we need to know is what these three legislatures have to tell us about legislatures in general and how these findings fit or don't fit with the work that has been done by other scholars at other research locales. Although some brief allusions are made to some of this work, the failure to consider this literature in any systematic way mars what is otherwise a major empirical contribution to the discipline.

MICHAEL L. MEZEY

DePaul University

Religion and Politics in the Modern World. Edited by Peter H. Merkl and Ninian Smart. (New York: New York University Press, 1983. Pp. xii + 276. $30.00.)

The upheaval in contemporary world politics evinces a renewed interest in religion; similarly, the current anarchy in religious thought and institutions often betrays a not-so-subtle interest in politics. Hence, for social scientists, among others, new studies of religion and politics are always welcome. Yet despite its title, this set of essays focuses primarily on nationalism and its religion-like manifestations.

Most of the essays were presented in 1979 at a symposium on "religion, myth, and politics" (p. xi); some have been updated through 1982. After a forward by Merkl and Smart and an introduction by Merkl, the collection's 13 essays are grouped into three parts followed by a conclusion from Smart.

Part 1 consists of three essays that attempt to set the groundwork for exploring the dynamics of nationalism and the inherent meaning and role of religion. In the first essay, Smart's especially insightful categories of the myth of nationalism and religion set a potentially fruitful analytical framework for further case study evaluation (Part 2). Unfortunately, however, his framework is infrequently applied. Jaroslav Krejci's discussion on the parallel dimensions of nation-state development and religion proves equally as promising and unfulfilled. Even more intriguing is Raimundo Panikkar's hope to shatter the dualism of religion and politics as well as the monism of religion/politics assumed in current research. He offers for consideration the promising prospects of political theology and its variants, such as liberation theology; as with the others, though, fulfillment of his hope is eluded.

Nevertheless, Part 2 provides seven excellent case studies of a particular combination of nationalism, politics, and religion in a designated country. Yet given the diversity of the authors' approaches, four subgroupings of essays suggest themselves. First, with regard to the phenomenologically religious aspects of nationalism, Merkl ably retells the conditions for and rise of Hitler's messianic drive to power. Second, focusing on the conscious incorporation of a religious component into nationalistic ideology, three authors provide illuminating examples: Gary Lease on the Christian element of National Socialism, Wilbur M. Fridell on state Shinto in Japan, and Barbara Metcalf on Islam and Pakistan.

Third, considering the involvement of religious institutions in politics, Michael J. Carey provides a fascinating account of the Catholic Church's role in Irish struggles. Michael D. Kennedy and Maurice D. Simon also depict well the involvement of the Catholic Church in Polish politics, especially with regard to Solidarity. And finally, focusing on the political theoretical dimension of religious thought, David J. Beale provides a detailed description of the messianism of one thread of Jewish thought. Still, notably lacking in this kind of collection are case studies dealing with Nicaragua and Iran.

Incongruous yet in many ways more interesting, Part 3 consists of three essays that return to the original theme of myths, religious and nationalistic, and that introduce the problem of alienation. Leonard Greenspoon provides a disturbing account of Jewish perceptions of God and war and the myth of their interrelatedness from ancient scripture. Continuing on the theme of myths of war and the warrior, Edward Tabor Linenthal documents the painful devolution of a myth: the role of the American soldier in national life, from patriotic hero of the Revolutionary War to mass murderer of Vietnam. Finally, Kees W. Bolle competently argues that any "novel" claim to a materialist theory as a "complete" solution to social conflict (his example is Marxism) is neither novel nor complete, the myths of materialism being timeless, pervasive, and shortsighted.

Despite the unevenness of the book's organization, this collection should appeal to a variety of readers. Merkl and Smart have assembled a set of essays that are extremely informative, well written, and intelligently argued.

JOHN R. POTTENGER

California State University-Long Beach

Leadership Selection and Patron-Client Relations in the USSR and Yugoslavia. Edited by T.H. Rigby and Bohdan Harasymiw. (Winchester, Mass.: George Allen & Unwin, 1983. Pp. ix + 246. $29.50.)

Leadership Selection and Patron-Client Relations in the USSR and Yugoslavia is a collection of six essays presented as papers in 1980 at the Second World Congress for Soviet and East European Studies. Despite the seemingly narrow focus of the topic, the anthology suffers from an unusual degree of diversity and disagreement within the work.

In the first essay, Joel C. Moses argues that although Soviet cadres have fairly consistent regional associations, they see themselves primarily as specialists, and as this self-perception grows, they will become more assertive, eventually causing friction within the policy apparatus. In the next chapter, John Miller flatly contradicts Moses's findings of regional association patterns. Lenard Cohen, in his discussion of elite recruitment patterns in Yugoslavia, then argues that differing skills and backgrounds may well be translated into future conflict. Gyula Jozsa calls the patron-client relationship between the USSR and Yugoslavia a political *Seilschaft* and a budding interest group in Soviet politics. Daniel T. Orlovsky discusses the historic pattern of clientilism in Russia which, he feels, is "a more prominent feature in Russian history and political culture than elsewhere," but he fails to discuss the relationship of that culture to current Soviet politics. Shugo Minagawa's comparison of Soviet and Japanese patron-client patterns then flatly contradicts Orlovsky; contrary to the other authors, Minagawa suggests that patronage, far from causing disruption, may well serve to oil the system. So many are the contradictory conclusions in this volume, and so little attempt is made by the authors to compare findings or to discuss their significance, that it is not surprising that Harasymiw does not try. In his conclusion, he acknowledges that the book's contributors "blaze no new trails, nor do they stray much from the recognized path" (p. 235) and that their theoretical work was "often fragmentary and implicit" (p. 241). He therefore offers his own model for future research in this area.

Yet this volume has a greater significance than, as Harasymiw notes, merely conveying the importance and complexity of the cadre selection process. It raises the issue of how much our knowledge of the Soviet regime can be advanced by focusing attention entirely on the minutiae of Soviet politics when detailed information in this area is both scarce and questionable. This volume also makes manifest the problem of defining a research project so narrowly that its results are virtually meaningless because the questions asked of it are too narrow, and because the issue has, for the sake of methodological purity, become divorced from nearly every important social, political, personal, or cultural consideration. It seems strange, for example, that in a compendium on such a central aspect of Soviet politics, the role of ideology is scarcely mentioned. When all the information is gathered, there remains the problem of its interpretation and integration into the broader field of Soviet studies.

This is not to say that the authors have not, for the most part, done an excellent job of documenting and presenting their findings. There is a great deal of useful information in this book that confirms prior suspicions about the rigidity and tensions within Soviet cadres policy. The study would have been even more useful, however, if it had also discussed the significance of these findings.

NICOLAI N. PETRO

University of Virginia

Europe's Industries: Public and Private Strategies for Change. Edited by Geoffrey Shepherd, Francois Duchene, and Christopher Saunders. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983. Pp. ix + 276. $34.95.)

Recent vicissitudes and long-term shifts in the industrial organization of the international economic system have underscored an old truth: Domestic economic prosperity and national political standing are intimately tied up with the capacity of industry and government to adjust. What is the nature of the international economic challenge facing particular industrial sectors? How do government adjustment strategies differ in method and effectiveness? How do sectoral characteristics of industry and national political setting influence the success or failure of private adaptive strategies? These questions guide the analysis in this edited volume, which focuses on recent European experience in industrial change.

The study is organized around the examination of particular industrial sectors such as textiles, autos, and machine tools. From there it moves to national patterns and characteristics of industrial change. The approach is decidedly inductive and microanalytic. Out of this exercise, patterns are found and lessons are drawn that are modest yet interesting. The authors argue that the most important generalizations are those between national institutional style rather than the sectoral characteristics of industries themselves: "it seems more feasible to find general strategic similarities across sectors within the same country than across countries within the same sector" (p. 15). At the national level the editors find a variety of "strategic" patterns in government and industry adjustment behavior. Although governments across Europe have increasingly resorted to selective intervention to manage industrial change, the scope left for autonomous corporate maneuvering and the play of competitive forces varies greatly. In searching for useful generalizations to characterize the sources of these differences, the authors talk rather vaguely in terms of divergent "government-industry-institutional" relationships. In accounting for successful or effective intervention and nonintervention, the analysis becomes even more contingent and hesitant. Nonetheless, the editors conclude that national economic goals are served most consistently where governments rely on the strategic use of "environmental" incentives (e.g., broad protection of industries or tax programs) rather than "structural" interventions that support specific firms or specific corporate strategies.

The book's virtues are found in its gathering and juxtaposition of empirical materials on European industrial change. In an area where many analysts are doing related but scattered research this is an important contribution indeed. For those searching for a powerful analytic apparatus or a fully elaborated theory of industrial change, this book will fall short.

The project serves a useful analytic bridge between the very specialized and narrow studies of single industries or nations on the one hand, and the broad macroscopic arguments of comparative political economists on the other. The editors promise a second volume, *Managing Industrial Change in Europe,* that will take up the international implications of particular national approaches to industrial change. As an important building block for that study and as an empirical casebook for other theoretical enterprises, this collaborative volume is quite valuable.

G. JOHN IKENBERRY

Princeton University

Policy Making in the German Democratic Republic. Edited by Klaus von Beyme and Hartmut Zimmerman. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. Pp. 220. $25.00.)

Recent developments in Central Europe have heightened interest in the politics of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), raising questions as to the state of our knowledge and the most promising strategies for further investigation of the subject.

A major center of research on the GDR has been West Germany. Researchers there have the motivation, a wealth of materials, and familiarity with the cultural and historical background. However, they have had to overcome political bias and polemics, an excessive focus on possible reunification, and neglect of a comparative framework.

Policy Making in the German Democratic Republic thus arrives at an appropriate juncture. It is designed to display to an English-reading audience a sample of West German scholarship on the GDR. All the authors are from the Federal Republic, all use such empirical data as are available, all are very familiar with the relevant literature, all are influenced by the "imminent" approach of the late Peter Ludz—they judge GDR policy against the GDR's history and ideological-political program.

This volume, furthermore, is intended to show how GDR and communist studies generally should be directed away from "inputism," that stress on elite decision making and techniques of social control said to be characteristic of both totalitarianism and interest group theories. Instead, research should focus on policy outputs, not least because that would facilitate more objective comparisons.

The book is framed by a useful bibliography of (mostly) German-language works of the 1970s and an introduction by von Beyme. Hartmut Zimmerman provides an encyclopedic analysis of party, state, and mass organization structures as these relate to individual participation in the political system; Zimmerman is insightful and stimulating in discussing GDR thinking on the future development of the political system. (The length of this chapter may account for the limited scope given some contributors.) Gero Neugebauer is excellent but cursory on the social role of the military establishment; Gert Joachim Glaessner's discussion of the relationship between education policy and broader social goals is elegant and thoughtful.

Helga Michalsky's chapter would benefit from an expanded discussion of social policy's ideological and economic setting. Irma Hanke points out the extent to which the GDR has preserved earlier bourgeois cultural values. Her account of policy changes is helpful, as is Juergen Strassburger's review of economic policy in the 1960s and 1970s. Gerhard Wettig displays his formidable knowledge of recent GDR-FRG relations; one would have wished more stress on the GDR perspective. Hanns-Dieter Jacobsen reviews the diplomatic and economic aspects of foreign trade. Klaus von Beyme considers the GDR in a comparative output perspective. His interesting chapter, in which one might have expected a summation, demonstrates the strengths and weaknesses of his approach. Von Beyme never makes quite clear what his 39 "indicators of system performance," some of which seem more reliable than others, are to tell us about GDR politics. Surprisingly, there is no discussion of youth or sports, and nothing on church policy.

Measured by its editors' intentions, and despite the impressive quality of many chapters, the work is somewhat disappointing. A focus on policy output, if it is to shed light on the nature of the regime, should make clear the larger significance of a given policy for the system. Moreover, "policymaking" as such, that is, how policies are made or implemented, is not discussed. Some chapters are unavoidably dated. Whether and when these essays were translated into English is not indicated.

Nevertheless, *Policy Making in the German Democratic Republic* is a valuable survey of the policy results of Honecker's first decade in power. It will fulfill one of the editors' goals by providing a valuable benchmark for comparisons with other industrial societies.

HENRY KRISCH

University of Connecticut

Nomenklatura: The Soviet Ruling Class, an Insider's Report. By Michael Voslensky. Translated by Eric Mosbacher. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1984. Pp. xvii + 455. $19.95.)

Students of the Soviet political system, from Merle Fainsod and Frederick C. Barghoorn to Milovan Djilas and Wolfgang Leonhard, have emphasized the importance of the *nomenklatura* in the highly centralized and extremely politicized system of elite recruitment in the USSR. Yet one looks virtually in vain for scholarly literature on this important facet of the Soviet political system—especially in English. As a matter of fact, Voslensky's work is the first book-length study of the subject in any language.

Defined in a recently published Soviet dictionary of foreign terms as "the circle of officials whose appointment or confirmation falls within the competence of some higher organ" (*Slovar' inostrannykh slov.* Moscow: "Russkii iazyk," 1984, 11th ed., p. 338), the *nomenklatura* has been variously described by Western writers as a new class, a political or central bureaucracy, a caste, a partocracy, and a new and invisible aristocracy. Voslensky analyzes the *nomenklatura* as a concealed, parasitic, and corrupt ruling class. To the political scientist, his study is of interest *inter alia* because it sheds light on the question of how an increasingly complex but essentially monocratic political system copes with the problem of elite selection.

Administered by Party and government officials at the various levels of the Soviet political system, the *nomenklatura* system is supposed to ensure high and uniform standards in the selection, placement, transfer, and promotion of key officials, both inside and outside the Party. At least in theory, the institution of the *nomenklatura* serves as an instrument for the operation of a merit system and the application of rational criteria in the evaluation of qualifications and performance. Voslensky seeks to demonstrate that the *nomenklatura* has in fact become a privileged class, a self-perpetuating elite that exploits the rest of the Soviet population for its own benefit. He brings to this task the experience and insights of a man who, although he did not hold a senior Party position, claims to have had close contacts with the Central Committee apparatus from 1950 to 1972.

Voslensky deals at some length with the history and development of the *nomenklatura* and undertakes fairly detailed calculations of its size, arriving at an overall figure of 750,000. Families included, he estimates the ruling class to encompass 3 million, that is, less than 1.5% of the total population (pp. 95-96). The author is at his best when detailing the special prerogatives of the *nomenklatura,* describing the life style of its members, and discussing the rules of the system which even the Politburo cannot ignore with impunity (p. 71).

Although Voslensky's study contains a good deal of information about the role of the Party apparatus, the functioning of the Politburo and the Central Committee Secretariat, as well as the decision-making process, only one of the nine chapters of his book deals with the operation of the *nomenklatura* system. On the subject of the different types of *nomenklatura*—basic *(osnovnaia),* registration and control *(uchetno-kontrol'naia),* and reserve *(rezerv na vydvizhenie) nomenklatura,* as well as on the scope of the system in Soviet society—his book is not particularly illuminating. As a result, the overlap in *nomenklatura* jurisdiction and the duplication in the exercise of *nomenklatura* powers—important weaknesses in the system—do not receive the attention they deserve. Close scrutiny of the Soviet press in recent years, especially the pages of *Partiinaia Zhizn',* would have been helpful in this regard. Likewise, the all-important question of what positions are included in the lower ranges of the system, that is, the question of just how far down the *nomenklatura* reaches, is left unanswered. All in all, one cannot help but be disappointed that Voslensky does not provide more details with respect to many important aspects of the *nomenklatura* system, especially since he claims to be so intimately acquainted with the subject. His perspective as an insider, moreover, could have been enhanced by the utilization of the findings of Bohdan Harasymiw on the organization, mechanisms, and social determinants of the *nomenklatura* (*Canadian Journal of Political Science,* December, 1969, *2*(4), 493-512; *Osteuropa,* July and August, 1977, *27*(7 & 8), 585-597, 665-681) and the work of Boris Lewytzkyj (*Osteuropa,* June, 1961, *11*(6), 408-412), whose position in regard to the importance of the *nomenklatura* the author, unfortunately, misrepresents by quoting out of context (p. 70).

Nevertheless, Voslensky's book is a most valuable contribution to our understanding of the Soviet political system because of his insight into the world of Soviet politics in general and the *nomenklatura* in particular. The reader should be warned that the English edition of Voslensky's book is not a complete or verbatim translation of the German version on which it is based (itself a translation from the Russian). The English translation does not include most of chapter 1 and all of chapter 2 of the German version. On the other hand, the English translation contains a new chapter (chapter 8, translated by Roger DeGaris), which discusses political developments since the death of Brezhnev, in particular the succession of Andropov. No explanation is offered as to why the English translation was not prepared from the original Russian.

ROLF H. W. THEEN

Purdue University

Crosses on the Ballot: Patterns of British Voter Alignment since 1885. By Kenneth D. Wald. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983. Pp. xvi + 263. $25.00.)

Early in the twentieth century, two major changes occurred in the British party system. First, the Liberal party ceased to be the major party of the Left and gave way to Labour, thereby producing the modern British party system. Second, the old Victorian alignment based on religion was replaced by a class alignment, with the major issues of political debate becoming the redistribution of wealth and economic inequality.

Two theories have been put forward to explain these changes. The older, traditionalist view asserts that the First World War was pivotal: Before 1914 the party alignment was religious, after 1918 it was class-based, and the displacement of the Liberals by Labour was an inevitable concomitant of this process. The newer, revisionist view argues that the transformation of the party alignment from religion to class took place before 1914, and rather than being inevitable, the collapse of the Liberals was a consequence of elite mismanagement: They, not Labour, could well have been the electoral champions of the working class.

By applying the techniques of modern social science to this historical debate, Kenneth Wald has, for the first time, produced comprehensive empirical evidence to test these two theories. By applying ecological analysis to British electoral and census data between 1885 and 1910 and from 1918 onwards, he comes to one unambiguous conclusion. The elections before the First World War were based on a religious, not a class, alignment, whereas in the general election of 1918 and thereafter, "class assumed primacy and religion joined region as a variable with intermittent electoral power" (p. 250). The rise of Labour, Wald argues, was essentially a consequence of this shift, and not the result of elite mismanagement on the part of the Liberals.

Wald further argues that the displacement of the Liberals by Labour was facilitated by political socialization. The shift from denominational schools towards nonsectarian, state-supported elementary schools served to undermine the Victorian religious alignment. Because most working-class men were disenfranchised at this time, school rather than home provided the central component of political socialization. Unfortunately, this hypothesis cannot be conclusively tested with the data at hand, although the evidence that is presented on its behalf suggests that it might, indeed, explain the rapid demise of the Liberals after the First World War.

Crosses on the Ballot, which as a dissertation won the Gabriel Almond Award and the Samuel Beer Prize, is cogently and elegantly argued, methodologically rigorous, and marshals the literature on the subject with authority. Its important findings shed light on a debate that has continued in British politics for several decades. It also provides significant methodological and conceptual advances for those wishing to apply modern quantitative analysis to other important historical questions.

IAN MCALLISTER

The Australian National University (Canberra)

Islam, Nationalism, and Radicalism in Egypt and the Sudan. Edited by G.R. Warburg and U.M. Kupferschmidt. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Pp. xi + 401. $39.95.)

Unless the reader is an area specialist familiar with both the Arabic language and the minutiae of Egyptian and Sudanese history, this valuable piece of scholarship, a collection of essays first presented in December, 1981 at the University of Haifa, is of marginal value.

The editors have allowed each contributor to transliterate Arabic terms without bothering to translate them. Even in the introductory essay Warburg uses several Arabic terms, such as *dar al-Islam, salafi, shubban al-muslimin, sufi,* and *shura,* each carefully transliterated but not translated. Such inattention to the linguistic limitations of most readers could have been easily avoided, if only to add a glossary of some 25-30 Arabic terms. Ironically, one of the first terms that is translated is *jihad,* translated by Warburg as "holy war" despite the fact that the contribution by Hannah R. Rahman goes to great lengths to demonstrate that the term *jihad* has been subject to a variety of meanings, depending upon the theological and political climate at the time of its use.

Many of the essays are essentially exegetical treatments of the works of some Egyptian or Sudanese authors with little sensitivity to modern methodological techniques. This is not to be construed as a criticism *per se,* but to stress that such approaches to themes such as nationalism, Islam, and radicalism are subjected to rather traditional methods of analysis. Even the concluding essay by Elie Kedourie takes note of the fact that the study of such terms as applied to either Egypt or Sudan can lead to a variety of interpretations. "Such are the pitfalls of intellectual history that try to deal with the relations between concepts like [sic] Islam and nationalism" (pp. 379-380), concludes Kedourie.

The editors could have aided the reader's travail here by deleting the word "radicalism" from the title, focusing their introductory essays on the terminological dilemma faced by the contributors, and alerting the reader to the range of understandings that terms such as *nationalism* and *Islam* have in the minds of either Egyptians or Sudanese at different times and with reference to different classes.

The editors have made the assumption that the reader is thoroughly familiar with modern Egyptian and Sudanese history. The Mahdist movement in the Sudan may be familiar to all, but the events at Dinshaway in 1906 in the lower Delta are not. Because knowledge of this event is critical to understanding Subhi Labib's essay on the Copts of Egypt, it would have helped if either Labib or the editors could have given a brief description of the Dinshaway event in a footnote. Similar comments could be made with reference to several other essays as well.

The book is most rewarding for the area specialist. It brings out the fact that during the past century political authorities have exploited Islam for their own ends in both Egypt and Sudan. The impact this has had on the Coptic and Jewish minorities of Egypt is the topic of insightful studies by Gudrun Kramer and Labib. And although most of the essays deal with Egypt, John Voll's essay on Islamic fundamentalism in Sudan constitutes a valuable counterpoinbt to those on Egypt.

William Brinner's essay is the most significant of the entire collection. His analysis of contemporary "anti-Orientalism" in Egypt as manifested in the works of ʻAisha ʻAbd al-Rahman is a chilling reminder to us all of the danger accompanying a merger of religious fervor with a violent hatred of a peoples (in this case the Jews). The subordination of religion to the political order is dangerous; the subordination of politics to religion is manifest evil.

RICHARD H. PFAFF

University of Colorado

International Relations

International Violence. Edited by Tunde Adeniran and Yonah Alexander. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Pp. xiii + 265. $24.95.)

This important volume explores some of the fundamental causes for international violence, offers an analysis of patterns of conflict in five regional settings, and presents a number of different perspectives on violence.

The four chapters on the sources of international violence (Part 1) are not of equal originality. The chapter by R. Olukayode Jegede on the psychological foundations of violence is merely a review of well-known theories of aggression, a review that does not even attempt to assess the new scholarship in the field. The chapter by David G. Hubbard on the psychodynamics of terrorism is somewhat more original: By calling attention to the neurochemical changes occurring in persons involved in a violent crisis, Hubbard points out the possibilities for new directions in the study of conflictual behavior.

The chapter by Malvern Lumsden on the sources of violence in the international system constitutes an attempt to offer a general, theoretical framework for analyzing the subject. Lumsden's approach is neo-Malthusian: He believes that the key factor determining international violence is the relationship between man and his environment. Although the chapter includes many interesting theoretical ideas, it fails to provide new insights regarding today's international system. Social inability to satisfy the biological and psychological needs of a growing population on a limited resource base is certainly an important factor in generating international violence, but it does not account for numerous aspects of international violence in today's international system. Wilton S. Dillon's contribution also offers some fascinating insights, especially from the field of anthropology, but the application of these insights to a better understanding of international affairs requires further analysis.

Among the essays on regional violence, Howard Stoffer's chapter on Central Europe deals extensively with potential nuclear violence, the only chapter to do so in the entire volume. Ernst Halperin offers an interesting analysis of violence in Latin America, focusing on Nicaragua. In his view, there are two kinds of international terrorists: those such as Bader-Meinhof, the Red Brigades and the S.L.A. who act pathologically, using politics as an excuse for acting out infantile rage, and those who act "methodically and rationally" as part of a political struggle. He sees the Sandanistas as the second kind of group. William H. Overholt's essay on international violence in Asia sees the USSR as the power most interested in upsetting the continental status quo. At the same time, he concludes that there is a dramatic decline in interstate violence in Asia because of the decline of nationalism and the adoption of an inward-looking attitude (focusing on economic development) in most Asian states. Like two other essays in the volume, Barry Rubin's chapter on the Middle East lacks supportive footnotes, so its claims are thus hard to substantiate. However Rubin is correct in noting that surrogate warfare and terrorism are central forms of violence in the region. Rubin believes that although these modes of violence are effective as harrassment and intimidation, they can hardly lead to the building of empires. T. A. Imobighe's essay on violence across African borders notes the limitations on the Organization of African Unity in trying to localize interstate conflicts, limitations that he sees as a function of Africa's dependence on external sources of military supply.

Parts 3 and 4 offer a variety of analytical perspectives. Robert A. Scalapino's chapter is the most general and all-encompassing. He notes the intimate relationships between national and international politics and sees them as the key for understanding violence in the modern world: The existence of "targets of opportunity" in domestically unstable states or regions is, to him, the greatest single cause for international violence today. Scalapino also offers a number of alternative scenarios for intervention in foreign countries. He notes that international terrorism, and even guerilla movements, are less effective than traditionally believed, and he offers some reasons for why this is so.

The book concludes with two essays dealing with economic perspectives on international violence and two on legal aspects of the phenomenon. These contributions demonstrate again the unusual breadth of the volume that will be useful for scholars, students, and the general public.

ILAN PELEG

Lafayette College

The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations on American Foreign Policy: The Ideology of Philanthropy. By Edward H. Berman. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983. Pp. viii + 227. $34.50, cloth; $10.95, paper.)

This book is an academically radical, historical-revisionist, conceptually Marxist appraisal of the funding of U.S. foreign policy analyses and related activities by the three major foundations named in its title. As such, not surprisingly, it finds their efforts to be an intentional and effective propagation of the gradualist-reformist, but unalterably capitalist, "liberal" middle-class values that these foundations are presumed to embody. The already converted will have no problems with this indictment; the unconverted will have at least three.

Edward Berman raises the first problem explicitly himself on page 2: Doesn't "everyone know" that American capitalist foundations want to propagate ideas that are essentially compatible with capitalist economic and American national interests? Yes, Berman does know that. What bothers him, however, is that this is not what these foundations *claim* that they do and that they are getting away with their claims, as it were. What they claim, in the particular context explored here, is that they encourage and support "independent" scholarship, especially in the United States, and then bring the benefits of appropriate parts of it to third-world countries, allegedly in the interests of those countries. But all American foreign aid, including foundation aid, is really designed to further the national interests of the United States, Berman insists. Among others, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles is quoted to this end (p. 46) as once making the unsurprising contention to a congressional committee that the purpose of foreign aid "is to look out for the interests of the United States."

A second problem is the "OK, but" problem. It arises over and over again. One example will have to suffice. In regard to what we may call the brainwashing allegedly endured by foundation fellowship winners from the Third World to study at "carefully selected, elite American universities," Berman admits (p. 96): "This is not to suggest that they [the fellows] are never exposed to intellectual perspectives considered as unorthodox; clearly they are. However, care is taken to assure that the few unorthodox approaches examined in, for example, their courses in Third-World development are more than counterbalanced by exposure to the voices and perspectives of developmental orthodoxy." In other words, the foundations really sometimes do right by their own proclaimed standards, and even by Berman's, but —there is always a "but" or a "however"—there are other aspects of the situation by which these achievements are inescapably overwhelmed. Such even-handedness, otherwise admirable, tends to weaken the very case Berman is making against these foundations and even suggests a possibility that what "everyone knows" about them may not in fact be true.

Finally and most seriously, there is the pervasive problem of empirical weakness of argument. Again one example will have to suffice. In respect once more to third-world fellows, now specifically African, enrolled at Columbia University Teachers College, Berman observes (p. 92) that "it seems likely that most, aware that persistent dissent from the intellectual orthodoxy as defined by Teachers College faculty would jeopardize their academic standing and subsequent careers, internalized many of the [capitalist] lessons taught during their graduate days." What is the evidence for such a statement? Only that the truth of it "can be seen," the following sentence contends, "if we accept the argument that schools process knowledge as well as people and that an institution like Teachers College had an interest in stressing only that knowledge consistent with its role as an integral institution in the dominant culture." For those of us who are not already convinced, such explanations will not be enough.

KEITH S. PETERSEN

Rhodes College

The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces. By Paul Bracken. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983. Pp. xii + 252. $19.95.)

In the strictest sense, Bracken's book is an excellent technical and political analysis of command, control, communication, and intelligence (*C³I*). In the broadest sense, it is an exploration of two fundamental questions: Who controls the most catastrophic means of war (ours and the Soviets') and what kind of control can be exercised, especially during a crisis or a nuclear exchange? The implications for national security doctrine, arms control, and foreign policy decision making in general are enormous and more than a little disturbing.

First, the questions.

By constitution general authority over military forces, and by law control over nuclear weapons, is held by political leadership, specifically the president. Bracken explains how and why a good deal of control has been devolved to the military over time, especially in wartime conditions when, for example, communications and intelligence may become significantly disrupted or the National Command Authority destroyed or otherwise rendered inoperable.

Nearly all doctrines governing the use of nuclear weapons, both strategic and theater forces, assume centralized control. Again, the probable facts of life rudely intrude, resulting in the greater likelihood of decentralized control. Part of the difficulty is technical. For example, if a major nuclear exchange were to take place, it would be extremely difficult to centrally assess damage and therefore difficult to know how to respond or what to anticipate. Part of the difficulty is conceptual, especially in the case of theater nuclear war in Europe. As Bracken notes, "A failure to define unambiguous centralized direction for a defense system means only that direction is supplied from decentralized, or bureaucratic, sources" (p. 135).

Now the implications.

First, important questions are raised about how well grand nuclear strategy can fit with our system of democratic constitutional government. More generally, there are disturbing questions raised about the role of political authority, democratic or nondemocratic, in situations of the most severe crisis. Military commanders can control weapons, but they do not ordinarily have authority or even the capability to determine the political conditions in order to terminate their use.

Second, Bracken's study does not provide much confidence in certain doctrines governing the use of nuclear weapons. For example, the doctrine of escalation dominance assumes that at some point in the escalation ladder, it should be possible (for rational political leaders) to terminate war. But if political leaders have already lost centralized control, it is difficult to even imagine how war could be terminated at an early moment.

Third, there are important implications for the role of arms control, particularly in the area of antisatellite weapons and confidence-building measures. Stability, especially crisis stability, is a function not only of the deployment of the right mix of certain kinds of offensive weapons but also of the maintenance of effective systems of intelligence and control. To anticipate an even more complicated situation, we must also consider the grave problems of C^3I in the context of horizontal nuclear proliferation. Because the fundamental purpose of arms control is achieving and reinforcing stability, Bracken's book is useful in identifying a number of issues that should be on the agenda of arms control (fortunately, some already are).

What makes Bracken's study useful and convincing is that detailed technical explanations are provided in historical context so that the reader can follow the development of policies. Clearly, political perspectives cannot be disassociated from technical considerations.

The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces should be required reading for analysts of nuclear doctrines, philosophers of arms control, and those concerned with the nature of foreign policy decision making, and, above all, policymakers.

BARCLAY WARD

The University of the South

Le Grand Frère: L'Union Soviétique et l'Europe Soviétisée. By Hélène Carrère d'Encausse. (Paris: Flammarion, 1983. Pp. 382. Price unavailable.)

Not since the publication of the most recent edition of Zbigniew Brzezinski's *The Soviet Bloc* in the late 1960s (Harvard University Press, 1967) has an attempt been made to provide a comprehensive scholarly assessment of the nature of the Soviet-East European relationship. Although numerous studies have appeared that focus on specific aspects of that relationship—e.g., military, economic, or political relations—none has provided a broad analytic overview. In *Le Grand Frère,* Hélène Carrère d'Encausse has synthesized a vast array of research in primary and secondary sources into an integrated analysis of the evolution of the relationships between the Soviet Union and its East European dependencies during the course of the past four decades.

Although the study presents a comprehensive overview of the history of that relationship, it is not primarily a historical study. Carrère d'Encausse, who in recent years has probably become the best known in the United States of French specialists on the Soviet Union, begins her analysis with a detailed discussion of the "Stalinization" of Eastern Europe. In her view, this process, although oriented toward guaranteeing Soviet security interests in the region, aimed at total social and political change. Mechanisms of control developed originally in the Soviet Union were transplanted to Eastern Europe over the course of the late 1940s and early 1950s.

In the remainder of the study Carrère d'Encausse examines the factors which have both challenged and supported the continuation of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe over the course of almost four decades since World War II. In the first category she gives special attention to the series of political shocks—from the Soviet-Yugoslav split of 1948 to the Solidarity movement in Poland in the early 1980s—that have demonstrated the continuing attraction of national traditions and the periodic open resistance to Soviet hegemony. Among the factors that have reinforced Soviet domination, Carrère d'Encausse discusses the numerous areas of political, economic, and military integration that contribute to the maintenance of the Soviet role in Eastern Europe. Despite the anachronism of imperial control at the end of the twentieth century and the ongoing resistance to Soviet domination evident throughout the region, the Soviets remain strongly committed to holding on to the one example of revolutionary "success."

Although *Le Grand Frère* is written primarily for a general audience, the specialist will benefit as well from the balanced and comprehensive treatment of Soviet-East European relations contained in the book. When it becomes available in English, this study will provide the type of text, long unavailable, essential for undergraduate courses—that is, an integrated and readable book that combines a balanced historical overview with trenchant analysis.

ROGER E. KANET

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

The Federal Republic of Germany and the United States: Changing Political, Social, and Economic Relations. Edited by James A. Cooney et al. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984. Pp. xii + 253. $22.00, paper.)

It seems altogether fitting that the Woodrow Wilson Center chose 1983, marking the 300th anniversary of the first German settlement in Pennsylvania, to call together some 40 social theorists and political practitioners from both sides of the Atlantic to reflect on past, present, and future FRG-U.S. relations. This collection of essays by 13 prominent participants offers a politically provocative overview of those deliberations. Their aims were fourfold: to assess the importance of national value structures underlying relations between the two states, to examine a growing divergence in their respective economic policies and security preferences as a function of value change, to suggest policy alternatives for sustaining and strengthening their special relationship, and to place FRG-U.S. ties and tensions in the larger context of European-American relations.

James Cooney's introductory observation that both countries are experiencing a loss of self-confidence and lack of self-identity in a rapidly changing socioeconomic environment finds substantiation throughout the work. Indeed, this vulnerability accounts for many of the strains besetting the Alliance. Gordon Craig traces the evolution of German and American post-Enlightenment values as they pertain to foreign policy approaches. American values historically evince a penchant for idealism, missionary zeal, and periodic withdrawal; German values have relied upon discipline, professionalism, and accommodation. Richard Loewenthal holds cultural and generational changes responsible for the FRG's permanent integration into the Western-democratic camp, his ambivalence toward the born-again peace movement notwithstanding. Hans Peter Schwarz addresses the FRG's commitment to democracy and the Western Alliance as reflected in public opinion data. Finding strong majority support for both, one is puzzled by his vitriolic assaults on the "so-called peace movement" (p. 90) and "lunatic fringe" neutralists (p. 78), whose significance he seeks to downplay. Juergen Moltmann notes a changing role for religion in politics stimulated by the debate over the morality of nuclear defense doctrines; he sees ecumenical solidarity providing a new basis for East-West *rapprochement.* Sidney Jones and Reimut Jochimsen attribute FRG-U.S. tensions to the global economic malaise for which protectionism offers no panacea. Both point to the "naive complacency" (p. 129) of the United States in pursuing one-sided monetarist policies that reverberate throughout the European export economies.

The discussion becomes more emotionally charged with Ernest May's reflections on the past, present, and future role of U.S. military forces in Germany. The options range from a deterrent alliance, to an armed alliance, to a symbolic alliance, to no alliance. May's disquietude over Reagan's "global unilateralism" and the inappropriateness of current NATO structures is shared by Josef Joffe in a review of West German security policies. Joffe paints the FRG as a "net importer of security" (p. 181) caught in a nuclear double bind that seeks maximum coupling with the United States and minimum provocation vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. For Kurt Biedenkopf, the future of FRG-U.S. relations will depend upon structural reforms based on the new premise that "Europe is capable of looking after itself" (p. 207). In searching for ways to sustain the Alliance in an era of strategic reassessment, James Schlesinger admits that there are universal doubts about American willingness to provide Europe with unqualified military support despite his claim that the United States has taken European security problems much more seriously than the Europeans themselves for the last 25 years.

Fritz Stern's closing essay highlights the extent to which the recent TNF deployments have given new life to the German Question "in all of its intractable complexity" (p. 324). Having "forgotten" the Federal Republic's *provisional* status ensconced in the Basic Law—for reasons of superpower expediency—the world conveniently managed to forget the national identity problem as well. After four decades of military complacency and exemplary economic performance, Germany remains a focus of *Angst* for friends and foes alike, while its own fears mount about the prospects of becoming *Deutschland unter alles.*

The real lesson of this book is not that Germany needs to accept its status as a "repressed nation" with open arms in order to allay old fears. Rather, the moral is that the United States itself must abandon the psychology of "paramountcy" and adopt a truly "flexible response" to the sea change in European security needs and economic interests. This is the first step to a very important dialogue.

JOYCE MARIE MUSHABEN

University of Missouri-St. Louis

The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs. By Robert Dallek. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1983. PP. xx + 313. $16.95.)

Robert Dallek, like many critics of American foreign policy, seeks to understand the consistent irrationality of American foreign policy so that potentially catastrophic shortcomings can be overcome. For Dallek, the key to America's failings in foreign policy is the "hidden side of American foreign policy. . . . those subjective influences that makers and backers of foreign policy barely glimpse themselves" (pp. xii-xiii). Specifically, he describes "foreign policy as a product of emotional displacement, of the impulse to make overseas affairs a vehicle for expressing unresolved inner tensions" (p. xiii). Thus, the "American style of foreign policy" is to seek in foreign policy a symbolic resolution of the conflict between the romantic urge to return to a nineteenth-century individualism and the drive toward organization and conformity of urban, industrial society, and of the problem of maintaining a stable democratic regime in the face of that conflict.

Dallek claims that from McKinley to Nixon and Kissinger the domestic climate consistently shaped foreign policy more strongly than objective, external conditions. The Spanish-American War was a quixotic flight from the oppressive lifestyle of emerging industrial society; Wilson's "missionary" diplomacy was part of a general progressive reformism; the universalistic policy of the 1940s, including the promotion of the United Nations, was an expression of American feelings of cohesiveness; and America's cold war policy was largely an effort to promote domestic conformity and unity and to resist older and (in twentieth-century America) dysfunctional forces of individualism. In each case, Dallek finds that "such displacement" was "an unconstructive way to deal with international relations" (p. 282).

His contribution is most welcome. Irrationality in foreign policy is a serious problem, and the essence of his argument is convincing. Clearly, the various levels of public attitudes and emotions condition foreign policy, and we should explore how these forces affect foreign-policy makers. Unfortunately, the scope of this work and the subjective nature of the forces dealt with here prevent a rigorous examination of the mechanism by which mass emotional forces influence policy. Dallek's account, therefore, sometimes borders on the mystical: leaders responding to forces of which they are only vaguely aware and which they do not understand.

Some of the conclusions ring true, but others seem strained. Wilson's diplomacy was certainly an extension of progressive domestic goals. That the Truman Doctrine was the president's assurance that he would not allow domestic strife to endanger freedom at home is somewhat less convincing. The notion that Johnson refused to withdraw from Vietnam because he feared "that a pullback from the Cold War might open the way to a destabilizing shift from large-scale organization and uniformity to romantic individualism or renewed inner direction" (p. 243) is less satisfying still. Because he must fit eight decades of American foreign policy into this scheme without a discussion of how hidden emotional forces contribute to policymaking, Dallek is left to rely on little but his assertions: Policy *X* was irrational, therefore it must have been a response to domestic concerns.

Also, it is not entirely clear what standard is used to judge the rationality of a given policy. Again, we are at the mercy of his assertions: American policy in 1948 was irrational because the Czech coup and the Berlin Blockade were defensive reactions to American challenges; Johnson was unreasonable to fear that American failure in Vietnam would embolden the Soviet Union. Perhaps, but one could reasonably take exception to these claims.

However, because Dallek intends this book to encourage discussion about the hidden side of foreign policy, these difficulties should be considered an opportunity to follow his lead in examining and describing the forces underpinning American foreign policy.

BRIAN E. KLUNK

Union College

Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy. By I. M. Destler, Leslie H. Gelb, and Anthony Lake. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984. Pp. 320. $17.95.)

The authors address an important topic that so far has not been high on the agenda of U.S. publications, although it has been very high on the lists of complaints of both foreign governments and students of American foreign policy: the inconsistency of American foreign policy since the sixties. The authors' political starting point is the hard to disprove view that an incoherent foreign policy approach harms U.S. interests and, therefore, should be seen as our "worst enemy." The authors' analytical starting point is the "systemic breakdown" (p. 30) of the consensus of U.S. foreign policy as the central legacy of the Vietnam War. Destler, Gelb, and Lake examine the emergence of dissent as the main driving force of the "wild swings" (p. 262) of U.S. foreign policy. They also analyze the factors that in their view have contributed to the polarization and ideologization of American foreign policy: presidential politics, changes in the foreign policy elites, the press and the more assertive Congress, increased bureaucratic fights between White House "courtiers" and various departments' (particularly State's) "barons," and a stronger involvement of presidents in the day-to-day politics of foreign policies.

The authors argue convincingly that U.S. presidents have contributed to the breakdown of consensus, centrism, and majorityship by raising expectations of U.S. and presidential omnipotence that are no longer compatible with international and domestic realities. But the importance of this factor (which seems to be overstated) is not made clear, nor is it clear how important the role is of the public with its contradictory demands, and to what extent it determines the political leeway of presidents. A systematic analysis of the relationship between the president and the public would have been very helpful in assessing presidential leeways more accurately and consistently, at least with respect to Jimmy Carter (see, for example, the contradictory remarks on pages 78, 86, and 120-121).

The study provides a good overview of the "new professionals" who have replaced the old "establishment"; an essential change in the political culture—the emergence of a number of elites as well as the more ideologized and partisan "new professionals"—is very well analyzed. It is surprising, however, that the broad fundamental changes in the domestic area such as establishment of interest groups and single-issue groups are hardly addressed (pp. 121-122). Although the authors make good points about the media, their remarks on the highly decentralized Congress are in part highly general and selective—as a whole, the legislative cannot be labeled as irresponsible, as congressional behavior in the arms control area shows. Without sufficiently analyzing the causes of "bureaucratic wars," the authors deal extensively with the increasing battles between "courtiers" and "barons" as well as among the various bureaucratic units since the Truman administration.

Their complex diagnosis determines their interesting therapy. It is not confined to relatively short-term bureaucratic and organizational fixes (e.g., centralization of Congress), but puts its main emphasis on a profound reexamination of U.S. "fundamental attitudes and ways of thinking about foreign-policy making" (p. 279). This means to find a "new political culture," a "new and very broad American center" (p. 286) that deals adequately with the main problem of U.S. foreign policy: the adjustment of a strong, but no longer dominant superpower to international realities. Regardless of whether one strives for a new consensus or a "centrist political force," a coherent U.S. foreign policy, as the authors have convincingly outlined, cannot be reached overnight and inexpensively. Despite its shortcomings, this book is an inspiring contribution to a topic that needs further systematic analysis.

BERND W. KUBBIG

Peace Research Institute
(Frankfurt, West Germany)

Forgotten Partnership: U.S.-Canada Relations Today. By Charles F. Doran. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984. Pp. viii + 273. $32.50.)

While most observers agree that maintenance of the relationship between Canada and the United

States is of utmost importance, few give it very much thought. A goal of *Forgotten Partnership* is to focus our attention on that relationship while highlighting a variety of peaks and valleys in it. Doran believes that there is a very real disparity of Canadian and American attention to their bilateral relationship. It is given more attention and analysis on the Canadian side of the border than it is on the United States side. *Forgotten Partnership* rectifies that disparity by a successful discussion of its sensitive and complex nature.

Doran is uncomfortable with the assumption that the Canada-United States relationship can be characterized as one of simple interdependence. Instead, he suggests that analysis of the relationship should be in terms of five of its characteristics: intervulnerability, asymmetry of power, offsetting bargaining strengths, ambiguity of foreign policy interests, and a propensity to conduct foreign policy with prudence. Further, analysis of Canadian-American relations must be based on recognition of the factors that shape and determine the issues. Doran calls these factors "dimensions of analysis" and identifies three: the political-strategic dimension, the trade-commercial dimension, and the psychological-cultural dimension.

On the political-strategic dimension, the United States has a global view of politics. It has worldwide responsibilities and interests, and its decision makers tend to see international issues as security ones. Canada is less interested or involved in global political or security matters. Its major foreign policy problems and opportunities are regional: They involve the United States. On the trade-commercial dimension, further differences emerge. This dimension has a greater role in the foreign policy of Canada than it does in the United States. This is at least partly due to the smaller size of the Canadian economy and the higher percentage of its GNP represented by foreign trade. Finally, Doran believes the psychological-cultural dimension to be the most important of the three in explaining both disputes and their outcomes between the two governments. At least partly this is because it is basic to any analysis of the issues, and because the psychological-cultural dimension underlies the political-strategic and trade-commercial dimensions.

Two chapters contain case studies. Doran illustrates characteristics of the relationship between the countries and the dimensions upon which it rests in discussions of the Law of the Sea, the environment, and fishery issues in chapter 6 and Canadian energy policy in chapter 7. These case studies are intended to highlight the nature of the relationship and the status of the Canadian-American partnership.

Doran concludes that the most important aspect of the relationship is the psychological dimension upon which it rests. Each country knows its own goals and interests and what it wants from the relationship. The conflicts that are generated result from the fact that these goals and interests do, indeed, conflict in many instances. A continuing and healthy partnership is one based upon a recognition of this basic fact of international political relationships coupled with an attempt to find common ground for resolving those conflicts.

Forgotten Partnership is an important and timely book. Doran does an excellent job detailing the present Canadian-American relationship and in suggesting its future. Although the very specificity of the subject matter and the price may make *Forgotten Partnership* inappropriate for most personal libraries, it deserves a place in every university library.

RICHARD HENRY FOSTER

Idaho State University

Arms Deal: The Selling of the F-16. By Ingemar Dörfer. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Pp. xvii + 287. $29.95.)

The F-16 is by now the most successful combat aircraft of its generation; more than 3,600 have been ordered for 12 air forces. It has won encomium from budgetary officials and pilots and has proven its worth in the skies of the Middle East. But as Ingemar Dörfer shows, left to its technical merits it might never have come into existence, and would almost certainly not have won "the deal of the century."

Dörfer's book is ostensibly about the 1975 deal in which General Dynamics sold the F-16 to Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway. On a broader scale, he sees the F-16 deal at the nexus of a web of domestic problems, diplomacy, military requirements, and industrial needs facing buyers and sellers alike. To explain how this situation was resolved, the book circles around the F-16 deal, telling and retelling the story from the perspective of each of the nations involved. The result is the clearest account in print of a major arms deal.

The first half of the book concentrates on the Pentagon's decision to buy the innovative airplane. The lightweight fighter was originally conceived by renegade Air Force officers and the Northrop Corporation as a small and cheap alternative to the costly machines the procurement bureaucracy prefers. Civilian defense officials supported it as a solution to their budgetary headaches. To improve the case for the lightweight fighter, these officials—aided by Henry Kissinger

—arranged a *quid pro quo* whereby the Air Force would buy it if the four European nations did likewise. With this arranged, all eyes turned on the competition between General Dynamics and Northrop. Although General Dynamics won, Dörfer shows how slight adjustments in the rules would have Northrop the winner.

The European side of the story revolves around the creation of the four-nation consortium to buy and coproduce a standardized fighter. All four were small NATO countries looking to modernize their aging arsenals. Aside from this, they had little in common. Norway leaned toward the United States, Belgium toward Paris, the Netherlands waivered, and Denmark was unsure it needed new fighters at all. Through Norway's leadership, the consortium was formed to assure the political and economic benefits that could only accrue through joint procurement. This led to another competition paralleling the one in the United States, pitting the two American corporations against Dassault of France and Sweden's Saab. The Americans had the inside track; their prototypes benefitted from newer technology and Washington's superior guarantees. The wonder of it all is not that a U.S. airplane won, but that the consortium held together. Dörfer argues that the reason lay in high politics. The outcome reaffirmed traditional patterns of influence in NATO; a French victory would have shaken the alliance to its core, a Swedish sale might have evoked outright hysteria.

Officials on both sides of the Atlantic used each other to achieve their own goals. American advocates overcame the Air Force's resistance to the diminutive fighter by dangling the carrot of European sales. European supporters needed the U.S. commitment to overcome their own domestic opponents. Direct intervention at the highest level was necessary every step of the way. The tale challenges prevailing notions that weapons procurement is determined by technological imperatives or the machinations of the military-industrial complex.

Dörfer makes good use of hundreds of interviews and reams of unpublished documents. He has the inside story on seven governments, four major corporations, and two U.S. armed services. He empathizes with the plight of all without becoming a spokesman for any one. Nevertheless, some actors have his admiration. There is Thomas Jones, the cosmopolitan chairman of Northrop who helped create the lightweight fighter concept and the European consortium but lost the deal. There is Norwegian Defense Minister Fostervoll who made the idea of the consortium into a reality. And Dörfer shows great respect for Belgium's then-Defense Minister Vanden Boeynants, who shrewdly fought against the American airplanes but still won much for his country. If there is a villain, it is the French officials whose ill-considered blundering cost them more than the deal.

Although the book's title associates it with arms transfers, it has more to say about U.S. military procurement and NATO diplomacy than about the global arms trade. The way NATO members do business with each other is unique. The technical merit of the aircraft under consideration was only one of several major factors in the deal. Prime ministers, cabinet officials, and corporate chairmen were the stars; arms sales bureaucrats were almost invisible. Bribery—as Dörfer repeatedly points out—was present but irrelevant if not counterproductive. The situation is, of course, much different in the Third World.

Aaron Karp

Columbia University

The OAU after Twenty Years. Edited by Yassin El-Ayouty and I. William Zartman. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984. Pp. 406. $29.95.)

The Organization of African Unity is celebrating its twentieth anniversary in the face of severe threats and challenges. Disagreements among member states over the status of the Western Sahara and over the civil war in Chad have forced the organization to the verge of collapse at the very time that its services are most sorely needed. The contributors to *The OAU after Twenty Years* —which follows El-Ayouty's 10-year anniversary collection—are acutely aware of these threats to the OAU, but at the same time are convinced that the organization has played an important role in African international relations in the past and potentially could do so in the future.

The OAU was designed with four purposes: the direction and encouragement of African unity, the direction and encouragement of continental development, the assistance of full decolonization and the end of minority rule in Africa, and peacekeeping. Each of these is covered in different forms in *The OAU after Twenty Years.*

The OAU was the offspring of decolonization in Africa, and as such was shaped by the conflict between the desire for continental unity—led by Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana—and the intense nationalism of the new states. Although it was originally envisaged as the instrument of Pan-African unity, the nationalism of member states eventually ended such hopes. This has meant, as Michael Wolfers notes in his essay on the institutional evolution of the OAU, that the organization has never actively encouraged continental unity, but rather has reinforced the sovereignty of member states. The best evidence of this is the fact that most of the concrete and effective actions of the organization have taken place through the annual summit of the heads of state of the member nations.

The OAU has been somewhat more successful in dealing with decolonization and minority rule. William J. Foltz and Jennifer Widner discuss this in the context of southern Africa and conclude that, although OAU aid was of some help to liberation groups such as Frelimo and ZAPU/ZANU, the ability of the organization to solve the last and largest problem—South Africa—is quite limited.

As John Ravenhill notes in his essay on the OAU's role in Africa economic cooperation, development issues have become more important in the organization's second decade. As is true on several issues, the inability to obtain formal commitments and to create permanent institutions to oversee development projects has limited the role that the OAU has played in African development, but Ravenhill remains at least moderately optimistic that these shortcomings can be transcended.

On the problem of peacekeeping among African states, Henry Wiseman notes that again the lack of formal administrative, organizational, logistical, and financial institutions for peacekeeping operations have greatly hampered the OAU. This has meant that in many cases the best that the organization could do was offer good offices to belligerents. Wiseman argues that international conflict is likely to be a part of the African political environment for some time, and thus if the OAU is to attain its stated goal of finding African solutions for African problems, it is essential that more formal structures for peacekeeping operations be developed.

Following sections on the institutional growth and operational trends of the OAU, the book closes with a series of case studies and with an essay by El-Ayouty on the future of the organization. In this piece the general consensus found among the various essays is repeated: The OAU is a potentially useful organization, but if it is to survive and prosper in what will likely be a traumatic decade for Africa, it must grow and develop.

Overall the book suffers from a lack of communication between contributors that results in a great deal of repetition among the various essays. But at the same time, the importance of the subject and the impressive expertise of the contributors means that *The OAU after Twenty Years* is likely to become the standard work on the Organization of African Unity during this very trying time in its history.

STEVEN METZ

Virginia Polytechnic Institute
and State University

Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention. Edited by Alexander L. George. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983. Pp. xii + 415. $30.00, cloth; $11.75, paper.)

Just as it is difficult to identify weapons the Soviets have successfully hidden, so also is it difficult to identify crises prevented. This latter problem is not necessarily large if one views crisis prevention regimes as obtainable and as a result of the rationalization of diplomatic practices. Alexander George has developed a solid reputation for his case studies of contemporary great power confrontation. His classifications of diplomatic activity and calculation are constructed after an attention to detail that exploits the public record of crises to the fullest. And the attractiveness of his approach for both diplomatic historians and foreign policy analysts guarantees a comfortable niche in the realist portion of the discipline of international relations.

George's latest work is a collection of 15 chapters by 10 authors around the theme that it is possible to draw lessons from superpower confrontations of the 1970s. Although George suggests that it is also possible to formulate theories from this approach, the contributions do not move far in this direction. Useful typologies, not elegant theories, are the primary product of this work. George writes six of the chapters in this volume, and the remaining chapters demonstrate continuity in both organization and style. George Breslauer has two very useful essays that complement George's chapters well by focusing on Soviet perspectives and goals. Breslauer characterizes Soviet behavior of the détente period as that of a "collaborative competitor." His argument is a crucial one because crisis prevention regimes as an objective of U.S. foreign policy could only emerge in a context that has many bilateral elements. As George points out in his conclusion, crisis prevention regimes can only occur if the rivalry of the United States and the USSR is "composed of a variety of competitive 'games' that have different structures and somewhat different logics" (p. 381). Exploring carefully the symmetries of these games establishes the driving factor in successful crisis prevention. And as I. William Zartman suggests in his chapter, parties in a conflict are often far better off with agreements than without them.

The contributions to this volume are primarily case studies of third world-U.S.-Soviet confrontations of the 1970s. An early chapter by Paul Lauren on crisis prevention in nineteenth-century diplomacy, although well done, does not fit with the pace and pattern of the remaining contributions. Most chapters examine, either alone or in combination, the cases of the Middle East, Angola, and Ethiopia. We are led through descriptions of crisis management that frequently do not flatter Henry Kissinger or President Carter. But the miscalculations of the Soviets are not ignored, either. The early Reagan administration is dealt with only briefly by George in his concluding chapter. Although he writes hopefully about the Reagan administration, the reader naturally tries to apply the lessons and suggestions of the volume to the Reagan record. The scope of this review does not permit that application, but the resources are present in *Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry* to evaluate critically the Lebanon and Nicaragua crises in particular.

Much of this volume proceeds from the notion of the importance of the Basic Principles Agreement of 1972. The difficulties of following through on the agreement provide a constant backdrop. Crisis prevention is, then, a creative diplomatic process that must contend with bureaucratic and domestic political factors on the one hand and your opponent's incoherence and misperceptions on the other. Decay of crisis prevention regimes may not be inevitable, however, and their persistence and reconstructions can be optimistic signs for the planet.

This book should be required reading in the National Security Council and in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. George's work never pretends to have solutions to the problems of managing the U.S.-Soviet rivalry, nor does he ever claim that a strategy can be constructed around crisis prevention. The modesty of purpose is both attractive and sensible. As long as the superpowers drift between the poles of unrestrained hostility and condominium, George's work will be useful.

PATRICK DRINAN

University of San Diego

Die Ära Nixon-Kissinger, 1969-1974: Konservative Reform der Weltpolitik. By Christian Hacke. (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1973. Pp. 319. DM 64,00.)

In 1969, the United States occupied the center of an emerging pentapolar world system driven by the interplay of competing national interests and regulated by the balance of power. The United States had experienced by this time a palpable decline in its military-strategic superiority and an erosion of its economic dominance. The overextension of American power initiated by the Kennedy administration was no longer sustainable, and Richard Nixon understood that isolationism was no longer a viable option for American foreign policy.

It is Christian Hacke's thesis that Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, in response to these circumstances, inaugurated a conservative reform of world politics with the "de-ideologizing of American foreign policy [and] a new emphasis on power and the national interest rather than on global communism" (p. 43). His analysis is organized around the Nixon administration's efforts to achieve balance among the great powers (China, the Soviet Union, and the United States) and to coordinate the foreign policies of the allies (Western Europe, Japan, and the United States). Nonetheless, the discussion inevitably returns to an analysis of the impact of the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy strategy on European-American relations.

Détente is treated as a three-cornered affair. The interests and objectives of the great powers are set out, compared, and skillfully combined to give a dynamic portrait of great power relations and the course of détente.

The Chinese sought to isolate the Soviet Union by allying themselves with the United States. The United States was driven by its desire to exploit the Sino-Soviet rift to American advantage and Henry Kissinger's conviction that until the People's Republic—viewed as a revolutionary state—became a status quo power, it would remain a source of instability in Asia. Chinese cooperation was also desired to help end the war in Vietnam, but the Soviet Union was believed to hold the key to "peace with honor."

American policy in Asia, however, was always conducted with one eye fixed on the Soviet Union, because normalization of relations with the Soviet Union was the centerpiece of American policy. Hacke believes that Soviet-American détente was built on the foreign policy weaknesses of both nations and a confluence of interests. The Soviets desired access to Western capital, technology, and markets; arms control to relieve bottlenecks in the economy; and a relaxation of tensions with the United States in order to frustrate Chinese efforts to isolate them. In addition to ending the war in Vietnam, the United States sought a general relaxation of tensions in Europe, a limitation of the arms race in response to domestic political pressures, and the reining of Soviet activity outside its acknowledged spheres of influence. Hacke weaves these weaknesses, interests, and objectives into a convincing tapestry of Soviet-American relations.

But Hacke inevitably speaks with a European voice: European discomfiture with the "new" Pacific orientation of American policy is evident, and European suspicions and fears of Soviet-American bilateralism are underlined. Yet the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy receives high marks because it served American interests, conformed to the dictates of the realpolitik, and established a framework for peace.

The Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy did not enjoy similar success in its efforts to cope with the tensions arising within the Atlantic Alliance. American security policy increasingly subordinated European interests to the demands of Soviet-American bilateralism, and American foreign economic policy assumed a more strident, less generous position on trade and monetary issues. The cumulative effect was a leadership crisis in the Atlantic Alliance. Hacke successfully integrates the interplay of economic and political forces shaping Alliance politics during the Nixon administration, beginning with the New Economic Policy in 1971 and concluding with the oil crisis in 1973 and 1974. His most provocative and original thesis is that the Federal Republic's *Ostpolitik* set the initial pace of East-West détente and that it "initiated the erosion of the American claim to leadership in the Atlantic Alliance."

His discussion of Alliance politics concludes with policy prescription rather than praise. Future conflicts, he believes, are to be avoided by developing policies in tandem so that "connected but different problems can be handled simultaneously, but separately" (p. 207). But Hacke does not question whether the Atlantic Alliance, in its present form, persists from mere force of habit or from a realistic assessment of either European or American interests. He approaches the precipice, but does not take the final step.

Die Ära Nixon-Kissinger is dedicated to Hans Morgenthau, to whom the author is indebted for his theoretical—and many of his substantive—insights. Hacke concludes his well-written and judicious interpretation of American foreign policy with a spirited defense of the "realist school" of international politics. He argues that the national interest, power, the balance of power, and diplomacy form the basis of a "timeless model." His defense will not convince any but the already committed, but his theoretical and methodological atavism is welcome relief from some of the more exotic, scientific treatments of the subject.

JAMES CLYDE SPERLING

University of California, Santa Barbara

A Palestinian State: The Implications for Israel. By Mark A. Heller. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983. Pp. x + 190. $16.00, cloth; $6.95, paper.)

Passionate hyperbole promoting one perspective or another on the Israel-Palestine conflict is not unusual, but such writing typically does little more than reinforce the myths of self-selected audiences. Put more kindly, much of the literature—whether popular or scholarly—has a predictable quality about it. Although there are predictable aspects to *A Palestinian State*, the book is distinguished by its ability to arrive at conclusions that confound our expectations. Heller, a senior research associate at Tel Aviv University's Center for Strategic Studies, has written a dispassionate, well-reasoned, and solidly researched policy analysis of Israeli options in meeting the claims of Palestinian nationalism in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Heller makes no claims of impartiality. He forthrightly notes his commitment to Israel's security and well-being (broadly defined to include social, political, and moral considerations), and his calculus is colored throughout by his sensitive evocation of Israel's apprehensions. Indeed, Heller's solid credentials as an Israeli scholar give *A Palestinian State* a special authenticity and persuasiveness and help to make the book a formidable contribution to the literature (not to mention the policy arena).

In addition to a Palestinian state under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Heller identifies five alternative outcomes (model-types) that Israel might pursue. These include nonsettlement, territorial compromise (usually identified as one of the variants of the Allon Plan that would leave certain militarily significant parts of the occupied territories under Israeli jurisdiction), nonterritorial settlement (such as the Begin Government's promotion of Palestinian autonomy short of sovereignty), a settlement bypassing the PLO (as represented by Israel's attempts to cultivate alternative leaders on the West Bank), and a settlement bypassing any Palestinian interlocutor (typified by the Labor party's penchant for striking a deal with Jordan's King Husain).

In Heller's view, none of the five alternatives share the qualities of feasibility and suitability. For example, nonsettlement promises persistently increasing national security costs while also threatening the durability of the peace treaty with Egypt. Territorial compromise, like solutions bypassing the PLO, brings with it the "extreme improbability" of finding any interlocutor with whom to conclude a settlement. Nonterritorial settlement would merely internalize Arab-Jewish conflict, perhaps spawning unattractive and reprehensible domestic policies. Thus, Heller comes to the relatively novel conclusion that the "least of all evils" is a settlement with the PLO leading to an independent Palestinian state.

Heller reaches the latter conclusion after considering the military, political, economic, and demographic characteristics of the prospective state. Although some of Heller's assumptions are questionable—for example, that only 750,000 Palestinians from the diaspora would elect to move to the nascent state—his presentation is, in the main, persuasive. The weakest segment of his analysis is his treatment of economic viability, but this is less a shortcoming than a symptom of Heller's concentration on first-order political and strategic considerations.

Although Palestine would be a sovereign state, its sovereignty would be truncated. The peace agreement that would bring Palestine to life would include provisions for binding neutrality, territorial adjustments in Israel's favor, restrictions on the exploitation of water resources, and severe limitations on standing military forces. Jerusalem, the proposed capital of the new state, would remain in Israeli hands, but under a sort of blurred sovereignty arrangement. Simply put, the municipality would be somewhat autonomous of the central government so as to allow a degree of communal independence. As Heller notes, the point is to obfuscate sovereignty "to the point where all parties can credibly claim that they have secured their essential objectives" (p. 120).

Obviously, the major problem is not to outline a settlement, but to achieve one, and Heller's unintended contribution may have been to emphasize how unlikely it is that a reasonable compromise can be attained between the adherents of Palestinian and Israeli nationalism. Neither side seems anywhere close to the solution presented in this book. Israel's governments persistently chase the specter of solutions bypassing the PLO, and the PLO is rife with internal conflict over the very issue of negotiation versus military struggle. The enlightened solution may well be close to Heller's prescription, but non-solution remains the likely prospect.

AUGUSTUS RICHARD NORTON

United States Military Academy

American Leadership in World Affairs: Vietnam and the Breakdown of Consensus. By Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau. (Winchester, Mass.: George Allen & Unwin, 1984. Pp. xvi + 301. $28.50, cloth; $9.95, paper.)

Considerable discussion about the impact of the Vietnam War on the evolution of American society has taken place in the study of American foreign policy. *American Leadership in World Affairs* by Ole Holsti and James Rosenau represents the first comprehensive, empirically based study of contemporary American foreign policy beliefs.

Holsti and Rosenau examine the evolution of foreign policy beliefs held by American leaders based on two nation-wide surveys conducted in 1976 and 1980. Three major research questions are addressed:

1. What has been the impact of the Vietnam War on America's leaders?
2. If the impact has been dissensus, what are the main lines of cleavage?
3. Have the post-Vietnam beliefs been maintained or have they undergone change over time?

Holsti and Rosenau find that the Vietnam War was a watershed event that shattered the post-World War II consensus in American foreign policy. The result of the war was diversity and disagreement concerning the causes, consequences, and lessons of Vietnam, as well as for issues unrelated to Vietnam.

Although diversity was the norm, Holsti and Rosenau find that three major cleavages or schools of thought developed in the foreign policy beliefs of America's leaders: cold war internationalism, post-cold war internationalism, and semi-isolationism. Cold war internationalism was the foundation of the post-World War II consensus, premised on expansionistic Soviet communism that America needed to contain, principally through the use of force. Post-cold war internationalists perceived a pluralistic international system and downplayed the role of force in its quest to promote a stable and just world order. Semi-isolationists emphasized the difficulty and danger of remaining internationally involved and the need to address key domestic problems. Holsti and Rosenau also find that "Vietnam policy position, ideology, and occupation are most strongly associated with the three foreign policy belief systems, whereas divisions corresponding to gender, generation, and military service are much weaker" (p. 173).

Holsti and Rosenau find that continuity in foreign policy beliefs persist when the 1976 and 1980 leadership surveys are compared, and they conclude that dissensus will continue into the future. As the authors suggest, "perhaps achievement of a consensus is at present beyond the reach of even the most skilled and inspired leadership for the cleavages are by no means limited to foreign policy issues" (p. 244).

As in any volume, there are a few things that could have been refined. There appear to be some ambiguities in the presentation of the findings. For example, the categories of "ambivalent supporters" and "ambivalent critics" are not differentiated clearly. The scales used in presenting the data are also confusing; no explanation is provided for the different types of scales utilized, and the discussion of how the responses were calculated for placement on the scale is insufficient.

A more important point to consider concerns the authors' conclusion that a cold war internationalist consensus existed before Vietnam and that three schools of thought have developed because of Vietnam. In fact, the authors suggest that there is an increasing division within the cold war internationalist group between multilateralists and unilateralists. I would suggest that this division, and therefore actually two competitive schools of thought, have always existed. The multilateralists became dominant following World War II, but have been consistently challenged by the unilateralists during McCarthyism in the fifties, the Goldwater candidacy in the sixties, and the rise of neoconservatism in the seventies and eighties.

In my opinion, a similar situation exists with the post-cold war internationalists. Placing Stanley Hoffmann and Seyom Brown in the same school of thought with Richard Falk and Walter LaFeber omits many important differences. Hoffmann and Brown are concerned with "reforming" U.S. foreign policy away from cold war policies in an effort to promote a stable and just world order. For Falk and LeFeber, reform is insufficient—a "transformation" is necessary in American foreign policy in order to create a truly peaceful and just world order. Unfortunately, Holsti and Rosenau's questionnaire does not allow analysis for these differences within cold war internationalism and post-cold war internationalism.

American Leadership in World Affairs is clearly a significant work and a valuable contribution to the study of American foreign policy. One of its additional benefits is that it brings together most of Holsti and Rosenau's work on this subject. Overall, in order to explain and predict the evolution of American foreign policy, one must understand the change and continuity that has developed in the foreign policy beliefs of American society.

JEREL A. ROSATI

University of South Carolina

Can Modern War Be Just? By James Turner Johnson. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984. Pp. xi + 215. $17.95.)

In several previous books Johnson—a Rutgers University professor with appointments in the departments of political science and religion—has written of the historical development of the just war tradition. After summarizing the elements of the tradition, this book explores its present applicability.

Begun by theologians such as Augustine and Aquinas, elaborated by jurists like Grotius and Vattel, incorporating the practical considerations of soldiers, and partially codified and universalized in twentieth-century international law, the just war tradition suggests some rules supposed to govern resort *to* war by political leaders (*ius ad bellum* principles) and the conduct *of* war by soldiers (*ius in bello* principles). The most honorable political leaders and soldiers have embraced these rules and have tried to comply with them.

Johnson asks whether they can continue to do so as we near the end of the twentieth century, the century of total wars, Dresden and Nagasaki, with numerous countries armed with nuclear and biological weaponry that make people an endangered species. "Yes," is his thoughtful reply—if our leaders and soldiers keep the principles in mind as they do their jobs, if the moral values of the tradition are allowed to help drive technological and targeting as well as political and tactical decisions.

Johnson examines five types of recent and possible wars. (1) War between the superpowers involving the use of strategic nuclear weapons aimed at cities would clearly violate the just war tradition; so the superpowers ought to adopt counterforce rather than countervalue targeting doctrines, they ought to press ahead with efforts to develop more accurate and thus discriminating strategic weapons (like cruise missiles), they ought to continue the quest for defenses against nuclear-tipped strategic missiles, and they ought to seek ways to move strategic warfare away from noncombatants (even into space). (2) Conflict in Europe involving the use of tactical nuclear weapons would be very difficult to reconcile with just war principles because of population densities and the dangers of escalation to the level of strategic exchanges; but if the Americans, Russians, and Europeans would replace current tactical nuclear weapons with neutron warheads ("definitely superior morally," p. 47) and increase their conventional warfare capabilities, then maybe this type of conflict could be fought within the rules. (3) Conventional warfare within the limitations can still occur, as the 1982 Falklands war illustrates. (4) Insurgency or revolutionary conflicts are almost inevitably "dirty" (p. 55) because the distinction between combatants and noncombatants is blurred, especially by the insurgents; only when the insurgents are able to fight conventionally can this sort of warfare be fought by both sides in compliance with *ius in bello* norms. (5) Terrorism as a form of political violence is irredeemably repugnant for Johnson because it so typically aims deliberately at injuring noncombatants in order to make its political points.

Johnson recognizes some of the problems with these conclusions and suggestions, and he tries to grapple with them, not always successfully. But in this book at least, he does not address some other problems with the just war tradition and its current applicability. Johnson's work does not help us much in deciding what to think when the principles of the just war tradition collide with impressive principles of other well-established traditions (revolutionary or pacifist or liberal or humanist or democratic or ecological).

Perhaps this is because Johnson is committed to the dubious proposition that the just war tradition is "the only way actually open for persons in our culture to think about morality and war" (p. 29). Many analysts disagree as they assert that the just war tradition is too permissive or statist, that it is unfair to make yesterday's immune civilian into today's fair game combatant merely by conscripting him, that even warfare conducted by the rules has always been a morally shabby enterprise (perhaps akin to slavery). These critics suggest, too, that today's technology and the operation of human nature and Murphy's Law make modern warfare essentially impossible to control morally, that rather than straining to find ways to clean up warfare so it can be continued as a final arbiter of dubious respectability Johnson and other supporters of the just war tradition might better spend their energies developing or supporting alternatives to obsolescent if not yet obsolete warfare (e.g., commercial inducements and deals, diplomacy, bribery, assassination, civilian resistance, and system transformation).

JAMES A. STEGENGA

Purdue University

Central America: Anatomy of Conflict. Edited by Robert S. Leiken. (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984. Pp. ix + 351. $19.95.)

This book is the result of meetings of former government officials, diplomats, scholars, and policy analysts assembled by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to contribute to the national debate on Central America. In the Preface, Leiken apologizes for the speed with which the essays were produced and for the fact that the whole reflects the "collective dismay" of Central American specialists and does not constitute a "collective work."

In fact, no apologies are necessary. There are indeed a great many questions to be considered, but the book's purpose is fully realized, and it is as useful a study of its subject as any that has appeared in print. The 15 essays represent a diversity of views and employ an eclectic array of sources including archives, personal interviews, and popular journals. Their quality is consistently high.

The book is organized into four parts. In the first, "Legacies and Contexts," Latin political culture, the history of U.S. intervention in Central America, and the role of the militaries in the region are reviewed. Most of the essential points are covered and occasionally, such as when Christopher Dickey is discussing the tradition of obedience without compliance, one wishes there were more. The second part of the book, "Socialism and Sovietism," does an admirable job of establishing the complex origins of Sandinista foreign policy and the crucial differences between the Sandinistas and the Salvadoran Left. One was stunted by the vacuousness of its political culture, the other was nurtured in a much richer medium resulting in differences in "political experience, ideological diversity, and attitudes towards the superpowers" (p. 114). Although some few reservations can be expressed (Do two selections want to rely on the same Sandinista defector for some important information, given the level of intrigue and fratricidal hatreds known to exist and which the essays themselves corroborate? Does the essay on the Soviets and Central America sometimes make too much of fairly innocuous public statements in Moscow?), these are minor distractions.

"Economic and Military Realities," the third section of the book, contains a particularly creative attempt by Theodore Moran to determine the "base-line cost estimates" of four alternative policy scenarios for the United States in El Salvador. With appreciation of the tenuousness of such an exercise and with deference to the many variables, Moran concludes that the cost of continuing current U.S. policies for the next five years would be the same as the cost of seeking a negotiated solution ($4 billion) and much less than the cost of attempting either a military solution without U.S. combat troops ($7 billion) or an invasion and occupation of Nicaragua ($16 billion). For all of the acknowledged difficulties of such an undertaking, this essay contains precisely the kinds of considerations that should figure prominently in the public debate. This section also offers a sober but optimistic assessment of the potential of an economic program for postwar Central America costing far less (as percentage of U.S. GNP) than the original Marshall Plan and having a much greater impact.

The final part of this book offers five essays on the U.S. policy process. Although little new ground is broken, the analyses are skillful, and selections by Howard Wiarda ("Conceptual Failures in U.S.-Central American Relations") and by I. M. Destler (on the "elusive consensus" on a foreign policy) are especially commendable.

The contributors to this book have crossed the minefield that is Central American scholarship with admirable skill to produce a study of great vitality and sagacity. Developments since the essays were written generally reinforce conclusions so that one can expect that this study will serve a diverse readership for some time.

ALBERT P. VANNUCCI

University of Pittsburgh at Johnstown

The Oil Decade: Conflict and Cooperation in the West. By Robert J. Lieber. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Pp. ix + 159. $23.95.)

At a time when the world oil market is experiencing a prolonged glut and when the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is encountering considerable difficulty either in maintaining its production programming agreement of 1983 or in abiding by its official price of $29 per barrel, reading Robert Lieber's book is a refreshing experience because it warns the Western industrial countries against becoming overly complacent concerning energy affairs.

As stated in its subtitle, this study is chiefly concerned with the issues of conflict and cooperation among members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and with their struggle to cope with the consequences of their failure to cooperate with each other. In the first four chapters, Lieber lucidly lays out the background of the energy crises of the 1970s and delineates the dynamics of responses of the Western industrial consuming nations to these crises. The first oil shock, that is, the Arab oil embargo imposed by the Organization of the Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) immediately after the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, caused disarray among the OECD countries, a majority of which had been substantially dependent on Middle East oil supplies since the 1960s. Even the establishment of the International Energy Agency (IEA) was preceded by considerable squabbling between European members such as France and Britain on the one hand, and the United States on the other. Lieber, quite correctly, lists supply-related anxieties, economic imperatives, export competition, differences between allied energy producers and consumers, and divergent beliefs about problems as sources of conflict among the OECD members on the energy issue.

According to Lieber, during the five-year interlude between the first and second oil shocks (i.e., between 1974 and 1978), the Western oil consumers failed to take significant steps to reduce their energy consumption. In fact, the impasse over energy policy that remained in the United States, even though energy consumption there increased by 28.5%, caused considerable resentment among the rest of the OECD members. Although the latter countries adopted small but significant measures encouraging modest energy conservation, these measures were of limited outcome and were implemented as a result of national rather than collective policies. The economies of the OECD countries also experienced another major shock as a result of energy shortages stemming from political revolution in Iran in late 1978 and early 1979. When faced with energy shortages emanating from the Iran-Iraq War toward the end of 1980, however, the Western industrial states were not only well prepared, but they also readily cooperated in mitigating the deleterious effects of these shortages on their economies.

Lieber's expertise on energy affairs is quite apparent in the ease with which he makes insightful observations. For example, he notes that of all the causes of conflict that remain as national obstacles in the way of the development of coherent and collective action for the OECD countries, divergent economic interests are particularly acute. In order to underscore the divisive nature of these interests, Lieber states that coordination in oil demand restraint and in the management of export competition may be even more difficult than agreement on diplomatic measures or military security cooperation. The book is peppered with similar comments.

As one of the major recommendations to the OECD countries, Lieber suggests that they adopt a mix of incremental policy choices which, in the long run, are aimed at tackling the long-term problem of reducing Western dependence on Middle East oil. His other suggestions include diversification of sources of imports, enhancement of production and fuel-switching, and attainment of energy efficiency through the use of market mechanisms as well as conscious policy measures. To lessen vulnerability, according to Lieber, the Western consumers must increase stockpiling of oil and other fuels, identify and develop production surge capacity, and continue to improve emergency planning at both domestic and international levels. Moreover, Lieber states that the OECD countries must also strive for "international economic coordination to alleviate both long-term and crisis problems" (p. 140).

In general, the study is well reasoned and well documented. Lieber is considerably at ease in dealing with the European countries. The case study of France is one of the two best chapters of this book, the second being the chapter on scenarios of energy crisis. The glaring flaw of this study is the scant attention paid to the issue of

Japanese energy policy. The chapter on the U.S. energy policy is the weakest because Lieber pays too much attention to limitations of space and fails to treat the intricacies of the energy policy process with the detail and the care that they deserve. Overall, Lieber's book is a noteworthy contribution to the extant literature on energy, and it should be read by all serious students of energy affairs.

M. E. Ahrari

East Carolina University

Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, 1969-1976. By Robert S. Litwak. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984. Pp. vii + 232. $24.95.)

Robert Litwak's *Détente and the Nixon Doctrine* is a subtly argued and largely convincing interpretation of American foreign policy. Two assumptions are central to his argument: first, that a "nation-state's *image* of the world . . . is crucial in the delineation and articulation of its interests and values" (p. 6); and second, that the fundamental problem facing American policymakers in the postwar period has been the 'integrating [of] force and policy in the nuclear age" (p. 7). From this starting point, Litwak argues that before 1969, U.S. foreign policy was driven by American universalism framed by a bipolar, Manichean image of the international system. The ends of American policy—the containment of global communism—were unquestioned, and attention was "invariably focused on the requisite *means* of containment" (p. 22). The cold war consensus on both the ends and instruments of American foreign policy collapsed in 1968 in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive and in response to qualitative changes taking place in the international system.

Litwak's thesis is that the Nixon administration implemented a foreign policy strategy of superpower détente and politico-military retrenchment (the Nixon Doctrine) to meet the conflicting policy imperatives of a "continued (indeed revitalized) military bipolarity with the new conditions of global pluralism" (p. 2). This foreign policy strategy sought to avoid the extremes of undifferentiated globalism and disengagement that had characterized American policy in the past.

The key departure of the Nixon administration was the Nixon Doctrine, which represented "a wholly new *philosophy* to govern American security policy towards the Third World during the post-Vietnam era" (p. 120). The devolution of American military responsibilities (although not commitments) along the Afro-Asian periphery was to be guaranteed by superpower détente that would create the necessary conditions enabling it to devolve its responsibilities to regional surrogates. Détente and devolution were conceived to be interdependent and mutually reinforcing. Thus, détente would allow the United States to extract itself from Vietnam, and the Nixon Doctrine (Vietnamization) would preclude a shift in the balance of power along the periphery that could prejudice its core relationship with the Soviet Union.

The interdependence of the core and the periphery, and the role attributed to regional surrogates in the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy strategy, is the central focus of Litwak's study. He examines and provides a credible analysis of American policy in Vietnam before the Paris Accords, during the Indo-Pakistani War, and of administration efforts to court regional powers (e.g., Iran, Brazil, and Indonesia).

Litwak characterizes the strategy of détente and devolution as a transitory policy—designed to meet the conflicting policy imperatives of nascent multipolarity and military bipolarity—that signified a break with the postwar policy initiated by the Truman Doctrine. After the near confrontation between the superpowers during the Arab-Israeli War in October, 1973, Nixon and Kissinger jettisoned the pentapolar vision of the international system elucidated in July, 1971, and U.S. policy is judged to have reverted to the containment of Soviet expansionism via the differentiation of means much like previous administrations. Domestic developments, however, hamstrung the Ford administration's foreign policy. The Congress, reasserting usurped foreign policy prerogatives, and the presidency, sapped of its institutional authority by Watergate, disagreed on two fundamental issues: the utility of force as an instrument of policy and the centrality of the East-West conflict in the Third World. The Congress discounted both heavily, controlled the purse strings, and consequently U.S. policy as well. In this way, Litwak handily explains the events leading to the fall of Saigon and American passivity during the Angolan Civil War.

Litwak concludes that the United States should sustain a global role, but that role must be based upon a "coherent, non-universalistic conception of US national interests" if it is to command a domestic consensus essential for a successful foreign policy (p. 198). The role the United States should play in the international system is open to debate, but it is certain that any foreign policy strategy that does not wed American interests to American ideals will fail to forge a domestic consensus on either the ends or instruments of American policy. Perhaps European scholars (Litwak received his Ph.D. at the London School of Economics) should abandon their hope that Americans will practice anything other than an American statecraft and concentrate instead on understanding it rather than trying to Europeanize it.

Finally, the author's excessive reliance upon italicization and foreign terms is distracting, often unnecessary, and in at least one instance incorrect (*Machtpolitik* rather than *Macht Politik*, pp. 62, 108). Nonetheless, *Détente and the Nixon Doctrine* is an important contribution to the historiography of American foreign policy during the Nixon and Ford administrations.

JAMES CLYDE SPERLING

University of California, Santa Barbara

The War Everyone Lost—and Won: America's Intervention in Vietnam's Twin Struggles. By Timothy J. Lomperis. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1984. Pp. x + 192. $22.50.)

Basing his views on familiar English-language historical studies, journalistic accounts, and government documents, Lomperis draws on his experience as an intelligence analyst in Saigon and on his more recent academic experience in the Ph.D. program at Duke University to advance an interesting thesis—that the communists won their struggle for national liberation while America won its struggle to defeat the communist effort to establish the international legitimacy of its Peoples War strategy.

In chapter 1, Lomperis relies on respected historical studies to trace the struggles of Vietnamese patriots over many centuries to gain traditional legitimacy as rulers by expelling foreigners and promoting land reform. Persuasively presenting relevant information on important political-military events, he describes how the Vietnamese communists in this century were able to counter their ideological opponents, claim the traditional Vietnamese role of freedom fighters, and employ both traditional and modern methods to expel the French and assume ruling power.

In chapter 2, Lomperis interprets the confusing developments of the 1960 to 1975 American period clearly and parsimoniously. Describing America's intervention as conceived in ignorance and aimed at preventing the communists from completing their historic struggle for independence, he tells a compelling story of American military-political operations and failures. He represents the communists as achieving victory by successfully controlling the pace of the war, maintaining the political-military initiative, rejecting the unwelcome advice of China and Russia, avoiding intolerable levels of physical destruction, supporting southern communists, and discouraging—by launching stunning and timely military attacks—the willingness of American citizens to pursue the struggle. He depicts Americans as failing either to create a capable South Vietnamese counterforce or to develop a useful system for monitoring the war but as succeeding in halting the communist offensives of 1968 and 1972 and at expanding pacification programs from 1969 to 1972.

In chapter 3, the author reviews the development of communist ideology in Asia and Vietnam; describes the changes that led to its increased reliance upon the peasantry, nationalism, and land reform; and portrays the Vietnamese politburo as a practical, innovative, and cohesive team of multitalented leaders who organized over several decades around their own Vietnamese version of Marxism-Leninism. In chapter 4, Lomperis analyzes the Peoples War strategy first conceived by Chinese theorists and describes it as composed of a flowing variety of interacting, overlapping, and ill-defined tactics and stages; as involving a confusing mix of military, political, and diplomatic resources changing in relation to enemy postures and operations; and as aimed at achieving political liberation by outlasting a militarily stronger but politically weaker enemy. He represents the pragmatic Vietnamese leaders as borrowing their version of Peoples War strategy from the Chinese and debating and changing it to meet their different needs, that is, to fight a different war of Vietnamese liberation against different enemies, at different places and times, and under different conditions. According to Lomperis, Vietnamese revolutionaries cannot legitimately claim to have gained liberation by means of a Peoples War strategy because they failed to implement what he believes to be the key features of such a strategy as laid down and promised by orthodox Chinese and Vietnamese theorists. Upon examining the strategy that the Vietnamese implemented on the battlefield, he argues that they suffered such heavy losses to their guerilla forces at the hands of Americans in 1968 that they subsequently had to abandon their Peoples War strategy. The communists thereby failed to demonstrate the legitimacy of their strategy for emulation by other revolutionaries.

Although I find Lomperis's arguments on behalf of the above thesis unconvincing, they are seriously presented and may well provoke interesting reactions among knowledgeable students of both Vietnamese history and the war and may stimulate additional research based on new primary data from both Vietnamese and American government sources.

JOHN JAMES MACDOUGALL

The University of Alabama in Huntsville

Arms Control: The Multilateral Alternative. Edited by Edward C. Luck. (New York: New York University Press, 1983. Pp. xii + 258. $32.50, cloth; $15.00, paper.)

In a series of five meetings from February through July, 1982, a distinguished 36-member study group of the United Nations Association—USA, chaired by Ambassador James F. Leonard, discussed drafts of the 10 expert papers that comprise this volume. UNA-USA commissioned the papers to initiate a dialogue between government officials and selected specialists concerning the future role of the United States in multilateral approaches to arms control. The experts were themselves a distinguished group of academics and practitioners, accustomed to analyzing and coping with the real world of arms control. Their collective product could be called a textbook in practical arms controlling, that is, policy-relevant analysis. Despite their positive, suggestive, and hopeful expectations regarding long-run outcomes of multilateral arms control strategies, the reader cannot escape the thread of short-run pessimism that stretches throughout the book.

Written while the United States was preparing for the second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in 1982, the expert papers emphasize policy alternatives that would have been particularly relevant for that occasion. In doing so, the authors draw upon all the postwar arms control experience that involved three or more nations negotiating in global, regional, or functional multilateral forums. The book describes the historical and political evolution of multilateralism; the major international forces such as U.S. allies, the Soviet Union, and the nonaligned states with which U.S. policies must deal; and several specific policy areas—nuclear nonproliferation, conventional arms control, and confidence-building measures—particularly needful of multilateral approaches.

A basic observation made by several contributors is that the United States has lacked a clear and consistent strategy for advancing its own and international security through multilateral bodies. Most of the American effort has been focused on tactical and procedural issues, reflecting the official skepticism about the effectiveness of multilateral bodies.

The rise and decline of multilateralism in the arms control field since 1963 is recounted in the first part of the book. Revival of these multilateral efforts is, according to several of the authors, primarily contingent upon improvement in Soviet-American political relations. Whether or not this requirement is met, it is in the U.S. interest to adopt an innovative, activist posture in multilateral bodies. "A more ambitious U.S. approach would both advance U.S. interests and improve the performance of the multilateral mechanisms themselves" (p. 5) according to these same authors. All agree that multilateral arms control issues are best studied and debated in United Nations' forums.

Another group of essays describes and analyzes the global political environment within which multilateralism is pursued. The authors agree that political rather than technical or military conditions are most influential in determining progress in arms limitation agreements. The book is particularly instructive in the map it draws of some of these complex and often intractable political conditions as they criss-cross among East-West, North-South, regional, and intra-alliance relationships.

For the United States, this complexity arises from relationships with allies in Western Europe and Japan, the Soviet Union and its allies, and the nonaligned states. U.S. alliance problems tend to vary with subject matter and negotiating forums, particularly when an alliance partner (all of them are democracies) must respond to the exigencies of domestic politics. Problems with the Soviet Union, despite that nation's maturing diplomatic methods and participation in several multilateral agreements, are likely to remain so long as the Soviets use the multilateral process for other purposes such as ideological leadership of the communist camp and recruitment of allies among the developing countries. Relations with the nonaligned states will vary from subgroup to subgroup, some of which are led, despite the angry third-world rhetoric, by policymakers with sophisticated security and political objectives such as the maintenance of internal order, the diminution of superpower influence, and the pursuit of regional power.

The essays that examine three specific policy areas add to the pessimistic tone of the discussion. One author feels that the international consensus against further nuclear proliferation may be breaking down. Another believes that the problem of conventional arms limitation is much too low on the U.S. public agenda. A third deems many of the benefits of confidence-building measures to be overstated and many of the liabilities overlooked. Noting the failure of the second Special Session on Disarmament, another contributor suggests shifting from a search for global consensus to a greater focus on regional arms control problems.

Most of the policies recommended throughout the book are modest and feasible, for example, in the absence of arms transfer statistics published by the United Nations, the United States should make an annual report of its own data on this subject for submission to the Secretary General and distribution among all the members. The recommended policies are realistic responses to the glacial pace of institutional progress in the arms control field. A president dedicated to the arms control process could make most of them happen in very short order. From another perspective, the book as a whole could become an antidote for disarmament visionaries who, in exasperation, will probably—and unfortunately—consider it "minimalist."

RALPH M. GOLDMAN

San Francisco State University

Conventional Deterrence. By John J. Mearsheimer. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983. Pp. 296. $29.50.)

John J. Mearsheimer's *Conventional Deterrence* is a complex work on an often forgotten subject. Although nuclear deterrence has been researched at length, few scholars have made the effort to investigate deterrence by conventional military means such as battlefield artillery, tanks, and infantry. Although this book in no way espouses the beliefs of the nuclear freeze movement, its findings could support a new emphasis on a strong conventional military. This well-documented book is a result of solid research and will be considered the definitive new work on the subject.

The book describes deterrence failures that resulted in conventional battlefield wars in which the parties involved were two large armies in direct confrontation in a large area. Guerilla, naval, and air warfare are excluded. Mearsheimer uses the comparative case study method to examine not only the deterrence failures, but also its successes in the following examples (pp. 19-20):

British-French decision making at Munich (1938)
British-French decision making in 1939-1940
The German decision to attack Poland (1939)
The German decision to attack France (1940)
The German decision to attack the Soviet Union (1941)
The Soviet decision to strike against Japan's Kwantung Army in Manchuria (1945)
The Israeli decision to attack in the Sinai (1956)
The Israeli decision to strike in the Sinai (1967)
The Egyptian decision to attack Israel (1973)
The North Korean invasion of South Korea (1950)
The Indian decision to attack Pakistan (1971)
The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia (1979)

Mearsheimer's conventional deterrence theory is clearly linked to military strategy. In the planning stage, decision makers try to study the proposed strategy of how the armed forces will be used successfully in the battlefield. Decision makers seeking conventional deterrence will be confronted with three alternative strategies: attrition, blitzkrieg, and limited arms. Blitzkrieg leads the list in the area of deterrence failures because it is a relatively inexpensive strategy and one that could result in a rapid victory. Attrition, which is long and protracted conflict, tends to be an expensive strategy that leads to success in deterrence. Limited arms strategy has the drawback of turning a conflict into a war of attrition and tends not to be a good strategy of deterrence.

Providing supporting evidence for the theory with case studies, Mearsheimer shows that deterrence worked when the Allies chose not to attack Germany in 1939 and 1940 because they believed that Germany would launch a war of attrition as it had in World War I; that Germany was not deterred from attacking the Allies in 1939 and 1940 when it used the blitzkrieg strategy; that deterrence failed when blitzkrieg and attrition strategies were used for deterrence resulting in the Arab-Israeli wars of October 1956, June 1967, and October 1973; and that to date, the Soviets have been successfully deterred by a blitzkrieg strategy and possibly a subsequent attrition strategy.

The development of very accurate weapons known as precision-guided munitions has changed the nature of battlefield deterrence and diminished the likelihood of the use of the blitzkrieg strategy. Shoulder-launched antitank missiles have changed the conditions of the battlefield. Limited aims strategy could be improved by use of such munitions.

Conventional Deterrence argues that deterrence will not be successful if one side is able to use the blitzkrieg strategy. Through the use of very highly technical details about battlefield strategy, Mearsheimer proves that an attacking nation can use any of the three strategies that will each have a different effect on deterrence.

MICHAEL A. PREDA

Midwestern State University

The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation. By Stephen M. Meyer. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984. Pp. vii + 229. $20.00.)

Why do governments acquire nuclear weapons? In this stimulating and insightful book Stephen M. Meyer challenges conventional wisdom to answer this question. In so doing he takes on the technological imperative school of thought that asserts that "once a nation acquires the capability to manufacture nuclear weaponry (has latent capacity) it will inevitably do so. . ." (p. 9). Arguing that such sentiment "unfortunately . . . led large segments of the academic and policy communities to perceive nuclear weapons proliferation as almost entirely a technological problem—much like air pollution or toxic waste disposal" (p. 4), Meyer contends that motivational constraints and inducements have been more compelling since the mid 1950s.

Marshalling his argument, Meyer applies quantitative and qualitative methodologies to aggregate data and country case studies to make a telling point: Since the dawn of the nuclear age, 36 nations have acquired a latent nuclear weapons capability. Leaving aside the arguable validity of the measures Meyer uses to construct his list, it is uncontestable that for some time states such as West Germany,Italy, Canada, Japan, and Sweden have had infrastructures capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons. But unlike the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain, which developed the technology upon acquisition of the wherewithal, most of these nations resisted the nuclear weapons option. This leads Meyer to conclude that "one cannot distinguish between countries that decide to 'go nuclear' and those that do not on the basis of nuclear technology" (p. 88). Indeed, the past decades suggest a decline in the rate of proliferation. The statistical data further point to the probability that if a nation does not acquire nuclear weapons within 10 years of its acquisition of a latent capability, it is unlikely to do so at all.

Given the temptation of nuclear arms for purposes of security, prestige, politics, and economics, why do nations resist? Although treaties, fear of preemptive strike by a major nuclear power, and peaceful reputation have moderate dissuasive effects, Meyer finds alliance to a nuclear ally to be most compelling. Will this and other restraints be sufficient to halt proliferation? Meyer is not sanguine. But it is at this point—trying to look into the future—that the work runs into its greatest difficulty, and understandably so given the notorious inadequacy of past nuclear proliferation forecasts. Notwithstanding his own wariness of behavioral laws, Meyer cannot resist the role of soothsayer that characterizes most foreign policy analysts. He suggests that "a proliferation decision is to be expected" (p. 155) from Argentina in light of its humiliation in the Falklands War. Yet as of early 1985, most analysts would agree that if anything, the civilian Alfonsin government is less disposed toward nuclear weapons than its military predecessors.

Still, other "hard core" (p. 160) proliferants are foreseeable, namely Pakistan, Iraq, and Libya. How is the international community to diminish their propensity for nuclear weapons? Ironically given his own dubious view of the technological imperative school, but realistically all the same, Meyer calls for technical constraints to buy time to change motivational profiles. At the same time Meyer acknowledges that, given the dissemination of nuclear knowledge, such barriers are bound to break down; eventually many nations will be able to build their own atomic plants. By implication, Meyer suggests that nuclear proliferation may be inevitable given the difficulty in modifying motivational profiles. However, such inevitability in the Middle East, to cite one dangerous region, would have to contend with a strategy of proliferation control that Meyer does not dwell on, the ingenuity of Israeli military planners who demonstrated in their 1981 attack on Iraq's research reactor that motivational modification, alliances, treaties, safeguards, and export controls are not the only proliferation remedies.

BENNETT RAMBERG

University of California, Los Angeles

Controlling Latin American Conflicts: Ten Approaches. Edited by Michael A. Morris and Victor Millán. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983. Pp. xiii + 272. $22.50, paper.)

Scholarly preoccupation with armed conflict in Latin America remains high despite the comparative paucity of external wars in this region and the greater aggregate death and destruction from internecine combat, guerilla insurgency, terrorism and state repression, and armed forces' insurrection. Despite their acknowledgement of a "legalistic" tradition of conflict containment in Latin America (p. 1), Morris and Millán contend that a recent upsurge in violence, epitomized by the 1982 Malvinas war, coupled with a growing arms race and a decline in legitimacy of the OAS, provoke concern over prospects for major conflagration.

Nine contributors provide a timely and original volume that divides conflicts into national, regional, functional, sectoral, and external categories of origination. The editors' introduction establishes a conceptual framework for the subsequent case studies.

Predicating that Latin American conflicts range from broadly systemic and ideological to particularistic (e.g., resources, boundary, or refugee disputes), Morris and Millán assert that "multicasual, overlapping conflicts" (p. 5), such as those generated by revolution in Central America, are highly impervious to legalistic solution and have the greatest likelihood of becoming internationalized. The essays by Juan Carlos Puig on juridical trends, Carlos Moneta on economic community, Michael Morris and Martin Slann on arms acquisition, and Max Manwaring on the implications of military expansion most faithfully exploit this framework.

Puig argues that insufficient attention is paid to international law regimes in shaping state conduct. Latin American history demonstrates that resistance to conflict arbitration can be overcome if there is consensus between government and citizenry over the legitimate application of legal principle and if international jurists are perceived as juridically competent. Puig implies that Argentina's resistance to arbitration in the Beagle Channel and Malvinas disputes would exemplify governmental manipulation of international conflict to achieve domestic consensus (p. 25).

Moneta, a consultant to the Latin American Economic Organization (SELA), assesses the potential of this little-known institution as a "centripital force" (p. 113) toward functional integration. Although SELA's success has thus far been modest, its vicissitudes confirm the apprehensions of international integration theorists. Although Mexico and Venezuela—the region's fastest growing economies—have become SELA's greatest boosters (p. 101), its continued evolution as a distinctly Latin American regional advocate hinges upon further development of member states' economic capacities.

Morris and Slann's analysis of weapons acquisition policy and the arms control regime in Latin America leads them to conclude that arms suppliers have a stake in stability to assure profits. Moreover, the decline of the United States as an arms supplier reduces its competence to influence arms control. Meanwhile, the region's potential nuclear powers are reluctant to break the weapons threshold due to cost considerations and fear of tipping an established balance of power (p. 125).

Manwaring's study of the growth of Latin American military capabilities constitutes the collection's most methodologically sophisticated contribution. Through a pathbreaking macrolevel factor analysis of armed forces strength, transport capacity, and defense infrastructure, he concludes that a dramatic imbalance in military power now exists among the region's larger countries and that some states may view nuclear proliferation as an attractive means of restoring influence (p. 174). Although a provocative analysis, additional factors such as the following should be included in this model to improve its predictive ability: the influence of population demographics upon military expansionism, health and welfare as important factors in protracted warfare, and tax effort and social service capacity as measures of penetrative capability.

Notwithstanding some unevenness among the contributions, this is a valuable collection for peace researchers and students of comparative foreign policy. There is a broad consensus among the contributors on the increasing self-assertiveness of Latin America and on the role of the Malvinas dispute as a milestone in hastening interstate cooperation (Moneta), inhibiting arms control (Augusto Varas, Morris and Slann), and illustrating the futility of equivocative negotiations (Ruben de Hoyos). An up-to-date bibliography on Latin American conflict resolution considerably enhances its value for scholars.

DAVID LEWIS FELDMAN

Moorhead State University

Soviet Allies: The Warsaw Pact and the Issue of Reliability. Edited by Daniel N. Nelson. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984. Pp. xiii + 273. $22.50.)

The author and six colleagues specify the variables thought to affect Warsaw Pact reliability and address the measurement of these variables, then analyze the changing Warsaw pact alliance structure, the relationship of East European military establishments to the USSR, and the interplay of Soviet and East European security concerns. In the case of the six "allies," the authors assess domestic-level variables (e.g., party-military relations, domestic political conditions, material and manpower resources, economic performance) and their relationship to the mobilization potential of Eastern Europe.

In the introduction, Nelson views mobilization potential in terms of a political system's ability to ensure efficient compliance when extracting manpower and material resources from its society and economy, only part of which is the military *per se.* He sees mobilization potential as the principal limitation on force availability, and thus the key determinant of reliability. He then introduces six indicators by which to rate Warsaw Pact reliability: (1) scenario of hostility (combat in homeland or in other countries); (2) duration of involvement in hostile action; (3) systemic integration (of each Pact state with the USSR); (4) domestic socioeconomic conditions; (5) domestic political conditions; and (6) military preparedness.

As to scenario, Nelson believes that only very select East German and Polish units would be involved in the initial Soviet attack on the German central front. On duration, the longer the hostilities and the more removed from their homelands, the less reliable Pact forces become. On systemic integration, the East German and Bulgarian forces rate best. As for socioeconomic factors, Nelson sees the Czechs, Poles, and Hungarians as the least reliable. Politically, the Poles, Czechs, and East German regimes "must confront the most volatile populations" (p. 28). And on military preparedness, the Soviets have favored select units of the three Northern Tier states (East German, Polish, and Czech). The concentration of Warsaw Pact mobility and firepower is in the Northern Tier.

Nelson concludes that only East Germany and Bulgaria are "reliable," but the Bulgarians are remote from the Central Front. Poland is the weak link in the Northern Tier, and the Czechs and Hungarians might only perform well on their homelands. Romania's mobilization potential for Soviet military adventures "is virtually nonexistent." Only East Germany exhibits consistently "a high level of systemic integration, a developed and productive economy, political control and military preparation" (p. 265). But this most reliably ally "has a bothersome record of political unrest and a persistent, disaffected minority" (p. 266).

Soviet forces stationed in Eastern Europe, Byelorussia, and the Ukraine are strong enough to deal with disaffection, and Nelson believes that the Warsaw Pact is "more a symbol of Soviet weakness than of Soviet strength." The Warsaw Pact "has now become an entity fraught with indications that communist party regimes cannot be assured of their own militaries" (p. 267).

The notes at the end of each chapter constitute a gold mine of references from both sides of the Iron Curtain.

ANTHONY TRAWICK BOUSCAREN

Le Moyne College

The Antinomies of Interdependence: National Welfare and the International Division of Labor. Edited by John Gerard Ruggie. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983. Pp. xiv + 506. $35.00, cloth; $15.00, paper.)

This collection of original essays, including a long introduction and conclusion by the editor, has as its stated aim the production of a political economy of human welfare focusing on the kinds of policy options third-world countries can adopt to maximize welfare gains for their citizens in the current international division of labor. It is a good collection, and its strengths are numerous. Above all, it is a well-balanced discussion of the *new* international division of labor (NIDL).

To date, such discussion has been from one of two competing perspectives. The first, informed by neoclassical economics, has been a largely uncritical eulogy to the role of "comparative advantage" in explaining the rise of the newly industrializing countries (NICs) and a new era in North-South relations. The second, informed by *neo*-Marxism, sees the NIDL as merely one more stage in the process of capitalist accumulation. This collection is a splendid critique of these, respectively, voluntarist and determinist positions. From these two theoretical positions two basic policy options do, however, emerge. Ruggie calls these "associative" and "dissociative" postures, and they themselves form the book's division of labor.

In Part 1, chapters on American development from 1776 to 1860, small European states, South Korea, Venezuela, and Ivory Coast examine how the management of economic association helps or hinders welfare distribution. In Part 2, three chapters examine respectively the pros and cons of technological, linguistic, and security dissociation. It is always difficult for collected anthologies to be genuinely comparative, but to the extent that the essays in Part 1 represent a good mix of countries and the authors have stuck to the task of asking similar questions about the international contexts of development and specifically the role of the state in this process, then this collection is as good as one is likely to get. The same can also be said for the thematic chapters of Part 2.

The central argument of the collection is that the international division of labor, in its response to welfare demands from developing countries, is "not really as elastic as its advocates assume, but not quite as rigid as its detractors insist" (p. 482). In addition, the abilities of developing countries to secure the best welfare distribution from this division are often more dependent on the political structures than rigid adherence to specific strategies predicted on one or another set of macroeconomic assumptions—be they "associative" or "dissociative." Nowhere is the importance of appropriate political infrastructure better highlighted than in Peter Katzenstein's chapter on economic dependence and corporatism in small European states and the discussion of "state-led" industrialization in South Korea. Both chapters support Ruggie's general assertion that governments pick up "market signals . . . then utilize a battery of interventionist techniques to maintain and diversify the basis of their comparative advantage" (p. 18).

By contrast, Part 2, although at pains to stress the difficulties attached to attempted dissociation, leads Ruggie to draw the conclusion for us that intervention to secure greater association similar to the strategies of the NICs discussed in Part 1 might not always be in the best interests of all states of the Third World. Although there may well be a NIDL characterized by systemic shifts in patterns of industrial production, trade, and finance, these should not be overstated and certainly not seen as universal. The history of the Asian NICs, for example, is unlikely to be repeated by all states on the lower rungs of the current international division of labor, and this book is a splendid reminder of the complexity and diversity of these processes currently in train.

RICHARD HIGGOTT

Murdoch University (Western Australia)

NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas. By David N. Schwartz. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1983. Pp. x + 270. $28.95, cloth; $10.95, paper.)

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded in 1949. The key article of the founding agreement, Article V, stated that the parties would consider "that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all." In the event of such an attack, Treaty members would take action, "including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic Area" (*NATO Facts and Figures,* Appendix 2 [Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1978]).

From that time, NATO has faced the issue of how to implement the pledge of Article V. On January 12, 1954, Secretary of State John F. Dulles unveiled the nuclear deterrence doctrine of "massive retaliation." While NATO has since relied on the American strategic nuclear arsenal to deter Warsaw Pact aggression, the deployment of nuclear weapons on both sides has raised the costs of policy error for all.

The December, 1979 decision by NATO to engage the Soviet Union in arms control talks and to deploy Pershing II medium-range ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles, according to David N. Schwartz, was the latest response to complex and unpleasant choices about the role of nuclear weapons in NATO defense policy. *NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas* is a well-written and incisive analysis of those difficult choices. Schwartz makes no claim to writing the definitive NATO history. His general purpose is to examine the way NATO nations deal with ambiguities, disagreements, and uncertainties surrounding nuclear deterrence. The specific purpose is to describe how NATO arrived at the December, 1979 decision.

Schwartz hopes to help policymakers learn from the past by presenting a historical analysis of NATO's nuclear choices. He notes that some aspects of the December, 1979 decision—to modernize NATO strategic weapons while also pursuing arms control talks—are incomprehensible unless seen in broad perspective. *NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas* encompasses seven chapters. The main part of the book examines "episodes in which the United States initiated action in part to address NATO's nuclear dilemmas" (p. 11). These episodes include the U.S. offer of Thor and Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missiles to the allies in December 1957; General Lauris Norstad's plans to create a NATO mobile land-based medium-range ballistic missile force; the U.S. effort to create a multilateral sea-based medium-range ballistic missile force for NATO between 1960 and 1965; the U.S. attempt between 1962 and 1967 to have NATO adopt a strategy of flexible response; and the creation of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group.

These events are considered together because they were initiated by the United States to assuage NATO's uneasiness over the American nuclear guarantee. Schwartz analyzes these events by explaining why the U.S. proceeded with each initiative, elucidating the Europeans' responses and describing the reasons for each initiative's success or failure.

NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas can be used for upper-division undergraduate and introductory graduate courses in foreign and defense policy. It also could be used for courses on organizational behavior because it provides great examples of the interplay of multiple values and uncertainty in decision making.

MARK D. MANDELES

Alexandria, Virginia

The Military Origins of Industrialisation and International Trade Rivalry. By Gautam Sen. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. Pp. vii + 277. $30.00.)

Trade disputes are complex and worthwhile analyzing. Although Sen states that his major concern is to explain the occurrence of such conflicts in the area of manufacturing products, this volume is particularly intriguing in the way it covers the characteristics of industrial development antecedent to trade disruptions. A second theme running throughout the book is Sen's attempt to account for protectionism.

The evidence that Sen provides to support the premise that strategic industries are the critical area of industrialization and trade rivalry is so painstakingly organized and logically argued that his analysis is both the most convincing part of the book and the most difficult to summarize. All specialists in economic growth should take the time to consider this aspect of Sen's work. He first documents the familiar view that all nations, first-comer as well as late-comer, follow a similar process of industrialization based on a similar structure of production. Strategic industries lead all economic development. Sen then limits the application of strategic to those industries that bring about and nurture self-sustained economic growth and ensure national economic self-reliance (p. 49). Sen selects the criteria of import-substitution, backward and forward linkages, and economies of scale to identify a group of six capital goods and heavy industries as strategic.

Military needs of the "human collective" provide the impetus to establish these industries and the patterns of production they encompass. All societies hold security as their paramount objective. Because its achievement is predicated on the successful pursuit of relative economic autonomy, the structures of strategic production, even in weaker nations (p. 87), embody a "secular tendency towards the creation of surplus capacity" (p. 158). Governments are prompted by overproduction in these intermediate goods to defend their industries through protectionism rather than to shift to other areas of productivity (p. 49). Free trade has been the exception rather than the rule since the late nineteenth century. The intra-firm trading activities of transnational corporations across national boundaries have modified the structure of production and thereby encouraged free trade. But state policies have eschewed the private endorsement of a liberal economic order by replacing tariff with nontariff barriers to trade as the means to safeguard economic autonomy (p. 226).

Sen's analysis loses credibility when he adopts the realist paradigm to explain similarities in the patterns of economic development and the presence of protectionism. The author's rejection of liberal and Marxist theories of international trade disjunctures leads him to conclude that the explanation must be found in an international system comprised of autonomous states who act in a unitary fashion at the national level. Sen accepts the state-centric model without either responding to recent, well-founded critiques of the approach or considering such relevant alternative models as the issue-based paradigm.

Among the more glaring problems in Sen's approach are his uncritical assignment of motivation to state policy and his assertion that the state is autonomous. According to the author, "the primacy of political considerations in governing the behavior of the State is apparent in its determination to institute industrialisation because of international political rivalry" (p. 67). He assumes that the international system is characterized by a struggle for power among nation-states and that the state is motivated solely by this struggle when it attempts to establish and maintain strategic industries within its domain. The case studies Sen provides do not, however, undertake the kind of policymaking analysis needed to ascertain the motives of the state. His espousal of state autonomy with regard to internal economic interests is based on equally tenuous grounds. Although he contends that the state modifies the means whereby it pursues security, Sen holds that this goal is unchangeable and not always consistent with economic interests. This view cannot be sustained without investigating how conflicts between security and other societal values, such as wealth, are perceived and resolved by industrialists, policymakers, and other political actors who contend for stakes in economic issue areas. Sen's work is nonetheless worth studying as a solidly researched and well-written economic analysis of industrialization.

M. Mark Amen

University of South Florida

Information Technology in the Third World: Can I.T. Lead to Humane National Development? By William James Stover. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984. Pp. 183. $15.00, paper.)

Popular periodicals and trade journals are repeatedly filled with tales of the dawning promise of the "information age" brought about by the fusion of computer and communication technologies. Variations on this theme frequently trace the current events in transborder data flows, international conflicts over the satellite geostationary orbit, calls for a "new world information order," and, in all, a blizzard of loosely related issues strung together by developments in a fast-moving technology. Rarely does a scholarly work such as Stover's appear that takes a first step toward investigating any one of these issues in any serious depth.

Stover attempts and partially succeeds at covering a very wide range of topics concerning communication and development. First, the book describes the familiar disparities between developed and developing states; indicators of general development inevitably correlate with corresponding indicators of information technology—televisions, telephones, computers, and the like. There is also a concise discussion of the context of communications in the process of overall political, economic, and social development. Here Stover relies on examples and on some of the theoretical writings by such social scientists as Daniel Lerner, Everett Rogers, and Wilbur Schramm. Two chapters follow that describe the technological dominance of the West in information technology, with emphasis on the redistributive claims of some developing states under the banner of a "new world information order" and the corollary doctrines of dependency theory and self-reliance. The final three chapters deal with means and ends in the use of technology and an agenda for humane development, which Stover defines as a process of meeting basic human needs while encouraging self-expression and decentralization (p. 11).

Stover succeeds in mentioning a variety of perspectives, although he offers a particular approach not significantly different from much contemporary thinking on how to solve the problems of the Third World. There are familiar appeals to international cooperation, to technology transfer, and to commitments by national leaders. He makes assertions such as "humankind is divided between the rich and the poor. . ." (p. 2), or that "[information technology] is the machine; communication is the product. . ." (p. 3). Information itself can be thought of as a commodity or product, but information technology is the use of machines to store, process, send, and receive information faster, cheaper, and more reliably. Communication refers to the means by which information transfer takes place.

Despite such minor definitional problems, the book benefits by a good organization of topics and at least outlines most of the salient issues on development and information technology. It is not likely to be dated by its treatment of these issues for a long time to come.

Even so, there are a number of errors and omissions that deserve mention. By emphasizing meeting basic human needs, alternative advantages of other approaches to development are understated. For example, Stover relies on much of the secondary source literature to restate the standard critique of multinational corporations and their apparent domination of information and its channels of communication. Yet many corporations that have operations in developing states assist greatly in advancing communication networks in these countries, and their very act of communicating puts many millions of dollars into national treasuries of the developing states.

Likewise, Stover is quick to cite the apparent shortcomings and inequities of American political advertising and the media in general in juxtaposition to critiques of Soviet practice insofar as they serve as rival development models. The book fails to do justice to the realities of how information technology is used today to keep tyrants in power versus its use in democratic states.

Finally, Stover is also on weak ground in his criticism of efforts toward international cooperation. Development communication projects coming into their own in programs sponsored by the UNDP, World Bank, and several regional organizations could have received better treatment. Stover's plea to reform the INTELSAT satellite system is similarly erroneous (p. 153). Contrary to his claim, developing countries do not pay higher prices for satellite communications than do the developed countries. In fact, INTELSAT's global satellite network consciously averages prices to favor less economical routes to and from the Third World, hardly a situation in need of reform. This inaccuracy may be due to Stover's reliance on a few secondary literature sources for these criticisms instead of relying on research from primary source material such as documents of the international organizations themselves.

For the novice interested in information technology, communication, and development, *Information Technology in the Third World* is a reasonable introduction. For those requiring something more substantial, the field is ripe for further inquiry.

ERIC J. NOVOTNY

Communications Satellite Corporation

Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe. Edited by Sarah Meiklejohn Terry. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984. Pp. xv + 375. $27.50.)

The continuing Polish drama has drawn attention to East Central Europe in the 1980s as had the invasions of Hungary in the 1950s and Czechoslovakia in the late 1960s. These and other events are discussed in *Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe.* No doubt the area has strategic, economic, and ideological importance to—and will continue to be a major concern of—the Soviet Union. To go beyond this observation and to make more specific predictions about the relations of the Soviet Union to this area is hazardous, a fact of which most contributors to this large volume have been fully aware.

Among the excellent surveys of the developments in Eastern Europe up to the early 1980s are those on "Soviet Policy toward the German Democratic Republic" by Angela E. Stent, "Soviet Policy toward Poland" by Andrzej Korbonski, "Soviet Relations with Yugoslavia and Romania" by William Zimmerman, "The Political Economy of Soviet Relations with Eastern Europe" by Paul Marer, "Soviet Energy Policy in Eastern Europe" by John P. Hardt, "Theories of Socialist Development in Soviet-East European Relations" by Sarah Meiklejohn Terry, "The Warsaw Pact: Soviet Military Policy in Eastern Europe" by A. Ross Johnson, "Soviet Policy in Western Europe: The East European Factor" by Pierre Hassner, and "Eastern Europe in the Context of U.S.-Soviet Relations" by Raymond L. Garthoff.

Korbonski points out that the Soviets have great strategic interest in Poland, and in order to protect their lines of transportation and communication with their divisions in East Germany, "two Soviet divisions have been permanently stationed in Poland since 1945" (p. 62). He notes the significance of the 1978 election of a Polish pope, whose visit to Poland "proved to be a major catalyst to the birth of Solidarity a year later" (p. 76). One may take exception to his statement that there was "every reason to expect that an invasion of Poland in response to the combined challenge was only a matter of time" (p. 87). The conventional view was that because the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968, a similar military invasion would take place in Poland in 1981. This "conventional wisdom," however, overlooked the obvious: Although the Soviets have kept their troops in Poland ever since the end of World War II, they did not have them in Czechoslovakia. Thus, the most important reason for the invasion of Czechoslovakia was the decision to secure the Soviet strategic and military interests in that country by having their troops there. Because the Soviets had their divisions in Poland, a military invasion of the country would make no sense from their point of view and would be counterproductive.

One may also take an exception to Jiri Valenta's claim made in his essay "Soviet Policy toward Hungary and Czechoslovakia" that "the Polish situation of 1980-81 may not be unique" (p. 123). I also question some of Valenta's other contentions, such as the idea that the Czechoslovak reform and infighting between members of the Czechoslovak ruling elite was "almost unnoticed by the Soviet leadership until matters came to a head in 1968" (p. 95). The known facts do not support this assertion. Indeed, the Soviets followed the developments in Czechoslovakia very closely. Furthermore, every country in the area is unique, and so are events in history including the Hungarian situation in 1956 and the Czechoslovak in 1968. In Hungary, the Hungarian armed forces were challenging the Soviet and Communist rule, whereas in Czechoslovakia, the Communist leaders, including Alexander Dubček, professed their unyielding loyalty to the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Only after the shocking experience in Moscow late in August did Dubček confess that he and his comrades underestimated Soviet "strategic interests" in Czechoslovakia (*The New York Times* and *The Washington Post,* September 2, 1968). While in Moscow as a member of the Czechoslovak Communist party delegation that signed the surrender, Zdeněk Mlynář realized, as he put it: "Actually we are imbeciles, but our imbecility has the appearance of ideology of reform Communism" [*Jsme vlastně blbci, ale naše blbost má podobu reformního komunismu*] (*Mráz přichází z Kremlu,* 2nd ed., Köln: *Index,* 1979, p. 297).

More recently, new testimony about the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia has been given by Vratislav Pěchota, who was directly involved in the Czechoslovak-Soviet negotiations in the summer of 1968 as a legal advisor to the Czechoslovak president Ludvík Svoboda, and who currently lives in the United States. He has stated that as early as April, 1968 the Soviet agents in Czechoslovak political circles made it plain that the real issue was not the reform, but rather the establishment of Soviet military bases in Czechoslovakia.

As A. Ross Johnson writes, "the Soviet stake in Eastern Europe involves security considerations and is based on military power" (p. 255). Thus, in the last analysis, the issues are simple: The Soviets did not invade Poland because they were already there since 1945; and because Dubček failed to invite the Soviets in, they invited themselves.

The book is equipped with footnotes and index, and does make a contribution to useful knowledge about the Soviet policy in Eastern Europe.

JOSEF KALVODA

Saint Joseph College

Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security.

Edited by Jiri Valenta and William C. Potter. (Winchester, Mass.: George Allen & Unwin, 1984. Pp. xiv + 319. $40.00, cloth; $18.50, paper.)

This is a useful collection of 12 essays written by prominent Soviet specialists. Most of the selections were first presented at the 1980 Conference on Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security sponsored by the Naval Postgraduate School and UCLA's Center for International and Strategic Studies.

Arthur Alexander provides a "simple model of decisionmaking" (p. 9) for Soviet national security comprised of four elements: the foundations of Soviet behavior (Russian history, Bolshevik ideology, and learned behavior); constraints (resources, technology, domestic and foreign reactions); interaction between high- and low-level decision makers; and decisional and policy outputs (resource allocation, budgets, weapons).

Vernon Aspaturian stresses the importance of Stalin's personality and character on, and dominance of, Soviet decision making from 1934 to 1953. The continuity of basic party and state institutions is part of Stalin's legacy, although the current functions of varous institutions and their interrelationships have evolved and changed over the years. Dimitri Simes characterizes Soviet decision making during the Brezhnev era as "controlled pluralism." He cautions, however, that increased pluralism among the elite and the official institutions need not lead to greater international restraint by the Soviets or to improved relations with the West.

Jerry Hough examines the role of the military in weapons development from the 1930s to the present and concludes that "the basic relationships between the military, the defense industries, the designers and the scientists" (p. 106) remain largely unchanged. Ellen Jones contends that organizational momentum or bureaucratic inertia are less important to the Soviet defense policy processes than are party-set policy goals and military doctrine. The higher level of centralization in the defense sector and oversight mechanisms generate greater responsiveness from the bureaucracy than is found in other areas. Raymond Garthoff argues that the Soviet military, which initially viewed the SALT negotiations with suspicion, played a constructive, although conservative, role during the negotiating process.

Jiri Valenta analyzes the Soviet interventions in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan from a bureaucratic politics perspective. In the Czechoslovak case, he is able to identify interventionist and noninterventionist coalitions that reflected different bureaucratic interests and functional responsibilities. Those concerned with domestic affairs (security, ideology, non-Russian nationalism) favored military intervention, whereas those dealing with foreign affairs and international communist party relations initially preferred the use of political and economic coercion. Among the differences between the Czechoslovak and Afghanistan interventions, Valenta notes that the Afghanistan action combined defensive and offensive motivations, and the Soviet military played a larger role in assessing the political situation in Afghanistan before intervention.

Galia Golan examines Soviet decision making during key stages of the Yom Kippur War and concludes that the leadership miscalculated the effects of its actions on détente with the West and suffered a decline of influence in the Arab world. Dennis Ross argues that the dynamics of oligarchic and coalition politics and the fear of failure create a pronounced risk aversion in Soviet decision making. This conservative bent does not, however, preclude the taking of decisive action when fundamental interests are at stake or when inaction is perceived as failure.

Stephen Meyer provides a stimulating critique of numerous models of Soviet decision making for national security. He notes that these contending models are often pitched at different levels of analysis and can be integrated into a composite model. Meyer calls for greater methodological rigor, empirical testing of hypotheses, and the employment of "focused-comparison" case studies. Finally, William Potter underscores the dearth of studies in Soviet national security decision making in the areas of policy initiation and implementation.

In conclusion, our understanding of Soviet national security decision making is deficient in many areas, due in large measure to data limitations. This volume, however, represents a stimulating, timely, and valuable contribution to the literature.

JAROSLAW BILOCERKOWYCZ

University of Tennessee, Knoxville

More for the Least? Prospects for Poorest Countries in the Eighties. By Thomas G. Weiss and Anthony Jennings. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1983. Pp. xxiv + 176. $24.95.)

The United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries was held in September, 1981 in Paris; this book is an analysis and evaluation of its work. The analysis is certainly informative in a straightforwardly narrative way, if somewhat less resonant to larger issues than its authors would appear to intend. The evaluations are always clearly presented and vigorously argued, if somewhat more ambiguous in overall effect than their authors might wish to admit. Both are worth reading. But there are problems.

The historical analysis primarily narrates with increasing intensity of detail both the sequence and variety of preparations made for the conference and the management and outcomes of negotiations in it. It is based on apparently full access to, and extensive exploitation of, all documentary records preparatory or pertaining to the conference, which are carefully cited, and—more obscurely—direct observations of these meetings and/or interviews with those who were participants in them, none of which are cited in particular, or even generally characterized or described. That is too bad. I have no grounds on which to question the validity of the authors' narrative, which is informative and clear. I only lament their occasional obscurity of reference, which perhaps needlessly weakens their case, no matter how slightly.

Evaluations, and generalizations from them, raise different problems. The authors end up saying (p. 156) that they "deem the Paris Conference a qualified success" and proceed to extrapolate from it a series of recommendations for the future conduct of conference diplomacy. The first problem is that the authors do not always agree with each other in this estimate, at least to essentially the same degree. Anthony Jennings seems to take, in chapter 5, a somewhat more jaundiced or perhaps more radical view of the outcomes of the conference than Thomas Weiss takes elsewhere. In any event, he seems a bit more disposed than Weiss toward what may be characterized as the apparent least-developed-country or third-world view of the conference—which was clearly less "exultant," as Jennings says (p. 127), than that professed by representatives of countries with "developed market economies."

This disagreement, finally, makes a difference. Whether the "Paris process" is in whole or in part a promising model for future global negotiations of North-South issues depends in large measure on which parties to the effort were pleased or displeased, and how much. The authors together are clear enough on the demise or the failure thus far of other earlier models, and all may want to agree that "if states are to make policy internationally through global conferences, a new framework needs to evolve, one based on a process of give and take" (p. 144). But what if one side perceives that it gave quite a bit more than it took? And what if events in the predictably near future (at the "mid-term" evaluation and review conference scheduled for 1985) bear out that perception, as even these authors confess that it well may? Then the allegedly good features of the Paris process become much less attractive, and the model itself much less promising. It is a problem that these authors have necessarily left unresolved. But they do not even agree fully enough between themselves convincingly to persuade others that the models that they recommend for the future are either desirable or likely.

KEITH S. PETERSEN

Rhodes College

Caught in the Middle East: Japan's Diplomacy in Transition. By Michael Yoshitsu. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1984. Pp. xi + 113. $20.00.)

The thrust of this short but pithy volume is that Japan's foreign policy has been undergoing a fundamental change since 1973. From the end of World War II until the international oil crisis of 1973, Japan's government was content to follow America's lead in world affairs and cultivate the image of a loyal and trustworthy ally. But by the 1980s, Japan had become a largely independent actor in world affairs.

In the Middle East, Japan's interests have corresponded only in part with those of the United States. Dependent on the Middle East for most of its energy, Japan's economy has been hostage to the good will of the Arab and Iranian oil producers. Japanese policymakers whom Yoshitsu interviewed perceive the Arab-Israeli dispute, and especially the Palestinian question, as the fundamental cause of instability and conflict in the Middle East. The unneutral American policy of siding with Israel is seen to stand in the way of any permanent solution. The Japanese have therefore sought to cooperate with the EEC powers in order to correct America's "bad habits" and mediate a settlement in the Middle East. The Japanese government in 1973 proclaimed its support for Palestinian self-determination, in 1976 permitted the establishment of a PLO liaison office in Tokyo, and in 1981 welcomed Yasir Arafat's visit to Japan.

Japan's principal concerns in the Iranian hostage crisis were to protect Iran from superpower intervention and internal collapse. The Japanese feared that Washington's policies might complicate the securing of oil supplies and the blunting of the Soviet advance in the Persian Gulf area. By cooperating with the Western European countries, Japan hoped to restrain America. Of continuing concern to the Japanese was the safety of the Iran-Japan Petrochemical Company, in which nearly $2 billion of Japanese capital was invested. The Iran-Iraq War inflicted physical damage on the uncompleted facilities of the IJPC and threatened the future of the project. Although the Mitsui Company wanted to cut its losses and get out, both the Iranian government (desirous of profits) and the Japanese government (seeking to protect Japan's oil supply) wanted to preserve the project.

With respect to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Japanese hoped that further Soviet aggression could be deterred by cooperating with the Western allies. Ronald Reagan's suspension of the grain embargo seemed to signify a lack of American resolve. At the same time, the Reagan administration's insistence that Japan drastically increase her defense expenditures seemed unreasonable to Japan.

Yoshitsu presents the theoretical conclusion of his study, a "regional view of world politics," in the Appendix of the book. In a regional perspective, Japan created a "network of bilateral, multilateral, and transnational measures applied selectively to three Middle Eastern concerns," namely regime instability, intra-area hostility, and foreign (superpower) intervention. The outlines of Japanese foreign policy delineated here are new to observers who are accustomed to seeing Japan in the simple role of an American ally. Based on authoritative sources, and written with a fresh perspective, Yoshitsu's book is one that no specialist on Japanese or American foreign policy can afford to ignore.

THEODORE MCNELLY

University of Maryland

Normative Theory

Political Judgment. By Ronald Beiner. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984. Pp. xvi + 199. $20.00, cloth; $9.50, paper.)

Beiner's articulate essay has a political purpose, "to disclose a mental faculty [political judgment] by which we situate ourselves in the political world without relying upon explicit rules and methods, and thus to open up a space of deliberation that is being closed ever more tightly in technocratic societies. . . . Ultimately, what is sought in this study is a redefinition of citizenship" (p. 3). If his political aim is hardly a novel one, the means he suggests are extraordinary. Elaborating on his remarks in his edition of Hannah Arendt's posthumous *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy* (University of Chicago Press, 1982), Beiner attempts nothing less than a synthesis of Kantian and Aristotelian political philosophies.

Why have political theorists ignored a political concept as important as judgment? Beiner concludes from a survey of contemporary arguments in political theory—those of Jürgen Habermas, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Arendt—that we must reconsider the fundamental alternatives of Kant and Aristotle. Reflecting on *The Critique of Judgment,* Beiner concludes that Kant might (and should) have developed a political philosophy based on the notion of objectivity of taste rather than have proceeded as he did in the later works on history (such as *Perpetual Peace*). "In judging the political world we exercise taste, but it is a faculty of taste as all-encompassing as human experience itself" (p. 165). But such a formal, principled notion of judgment does not adequately consider man's social and political character.

Hence, Beiner turns to Aristotle's account of prudence (*phronēsis*) in Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics.* Beiner interprets qualities often associated with prudence, "judgment" (*gnōmē*) and "understanding" (*sunesis*), to mean that "judging-with" or "sympathy" (*suggnōmē*) are important elements of prudence. Thus friendship and rhetoric are crucial in Aristotle's political philosophy, for they bind together the political community, reflecting common judgments about the common good. With the importance of prudence, friendship, and rhetoric, Aristotle's notion of judgment is "diametrically opposed" to that of Kant (p. 71).

Beiner wants political judgment to embrace both Kantian autonomy and Aristotelian community, detached taste and grounded prudence, Thucydides and Pericles. "Political judgment must be aesthetic *and* teleological: it must encompass formal-transcendental features of the faculty of judgment, as well as orient itself to rationally desirable human ends" (p. 102).

Now Beiner (a Canadian) is certainly correct in saying that the theory of political judgment should be "exemplified" by the particulars it illuminates. But consider his own examples of political judgment reflecting its "tragic responsibility"—Arendt's *Eichmann in Jerusalem* (Penguin, 1977) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty's *Humanism and Terror* (Beacon Press, 1969), the latter a despicable apology for Soviet tyranny. Other examples are problematic as well.

In a way Beiner's concerns remind one of Kant's inspiration, Rousseau. But Rousseauian and Kantian morality reflect the lowness of Machiavelli's project even more than those earlier adherents of Machiavelli they criticized. Ignoring Machiavelli's significance here, Beiner remains within the horizon of the modern intellectual debate (deproletarized Marx and academized Heidegger). Moreover, Beiner depreciates Aristotle. He leaves undiscussed the greatest tension between Aristotle and Kant: Aristotle saw philosophy arising from wonder, whereas Kant sought to put an end to wonder, that is, to philosophy itself. (Hence Kant elevated morality above philosophy.) Finally, Beiner, while admiring *phronēsis,* has no use for Aristotle's virtue as perfected in the magnanimous man (*megalopsuchos*). This reflects Beiner's slighting of classical political philosophy's standard of the best regime. That is, he does not make the question of natural right the central one. Had he followed through these steps he might have concluded that a proper study of political judgment would have its *archē* in its particular manifestations—such as Lincoln and Churchill.

KEN MASUGI

The Claremont Institute for the Study of Statesmanship and Political Philosophy

The State and Political Theory. By Martin Carnoy. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984. Pp. 282. $27.50, cloth; $8.95, paper.)

Often reading works on Marxist theory is like reading a bad novel: One encounters a cast of thousands, each player appearing briefly and then disappearing into the great mass never to be heard of again with little in the way of story line to connect the disparate characters or events. Happily, Martin Carnoy avoids these difficulties and provides a masterful analysis of recent Marxist thought.

The framework for this study is set in the opening chapters, which provide two alternative understandings of the nature and function of the State. The opening chapter, misleadingly titled "The State and American Political Thought," actually presents the case for liberalism as developed by Adam Smith and John Locke. Only after analyzing free-market and social contract theories does Carnoy turn to a discussion of the State from an explicitly American perspective in the form of pluralism and corporatism.

The minimalist view of the State, as represented by classical liberalism, is then contrasted with the Marxist view of the State. Marx's own view of the State is threefold according to Carnoy: The State emerges from the material conditions of society, particularly the relations of production; rather than representing the common good, the State represents the class dominant in productive relations; therefore, "the State in bourgeoisie society is the repressive arm of the bourgeoisie" (p. 50).

Although this basic theoretical framework holds throughout Marx, it is not fully developed, and there are inconsistencies among Marx's various writings. The limitations and tensions found within Marx—especially concerning why and how the State is an instrument of the ruling class, the possibility of State autonomy from the class structure of the economic system, and the role of democracy in a socialist revolution—provide the grounds for the reinterpretation of Marx.

Lenin's theory of the State, which is actually a strategy for revolution, eliminates all of the tensions and ambiguities found in Marx. But given his narrow understanding of the State, Lenin derails rather than develops Marxian theory.

As thesis begets antithesis, so Lenin begets Rosa Luxemburg, who defends the possibility of a worker democracy against Lenin's new centralism and a host of other revisionists. The major part of Carnoy's book deals with some of the most important of the post-Leninist theorists, all of whom attempt to put the red train back on the tracks. Each of these core chapters provides an introduction to a thinker or school of thought (among those discussed are Gramsci, Althusser, Poulantzas, Offe, Bobbio, Cardoso, and a number of Americans) and an analysis of the thinker as he relates to or develops the basic Marxian model. The real strength of Carnoy's treatment, however, is that he shows the relationship of these thinkers not only to Marx, but also to each other. Thus, his analysis takes the form of a debate between various points of emphasis and interpretation within the Marxist camp.

Carnoy concludes that contemporary Marxian analyses "are generally opposed to Lenin's view of the State: the State is not regarded simply as an instrument of the ruling class" (p. 250). The State, rather than the means of production, has become the focus of class conflict. In addition, Carnoy argues that recent Marxist thought sees the transition to socialism in terms of a democratic movement rather than a violent struggle.

Although one may disagree with some of Carnoy's editorial decisions (for example, no discussion of Jurgen Habermas), this book is well organized and cogently written. It can be used effectively at two levels: It is a fine introduction to recent Marxist theory, but it is also a sophisticated analysis of recent controversies within Marxist thought that will be of value to those already initiated in these concerns.

STEVEN D. EALY

Armstrong State College

The Analysis of Power: Core Elements and Structure. By Geoffrey Debnam. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. Pp. x + 112. $19.95.)

Debnam has written a concise and relatively balanced book on social power, which can be read at two levels. At one level the book is a critique of the existing community power literature. Although he devotes more space to attacking critics of pluralism such as Floyd Hunter, Peter

Bachrach and Morton Baratz, Matthew Crenson, John Galventa, and Steven Lukes, Debnam does critique pluralists, especially Nelson Polsby and Robert Dahl, for their narrow focus on "Who governs?" and their consequent avoidance of the "Who benefits?" question. Because much of this criticism has already appeared in print, including Debnam's 1975 article in the *American Political Science Review* (*69*, 889-899), students of power will largely find this material familiar.

At a second level the book introduces Frederick Frohock's core properties framework as a new approach to the study of power. Noting the wide variations in definitions of power and the further gap between these formal definitions and the operational terms actually used in research, Debnam argues that it is necessary "to identify the core elements that are present in all conceivable instances of power," otherwise analysis can be flawed by a fatal preoccupation with other features, such as conflict (p. i). After a search of the community power literature for nominees to the "core elements" category, Debnam produces a list of 15 elements, which through a series of ad hoc arguments, he reduces to four: action, actor, intention, and outcome.

Debnam's identification of these four core elements does not, however, free his study of power from all major methodological difficulties. By his own admission, both intention and outcome are difficult to apply in practice because their meaning varies depending on whether one is applying the term from the viewpoint of the observer or the observed (pp. 50, 59-60, 84). For Debnam, this problem of duality is one inherent in the social sciences; yet, according to Debnam, the problem of ignoring the duality (i.e., a covert ideological stance masquerading as objective analysis) is much worse than the problem of ambiguity which is inherent in any approach which honestly faces up to the duality. Granted that his conclusion is correct, Debnam's argument would be more convincing if he had dealt with several books by and about Michel Foucault, which explicitly address this structural aspect of power.

Those familiar with his 1975 article may also be troubled by an unexplained shift in emphasis in Debnam's present argument. In 1975, he explicitly and repeatedly argued that power was a descriptive rather than an explanatory concept (pp. 898-899, 906). Although his focus in this book remains the same—identifying the context of power and demanding evidence of a causal relationship between intention and effect—he no longer explicitly rejects power as an explanatory term.

In contrast to the problems noted previously, Debnam's discussion of action and actors is crisp and well fleshed out, especially his analysis of collective actors. In addition, his attempt to deal explicitly with the subjective side of power in that chapter and throughout the book represents an important, albeit incomplete, start toward a proper understanding of that dimension of power, which is all too frequently ignored by political scientists. Debnam himself could have profitably incorporated insights by social psychologists in this regard, especially those of Samuel Bacharach and Edward Lawler. Still, what Debnam has written should be useful to students of power and should be especially attractive to those who feel uncomfortable with either side in the polarized community power literature, which remains divided among pluralist and anti-pluralist lines.

EDWARD S. MALECKI

California State University, Los Angeles

The Feminist Case against Bureaucracy. By Kathy E. Ferguson. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1984. Pp. xviii + 286. $24.95.)

Those who work in bureaucratic organizations and those who are the clients of bureaucracies often know what it is like to be marginalized, either through being made invisible in relationship to superiors or, ironically, by being constantly exposed, being made highly visible through supervision, techniques of surveillance, and the structuring of time so that one's time is accounted for. This book takes the insights of those who have had the bureaucratic experience and develops a singular and striking argument: The modern, bureaucratic organization of social life is universalizing the processes by which women have been subjugated to men. Contemporary guides to success in business, the use of language as a means of insuring monopolies of expert knowledge, the function of bureaucratic rationality as a technique for denegrating, and discounting the validity of emotion are among the topics taken up in this unique study of modern bureaucracy.

This book is divided into five essays. Ferguson starts by arguing that the critique of bureaucracy is best advanced through the use of a discourse that not only comprehends the subtle ways in which bureaucratic power is exercised, but that also has potential for presenting an alternative vision of collective life. Radical feminist thought does just that, in her view. She evokes Michel Foucault's idea that the resistance to dominant discourses might provide the basis for the construction of new, less threatening forms of subjectivity. The discourse of bureaucracy, Ferguson argues, constitutes the dominant language through which modern subjects are shaped. It is that discourse she wishes to challenge.

Chapters 3 and 4, "The Bureaucrat as the Second Sex" and "The Client as the Second Sex," detail the charges Ferguson makes in the earlier chapters. She develops the concept of "feminization," initially used by Ann Douglas in *The Feminization of American Culture* (Alfred A. Knopf, 1977). " 'Feminization' involves the extension of the depoliticizing, privatizing aspects of women's traditional role to the sectors of the population who are the victims of bureaucratic organizations, both the administrators and the clientele," she explains (p. 93). Through a rigorous examination of contemporary organization theory, the use of interviews, and a skillful reading of labor industrial relations literature, Ferguson buttresses her argument with the sort of compelling evidence that is immediately recognizable to anyone who has struggled to cope with working within a bureaucratic organization or who has confronted a bureaucracy as a client.

Ferguson does not call for an alternative "masculinization" of modern, bureaucratic society, but instead argues for the development of a feminist discourse of resistance. The concluding chapter, "Elements of a Feminist Discourse," presents the case for alternative value structures based upon values that are associated with the experience of women but that have been devalued precisely by modern bureaucratic forms of organization.

Ferguson's conclusion may strike some as a bit too facile. Such is the fate, it seems, of almost all works that attempt to move off the spot of radical critique to present an alternative vision. But in her sense of the tragic elements of contemporary, bureaucratically determined social life, and in her willingness to offer an alternative discourse, Ferguson has opened what should be a new and refreshing debate about the future of bureaucracy and the future of feminism. If this book does little else, and it does much more, it should end any remaining doubt about the value of feminist political thought for providing a critical perspective on contemporary political problems.

THOMAS L. DUMM

University of Houston, Downtown

Beyond Subjective Morality: Ethical Reasoning and Political Philosophy. By James S. Fishkin. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984. Pp. vii + 201. $22.00.)

James Fishkin's new book is an ambitious work, spanning as it does the fields of moral philosophy, moral psychology, and what might be called speculative cultural analysis. The main part of the book is an account of the ways in which "ordinary moral reasoners" develop subjectivist positions on ethics as a way of dealing with their own positions on moral issues. Fishkin believes that such skepticism is characteristic of our contemporary moral culture. However, he argues, this common skepticism is not inevitable, and it may be avoided by a better understanding of the conditions of morality. The speculative social analysis of the book is to be found in Fishkin's interesting thesis that the moral subjectivism of our culture undermines the legitimacy of the liberal state.

An important part of Fishkin's argument is a taxonomy of ethical positions, constructed for an analysis of the "meta-ethical" positions of ordinary moral reasoners. The proposed classificatory scheme consists of six claims about moral judgments, each alleged to entail those that follow. The strongest claim is that "One's judgments are ***absolute,*** that is, their inviolable character is rationally unquestionable" (p. 11); the weakest is simply that "One's judgments apply [only] to oneself" (p. 14). The proponent of the first claim is committed to the position ("absolutism") that there are "rationally unquestionable principles that hold inviolably, with objective validity, with universalizability, and . . . that apply to others as well as to oneself" (Kant is cited as an example on page 15). The "amoralist" rejects all six claims, including the weakest. In between the absolutist and the amoralist are to be found defenders of "rigorism," "minimal objectivism," "subjective universalism," "relativism," and "personalism."

Using this classificatory scheme, Fishkin analyzes the meta-ethical claims and assumptions of some moral reasoners with whom he has conducted extensive interviews. Although it is possible that the latter are not representative of ordinary moral reasoners—all (but one) university students at Yale or Cambridge and all (but one) male—any reader of this journal who has ever discussed ethics with college students will recognize the positions articulated. Fishkin argues that his moral reasoners have certain "expectations" (e.g., "An objectively valid moral position must have a basis that is rationally unquestionable" [p. 52]), and that these give rise to subjectivism. Thus, a rejection of these assumptions may enable one to avoid skepticism.

The crisis of liberal culture to which Fishkin wishes to draw our attention is due to the fact that the legitimacy of the liberal state cannot be based "on the controversial religious or metaphysical assumptions of any particular group" given liberalism's commitment to state neutrality (p. 154). Yet if we make the assumptions that lead Fishkin's moral reasoners to skepticism, it is unclear how the legitimacy of the liberal state is to be defended given the unavailability of a foundation in "ultimate convictions" about religious or metaphysical matters.

Although Fishkin's project is interesting and original, there are a number of problems that should be mentioned. For one, the religious and metaphysical skepticism that he appears to accept in his account of contemporary liberal culture risks undermining his attack on moral skepticism. More importantly, there are serious problems with the taxonomy of moral positions that Fishkin develops. It is hard to see how to use the scheme to classify the moral theories of many classical and contemporary philosophers (e.g., Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Rousseau, Hegel, Philippa Foot, David Gauther). Yet Fishkin claims that "the seven positions defined by the total scheme combine to capture the full range of possible consistent positions on the issues that they classify" (p. 10). The scheme seems to work well only for "Kantian" moral theories. Further, the scheme reflects some of the very confusions that seem to lead Fishkin's moral reasoners down the path of skepticism. The various claims conflate epistemological requirements (e.g., that moral judgments be rationally unquestionable), scope requirements (e.g., that moral judgments apply interpersonally), logical or formal requirements (e.g., that relevantly similar cases be treated similarly), and overrideability conditions (e.g., that duties be absolute or inviolable). In one of the appendixes, Fishkin discusses some elaborations of this taxonomy, but we are still left with a scheme much less general than that promised in the beginning of the enquiry and thus unlikely to enable contemporary moral reasoners to find a particularly stable foundation for the liberal polity.

CHRISTOPHER W. MORRIS

University of California, Los Angeles

Beyond Domination: New Perspectives on Women and Philosophy. Edited by Carol C. Gould. (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld Publishers, 1984. Pp. xii + 321. $24.95, cloth; $11.95, paper.)

Beyond Domination is an articulate collection for scholars in philosophy, the social sciences, and psychiatry. It should be read for the excitement of new or revised conceptualization and possible paradigm shift and as a corrective to inadequate thought modes; Linda J. Nicholson (pp. 221-230) nicely combines these strengths. These are the supplemented proceedings of a 1981 interdisciplinary conference on the philosophy of women's liberation convened by the Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant Institute of Women Today. The relative moderation of the proceedings may render radical ideas palatable to the intellectually curious. One result of this circumstance is that many contributions, for example, that of Janice Moulton and Francine Rainone (pp. 189-203), demonstrate tension between creativity and palatability, which may not amount to full disclosure (see, for example, Gould's chapter 1).

These largely historically grounded and valuable perspectives (Mitchell Aboulafia, pp. 175-185; Paula Rothenberg, pp. 204-220) also sometimes become dismayingly ahistorical through nonrecognition of blinders that have characterized past feminist thought—for example, the centrality of the complementarity of women's and men's roles. Space limitations notwithstanding, the underdevelopment of overinclusive arguments is frustrating (e.g., Anne Donchin, pp. 89-103; Eva Feder Kittay, pp. 145-174).

The juxtaposition of the sophisticated (for example, Caroline Whitbeck on gender orientation) and the naive (for example, uncritical reliance on the linear socialization model) is problematic. Discussions of mother-child separation explore the child's but not the mother's need for independence; compare, for example, Aboulafia (pp. 179-183) and Janet Farrell Smith (p. 265). The nonetheless fairly uniform reliance on androgyny is outmoded in much recent feminist thought; the emphasis on liberty, ethnocentric. Alison Jagger's to-the-point critique of traditional Marxism seems overinspired given her lackluster critique of liberal feminism.

Also problematic is a tendency to sidestep issues: Gould argues the deinstitutionalization of marriage without discussion of battering (p. 22); Donchin, Freud's discovery of the unconscious mind without discussion of its incest-based aspects. Kittay's chapter on pornography is confusing. The complex abortion issue is mostly tangentially and not satisfactorily explored; the sterilization issue seems not to exist; the differently-abled are not recognized as worthy of sustained analysis. Excepting Rothenberg's analysis, race is ignored. Geraldine Perreault criticizes radical feminists for racism, then mentions certain white but no black "exceptions"; third-world women fare no better (p. 299).

The weakest chapter may be Rosemary Radford Reuther's, which presents history that is already reasonably known and avoids some of the most creative thought on women, spirituality, and empowerment. Reuther's discussion of women's marginalization by organized religion turns from the ethical failure of corporate responsibility in an individualistic society to founder on the argument that "liberation feminists" see biblical history monofocally. These feminists demonstrate aspects of biblical history and its precursors that retain, reinstate, revise, or seek to destroy goddess worship, and hence awareness of the precursors' significance to biblical history.

Negative references to the attractiveness of goddess worship to propertied individuals are equally unconvincing: Anne Hutchinson's and Mary Baker Eddy's beliefs were similarly attractive; this does not defeat the importance to many women of Hutchinson's and Eddy's work. "Liberation feminists" are involved in the search for documentation of the nature of societies engaging in goddess worship.

Often, the further removed from theology or controversial subjects in organized religion, the stronger the presentations. The strongest of the 17 essays may be Whitbeck's and Sandra Harding's. Harding's concise epistemological analysis is concerned with how sexual politics shape legitimated beliefs. Her orientation emphasizes the disproportionate reliance on (select) men's social experiences and the denial of validity to women's perceptions of them and their own. Further, denial is based on men's experiences, which model most study and progress. Claims to universality for any such paradigm are suspect because of the historical, differential objectifications of women's and men's senses of self or gender. The masculinized abstraction of moral development and thus standards for " 'practical rationality' " (p. 55), are inadequate to judge allocations of rationality between women and men. Harding asks (p. 57), "Why should [criteria for maximally complete and undistorted scientific accounts] not insist on the neutralization only of epistemologically regressive social values?" The gender-typed rational reconstructions of the scientific process may be amiss rather than the process itself.

Whitbeck turns to a feminist ontology and its core concept, the self-other relation, to demonstrate brilliantly its difference from self-other opposition. Whitbeck's point is not the continuation of opposition but the value of social vision organized cooperatively for purposes of mutual realization.

The diversity of Harding's and Whitbeck's essays is a tribute to feminist philosophical diversity and thoughtfulness. Both essays deserve separate and combined study.

SARAH SLAVIN

State University College at Buffalo

Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment. Edited by Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Pp. x + 371. $59.50.)

The debate that is at the center of this collection of essays is over the relative influence of two intellectual traditions upon the origins of political economy: civic humanism, with its concerns for virtue and corruption, and the natural jurisprudence tradition, with its focus on justice. Five of the 13 papers collected here were originally presented at a colloquium held on civic humanism and Scottish political economy in May, 1979 at King's College, Cambridge, and the others were either commissioned for this volume or were presented during a seminar series that preceded the colloquium. On the whole, the essays suggest that although civic humanism may describe the intellectual background against which political economy emerged, it is the jurisprudence tradition that captures more of the content of the new science.

In his contribution, J. G. A. Pocock seems to back off from his earlier strong claims for the civic humanist tradition, arguing now that civic humanism should be seen as a paradigm serving a heuristic purpose for the historian. As such, it is just one of a set of competing paradigms for the understanding of Scottish philosophy and political economy—the tradition of civil jurisprudence is another such paradigm. For the Scots themselves, the competing paradigms take the form of competing rhetorics available to serve a variety of ideological purposes so that the different languages may wind up present in the same theorist as ideological need dictates. "It is certainly not the case," Pocock argues, "that the Scottish theorists in general regarded republican and jurisprudential language as distinct and ideologically opposite rhetorics" (p. 251).

Donald Winch, however, argues that Adam Smith was entirely free of the civic humanist influence. Instead, Winch maintains that when Smith subsumed political economy under the broader framework of "the science of the legislator," he was rejecting the civic humanist lessons of his teacher Francis Hutcheson in favor of a natural law perspective combined with "a comparative historical treatment of law and government considered as social phenomena" in the manner of Montesquieu and Hume (p. 264). Winch acknowledges that the resulting view of politics as constitutional machinery is a pale one compared with the active citizen virtue of civic humanism but defends it nonetheless, choosing to see Smith as an eighteenth-century theorist in eighteenth-century terms.

A more modern and interesting interpretation of Smith is given in the editors' introductory essay. Hont and Ignatieff claim that Smith set out in the *Wealth of Nations* to solve a "paradox" he had identified in his earlier *Theory of Moral Sentiments*; namely, that while commercial society was inegalitarian in its distribution of property, it also provided more adequately for the needs of the poor than had earlier, more egalitarian (and more virtuous) societies. The paradox is resolved through Smith's theory of economic growth, a theory that takes into consideration the role of inequality in fostering emulation and thus the incentive to accumulation. That incentive, when combined with the increased productivity made possible by the division of labor, results in a system in which the living standard of the lowest orders steadily improves, absolutely if not relatively to the orders above them. Security of property is essential to such a system, and Hont and Ignatieff argue that it is for this reason that Smith adopted, following Grotius, a "commutative" rather than a "distributive" theory of justice (i.e., justice as police rather than as allocation of property).

This is a convincing account of Smith, despite the unnecessary interpretive ploy of the "paradox," which was never so stated by him. In separate essays, Hont goes on to trace the development of arguments in the eighteenth century concerning the relationship of rich and poor countries in the competitive scramble for markets that broke free of the civic humanist projection of cycles of growth and decline, while Ignatieff provides an insightful analysis of John Millar, arguing that the Scottish philosopher played a key role in marginalizing the civic humanist discourse by reducing it to a moralism of private life. The combined weight of these arguments is more than enough to overwhelm the defenders of the civic humanist interpretation represented here. John Robertson, in an essay comparing Andrew Fletcher with David Hume, claims that with Hume, "the Scottish Enlightenment came to the limits of the civic tradition" (p. 141) while still remaining within them since Hume argued that commercial society would make civic virtue possible despite employing nonvirtuous means. No more convincing is Nicholas Phillipson's view that Smith's civic moralism must be interpreted against the background of Scottish provincialism and the chance it provided "responsibly-minded men of middling rank" (p. 179) to escape the worst features of commercial society. Robertson and Phillipson both appear to be fighting a losing battle.

Other contributions include an informative essay by James Moore and Michael Silverstone on Gershom Carmichael, who was responsible for the particular shape taken by natural jurisprudence in Scotland, and an article by John Dunn contrasting the theocentrism of John Locke with the practical reason of Hume and Smith, further attesting to the modern temper at the root of political economy.

Nicholas Xenos

University of Massachusetts at Amherst

The Reconstruction of Patriotism: Education for Civic Consciousness. By Morris Janowitz. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984. Pp. xiv + 220. $22.50.)

Morris Janowitz examines an issue that seldom is subject to social and political analysis—patriotism. His thesis is clear: The long-term trend in politics has been to enhance citizen rights without effective articulation of citizen obligations (p. ix). A meaningful balance between the two, he contends, must be restored.

Democratic institutions cannot endure unless the citizens possess a sense of attachment or allegiance to the nation-state. It is, therefore, a matter of great concern to democracies that a vital system of civic education be established whereby their political traditions, the operation and organization of their governmental institutions, and the "essential identifications and moral sentiments required for performance as effective citizens" can be learned (p. 12). Traditionally, the central agencies of civic education in the United States have been the school system and military. Yet, for a variety of reasons, as Janowitz notes, these institutions have declined in their effectiveness as instruments for civic education.

His assessment of civic education in America is both institutional and historical. In addition to the military service, he examines primary, secondary, and collegiate institutions as agencies for citizen education and contrasts them with experimental work and national service programs such as the Civilian Conservation Corps and VISTA. In addition, he depicts the changes that have taken place in the popular definition of citizenship since the American Revolution, contrasting especially the post-World War II period with the decades just preceding it.

Especially after 1960, Janowitz charges, the decline of civic education was led by politically motivated intellectuals and social scientists suspicious of traditional notions of patriotism. There also occurred the emergence of what Janowitz calls a "new communalism" in which an emphasis on ethnic and racial affiliations, particularly among groups which felt excluded from economic advantages, outweighed "concern with national citizenship" (p. 20). Social studies instructors further aggravated the delegitimization of social and political institutions by endorsing in the name of civil and economic rights many of the claims of aggrieved minorities (p. 23). The new directions in civic education, the seeds of which were planted by the social realism professed by left-of-center intellectuals, emphasized "various forms of political dissent of the status quo" rather than traditional patriotism (p. 98). As a result of these trends, schooling came to play a less effective role as an agency for civic education.

Between the American Revolution and the introduction of the all-volunteer military force in 1973, the military constituted the other major agency of civic education. The idea of the citizen soldier, which embodied the belief in obligatory national service, enhanced civic consciousness. Yet, with the end of military conscription "the contribution of military service to civic education becomes problematic" (p. 42). In effect, the citizen soldier concept has been abandoned. Although Janowitz would prefer the return of conscription, he realizes that this prospect is not presently politically feasible (p. 198).

To bring about the reconstruction of patriotism, then, Janowitz proposes establishing a program of voluntary national service in which options for either military service or community civilian work would be provided. "Work pursued on behalf of the community or nation is a form of civic education" (p. 170). To guarantee participation from a socially heterogeneous group of people, Janowitz suggests that federal aid to education be made dependent upon national service.

The strength of this study lies in Janowitz's persuasive argument that the durability and vitality of democratic institutions require that a sense of community, or shared values, be preserved. Without civic consciousness, he rightly observes, social and political fragmentation ensues. My only complaint (albeit a minor one) with this lucid and impressively researched polemic is Janowitz's implication that the military and educational institutions are almost entirely responsible for the present decline in civic consciousness. Other equally important contributing factors are not given their proper due. The loss of family authority, the decline of religious faith, mass industrialism, and the retreat from localism and traditions have been identified by such social critics Russell Kirk and Robert Nisbet as having inclined us toward a loss of real community. Since the problem of community is intimately connected with the problem of civic consciousness, this book would have benefitted from a consideration of the insights of scholars such as these.

W. WESLEY MCDONALD

Elizabethtown College

Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukács to Habermas. By Martin Jay. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. Pp. xi + 576. $29.50.)

This book is a monumental history of Western Marxism. It contains separate chapters on almost every thinker of note operating within this tradition: Lukács, Korsch, Gramsci, Bloch, Horkheimer, Marcuse, Adorno, Lefebvre, Goldmann, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Althusser, Della Volpe, Colletti, and Habermas. Yet the work is more than a mere encyclopedia. Its organizing theme is the concept of totality. Indeed this concept has enjoyed a singularly privileged position within both Marxist and non-Marxist social theory.

There are two distinct senses in which the idea of totality can be used. The first is a primarily methodological sense that enjoins us to understand the parts of any complex phenomenon in terms of their relational properties to some larger whole. Methodological holists as they are sometimes called tend to look not for external, causal associations between events, but for relations of opposition, mediation, and reconciliation between them. The second sense of the term, however, implies a normative longing for coherence, wholeness, plenitude, or what Rousseau once poignantly called *"le moi sans contradiction."* Implied here is a call to transform and overcome the present state of the world which may be variously described as alienated, reified, disenchanted, or anomic.

The concept of totality, Jay notes, was introduced into the Marxist tradition by Lukács who credited Hegel, not Marx, with its discovery. In *History and Class Consciousness* (1923) he wrote: "It is not the primacy of economic motives in historical explanation that constitutes the decisive difference between Marxism and bourgeois thought but the point of view of totality." Lukács hoped the introduction of this concept would liberate Marxism from the dead hand of economic determinism and the belief that revolution was only possible when the productive forces of society had reached an appropriate stage of development. Like Gramsci, who also called for a "revolt" against the deterministic laws of *Capital,* Lukács endowed the term with a high degree of political activism or "voluntarism," that is, Leninism.

And yet the relation between the concept of totality and political practice was far from unambiguous as the heirs of Lukács were to discover. In their joint work, *The Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1947), Horkheimer and Adorno presented modern society as a repressive totality of such stability and cohesion as to present literally no way out. The internal dynamics of "enlightenment" with its twin forces of capitalist production and the modern sciences of nature had drawn a closed circle from which there could be no means of escape. The subsequent history of the Frankfurt School divided over those like Horkheimer, who resigned themselves to the "iron cage" of modernity and who turned increasingly toward literary and aesthetic criticism as a form of consolation, and those like Marcuse, who remained loyal to Marx's original utopianism, but who saw it as a "Great Refusal," a nihilistic rejection of whatever exists.

Jay fulfills his intention of portraying the "adventures" of this concept to an impressive degree. While deepening and completing, he builds upon the earlier interpretive studies of scholars like Perry Anderson, Alvin Gouldner, and Russell Jacoby. He has read and digested not only the primary sources, but also all of the important critical studies in English, French, German, and Italian. In addition, he moves through the minefields of critical theory, phenomenological, and structural Marxism with an ease that comes only with long familiarity. Given these merits, it seems ungenerous to search for faults. Yet one wonders whether the history of Western Marxism can be written as so many variations on the theme of totality, or whether the concept is being made to bear more weight than it can stand. Jay impicitly assumes that there is some essential structure or core meaning to the term that persists throughout the writings of the diverse authors that he studies. But is there? If so, it is not demonstrated.

To take only the two limiting cases. Ernst Bloch maintained a highly speculative sense of the term that sought to unify man and nature, subject and object, in a single cosmic process. Louis Althusser, by contrast, emphatically rejects the concept of totality even for limited purposes of historical explanation. Instead, he prefers to use terms like *overdetermination* and *structure in dominance* to describe the relations obtaining within a society. His critique of historicism and insistence on the "relative autonomy" of the superstructure points away from the tradition of holistic thinking with which Jay seeks to assimilate him. Indeed, it is never fully explained why Althusser merits inclusion as a contributor to a concept that he everywhere claims to reject.

In the final analysis I question whether the concept of totality can provide the unifying thread that runs throughout Western Marxism. Furthermore, one would like to have seen some kind of overall assessment of both the strengths and weaknesses of the concept, what it can help us to interpret and what it cannot. Until such an evaluation is provided, the concept of totality will remain vulnerable to attacks from methodological individualists like Popper on the Right and Nietzschean deconstructionists like Foucault and Derrida on the Left.

STEVEN B. SMITH

Yale University

Public Life and Late Capitalism: Toward a Socialist Theory of Democracy. By John Keane. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984. Pp. vii + 340. $39.50.)

Bureaucratic organizations increasingly administer the populations and social life of late capitalist societies. Keane's thesis is that this bureaucratization and rationalization of capitalism—the professional effort to administer, control, and depoliticize—both repress and incite demands and resistance that constitute and show the need for spheres of autonomous public life. Keane formulates a democratic road to socialism characterized by decentralized decision-making power and a plurality of public spheres.

He begins with an analysis of the internal contradictions of the bureaucracies and policies of the welfare state. It is an unstable and transitional social formation that cannot reproduce itself. Yet not even Max Weber was able to appreciate fully the limits of bureaucratic domination. Although he identified some of its internal tensions and was committed to a view of conflict based on a polytheism of values, Weber overlooked how his own analysis pointed to the possibility of public life. Keane's review of the theory of late capitalism in Claus Offe and Jürgen Habermas rejects Theodor Adorno's view of it as a totally administered society. Rather, it is a contradictory unity that fails to reproduce meaningful social and political relations and to rationalize state and corporate policy planning over time. Keane is critical of Habermas on the relationship between labor, science, and technology. Habermas's defense of instrumental rationality in work and relations with nature obscures the need for autonomous realms of public life in production and the ecological need not to treat nature as mere "standing reserve."

Keane's fifth chapter, where Michel Foucault's influence is most pronounced, is the finest portion of the book. He first reviews the contributions of Ferdinand Tönnies and John Dewey to a socialist theory of public life. Rejecting Habermas's theory of universal pragmatics as a framework, Keane proposes four elements in a socialist theory of public life. Its communication is sensuously embodied and depends upon gestures. A socialist public life values a rhetorical speech that produces new meanings whose linguistic density remains ambiguous, beyond rational consensus. It emphasizes as well the aesthetic dimensions of communicative action. And, it incorporates festivity, mutually negotiated consent, and disobedience. In short, the forms of communication in socialist public life are free, pluralistic, and self-interrogating, that is, as disorderly as possible.

Keane leaves several questions unanswered. First, there is a too-ready acceptance of the legitimation crisis thesis. Deficiencies in mass loyalty may or may not pose legitimation problems for late capitalist societies and their regimes. Legitimation crisis can perhaps take different forms. It may be latent or manifest. It may constitute no threat, a threat to a regime or system, or a threat to both. Not every decline in mass loyalty necessarily means that legitimation crisis is at hand.

Second, Keane holds that a wide array of diverse local movements and struggles represents the existing framework for autonomous spheres of public life. However, these may not all be genuine forms of resistance. Although they share an opposition to established disciplinary controls, Keane does not indicate other principles of local, fragmented, particularistic resistances that suggest their commonality as autonomous spheres of public life. Perhaps none is necessary. But we do need to know which are forms of resistance constituting autonomous public life and which reinforce established mechanisms of power. Not every local movement embodies a sphere of autonomous public life.

Third, local movements, when they embody public life, may introduce a bit more slack in the social order of late capitalism. The relaxation of some disciplinary controls no doubt can revive and democratize public life. Perhaps this is the best that can be hoped for in the struggle against domination. Keane argues for a democratic socialism that limits the controls of centralized bureaucracies and maximizes the decentralized power and slack in the social order. But he does not adequately address the likelihood that the construction of legitimate forms of institutionalized power in a democratic socialist society will introduce its own forms of imposition and controls in order to prevail over and/or minimize the enormous powers of corporate and state bureaucracies.

CHARLES E. ELLISON

University of Cincinnati

Analyzing Marx: Morality, Power and History. By Richard W. Miller. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984. Pp. xi + 319. $30.00, cloth; $8.95, paper.)

In the past decade or so, Anglo-American philosophers have discovered Marx. Richard Miller is, rightly, not content with the Marx his colleagues have found. Miller uses the techniques of analytic philosophy to interpret Marx, show the implausibility of technological determinist readings, and suggest his relevance to current controversies in analytic philosophy. But Miller does not demonstrate that analytic philosophy represents an essential or superior approach to Marx scholarship. Neglect of secondary sources particularly relevant to his project exaggerates Miller's claims for analytic philosophy and the uniqueness of his reading of Marx. Marx may clarify contemporary philosophical debates, but it is not clear that analytic philosophy makes a unique contribution to Marx scholarship.

For Miller, Marx rejects morality as a basis for social choice and political decision. No ethical theory—whether based on distributive, rights, utilitarian, or humanitarian claims—can justify institutional arrangements. Conflicting group needs and class interests, strategies for change, limits of rationality, and inevitable value differences suggest a new approach. In one of the book's more suggestive chapters, Miller sketches Marx's alternative to the moralization of politics, the experience and practice of class solidarity as the foundation of political commitment.

Miller holds that taking Marx seriously might improve social scientific analyses of power in advanced industrial societies. The concept of a ruling class, often dismissed as too outrageous to merit investigation, can be made intelligible and testable. A society has a ruling class when government actions serve the long-term interests of a group or coalition of groups (which controls the surplus produced by and opposes the interests of the majority) through definite but shifting mechanisms, and actions designed to break or disrupt this pattern are not permitted by government. Only extragovernmental uses of force can move resources enough to break the bond between policy and interests. Unfortunately, the effort to show the potential benefits of the concept overlooks studies of power published in the past decade.

Miller argues against Cohen's technological determinist reading of Marx's theory of history. Ruling-class dominance explains social stability. Historical change is rooted in the self-transforming tendencies of the means of production or, more narrowly, transformations in the economic bases of class power or new patterns of access to increasingly productive power that are fettered by existing production relations. He offers a much broader and more political interpretation, but one that still grants great causal independence to economic structures.

Finally, Miller's attack shifts to positivism as a philosophy of inquiry that deforms Marxism and social science. Miller claims that positivist method denies intelligible and scientific status to his reading of Marx's theory of history because it has no empirical laws of predictive import and employs shifting definitions of key categories in the theory. Miller resolves the conflict by suggesting that positivists have fundamentally misconstrued the logic of the social and the natural sciences. He opts instead for a mode of inquiry in which explanation and confirmation require a plurality of causal accounts and empirically controversial alternatives to explain social and historical phenomena. On this view, a general theory describes the causal mechanisms that bring about certain social phenomena or produce specific social changes. Confirmation requires that hypotheses be tested by fair causal comparison, with rival theories also able to generate hypotheses to explain existing data. This method of inquiry, based on specificity of times and fields and dependent on agreed-upon backbround principles, makes it more difficult for scientists simply and arbitrarily to exclude claims with disturbing political and cultural effects from scientific investigation.

Miller ably uses Marx to enter current debates in ethical theory, the analysis of power, and philosophy of inquiry. One wonders, however, if analytic philosophy has a particularly important role to play in Marx scholarship or if, indeed, it can be used to construct a credible Marx without assistance from other key disciplines.

CHARLES E. ELLISON

University of Cincinnati

The Tragedy of Political Science: Politics, Scholarship, and Democracy. By David M. Ricci. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984. Pp. xiii + 335. $30.00.)

This is a provocative, rich, and rewarding book that advances a thesis that will be hotly and widely debated by political scientists. The tragedy of political science, according to Ricci, lies in the conflict between two goods: the commitment to science and the commitment to the good, wise, democratic life. Ricci's focus is American political science. In developing his supporting argument he highlights two crises in the conflict-ridden marriage between science and democracy—one in the 1930s before World War II, the second in the decade from 1965 to 1975 when the behavioral establishment was challenged by a host of powerful critics. Ricci argues that the champions of a scientific political science were able to deal with the first crisis with the help of Dewey and Popper. The two philosophers advanced ideas that seemingly supported the compatibility of science and democracy. Some of these ideas helped the behavioralists to finesse both the premise that science could not defend democracy's values *and* the fact that science sometimes came up with findings that cast doubt on the truth of other liberal democratic postulates. The victory of the United States in World War II also helped to restore confidence in the marriage of science and democracy. These developments influenced behavioralism's understanding of, and high expectations about, science and liberal democracy. Political science could become a real science; liberal democracy was the good society! However, such confidence was soon to be undermined by practical events such as the civil rights movement and the Vietnam War and by another understanding of science—Thomas S. Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (University of Chicago Press, 1962). And although some in the behavioral establishment tried to coopt Kuhn, they were unable to still the adverse criticism of behavioral political science: that behavioral political science was a failure as science, and that it undermined a good, wise, democratic society.

As of this date, the second disturbing clash between science and the good, wise, democratic life has not been resolved. What can be done about this tragedy? Will it endure? Although Ricci emphasizes that the "tragic vision" enables some of us to learn from the tragic clash of ideals, he does not believe that most behavioral political scientists (devoted as they are to studying politics scientifically) will have the insight or courage to moderate their aspirations in order to do justice to democracy, the common good, or wisdom. Hence, that insightful minority seeking a more truthful and fruitful political science must practice "deception," or "robinhooding." Those in this minority must pretend to be involved in the "small conversation" of the behavioral political science establishment while they remain faithful to the "great conversation," which is the conversation concerned with the good life, wisdom, genuine human needs, illuminated by the intelligence derived from a study of history and rewarded by an appreciation of the political verities to be found in the "good" or "great books."

Those of us who have long been convinced that political science has three main concerns—the search for the good political life, for a more scientific understanding of politics, and for wise judgment in politics and public policy—will applaud Ricci's critique. Empirical political scientists (even though disagreeing with Ricci's analysis) will be made more self-critical of their operative assumptions by this intelligent, lucid, scholarly, well-argued book. However, not all of those who share Ricci's concerns will necessarily endorse his view of, or response to, our tragic future. Some may hold that a genuine integration of the major components of political science is theoretically possible if the discipline could be persuaded to accept a concept such as that of political health as political science's central integrating concept. Such a concept would do justice to the discipline's three main concerns. And, of course, successful integration (theoretical and practical) would overcome the tragedy of political science. Such integration is, moreover, quite compatible with Ricci's rightful concern for ethical standards for the good political life, for a fruitful empirical political science, and for political wisdom. Only time will tell if Ricci is right about the continuing tragedy of political science, or if genuine integration of the discipline's concerns will come about.

NEAL RIEMER

Drew University

Ordinary Vices. By Judith N. Shklar. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984. Pp. 268. $16.50.)

In this brilliant, psychologically insightful, and deeply humane book—which ranks cruelty first (and worst) among the vices, and argues for a skeptical, Montesquieuean "liberalism of fear," a "division and diffusion of power that will permit the flow of political cruelty to be dammed up"—Montaigne and Hegel meet to wonderful effect: Montaigne supplies the "ordinary vices" (cruelty, hypocrisy, snobbery, treachery, and misanthropy) that Shklar will illuminate, and Hegel brings the method of illumination—the method of reading great works of literature, in the manner of the *Phenomenology,* as clues to the political and moral beliefs and practices of nations and of ages.

As it happens, Hegel's favorites, *Antigone* and *Hamlet,* are very nearly the only literary works that Shklar does not employ in her storytelling about vices, and above all about the political effects of practicing those vices—the political effect, for example, of "Europhile," aristocracy-chasing snobbery in an American liberal democracy that values equality and simple manners. This she illustrates with a brilliantly compressed capsule version of Henry James's *Portrait of a Lady,* characterizing expatriate Gilbert Osmond as an "already demoralized American aesthete" whose "European snobbery" leaves him "no community" and "no culture, a mere connoisseur of an alien one" (p. 114).

But Shklar doesn't simply illustrate ordinary vices; she brings them vibrantly to life through their most notable practitioners in the "treasure house" of our literature. Thus, snobbery springs onto the stage in the person of Molière's *Bourgeois Gentilhomme,* M. Jourdain, but also in that of Jane Austen's Lady Catherine de Bourgh and Sinclair Lewis's Seneca Doane (in *Babbitt*). Hypocrisy is made to live and breathe through Molière's *Tartuffe* (the "matchless black comedy" of Puritan fear and dissembling), but no less through Dickens's "immortal hypocrite" Uriah Heep and through Hawthorne's Judge Pyncheon—who hides private wickedness and political ambition behind a false "free and hearty manner" that may gain him "the honors of a republic."

For all her striking resuscitation of snobbery and hypocrisy, however, Shklar thinks that some social critics—above all Hegel and Pascal—hated hypocrisy so much that insufficient room was left for a Montaignesque "cruel hatred of cruelty" as the vice to be put *first.* After all, as Shklar says, the artful dissembling of a Benjamin Franklin may be necessary if one hopes to influence a democracy without revealing one's "enormous superiority," and "culture snobs," silly as they are, support threadbare orchestras and museums.

Incomparably worse, unredeemed, is treachery—quickened by Conrad's Lord Jim, Thucydides' assorted traitors in *The Peloponnesian War,* and Josephus' betrayal of the Jews, but above all by remarkable retellings of Shakespeare's *Richard II* and *Coriolanus.* And misanthropy is made vivid partly through the writings of Machiavelli and Nietzsche—for whose "glory" and "creative cruelty" Shklar has no use at all—but especially through a dazzling reading of Shakespeare's *Timon of Athens,* the passionate hater who pays Alcibiades to destroy the *polis* that had despised and rejected him.

Nonetheless, misanthropy is for Shklar "ambiguous" and "politically a paradox"; whereas the "passionate and active" misanthrope like Timon is "indeed a political menace" who will cruelly "initiate slaughter," the "purely intellectual and distrustful misanthrope"—Montaigne, Montesquieu, Kant in some moods—feels a reasonable fear (of limitless power) that can "serve as the basis of political decency, legal restraint and the effort to create limited government that would attenuate the effects of the cruelty of those who rule" (p. 193). Indeed, for Shklar, "misanthropy's finest hour" arrived with

Montesquieu's "legal" government, in which "procedure replaced personality," in which people "could do no better than to indulge in lesser vices in order to avoid worse ones" (p. 197). When one recalls the social cost of producing Aristotle's virtuous great man—slavery for the many who are "living instruments" to an aristocratic project of "self-perfection"—Shklar observes tartly, "the advantages of Montesquieu's self-assertive vices may correspondingly recommend themselves" (p. 236). (Aristotle also loses a four-page *agon* with Kantian egalitarianism (p. 233): "You do not have to be an aristocratic, superbly endowed Greek male to be a decent character. This [Kantian respect for "humanity"] is a thoroughly democratic liberal character . . . neither demanding nor enduring servility.")

But if, for Shklar, a "liberalism of fear" avoids the worst single vice (cruelty) by fragmenting power and relying on the lesser vices—Montesquieuean "commerce," Kantian self-love of intelligent "devils" (who embrace republicanism and peace from "legal" motives), Madisonian ambition-counteracting-ambition—that does not make liberalism "base," a decline from an imaginary antique age of civic virtue: "The alternative . . . still before us, is not one between classical virtue and liberal self-indulgence, but between cruel military and moral repression and violence, and a self-restraining tolerance that fences in the powerful to protect the freedom and safety of every citizen" (p. 5). That is the voice of an Enlightenment that continues to enlighten.

Ordinary Vices is a wonderful book. It preserves what is greatest in Hegelianism—the reading of Western literature from Thucydides and Euripides to Shakespeare, Molière, Hawthorne, and James as the best clue to the complexities and ambiguities of vice and virtue—while avoiding what is (arguably) least attractive in Hegel: excessive reverence for the "modern state" viewed as rational freedom sufficiently (and safely) "realized." For such a book, which deepens important political and moral questions by relating them to the greatest artworks of the past two millenia, one can only be profoundly grateful.

PATRICK RILEY

University of Wisconsin

Reading Althusser: An Essay on Structural Marxism. By Steven B. Smith. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984. Pp. 230. $19.95.)

Louis Althusser's structuralist Marxism presented a significant and controversial challenge to neo-Marxist social theory. Born in a dispute with the orthodox dialectical materialism of social democracy and communism, the neo-Marxism of Lukács, Gramsci, the Frankfurt School, and the French existential Marxists offered a vision of Marxism that was at once Hegelian, subjective, humanistic, and historical. From this perspective, the early works of Marx were not the prescientific sins of youth, but the keys to the interpretation of the mature Marxian world view. Perhaps a theoretical reaction was inevitable. From the mid-sixties through the mid-seventies, Althusser set himself to the task of attacking the fundamental principles of neo-Marxism. Without reviving the old dialectical materialism, Althusser formulated a structuralist interpretation of Marxism that was Spinozist, scientific, objective, nihilistic, and antihistorical. In the process, the work of the young Marx was relegated to the status of a footnote in intellectual history.

Steven B. Smith's lucid book will reward both the specialist and the interested general reader. Smith's exposition of the central concepts of Marxist structuralism—that is, the "symptomatic reading" of texts, the "rupture" of tradition as the basis for progress in science, the "overdetermination" of the ideological superstructure, the notion of human beings as the unconscious "bearers" of the relations of production—is far more accessible than it is in Althusser's frequently arcane works. And the intellectual context for this exposition touches many of the foundations of contemporary political thought. Althusser's concepts are compared to developments in orthodox Marxism, neo-Marxism, philosophy of science, Freudian psychoanalysis, structural linguistics, and structural functionalism.

Although Smith's exposition is free from the polemics that have marked most previous studies of Althusser, it is far from uncritical. Each of Althusser's central ideas is subjected to criticism. Many of these criticisms are Smith's own. Others are derived from sources as diverse as Karl Marx and Alasdair MacIntyre, Hannah Arendt and Alfred Schmidt, Roger Garaudy and Leszek Kolakowski, to name only some. Ultimately, the reader is left with the impression that Althusser's structuralist Marxism is as conceptually complex as it is substantively impoverished.

Smith's unpolemical treatment of Althusser is refreshing, but not above reproach. From time to time throughout his study, Smith associates Althusser's structuralism with technocratic modes of thought and political organization. This thesis, if it really was a thesis, is suggestive and well worth developing. But Smith does not confront Althusser with this technocracy thesis. Rather, Smith's eclectic mode of criticism whittles away at

Althusser's position, but never engages it directly in a critical dialogue.

JOHN BOKINA

Pan American University

Max Weber and the Dispute over Reason and Value: A Study in Philosophy, Ethics, and Politics. By Stephen P. Turner and Regis A. Factor. (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984. Pp. ix + 274. $28.95.)

In this study of Max Weber, Turner and Factor have produced a work of impeccable scholarship, intellectual excitement, and theoretical importance. The content of the study addresses two primary areas: Weber's position on the relationship between reason and value emphasizing its historical and theoretical origins, and the controversy surrounding the broader issue for nearly 100 years.

The authors make their way through the intricacies of the arguments by keeping focused on Weber's ideas. Their mastery of both the details of the political environment where the theoretical battles emerged and of the subtleties of dozens of different positions is particularly remarkable.

Despite the many positive aspects of the work, there are troubling questions about its ultimate value as a contribution to the development of social scientific theory. These are reflected in the primary purpose that Turner and Factor give for writing the book and in the nature of the work itself.

The authors open their first chapter with a question, "why should anyone care about the history of the arguments for and against Max Weber's conception of the relation of reason, or, more broadly, rational and cognitive knowledge, and values?" (p. 1). Their answer seems to be twofold: that Weber's position has not been accurately understood, and that the general impression that we now have a theoretical consensus in the social sciences on the reason/value issue is mistaken. They suggest that because the issue is still alive and vital, we have to return to dealing with it. But although they effectively illustrate the great confusion that rages in hidden form over the reason/value problem, Turner and Factor do not show how anything can be done to reopen fruitful discourse on the problem.

Why they do not reveals both the underlying condition that permitted the confusion and controversy to continue so long without being resolved and what may be the fundamental problem of contemporary theory as well. The historical chain of misinterpretations of Max Weber that Turner and Factor describe has the same source as our current inability to discuss the reason/value issue meaningfully, let alone achieve mutual understanding on it: The differences in theoretical perspective have been and remain too fundamental.

At the end of the book, the reader is left with its opening question, Why bother? One hopes that after their exciting and stimulating history of the controversies, Turner and Factor will draw their conclusions about the relationship between reason and value, taking into account the limitations of the past so that discourse can begin again. But for them to do so would require taking sides in the historical controversies they describe so fairly; they would have to take sides because there are no fundamental theoretical approaches available to them other than those whose limitations they have spent chapters revealing. Following the only other available alternative, Turner and Factor appeal to us concerning the urgency of reopening the issue, but remain aloof themselves and, consequently, provide us with no idea of how to go about the important task. We remain caught in a theoretical cul-de-sac.

This is an important book in its own terms, however, and even though its major contribution to the future development of theory is negative, that contribution is enormously significant because it shows so dramatically the need today for neither new ideas nor for the recognition of the continuing significance of old ideas, but for a new idiom that could bridge the basic theoretical disparities keeping us from productive discourse.

RONALD E. PUHEK

Michigan State University

Le droit et les droits de l'homme. By Michel Villey. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1983. Pp. 170. FF78.)

For several decades the name of Michel Villey was almost synonymous with French legal philosophy. His publications, especially *La formation de la pensée juridique moderne* in 1968 and *Critique de la pensée juridique moderne* in 1975, culminated in a two-volume history of legal philosophy in 1979 and 1980.

The book under review is an abbreviated version of the course given by Villey before his retirement from the Sorbonne. It provides more, but also less, than its title promises. Over a half of the book is devoted to the genesis of the notion of "law" (pp. 15-104), while a considerable part of the rest demonstrates the absence of the concept of "human rights" in the tradition of the Catholic Church (pp. 105-130). The final part includes a highy articulate critique of Villey's views signed by "E.F." (pp. 155-159) and the texts of "the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789," as well as of the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" adopted in 1948 by the United Nations (pp. 161-163, 164-169).

All of Villey's work reflects the original Romanist specialization of an author captured by the culture of antiquity and its rebirth in the Middle Ages. His genetic concept of the notion of law leads from Aristotle over Cicero, Gaius, Ulpian, and Justinian's Corpus Juris Civilis to Thomas Aquinas, in whom Villey sees the apogee of legal thought. He considers further development to be only a nominalistic decline.

Yet the nominalism rejected by Villey seems rather to be particularism, an ideographic approach if we borrow Windelband and Rickert's terminology for this specific case. Also, Villey's presentation of the unfolding notion of law is rather his vision projected into history than a plain description.

Villey criticizes the concept of "human rights" as unreal, inconsistent, subservient to the interest of certain social groups or classes, and always prone to misuse. His own objective is "to search for what kind of norm is appropriate for the protection of the universality of men" (p. 92). "Legal rules are not the law: they describe the law. The law is a thing that precedes them (*jus quod est*), it is the object of permanent search and of dialectic discussion, with which our norms will never coincide" (p. 67). Villey compares the work of Gaius to a "quasi-sociology" that is different from ours by not being neuter, but by trying to discern "the just from the unjust" (p. 72).

There is no doubt that many legal theoreticians will disagree with Villey's opinion and believe that "human rights," even if ony fictitious and "operatory," have nevertheless played an important positive role in legal development. Still, even if we do not accept Villey's conclusion, we have to recognize the significance of his book. It offers the same qualities that for years filled his weekly philosophical meetings with the cream of legal thinkers. On the basis of remarkable erudition Villey shows that law has much larger dimensions than legal norms reveal and forcefully invites us to study law as an eternal quest for justice in the service of society and humankind.

ZDENEK KRYSTUFEK

University of Colorado

The Emergence of Dialectical Theory: Philosophy and Political Inquiry. By Scott Warren. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984. Pp. ix + 262. $26.00, cloth; $12.95, paper.)

Scott Warren begins with the fairly recent debate in political science between behavioralists and those who would restore the classical tradition of political inquiry. Warren argues that although those working in the tradition of classical political theory have scored decisive objections against the behavioralists, the traditionalists have not always been very clear about what their alternative would look like. Indeed, says Warren, in many respects the behavioralists and traditionalists share a number of common assumptions, such as an "objectivist conception of reality, either in implicit or in explicit formulations" (p. 182). It is the purpose of Warren's book to show that there is a philosophical tradition which, although not well known to American political scientists, constitutes a third alternative, Most of Warren's book is an attempt to show that a seemingly disparate group of authors—Kant, Hegel, Marx, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Horkheimer, Adorno, and Habermas—constitute such a tradition: that of dialectical theory. In particular, Warren seeks to show how the dialectical tradition avoids what he regards as the false objectivism of both the behavioral and classical traditions while not succumbing to relativism.

Warren's is a work of original scholarship. Taken one at a time, Warren's interpretation of these authors is generally quite conventional. However, in showing how they constitute an identifiable tradition, he breaks new ground and makes a genuine intellectual contribution. For example, Warren calls attention to dialectical elements in Kant's thought that have been insufficiently noticed and demonstrates how these elements resonate in the work of a surprising group of authors. As might be expected, however, the major weakness of Warren's book is his frequent inability to bring the work of disparate authors together in more than superficial fashion. Too frequently the dialectical tradition that these authors share is reduced to such things as a concern for self-critical and self-reflective theory, a focus on totality, a critique of false objectivism, a concern with the historicity of knowledge, that philosophy be forward-looking, and so forth. The dialectical tradition comes to stand for all the good things that theory should be. Conversely, traditions that are not dialectical are sometimes treated in rather stereotypical fashion—as everything dialectics is not. For example, we learn that it is "misleading to approach reality in terms of linear causal relations" (p. 190). Quite so in many cases, but it is hardly the unique contribution of dialectics to have pointed this out. What is lacking on Warren's part is an appreciation that perhaps some of the dialecticians whose positions he so carefully represents may themselves not have always faithfully represented the standpoints they criticize.

Warren claims in the first chapter that he is going to show how the dialectical tradition "may prove to be important for political scientists today" (p. 27). Yet he never does so in more than the very general terms discussed above, for example, political science should be concerned with relatedness and totality. In another study of dialectical thought, *The Origin of Negative Dialectics* (Free Press, 1977), Susan Buck-Morss has a wonderful discussion (pp. 182-184) of how Theodor Adorno's anti-system of negative dialectics influenced the research program that produced the famous postwar study, *The Authoritarian Personality* (Harper, 1950). It is something like this that is missing in Warren's book—an attempt to link a philosophical tradition with actual political issues, phenomena, or studies. As Buck-Morss's study shows, it is possible to do so without trivializing dialectics, or reducing it to a formula.

Warren's book is nonetheless a serious effort that repays careful study. The scholarship is scrupulous, the topic is important, and Warren does indeed call attention to a neglected tradition within political science.

C. FRED ALFORD

University of Maryland at College Park

Empirical Theory and Methodology

History—The Human Gamble. By Reuven Brenner. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983. Pp. xiv + 239. $17.50.)

With an economist's discerning eye, Reuven Brenner surveys the broad sweep of human history and offers two insights. On substance the Marines are right: When the going gets tough, the tough get going. The going invariably gets tough. On method most economists are wrong: Envy and ambition, not just greed, motivate people to act.

Brenner finds that demographic currents largely set the course for individual endeavors. When individual endeavors set the course for history, they do so by chance because people are gambling. People gamble when some exogenous shock upsets the social equilibrium, sending everyone scrambling for creative ways to reestablish stability. Thus, the invention of agriculture was not a random event that promoted population growth. On the contrary, population growth induced the invention. Calvinistic doctrine did not release mankind from penurious guilt into opulent materialism. Rather, it was "an endogenous, although random, event, representing a gamble on ideas that justified already existing behavior patterns and so appealed to a segment of the public when the wealth distribution changed" (p. 124).

In one sense Brenner's method is enlightening but unexceptional. Behind his reading of history is Frank Knight's classic notion of uncertainty and its signal role in inducing people to innovate. Traditional assumptions from economics power the analysis. The pursuit of wealth matters, as does the tendency of individual activities to generate social equilibrium.

In another sense, Brenner's method parts company with its intellectual forebearers. He assumes that an individual's "satisfaction depends not only on his wealth . . . but also on the fraction of people who are richer than he is" (p. 3). The key to understanding human events, then, is self-preservation, characterized here as the probability of securing at least one's relative position in the distribution of wealth, if not more. An agile mathematical treatment (relegated largely to appendixes) buttresses Brenner's exposition.

Brenner presents evidence that the perception of inequality, and especially changes in that perception, affect people's attitudes towards risk. Most susceptible to taking risks are those who suffer most from a change in the distribution of wealth. As a result, we observe systematic and regular behavior with respect to lotteries, crime, discrimination against minorities (anti-Semitism in particular), entrepreneurial activity, and a host of phenomena from tribal customs to usery laws.

Many political scientists will recognize Brenner's message if not his method. The trust and customs that govern intimate societies break down as population grows and anonymity prevails. Political institutions emerge because they are more efficient than customs but serve the same purpose: to sustain social stability in terms of the distribution of wealth. The pivotal position of distribution in this theory identifies Brenner's method as one more contribution to the neo-institutionalist school. Its adherents combine the individual's perception of fairness, equity, or norms with self-interest to explain political behavior.

Editorial lapses make more difficult an argument already burdened by being counterintuitive, but logical lapses deserve greater note, especially because Brenner expounds on the notion of causality. First, he fails to establish an empirical link critical to his argument, that between population increases and increased wealth inequality. Second, the weight of his evidence is not always compelling, even when he uses appropriate statistical rigor. His examples seem at times incomplete. For example, one wonders whether discrimination really abates in stable societies or merely takes forms alien to Brenner's perspective. Finally, he treats envy and ambition as one. They are not. If envy motivates people, then, as Brenner suggests, equality stifles creativity and thinking; inequality excites it. But equality motivates ambitious people to excel, perhaps more so than does inequality. Despite such lapses, Brenner's basic insights remain exciting and rich, well worth further attention.

STEVEN M. MASER

Willamette University

Political/Military Applications of Bayesian Analysis: Methodological Issues. By Douglas E. Hunter. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984. Pp. xviii + 293. $22.50, paper.)

The essential feature of Bayesian analysis is that a priori estimates of the probability of an event are altered in light of subsequent observations. The attempt to formally apply this technique in political science is to be commended. Hunter makes a start at demonstrating possible uses.

In the book's first chapter, Hunter reviews some basic concepts in probability theory. Here and throughout the rest of the book he sometimes tediously proceeds step by step through the arithmetic in light of his desire to include the nontechnical reader as part of the intended audience.

Basic aspects of Bayesian analysis are discussed in the second chapter, an "Introduction to Bayesian Analysis." The rest of the book consists entirely of models that are variations of those that appear in this chapter. The book's sometimes-colloquial style makes it appear that some sections were simply transcribed from lectures. One substantive weakness that might be an outgrowth of this style is Hunter's use of the phrase "revised probability" (p. 60) to represent what are typically the a posteriori estimates. If he feels that these conditional probabilities should be "revised," then their estimates should be recomputed with the new figures until the result stabilizes.

After a concise argument of the benefits of Bayesian analysis, problems associated with this technique consume the rest of the book.

The material in the remaining chapters follows a canonical form. First, a problem associated with Hunter's paradigm is stated briefly. Second, that problem is more fully described. Third, a solution is proposed, or extensive obstacles are indicated. A variation is problem 32 (p. 237), which discusses "source reliability'; no solution appears, and suggestions by readers are solicited. A similar request is made in problem 27 (p. 208), which deals with overweighting the chances of non-occurring events. Fourth, a general and extended discussion of each problem is presented.

The problems are occasionally illuminated by a historical example. Given that Hunter is presumably concentrating on methodological issues that have political or military applications, these examples are not only too sparse, but are also not sufficiently rich in texture. One well-written section is Hunter's discussion of the problem that sub-hypotheses may be buried in the model. He begins (p. 103) with two hypotheses. The first is that "the Soviet Union has 'decided to invade Poland within one month.' " The second hypothesis is "the Soviet Union has not 'decided to invade Poland within one month.' " Several sub-hypotheses are discussed on the following pages: the Soviet Union has decided to invade after a month, or she has decided not to invade, or has decided not to decide. Coincidentally, the examples throughout the text universally posit potential nefarious behavior on the part of America's adversaries. Not even ostensibly neutral examples such as "Graf von Berchtold decides to send an ultimatum to Serbia" are entertained.

A more serious problem in applying this technique directly from this work is the high degree of uncertainty in the parameters. For example, the probability for an event given that "the North Koreans have decided to attack within a year" (p. 117) is assessed at 0.8. From where does this 0.8 come? The problem is acknowledged (p. 258), but not resolved. Unlike Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing's *Conflict among Nations* (Princeton University Press, 1977), where ordinal rankings of a dozen analyzed cases from the diplomatic and historical literature are interwoven throughout the manuscript, this Bayesian method requires reasonably accurate interval level data.

Four other comments on style are in order. First, frequently the denominator of a fraction is written on two lines. I found this at first confusing, and then unnerving. Second, Hunter makes a unique contribution to the sir/madam controversy by a use of "s(he)" (p. 211). Third, the book contains no index. Fourth, it is refreshing to see Hunter regularly cite student contributions.

In many ways, Hunter thoughtfully raises a number of questions and methodological issues associated with the use of Bayesian analysis. Those expecting to find practical applications for those methodological issues, however, will find this a preliminary rather than definitive text.

WALTER W. HILL, JR.

Howard University

Annotations

Access to Medical Care in the U.S.: Who Has It, Who Doesn't. By Lu Ann Aday, Gretchen V. Fleming, and Ronald Andersen. (Chicago: Pluribus Press, 1984. Pp. 240. $24.95, paper.)

Based upon data from a 1982 National Survey of Access to Medical Care, this book provides an overview of policy, ethical, conceptual, and empirical issues; the measurement of access, potential and realized access; equity of access; and special problems of access. Volume contains several methodological appendixes, an executive summary, and an index.

Computers in Criminal Justice Administration and Management: Introduction to Emerging Issues and Applications. By William G. Archambeault and Betty J. Archambeault. (Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing, 1984. Pp. 186. $12.95.)

This text explores computers as management tools in criminal justice administration and gives particular emphasis to the use of microcomputers in data base management, networking, word processing, and computer-assisted instruction. Chapters include an overview of computer terminology, hardware, and software, information management, organizational communication, instruction, and criminal justice issues in computer technology. Volume includes glossary, bibliography, and index.

A Middle East Studies Handbook. By Jere L. Bacharach. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1984. Pp. 172. $20.00, cloth; $9.95, paper.)

This revision of the 1974 edition includes brief sections on transliteration and Islamic names, an Islamic calendar and conversion table, lists and genealogical tables of dynasties, rulers, and administrators, a historical chronology from 570 through 1983, a historical atlas, and more. Volume contains a general index and index to the historical atlas.

Data Construction in Social Surveys. By Nicholas Bateson. (Winchester, Mass.: George Allen & Unwin, 1984. Pp. x + 147. $28.50, cloth; $12.50, paper.)

Focusing on the construction of survey items, this text examines the basic concepts of data construction, the validation of survey data, design of a data matrix, and procedures for data construction. Volume includes a brief discussion of measurement error, references, and a subject index.

The Being of the Beautiful: Plato's *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, and *Statesman*. Translated by Seth Benardete. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984. Pp. li + 539. $42.50.)

This modern English translation presents together the three Platonic dialogues formulating a conception of philosophy while Socrates prepares for his trial. Text includes a brief discussion of *Hippias Major* and commentaries following each of the dialogues. Volume also includes select bibliography and an index.

Secondary Analysis of Available Data Bases. Edited by David J. Bowering. (San Francisco:

Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1984. Pp. 115. $8.95, paper.)

This text advocates the secondary analysis of available data bases instead of the more costly and time-consuming data gathering associated with most policy research. Chapters include discussions of available large-scale data bases, the technical requirements for subfiling these data sources, and examples of how such subfiles might be analyzed. Volume contains index.

A Guide to Marx's *Capital.* By Anthony Brewer. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984. Pp. xiv + 211. $29.95, cloth; $8.95, paper.)

Designed as a companion volume for Marx's *Capital,* this guide provides a chapter-by-chapter introduction to, and explanation of, Marx's argument. Text includes a general introduction on the roots of Marx's political economy and appendixes instructing the reader on the prefaces and afterwords to *Capital, The Communist Manifesto,* and the preface and introduction to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.* Volume also contains glossary and brief index.

A Campaign of Ideas: The 1980 Anderson/Lucey Platform. Compiled by Clifford W. Brown, Jr. and Robert J. Walker. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1984. Pp. lxxii + 486. $35.00.)

This compilation of documents from the Anderson-Lucey presidential campaign of 1980 includes the full platform, a summary version of the platform titled "Rebuilding a Society that Works: An Agenda for America," and the "Budget Impact Statement." Volume includes index.

Harry S. Truman: A Bibliography of His Times and Presidency. Compiled by Richard Dean Burns. (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1984. Pp. xlviii + 297. $50.00.)

This bibliography of Truman and his times includes more than 3,000 annotated entries on Truman himself, the Truman presidency, personalities in the Truman administration, domestic affairs (agriculture, business, the economy, labor, and veterans; the arts, culture, health and welfare, science and technology; civil rights, internal security and civil liberties, politics and public opinion, and the Supreme Court), foreign affairs (the end of World War II, the beginnings of the Korean War, and bilateral relations), military affairs, the Korean War, and general reference works. Volume includes both an author and a subject index.

Social Impact Assessment and Monitoring: A Guide to the Literature. By Michael J. Carley and Eduardo S. Bustelo. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985. Pp. xii + 250. $32.50.)

Reviewing some 600 publications on social impact assessment, this text provides an introduction to social impact assessment generally, its use in policymaking and planning, various methodological issues, problems, and applications, interdisciplinary perspectives on social impact assessment, and its use in developing countries. Volume also includes an overview of selected periodicals and other bibliographies and an author index.

Women in China: Bibliography of Available English Language Materials. Compiled by Lucie Cheng, Charlotte Furth, and Hon-ming Yip. (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1984. Pp. xiv + 109. $12.00, paper.)

This bibliography contains more than 4,000 entries catalogues under such topics as education; emancipation movements; health and population; labor and production; literature, art, and folklore; marriage and the family; politics and the law; psychology and religion; science, technology, and the military; sports and fashion; and Western women in China. Volume includes an index of authors and an index of Chinese women as subjects.

Countries of the World and Their Leaders Yearbook 1985: Vol. 1, Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments; States of the World's Nations; U.S. Embassies, Consulates, and Foreign Service Posts; Background Notes: Afghanistan-Luxembourg; Vol. 2, Macau-Zimbabwe; Foreign Travel; International Treaty Organizations; Climates of the World. (Detroit: Gale Research, 1984. Pp. xiv + 1,546. $95.00/set.)

This compilation provides the most recent State Department reports on some 168 countries of the world. In addition to the background notes for Afghanistan through Luxembourg, Volume 1 contains information on chiefs of state and cabinet members of foreign governments, a brief survey of the world's nations, and a section on

U.S. embassies, consulates, and foreign service posts. Volume 2 includes the background notes for Macau through Zimbabwe, a section on foreign travel, a section on international treaty organizations, and a brief section on climates of the world. Volumes contain no index.

Political Parties of the World, 2nd ed. Compiled and Edited by Alan J. Day and Henry W. Degenhardt. (London: Longman Group, and Detroit: Gale Research, 1984. Pp. x + 602. $90.00.)

This edition covers more than 1,300 political parties found throughout the world. Country entries include a brief political introduction followed by a description of each legally active political formation, including such information as leadership, date of founding, history, and political orientation. Appendixes catalog international party groupings under such rubrics as Democratic Socialists, Christian Democrats, Liberals, Conservatives, Ecologists, and Communists and Marxist-Leninists. Volume contains index of parties and index of names.

Information Sources in Politics and Political Science: A Survey Worldwide. Edited by Dermot Englefield and Gavin Drewry. (Boston: Butterworth Publishers, 1984. Pp. xviii + 507. $69.96.)

Designed as an international survey of the discipline, this volume by British scholars and librarians includes discussions of library and bibliographical aids to the study of politics, essays on comparative politics, political behavior, international politics and international relations, political thought, and group approaches to the study of politics, another section of essays on the study of politics and government in the United Kingdom, and a final collection of essays on the study of politics and government elsewhere. Volume contains an index.

The Europa Year Book, 1984: A World Survey: Vol. 1, **International Organizations, Europe, Afghanistan-Burundi;** Vol. 2, **Cameroon-Zimbabwe.** (London: Europa Publications, and Detroit: Gale Research. Pp. xx + 2,761. $210.00/set.)

The twenty-fifth edition of this yearbook, the survey includes a section on the function, structure, and activities of more than 1,500 international organizations; a section on the countries of Europe plus the USSR, Cyprus, and Turkey; and another section on Africa, the Americas, Asia, and Australasia. Country information includes descriptive overview, statistical survey, and a directory of government agencies, political organizations, religion, the press, the media, finance, trade and industry, and more. Volume 1 contains an index of international organizations, and Volume 2 contains a brief index of territories cited in both volumes.

Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel: Vol. 2, **October 1948-April 1949.** Edited by Yehoshua Freundlich. (Jerusalem: Israel State Archives, 1984. Pp. 680 and lxvi + 251. $69.50, includes companion volume.)

Official Israeli documents included in the main volume and referenced in the English companion volume focus on the conclusion of Israel's war for independence, Israel's relations with neighbors and the United States, the role of the United Nations, and such issues as Jerusalem, Arab refugees, Israel's admission to the United Nations, and more. Companion volume contains extensive index.

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: Vol. 10, **Columbia University;** Vol. 11, **Columbia University.** Edited by Louis Galambos. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984. Pp. xxiii + 845 and vi + 857. $60.00/set.)

These two volumes chronologically follow Eisenhower from termination of active duty as Chief of Staff in February, 1948 through his presidency at Columbia University up to his assumption of duties as Supreme Allied Commander of NATO in 1950. The selected and annotated papers cover the transition period from military to university presidency in 1948, his continued role in national affairs, programs and problems at Columbia, and his reemergence as a key military figure. Volume 11 contains an extensive chronology and index for the 1948 to 1950 period.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Vol. 12, Part 1: **East Asia and the Pacific.** Edited by John P. Glennon. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984. Pp. xiv + 1,113. $20.00.)

Part 1 of this volume contains official documents regarding the military role of Australia and New Zealand, ANZUS relations more generally, Five Power discussions on Southeast Asia, the

Southeast Asia problem, Pacific security and Chinese communist aggression more generally, U.S. policy toward Formosa and Japan as it affects Chinese policy, Asian economic development, a collective security pact for Southeast Asia, the French in Indochina, and more. Part 1 contains index.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Vol. 15, Part 1 and Part 2: **Korea.** Edited by John P. Glennon. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984. Pp. xxix + 1,151 and xxix + 845. $29.00.)

This important volume contains official U.S. documents preceding and following the Korean Armistice. Part 1 focuses on the armistice negotiations at Panmunjom, economic and political crises in South Korea, United Nations debates, and decision making in both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. Part 2 includes documents on problems with Rhee and the armistice, final negotiations, postarmistice issues such as Korea's reconstruction, military and economic aid, and the redeployment of U.S. troops in Korea. Volume contains index.

The Caribbean Basin to the Year 2000: Demographic, Economic, and Resource-Use Trends in Seventeen Countries, a Compendium of Statistics and Projections. By Norman A. Graham and Keith L. Edwards. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984. Pp. xv + 165. $18.50, paper.)

Volume contains statistics and case commentaries for 17 Caribbean Basin countries. Chapters include a discussion of method and data sources; country profiles; a discussion of interrelationships among demographic, economic, and environmental trends; and implications for U.S. interests and policy. Volume has listing of tables and figures but no index.

Western Interests and U.S. Policy Options in the Caribbean Basin: Report of the Atlantic Council's Working Group on the Caribbean Basin. Edited by James R. Green and Brent Scowcroft. (Boston: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, Publishers, 1984. Pp. xix + 331. $27.50, cloth; $12.50, paper.)

Chapter 1 of this volume contains the policy paper of the Atlantic Council's Working Group on the Caribbean Basin, defined as the United States, the Caribbean Islands, Central America, Colombia, Guyana, Mexico, Suriname, and Venezuela. Other chapters include signed essays on a general overview of U.S. policy in tha region, economic, social, and political issues, security issues, the Southern flank, migration, energy, and options for U.S. policy. Volume contains index.

Encyclopedia of American Political History: Studies of the Principal Movements and Ideas, 3 vols. Edited by Jack P. Greene. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1984. Pp. xiii + 1,420. $180.00/set.)

This topical guide to American political history contains some 90 specially commissioned essays. Topics include agricultural policy, the American Revolution, the Articles of Confederation, the Bill of Rights, church and state, citizenship, civil disobedience, the civil rights movement, Congress, the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence, federalism, the Federalist Papers, feminism, Jacksonian and Jeffersonian democracy, labor movements, lobbies and pressure groups, machine politics, the New Deal, pluralism, political parties, the presidency, Progressivism, Reconstruction, slavery, sectionalism, and secession, state government, suffrage, tariff policies, taxation, territories and statehood, veterans' movements, and many more. Third volume contains an index.

The PAC Directory: Vol. 2, **The Federal Committees.** Edited by David U. Greevy, Chadwick R. Gore, and Marvin I. Weinberger. (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing, 1984. Pp. ix + 873. $195.00.)

This book and its companion volume on the federal candidates presents a gold mine of information on political action committees. Financial tables for more than 1,600 PACs report gross receipts and disbursements for 1981 and 1982, contribution breakdowns by size, Senate or House recipient, incumbency, and winner, plus who received the largest contributions from that PAC. Volume also includes a PAC directory, a listing of PACs and sponsoring organizations, and a top-200 rank of PAC contributors to federal candidates. Volume has no index.

Encyclopedia of Associations, 1985: Vol. 4, **International Organizations.** Edited by Katherine Gruber. (Detroit: Gale Research, 1984. Pp. 508. $160.00.)

This volume focuses on nonprofit organizations that are international in scope and headquartered outside the United States. Some 2,000 entries are catalogued under agricultural organizations and commodity exchanges; legal, governmental, public administration, and military organizations; scientific, engineering, and technical organizations; educational organizations; cultural organizations; social welfare organizations; health and medical organizations; public affairs organizations; fraternal, foreign interest, nationality, and ethnic organizations; religious organizations; veteran, hereditary, and patriotic organizations; hobby and avocational organizations; athletic and sports organizations; and labor unions, associations, and federations. Basic entry typically includes address, date of founding, number of members, staff, language, brief description of purpose, publications, conventions or meetings, and more. Volume includes alphabetical index, geographic index, and executive officer index.

The President and the Council of Economic Advisors: Interviews with CEA Chairmen. Edited by Erwin C. Hargrove and Samuel A. Morley. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984. Pp. 511. $29.50, paper.)

This text compiles oral histories of 10 former chairmen of the Council of Economic Advisors as a means of illuminating the relationship between the CEA and the President, executive departments, and federal financial agencies. Sections on Leon Keyserling, Arthur Burns, Raymond Saulnier, Walter Heller, Gardner Ackley, Arthur Okun, Paul McCracken, Herbert Stein, Alan Greenspan, and Charles Schultze include both a summary history and an oral interview. Volume contains bibliography but no index.

Introduction to Causal Analysis: Exploring Survey Data by Crosstabulation. By Ottar Hellevik. (Winchester, Mass.: George Allen & Unwin, 1984. Pp. xxiii + 211. $28.50, cloth; $13.50, paper.)

Written as a crosstabulation approach to path analysis, this text examines crosstabulation generally, the meaning and measurement of causation, the development of causal models, deductions from causal models, design and design problems, analyzing interaction, regression analysis, log-linear analysis, and interpreting results. Volume also contains references and subject index.

British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations: Vol. 3, Part 1. By F. H. Hinsley et al. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984. Pp. xvi + 693. $39.50.)

This volume contains Parts 8 through 12 of the official history of British intelligence strategy and operations during the Second World War. Most chapters cover the time period from June 1943 to June 1944 and include a general assessment of strategic intelligence, the Mediterranean theater, the war at sea, the air war, and V-weapons. Volume includes 27 appendixes and an extensive index.

The Annual Register: A Record of World Events, 1983. Edited by H. V. Hodson. (Detroit: Gale Research, 1984. Pp. xiv + 543. $90.00.)

The 225th in its series, this volume provides a registry of recent events in the United Kingdom; the Americas and the Caribbean; the USSR and Eastern Europe; Western, Central, and Southern Europe; the Middle East and North Africa; Equatorial Africa; Central and Southern Africa; South Asia and the Indian Ocean; South-East Asia and East Asia; Australasia and the South Pacific; and international organizations. Topical chapters cover events in religion, the sciences, law, the arts, sports, and economic and social affairs. Volume also includes a chronicle of principal events in 1983 and an index.

An Atlas of EEC Affairs. By Ray Hudson, David Rhind, and Helen Mounsey. (New York: Methuen, 1984. Pp. xiv + 158. $31.00, cloth; $12.95, paper.)

This graphic and descriptive survey looks at the history, organizational structure, powers, and policies of the European Community, its changing population, its labor market, its economic performance and resources, its social conditions, consumption patterns, and lifestyles, and examines issues facing the community during the rest of this century. An appendix discusses the technical basis for the atlas. Volume also includes author, location, and subject indexes.

Bridges to Knowledge in Political Science: A Handbook for Research. By Carl Kalvelage, Albert P. Melone, and Morley Segal. (Pacific Palisades, Calif.: Palisades Publishers, 1984. Pp. 153. $6.95, paper.)

This text has been designed as a guide to sources in political science and a guide for conceptualizing, researching, and writing term papers. Chapters discuss such matters as developing a topic and hypotheses, finding and using available information, the use of original sources, and footnotes and bibliographies. Volume contains index.

The Role of Courts in American Society: The Final Report of the Council on the Role of Courts. Edited by Jethro K. Kieberman. (St. Paul: West Publishing, 1984. Pp. xiii + 171. $10.00, paper.)

This volume examines the proper role of courts in American society. Text includes an executive summary and chapters on the role of courts as a public issue, what courts are doing and have been doing, what courts do and do not do effectively, strengthening the capacity of courts, plus conclusions and recommendations. Volume contains some tables and appendixes but no index.

Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence: Vol. 1, **Alliance Emerging, October 1933-November 1942;** Vol. 2, **Alliance Forged, November 1942-February 1944;** Vol. 3, **Alliance Declining, February 1944-April 1945.** Edited by Warren F. Kimball. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984. Pp. clxiv + 674, 773, and 742. $150.00/set.)

This massive three-volume set contains a complete collection of the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence. Headnotes provide historical background to the documents. Volume 1 contains editorial and bibliographical notes and an extensive digest of documents. Materials are arranged chronologically and cover a period from October, 1933 through Roosevelt's death in 1945. Volume 1 ends just before the North African invasion in November, 1942; Volume 2 contains documents to February 29, 1944; and the final volume ends with Truman's assumption of the presidency. Each volume contains maps and photographs, and the final volume contains a glossary and an index.

Strategic Requirements for the Army to the Year 2000. Edited by Robert H. Kupperman and William J. Taylor, Jr. (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1984. Pp. xi + 539. $35.00.)

The results of a forecasting project guided by a steering committee from the Center for Strategic and International Studies and an Army Study Advisory Group, this volume includes essays on forecasting as a policy instrument; U.S. interests in the 1990s; the American public and U.S. foreign and defense policies; future trends and their impact on the army; arms and energy technology; army mobilization; manpower and training; unconventional war; terrorism; Soviet proxy warfare; the world environment; and several regional studies. Volume contains an index.

Aristotle: The Politics. Translated by Carnes Lord. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984. Pp. 284. $35.00.)

This modern English translation of *The Politics* includes the editor's brief introduction and outline of the argument, annotative and connotative notes, a glossary of key terms, and an index of names.

The Diary of Beatrice Webb: Vol. 3, **1905-1924, "The Power to Alter Things."** Edited by Norman MacKenzie and Jeanne MacKenzie. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984. Pp. xvii + 460. $25.00.)

This third volume of the diary covers Beatrice Webb's service on the Royal Commission investigating the Poor Law and the public controversy surrounding her campaign, her trip around the world with husband Sidney, the days of World War I, and the events surrounding Sidney's election to Parliament in 1922. Volume includes photographs, a short bibliography, and an index.

Selected Letters of Edmund Burke. Edited by Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984. Pp. viii + 497. $27.50.)

Based on the 10-volume edition of Burke's complete correspondence, this selected edition includes correspondence on private and public life, literary friends and philosophical concerns, toleration and religion, early and later views of party, America, reform and revolution, counterrevolution, India, and Ireland. Volume also includes a discussion of Burke's theory of political practice, a sketch of his life, and an index.

Middle East and North Africa 1984-85, 31st ed. (London: Europa Publications, and Detroit: Gale Research, 1984. Pp. xx + 801. $120.00.)

The 31st in its series, this volume includes a general survey of the Middle East and North African region, a selection on regional organizations, and 24 country surveys. The general survey contains essays on the region's religions, the Arab-Israeli conflict, its natural resources, and more. Country surveys provide basic information on physical and social geography, history, economy, a general statistical overview, a directory of constitution and government, legislature, diplomatic representation, judicial system, religion, the press, publishing, radio and television, finance, trade and industry, transport, tourism, atomic energy, defense, education, and a bibliography. Volume contains some maps but no index.

Sisterhood Is Global: The International Women's Movement Anthology. Compiled and edited by Robin Morgan. (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1984. Pp. xxiii + 815. $24.95, cloth; $12.95, paper.)

This international feminist anthology covers 70 nations and the United Nations. A statistical preface precedes each contribution and includes such information as demography, government, economy, gynography, herstory, and mythography. Individual contributions are very heterogeneous. Volume includes a glossary, bibliography, and index.

Handbook of the Nations, 4th ed.: A Brief Guide to the Economy, Government, Land, Demographic, Communications, and National Defense Establishment of Each of 191 Nations and Other Political Entities. Compiled by the National Foreign Assessment Center. (Detroit: Gale Research, 1984. Pp. xiv + 274. $64.00.)

This fourth edition is a reprint of *World Factbook—1984* prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency's National Foreign Assessment Center. The 191 entries are alphabetized by country and include information on land, people, government, economy, communications, and defense forces. Appendixes include a diagram on the United Nations as a system, selected United Nations organizations, selected international organizations, country membership in selected organizations, and a table of conversion factors.

The Reagan Record: An Assessment of America's Changing Domestic Priorities. Edited by John L. Palmer and Isabel V. Sawhill. (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing, 1984. Pp. 440. $28.00, cloth; $12.95, paper.)

This volume examines the Reagan shift in domestic policy over the past four years, assesses consequences, and explores implications. Text includes a general overview of Reagan's goals and philosophy, a look at governance, the economy, the budget, natural resources and the environment, social policy, federalism and the states, nonprofit organizations, businesses, and family incomes. Volume also includes some statistical appendixes, a summary of major social programs, and an index.

The Foreign Office and the Kremlin: British Documents on Anglo-Soviet Relations 1941-45. Edited by Graham Ross. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984. Pp. xi + 303. $49.50.)

The documents selected for inclusion in this volume emphasize the British Foreign Office and professional diplomats. Volume includes some 46 documents generally illustrating the Foreign Office attitude toward the war and introductory chapters on Anglo-Soviet relations up to 1941, developments in 1941, Eden's visit to Moscow and the Anglo-Soviet treaty, and the periods up to the Russian break with Poland, between Katyn to Tehran, then Yalta, then Potsdam, and finally Moscow. Text contains bibliography but no index.

Politics and Government in the Federal Republic of Germany: Basic Documents. Edited by Carl-Christoph Schweitzer et al. (Leamington Spa, Great Britain: Berg Publishers, and New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984. Pp. xix + 443. $37.50, cloth; $15.95, paper.)

This compilation of key documents on postwar Germany include several on the origins of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1944 to 1949, the Bundestag, the chancellor, cabinet, and president, the judiciary, basic rights and constitutional review, federalism, political parties, public opinion, economic and social policy, foreign policy, defense policy and the armed forces, Berlin, and the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic. Volume also includes several statistical tables, a select bibliography, and an index.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Vol. 2, Part 1 and Part 2: National Security Affairs. Edited by William Z. Slany. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984. Pp. xxvi + 884 and xxvi + 1,083. $28.00.)

Official documents included in Part 1 of this volume focus on U.S. government's national security policy generally (1952 to 1954), its objectives and programs, its estimates of national security threats, its military posture, and its organization for national security. Documents in Part 2 center upon U.S. atomic energy policy, arms control, U.S. strategic bases in the United Kingdom and Canada, the U.S. International Information Administration, and other international information activities. Volume includes index.

American Landmark Legislation: The Railway Labor Act of 1926, Vol. 1. Edited by Irving J. Sloan. (Dobbs Ferry, N.J.: Oceana Publications, 1984. Pp. 506. $100.00.)

This compilation of documents focuses on the Railway Labor Act of 1926. Included are a brief legislative history of the act, the statute itself, hearings before and reports of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce and House Committee and Interstate and Foreign Commerce, the congressional debates of 1926, and text of the Supreme Court decision in *Texas & New Orleans Railroad Company et al.* v. *Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks et al.* Volume has no index.

Legislative Acts of the USSR, Book 3. Edited by L. N. Smirnov. (Moscow: Progress Publishers, and Chicago: Imported Publications, 1984. Pp. 358. $7.95.)

The third in its series, this volume contains translations of major Soviet legislation in the areas of public health, public education, marriage and the family, the judicial system, civil legislation, criminal legislation and procedure, corrective labor, the utilization of historical and cultural monuments, universal military service, and pensions and allowances to collective farm members. Text includes brief index.

Social Research on Arabs in Israel, 1977-1982: A Bibliography. Edited by Sammy Smooha. (Haifa: University of Haifa, Jewish-Arab Center, 1984. Pp. 100. $10.00, paper.)

Prepared as a supplement to *Social Research on Arabs in Israel 1948-1976, Trends and an Annotated Bibliography,* this volume contains about 240 citations for social scientific publications and more selected citations from other publications and publications on the Palestinians. Text includes Hebrew bibliography as well as English bibliography.

Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, 1984: Parties and Revolutionary Movements. Edited by Richard F. Staar. (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1984. Pp. 590. $49.95.)

The eighteenth in its series, this volume includes profiles on communist or Marxist-Leninist parties in 104 countries, two regional organizations, and 10 international fronts written by some 71 scholars. Text includes entries under Africa and the Middle East, the Americas, Asia and the Pacific, Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and Western Europe. Volume includes a registry of communist parties, select bibliography, and name and subject indexes.

The Visual Display of Quantitative Information. By Edward R. Tufte. (Cheshire, Conn.: Graphics Press, 1983. Pp. 197. $34.00.)

In this remarkably rich volume, Tufte argues that "graphics are instruments for reasoning about quantitative information." The first part of the book examines the uses and abuses of graphics in the two centuries following William Playfair's work on graphical designs. Part 2 introduces a theory of data graphics through chapters on data-ink and graphical redesign, chartjunk, data-ink maximization and graphical design, multifunctioning graphical elements, data density and small multiples, and aesthetics and technique in data graphical design. Text includes index.

The Use of Public Services by Undocumented Aliens in Texas: A Study of State Costs and Revenues. (Austin: Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas, 1984. Pp. 280. $12.50, paper.)

Researchers interviewed state and local public service agencies and 253 undocumented aliens to determine whether taxes paid by these aliens covered the costs of public services provided to them. Report suggests that state revenues from these people exceed the cost of providing services, but that localities pay more for services provided than they receive in revenue from undocumented aliens. Overall, state and local revenues exceed the cost of services provided. Volume includes several appendixes but no index.

Strategic Materials: A World Survey. By Rae Weston. (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allenheld, 1984. Pp. 189. $34.50.)

This text examines the extraction of, access to, and stockpiling of strategic materials worldwide. Topics include the anatomy of strategic materials, their supply, substitution, and recycling, supply disruptions or restrictions, and markets and pricing. Appendixes cover U.S. stockpiles, operating mines in the Western world, major new projects and expansion programs, a bibliography, and an index.

The Legal Research Manual: A Game Plan for Legal Research and Analysis. By Christopher G. Wren and Jill Robinson Wren. (Madison, Wis.: A-R Editions, 1983. Pp. xiv + 197. $8.95, paper.)

This guidebook provides a basic procedure for legal research. Chapters include discussions of sources and citations, gathering and analyzing facts, identifying and organizing the legal issues, finding, reading, and updating the law, notetaking, and more. Appendixes include sections on computerized legal research, other research sources, an overview of civil procedure, briefing a case, and other research aids. Volume contains index.

Statement of Ownership, Management and Circulation

Required by Act of October 23, 1962:
Section 4369, Title 39, United States Code

1. **Date of Filing:** November 29, 1984.

2. **Title of Publication:** The American Political Science Review.

3. **Frequenty of Issue:** Quarterly in March, June, September, December.

4. **Locatison of Known Office of Publication:**
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

5. **Location of the Headquarters or General Business Office of the Publishers:**
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

6. **Names and Addresses of Publisher and Managing Editor:**

   Publisher: American Political Science Association,
   1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

   Managing Editor: Dina A. Zinnes,
   Department of Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, Illinois 61801.

7. **Owner:**
American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

8. **Known Bondholders, Mortgagees, etc.:** None.

9. The purpose, function and nonprofit status of this organization and the exempt status for federal income tax purposes have not changed during the preceding 12 months.

10. **Extent and Nature of Circulation:**

		Average No. Copies Each Issue During Preceding 12 Months	Actual No. Copies Single Issue Nearest to Filing Date
A.	Total Number Copies Printed	14,086	14,249
B.	Paid Circulation		
	1. Sales	0	0
	2. Mail Subscriptions	10,202	10,187
C.	Total Paid Circulation	10,202	10,187
D.	Free Distribution by Mail, Carrier or Other Means	71	71
E.	Total Distribution (C + D)	10,273	10,258
F.	Office Use, Left-Over, Unaccounted, Spoiled after Printing	3,813	3,991
G.	Total	14,086	14,249

Select your fall texts from CQ Press

FORTHCOMING

Congress and Democracy
David J. Vogler, Wheaton College
Sidney R. Waldman, Haverford College
July 1985. App. 220 pages. $9.95.

American Intergovernmental Relations
Laurence J. O'Toole, Auburn University
July 1985. App. 280 pages. $13.95.

Rational Politics
Decisions, Games and Strategies
Steven J. Brams, New York University
July 1985. App. 250 pages. $16.95.

Political Participation in the U.S.
M. Margaret Conway, University of Maryland
July 1985. App. 310 pages. $10.95.

The Federal Courts
Robert A. Carp, University of Houston
Ronald Stidham, Lamar University
July 1985. 225 pages. $12.95.

JUST PUBLISHED

Candidates, Parties, and Campaigns
Electoral Politics in America
Stephen A. Salmore, Rutgers University
Barbara G. Salmore, Drew University
June 1985. App. 225 pages. $9.95.

Congress and Its Members, Second Edition
Roger H. Davidson and Walter J. Oleszek
Congressional Research Service
March 1985. 477 pages. $14.95.

Congress Reconsidered, Third Edition
Lawrence C. Dodd, Indiana University
Bruce I. Oppenheimer, University of Houston
editors
January 1985. 460 pages. $14.95.

The Elections of 1984
Michael Nelson, editor, Vanderbilt University
February 1985. 318 pages. $10.95.

Environmental Politics and Policy
Walter A. Rosenbaum, University of Florida
September 1984. 328 pages. $10.50.

The Politics of Unemployment
Donald C. Baumer, Smith College
Carl E. Van Horn, Rutgers University
September 1984. 224 pages. $8.95.

Studies of Congress
Glenn R. Parker, editor, Florida State University
October 1984. 570 pages. $15.95.

Presidential Primaries and Nominations
William Crotty, Northwestern University
John S. Jackson III, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale
October 1984. 251 pages. $8.95.

Presidents and Promises
From Campaign Pledge to Presidential Performance
Jeff Fishel, American University
December 1984. 226 pages. $9.95.

The Supreme Court, Second Edition
Lawrence Baum, Ohio State University
November 1984. 270 pages. $12.95.

State Government
CQ's Guide to Current Issues and Activities
Thad L. Beyle, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
and the editors of Congressional Quarterly Inc.
April 1985. App. 180 pages. $8.95.

For examination copies, write on departmental stationery, indicating course name, level, and term to:

CQ Press
Ellen Kresky, College Services
1414 22nd Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

SPSS^{X}

Take another look!

New developments in data analysis
from SPSS and McGraw-Hill

NEW *data analysis facilities*

SPSS^{X} User's Guide, second edition
SPSS Inc. 1986
1000 pages (tent.)
(07-046553-3)
Available in August!

All of the material from the first edition, plus additions through SPSS^{X} Release 2.1: probit, logit, and hierarchical loglinear modeling, ALSCAL, new clustering procedures, an all-new plotting procedure, new facilities for reading files from other analysis systems (including SAS and OSIRIS) and DBMS's, and more.

SOPHISTICATED *new display capabilities*

SPSS Graphics
SPSS Inc. 1985
320 pages
(07-046554-1)

A complete guide and reference for the new interactive SPSS Graphics system. This book explains how to use SPSS Graphics on its own or as a powerful extension to SPSS^{X}, allowing users to present their data using a wide variety of charts, graphs, maps, and pages of text.

SPSS^{X} TABLES
SPSS Inc. 1985
224 pages
(07-046558-4)

Explains how to produce publication-quality tables in a variety of formats using the new optional TABLES procedure in SPSS^{X} Release 2.1. Using simple English commands, TABLES allows the user to combine multiple variables in a single table, with flexible options for displaying totals, percentages, and other statistics.

MORE *complete documentation*

SPSS^{X} Advanced Statistics Guide
Marija Norusis 1985
432 pages
(07-046548-7)
Available Now!

A reference for researchers and a text for the multivariate statistics course. This book explains statistical concepts and SPSS^{X} operations with interesting examples drawn from actual research.

Topics include: multiple linear regression analysis, discriminant analysis, factor analysis, cluster analysis, multivariate analysis of variance, repeated measures analysis of variance, hierarchical loglinear models, logit models, models for ordinal data, and tests of symmetry.

STILL AVAILABLE

SPSS^{X} Basics
SPSS Inc. 1984
214 pages
(07-060524-6)

SPSS^{X} Introductory Statistics Guide
Marija Norusis 1983
276 pages
(07-046549-5)

SPSS inc.
444 N. Michigan Avenue
Chicago, Illinois 60611

College Division
McGraw-Hill Book Company
1221 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10020

SPSS^{X} is a trademark of SPSS Inc.

Revolution and War in Spain 1931-1939
Edited by *Paul Preston*

"This collection of essays constitutes a magnificent monument to recent scholarship on the Second Republic and the Civil War. It is indispensable for a full understanding of the period."

—Raymond Carr

This exciting new collection, reflecting the virtual revolution in recent years in the study of contemporary Spain, explodes the traditional view of the Spanish Civil War as a simple conflict between fascism and communism.

January 1985 320pp.
0-412-34960-9 #9247 $33.00/cloth
0-412-34970-6 #9074 $12.95/paper

NEW
Socialism, the State and Public Policy in France
Edited by *Philip Cerny* and *Martin Schain*

It has been four years since a government of the Left was elected in France. Cerny and Schain now offer the first comprehensive evaluation of what the Left has built, as well as the equally enduring consequences of failed policies.

April 1985 220pp.
0-416-01131-4 #9384 $29.95/cloth
0-416-01161-6 #9416 $12.95/paper

NEW
Fifth Edition
France 1814-1940
J.P.T. Bury

A review from a previous edition: "It could hardly be bettered: balanced, thorough, clearly thought-out and clearly written."

—Max Beloff

France 1814-1940 has a long-established reputation as a clear, scholarly and readable account of what often seems a complex and confusing period of French history. It describes the characteristics of France's different regimes and their leading personalities and explains why during these years her people had to undergo so many revolutions, wars and crises of various kinds.

April 1985 356pp.
0-416-37930-3 #9331 $13.95/paper

Methuen
29 WEST 35th STREET, NEW YORK, NY 10001

Eight noted political scientists take an in-depth look at what *really* went on during

ELECTION 1984
Landslide without a Mandate
Edited by ELLIS SANDOZ and CECIL V. CRABB, JR., Louisiana State University

CONTENTS:

Introduction: The Silent Majority Finds its Voice
by ELLIS SANDOZ

The Presidential Election of 1984
by THOMAS E. CRONIN

Ronald Reagan's Presidential Leadership
by FRED I. GREENSTEIN

The Voters Say "Yes": The 1984 Congressional Elections
by CHARLES O. JONES

New Federalism and State Elections
by DANIEL J. ELAZAR

Economic Issues and Reaganomics
by STEPHEN L. McDONALD

"Standing Tall" as a Foreign Policy: Diplomacy & Security in Reagan's Second Term
by CECIL V. CRABB, JR.

The 1984 Election and the Future of American Politics
by WALTER DEAN BURNHAM

Conclusion: The Reagan Victory—Retrospect and Prospect
by ELLIS SANDOZ and CECIL V. CRABB, JR.

MENTOR 0-451-62424-6 $4.95

NEW AMERICAN LIBRARY
1633 Broadway, New York, NY 10019
NAL

the american political science association

GROUP INSURANCE PLANS

- **Group Life Insurance Plan**—Complete life insurance protection is available for members and spouses with up to $110,000 of coverage at economical group rates. Dependent children are also eligible.
- **Disability Income Plan**—Up to $1,500 per month in benefits help provide members with a continuing income when a disabling accident or illness prevents them from working.
- **Hospitalization Program**—Up to $110 a day for each day of covered hospitalization helps provide for the expenses left unpaid by other insurance plans. Coverage is available for the entire family.
- **Personal Accident Insurance Program**—APSA families are protected from the financial disaster that often follows a serious accident with up to $200,000 in coverage for accidental death or accident impairment.
- **Catastrophe Major Medical Plan**—When basic medical coverage benefits are exhausted, this Plan takes over with 100% coverage of all eligible expenses . . . up to $1,000,000 over 10 full years.

CLIP ALONG DOTTED LINE

☐ **YES!** I would like more information on the following APSA group insurance plans:

☐ **Group Life Insurance Plan** ☐ **Disability Income Plan**
☐ **Hospitalization Program** ☐ **Personal Accident Insurance Program**
☐ **Catastrophe Major Medical Plan**

Name__________________________________

Address__________________________________

City/State/Zip__________________________________

Mail to: Albert H. Wohlers & Co., APSA Group Insurance Plans
1500 Higgins Road, Park Ridge, Illinois 60068

Newsmakers



LYNDON JOHNSON'S DUAL WAR

Vietnam and the Press

Kathleen J. Turner

Turner presents an absorbing account of the "other war" that Johnson fought: the struggle to establish rapport with the press, to persuade them to back him up in his handling of the Vietnam war. This is the story of the tragic consequences of Johnson's shortcomings as a communicator. As the debate on media influence is as hotly waged as ever, it is a story with profound contemporary implications.

Cloth $25.00 368 pages

DELUSION

Internal Dimensions of Political Life

James M. Glass

A radical new vision of political practice. Through vivid recreations of schizophrenics's case histories, Glass demonstrates that delusion may well provide clinical evidence for the concept of human nature that informs much of political theory.

"One of the most enlightening and original pieces of writing that I have read in recent years. . . . *Delusion* reflects a mature synthesis of Glass's longstanding devotion to the problem of understanding the relations between politics and madness." — Michael A. Weinstein, Department of Political Science, Purdue University

Cloth $22.50 296 pages

THE EAGLE AND THE SMALL BIRDS

Crisis in the Soviet Empire: From Yalta to Solidarity

Michael Charlton

Oral history at its best, this book chronicles events in Eastern Europe in the four decades since the Soviet takeover after Yalta. Charlton posed provocative questions to the former diplomats, politicians, and party officers who experienced Yalta and its aftermath. Alongside their eyewitness accounts and moving personal narratives, he presents discussions and analyses of more recent developments by various White House advisers and by leading East European intellectuals including Arkady Shevchenko and Milovan Djilas. His probing questions ultimately suggest future directions for both East and West.

Cloth $14.95 192 pages
31 b&w photographs



THE OTHER ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

Making America's Middle East Policy, from Truman to Reagan

Steven L. Spiegel

Steven Spiegel provides an unparalleled explanation of United States policymaking in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Skillfully separating actual policymaking from the myths that have come to surround it, he makes clear the critical role of the president as agenda-setter.

"Clearly, a major study on United States policymaking toward the Arab-Israeli dispute. It is recommended to anyone seeking to be educated on the intricacies of Washington's approach to the issue." — Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

Cloth $24.95 520 pages

The University of CHICAGO Press
5801 South Ellis Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637

CHICAGO Paperbacks

THE ANTI-FEDERALIST

An Abridgment, by Murray Dry, of,
The Complete Anti-Federalist,
Edited, with Commentary and Notes, by
Herbert J. Storing

This one-volume edition can be read as a genuine counterpart to the *Federalist Papers;* as an original source companion to Storing's brilliant essay *What the Anti-Federalists Were For* (volume 1 of *The Complete Anti-Federalist,* available as a separate paperback); or as a guide to exploring the full range of Anti-Federalist writing. *The Anti-Federalist* makes a fundamental source of our political heritage accessible to everyone.

$9.95 384 pages

THE UNEASY STATE

The United States from 1915 to 1945
Barry D. Karl

Karl presents an imaginative and thoughtful perspective on America's quest for political, economic, and cultural nationalism. "A book that all students of the modern United States will want to read. . . . Karl has given us much food for thought." — Ellis W. Hawley, *Journal of American History*

$7.95 268 pages

AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

Expanded Edition
George F. Kennan

Kennan offers a plain-spoken appraisal of United States foreign policy that cuts to the heart of issues much debated today. This expanded edition of the original 1951 work includes a new preface by the author as well as two lectures delivered in 1984 dealing with such current questions as the escalation of the nuclear arms race and the consequences of American involvement in Vietnam.

$5.95 192 pages
Library cloth edition $15.00

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF PATRIOTISM

Education for Civic Consciousness
Morris Janowitz

"It is . . . the notable contribution of this book to revive patriotism and civic education as subjects worthy of contemporary debate." — Michael J. Sandel, *New York Times Book Review*

$8.95 236 pages

TWELVE AGAINST EMPIRE

The Anti-Imperialists, 1898–1900
With a new Preface
Robert L. Beisner

"Robert Beisner has brilliantly recreated not only the choices but the minds and hearts of the men who faced them. . . . His book becomes a study in the classic self-divisions of American character." — Melvin Maddocks, *Christian Science Monitor*

$9.95 324 pages

LEGISLATURE

California's School for Politics
William K. Muir, Jr.

"This is an absorbing and elegant work, of [great] value to our understanding of legislatures in democratic societies. . . . *Legislature* is written with clarity, great insight, and profound sensitivity to its subject." — Alvin D. Sokolow, *American Political Science Review*

$8.95 236 pages

ROUSSEAU'S *SOCIAL CONTRACT*

The Design of the Argument

Hilail Gildin

"The many insightful and sensible things Gildin says make his book a superb commentary. . . . All things considered, Gildin's work is the best book devoted to *The Social Contract* that this reviewer has ever read." — Ramon M. Lemos, *Political Theory*

$7.95 214 pages

FELLOW TEACHERS

Of Culture and Its Second Death

With a new Preface

Philip Rieff

Rieff makes a witty, devastating attack on modern intellectual life and its corruption in the universities. "A masterly work, whose relevance to the academic community as a whole is probably unmatched. . . . It should be made required reading for all candidates for tenure." — Alasdair MacIntyre

$7.95 269 pages

STUDIES IN PLATONIC POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

Leo Strauss

With an Introduction by **Thomas L. Pangle**

One of the outstanding thinkers of our time offers in this book his final words to posterity. These essays consider, among others, Heidegger, Husserl, Nietzsche, Marx, Moses Maimonides, Machiavelli, and of course Plato himself to test the Platonic understanding of the conflict between philosophy and political society.

$8.95 268 pages

NEW STUDIES

In Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas

Friedrich A. Hayek

This selection of Hayek's recent essays and lectures includes several important ones that have never before been published in English.

$12.50 322 pages

THE U.S. ECONOMY IN THE 1950s

Harold G. Vatter

First published in 1963, this book remains the best single economic profile of the period.

$12.00 320 pages

Midway Reprint series



CREATED EQUAL?

The Complete Lincoln-Douglas Debates of 1858

Edited and with an Introduction by

Paul M. Angle

$14.00 456 pages

REACHING THE PEASANT FARMER

Organization Theory and Practice in Kenya

David K. Leonard

$17.00 320 pages

UTOPIA AND REVOLUTION

On the Origins of a Metaphor, or Some Illustrations of the Problem of Political Temperament and Intellectual Climate and How Ideas, Ideals, and Ideologies Have Been Historically Related

Melvin J. Lasky

$30.00 740 pages

The University of CHICAGO Press
5801 South Ellis Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637

SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY PRESS

THE FRANK W. ABRAMS LECTURES

CONTROLLING NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Guardianship Versus Democracy

Robert Dahl

128 pages, bibliography, index — Cloth $14.95 Paper $8.95

IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW

Private Law Perspectives on a Public Law Problem

Guido Calabresi

224 pages, bibliography, index — Cloth $20.00 Paper $11.95

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

ISLAM IN REVOLUTION

Fundamentalism in the Arab World

R. Hrair Dekmejian

272 pages, 6 figs., 10 tables, bibliography, index — Cloth $26.00 Paper $12.95

THE RED SEA REGION

Local Actors and the Superpowers

Roberto Aliboni

Foreword by H. E. Boutrous Boutrous-Ghali,
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Egypt

158 pages, index — (U.S. and Canadian rights) — Cloth $19.95

ISLAM AND POLITICS

John L. Esposito

Foreword by Hermann Frederick Eilts

294 pages, map, index — Cloth $28.00 Paper $12.95

Write for our free catalog of books on the Middle East.

SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY PRESS
1600 Jamesville Avenue
Syracuse, New York 13210

Russia

The Roots of Confrontation

Robert V. Daniels

Here is a compact yet comprehensive history that examines the historical contrasts between East and West and elucidates the Russian enigma.

"It's hard to imagine how a one-volume history of Russia could be any better than this."–*Kirkus Reviews*

American Foreign Policy Library $25.00

The Federal Courts

Crisis and Reform

Richard A. Posner

"Whether or not one agrees with all his proposed solutions, Judge Posner presents a comprehensive and clear analysis of the fundamental institutional problems of the federal judicial system. The book is essential reading for those interested in maintaining a system that works fairly and judiciously."

–Stephen Breyer,
Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit $25.00

Racial Conflict and Economic Development

W. Arthur Lewis

Lewis discerns the ways in which race and economics affects individuals and groups, bringing a personal viewpoint to the problems faced by both less-developed and more-developed countries.

The W. E. B. Du Bois Lectures $12.50

Selections from Cultural Writings

Antonio Gramsci

Edited and Introduced by David Forgacs and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith

Translated by William Boelhower

This volume is the first English translation of Gramsci's writings on culture, organically and coherently edited from his journalism and his *Prison Notebooks*. $20.00

A Matter of Principle

Ronald Dworkin

This book is about the interplay of urgent political issues and hotly debated questions of moral philosophy. Dworkin addresses questions about the Anglo-American legal system as protector of individual rights and as machinery for furthering the common good. $25.00

Economics of Worldwide Stagflation

Michael Bruno and Jeffrey Sachs

"This is *serious* supply-side economics... An excellent and important book."

–Robert M. Solow

The authors make several key recommendations for the mix of demand management and incomes policies necessary to combat stagflation in individual countries, as well as for the coordination of macroeconomic policies among the major industrial nations. $25.00

Tax Expenditures

Stanley S. Surrey and Paul R. McDaniel

"This book is comprehensive, challenging, and constructive, and it fills a big void in the tax literature. It will interest economists, political scientists, lawyers, accountants, and legislators."–Joseph Pechman

$27.50

Lord Liverpool

The Life and Political Career
of Robert Banks Jenkinson,
Second Earl of Liverpool, 1770–1828

Norman Gash

"Those who know Professor Gash's previous work will immediately recognize his great virtues as a historian: control, style, insight, formidable narrative gifts..."

–*Times Literary Supplement*

$20.00

Facing Total War

German Society, 1914–1918

Jürgen Kocka

Translated by Barbara Weinberger

This book analyzes the effects of World War I on German society. It shows the crucial role that social classes play in wartime, and provides a history of class interaction, class compromises, and class conflict. $22.50

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

79 Garden Street, Cambridge, MA 02138

Princeton University Press

Do New Leaders Make a Difference?

Executive Succession and Public Policy
Under Capitalism and Socialism
Valerie Bunce

"...should influence all future discussions of such events."
—*American Political Science Review*

In a volume with special significance during the current transition in Soviet power, Professor Bunce assesses the impact of such changes in leadership on priorities in policy within the Soviet bloc and western democratic states during the post-war era.
P: $8.95. C: $27.50

The Status and Appraisal of Classic Texts

An Essay on Political Theory, Its Inheritance,
and the History of Ideas
Conal Condren

"A substantial and original contribution to the debate on how to read and understand a piece of writing that purports to be 'political theory.' Dr. Condren's work is genuinely thoughtful and scholarly, the product of a lively and well-stocked mind."
—*Michael Oakeshott, Professor Emeritus, University of London*
$27.50

Decolonization in Britain and France

The Domestic Consequences of International Relations
Miles Kahler

"This is a very interesting book on an important subject, which Kahler relates to significant theoretical debates in international relations and comparative politics. He examines the linkages between these two fields in a distinctive way. Particularly superb is his treatment of the impact of decolonization on British and French political parties."
—*Peter A. Gourevitch, University of California at San Diego*
P: $9.95. C: $40.00

At your bookstore or

Princeton University Press
41 William Street, Princeton, NJ 08540

Black Box
KAL 007 and the Superpowers
ALEXANDER DALLIN

"Combines the suspense of a spy thriller and the investigative ingenuity of a detective mystery with the careful and well-informed judgments of one of this country's most distinguished experts on the Soviet Union."
—John Lewis Gaddis

"A tight, methodical, attention-gripping attempt to narrow-down the possible explanations—accident? bravado or short-cut? covert anti-Soviet mission?—for the Korean Air Lines 007 overflight of Soviet far-eastern territory in September 1983."—*Kirkus Reviews*

$14.95

American Domestic Priorities
An Economic Appraisal
JOHN M. QUIGLEY and DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, Editors

High deficits, large military and social security expenditures, and the "New Federalism" have put the future of many domestic programs in doubt. Twenty-six nationally prominent economists address questions fundamental to the design of education, housing, transportation, environmental, and anti-poverty policy, proposing imaginative alternatives to further budget cuts for reducing the federal deficit.

$32.50 cloth, $9.95 paper

Parallel Systems
Redundancy in Government
JONATHAN B. BENDOR

It is axiomatic that redundancy in bureaucracy is wasteful. Bendor challenges this conventional wisdom of always applauding streamlined organizations arguing that nonredundant bureaucracies are vulnerable to errors of judgment and execution. Through revealing case studies he shows how redundancy can actually be appropriate and rational.

$34.50

Marx and the Disillusionment of Marxism
WALTER L. ADAMSON

Far from being a consistent thinker, Marx had four different theoretical paradigms for the analysis of history, politics, and culture. Adamson, rejecting the strong claims of historical materialism, reconsiders the relation such a history might have to political action and to the possibility of a genuine and viable socialism.

$22.50

At bookstores or order from

University of California Press
Berkeley 94720

The Latest in Political Research . . .

Alien Powers

The Pure Theory of Ideology

KENNETH MINOGUE

". . . a *tour de force*-highly erudite and wide-ranging, argued with a relentless logic, written with witty and ironical eloquence. As a piece of sustained analysis and criticism of a theoretical idea and its practical implications it has few equals in contemporary literature."—**New Society**

255 pp. ISBN 0-312-01858-4 $27.50

Conceptions of Liberty in Political Philosophy

edited by ZBIGNIEW PELCZYNSKI
and JOHN GRAY

Leading contemporary philosophers explore the conceptions of 'liberty' and 'freedom' from the time of the ancient Greeks to the present day. Animating the discussion throughout is Sir Isaiah Berlin's distinction between 'negative' and 'positive' liberty.

438 pp. ISBN 0-312-16034-8 $32.50

Presidential Leadership

Politics and Policymaking

GEORGE C. EDWARDS III and
STEPHEN J. WAYNE

". . . The scholarship is extraordinary."—*G. Calvin MacKenzie, Colby College*
". . . It is one of the most comprehensive treatments of the presidency available."—*Eric L. Davis, Middlebury College*

480 pp. ISBN 0-312-64037-4 $39.95

The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies

A Study in British Power

A. P. THORNTON

The new edition of Thornton's classic work that traces the history of British imperialism from its emergence through its heyday and collapse following WW II. Thornton's unique contribution is to identify a positive side to the Imperialists which has been obscured by all the jingoistic versions of the doctrine.

392 pp. ISBN 0-312-40989-3 $25.00

Opinion Control in the Democracies

TERENCE H. QUALTER

Brings together the research from a number of disciplines into one integrated study of the nature and fate of the modern mass-media democracy.

317 pp. ISBN 0-312-58683-3 $29.95

Regulation

Politics, Bureaucracy, and Economics

KENNETH J. MEIER

A thorough, up-to-date introduction to regulatory policy in the US. Includes discussions of the policy process and such policy areas as banking, consumer protection, agriculture, occupations, the environment, workplace safety, and antitrust.

334 pp. ISBN 0-312-66971-2 $32.50

The Nuclear Reader

Strategy, Weapons, War

edited by CHARLES W. KEGLEY JR. and
EUGENE R. WITTKOPF

Essays by **Theodore Draper, Wolfgang Panofsky, Robert S. McNamara, Jonathan Schell,** and **Carl Sagan** among others on the strategies, technologies and dangers of nuclear warfare. The presentation is nontechnical and represents all the major alternative viewpoints in the debate.

332 pp. ISBN 0-312-57982-9 $27.50

Developing Contemporary Marxism

edited by ZYGMUNT G. BARANSKI and
JOHN R. SHORT

Surveys the contribution made by Marxism to international debates within economic, social and cultural theory, with discussions of the strengths and weaknesses of Marxist ideas and their applications in past, present, and future scholarship. Areas covered include the historiographical tradition, human geography, linguistics, literary theory, and media and cultural studies.

308 pp. ISBN 0-312-19659-8 $27.50

. . . From St. Martin's Scholarly

Public Policy and Federalism

Issues in State and Local Politics

JEFFREY R. HENIG

An introduction to the ways in which government—at all levels of the federal system—responds to contemporary issues in state and local affairs. Discusses specific policy debates in such areas as welfare, education, crime, and environment; demonstrates their effects on American society; and considers possible future reforms.

401 pp. ISBN 0-312-65557-6 $32.50

The Nordic Parliaments

A Comparative Analysis

DAVID ARTER

The first systematic, comparative examination of the participation of the parliaments of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden in all aspects of the policy cycle. Based largely on field interviews.

431 pp. ISBN 0-312-57767-2 $30.00

The Concept of Human Rights

JACK DONNELLY

"Donnelly's book makes an original and important contribution to the debate about the nature of human rights. The author succeeds admirably in bringing a measure of conceptual clarity out of chaos."—*Terence Ball, University of Minnesota*

120 pp. ISBN 0-312-15941-2 $22.50

Electoral Change in Western Democracies

Patterns and Sources of Electoral Volatility

edited by IVOR CREWE and DAVID DENVER

An exploration of partisan dealignment and electoral volatility and their implications for Western democracies. Includes an overall survey, cross-country comparisons, and in-depth country studies of the phenomenon's magnitude, pattern, source and consequences in the US and Western Europe.

320 pp. ISBN 0-312-24098-8 $29.95

The Politics of Broadcasting

An International Survey

edited by RAYMOND KUHN

A discussion of the interplay between politics and broadcasting in the West. Contributors consider the major themes, issues, and problems that prevail as well as ways these have evolved in the past and are likely to develop in the future. Addresses public vs. private broadcasting, political contests and broadcasting, and the effects and regulation of new technologies.

305 pp. ISBN 0-312-62660-6 $25.00

French Communism and Local Power

Urban Politics and Political Change

MARTIN SCHAIN

A thorough examination of the role Communists play in French government at the local level, which provides a new perspective on the basis of Communist support and on the conditions and limitations of the exercise of local power in France.

147 pp. ISBN 0-312-30445-5 $25.00

Democracy East and West

A Philosophical Overview

HOWARD P. KAINZ

A synthesis of pure philosophy and empiricism that clarifies and analyzes the characteristics of democracy, the dialectical patterns that emerge, and the correlation between a nation's prevailing religious system and the nature of its democratic process.

152 pp. ISBN 0-312-19220-7 $22.50

Now in Paperback!

Communist Political Systems

An Introduction

STEPHEN WHITE, JOHN GARDNER and GEORGE SCHÖPFLIN

Analyzes the emergence, ideology, performance, structure, power machinery, and policy process of communist-ruled states worldwide. "Each author is an expert in his field. . . . This is a valuable book."—**Perspective**

293 pp. ISBN 0-312-15279-5 $9.95

The Concept of Class

An Historical Introduction

PETER CALVERT

Examines the concept's political origins, instances of Marxist and non-Marxist uses up to the 20th century, and the efficiency of using the concept to assess the nature of contemporary socialist states and post-industrial capitalist societies.

254 pp. ISBN 0-312-15919-6 $12.95

St. Martin's Press

Scholarly and Reference Books

175 Fifth Avenue

New York, NY 10010

NEW FROM *Virginia*

Regulatory Decision Making
The Virginia State Corporation Commission
By Laurence J. O'Toole, Jr. and Robert S. Montjoy

The regulation of business is one of the most important functions of state government. Yet there has been little systematic examination of the agencies that shape and implement economic regulatory policy. *Regulatory Decision Making* describes and analyzes one such organization, the State Corporation Commission of Virginia, probably the most powerful regulatory body in the United States today.

This study focuses on the decision-making process of the SCC. The authors evaluate the SCC in the context of the organization theory, public administration, and regulation. Potential influences are closely examined, including law, history, and political culture, the economic and political environments, and the structure and processes of the organization itself. The study is further amplified by two case histories: Regulations for Credit Life Insurance and the 1978 VEPCO rate case. This work will be useful to anyone actively involved in regulatory administration, especially at the state level, and to those interested in Virginia government and politics.

xiv, 389 pages. **$32.50**

The University Press of Virginia
Box 3608, University Station
Charlottesville, Virginia 22903

I O W A

Ψ UNIVERSITY OF IOWA PRESS Ψ

THE FIRST BOOK ON FULBRIGHT IN OVER TEN YEARS

J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT: ADVICE AND DISSENT

By Eugene Brown

An incisive study analyzing Fulbright's famed reputation as a dissenter against American foreign policy. "Presents a new approach to a very important field of American government. This book has valuable interview materials, an excellent bibliography, and considerable literary merit."—Professor Francis Wilhoit

Cloth, $22.50 ISBN 0-87745-130-3

ALSO NEWLY PUBLISHED

HANS DELBRÜCK AND THE GERMAN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

By Arden Bucholz

"A very thorough and searching job of research. Students of German history and military affairs will learn a great deal from it."—Professor Gordon Craig

Cloth, $20.00 ISBN 0-87745-129-X

IOWA CITY IOWA 52242

AND JUSTICE FOR ALL

DISCRETION, JUSTICE, AND DEMOCRACY

A PUBLIC POLICY PERSPECTIVE

Edited by Carl F. Pinkele and William C. Louthan

The presence of discretionary opportunities in the law implementation system is a significant public policy issue. In this important new book, editors Pinkele and Louthan focus upon the complex questions discretion presents within a democratic society. The fact that individuals within the legal system can and *do* act quite autonomously must be reconciled with the precept that this system has formalized rules guiding and constraining authoritative behavior. The argument put forward in this collection of essays is *not* that discretionary behavior leads only to abusive and tyrannical actions, but that much of it is potentially healthy for a democratic society. Treatment of topics such as the responsibility, accountability, and accessibility of public decision makers is thorough and provocative. **Discretion, Justice, and Democracy** delineates the realities and complexities of discretionary behavior and stimulates a new response to its role in a democratic society.

To purchase your copy send $18.20 to ***Iowa State University Press****, Dept. DJD, 2121 South State Avenue, Ames, IA 50010*

University Microfilms

This publication is available in microform.

University Microfilms International reproduces this publication in microform: microfiche and 16mm or 35mm film. For information about this publication or any of the more than 13,000 titles we offer, complete and mail the coupon to: University Microfilms International, 300 N. Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106. Call us toll-free for an immediate response: 800-521-3044. Or call collect in Michigan, Alaska and Hawaii: 313-761-4700.

University
Microfilms
International

☐ Please send information about these titles:

Name
Company/Institution
Address
City State Zip
Phone ( )

The Pergamon Government & Politics Series

Series Editors: **Richard A. Brody**, Stanford University, **Norman J. Ornstein**, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, **Paul E. Peterson**, The Brookings Institution, **Nelson W. Polsby**, University of California, Berkeley & **Martin M. Shapiro**, University of California, Berkeley

Published Spring 1985:

CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL LAWMAKING
The Supreme Court and the Art of Politics
by **Lief H. Carter**
232 pages 1985 hardcover $29.50 softcover $12.95

THE POLITICAL HAND
Policy Implementation and Youth Employment Programs
by **Martin A. Levin** & **Barbara Ferman**
180 pages 1985 hardcover $19.50 softcover $ 9.95

Coming This Fall:

CAN GOVERNMENTS LEARN?
American Foreign Policy and Central American Revolutions
by **Lloyd S. Etheredge**
300 pages (approx.) 1985 hardcover $32.50 (approx.)
softcover $12.95 (approx.)

THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR II
by **Amos Yoder**
304 pages (approx.) 1985 hardcover $32.50 (approx.)
softcover $12.95 (approx.)

Pergamon Press
Maxwell House, Fairview Park, Elmsford, NY 10523

Political Science from

American Hostages In Iran

The Conduct of a Crisis

Warren Christopher, Harold H. Saunders, Gary Sick, Robert Carswell, Richard J. Davis, John E. Hoffman, Jr., Roberts B. Owen, with commentaries by Oscar Schachter and Abraham A. Ribicoff

A rare insider's view of the complex international negotiations that led to the release of the American hostages in Iran. Key Americans involved in the negotiating process discuss how agonizing political, economic, military, and human choices were made. In addition, a distinguished lawyer and a former senator discuss the implications for future U.S. policy.

Soviet Union
Caspian Sea
Iraq
Iran
Afghanistan
Persian Gulf
Gulf of Oman
Arabian Sea

Iran and the Desert Rendezvous

"A first-class piece of work . . . [and] a classic case study. Anybody who is interested in the Iranian crisis should read this book."
—Lawrence S. Eagleburger

A Council on Foreign Relations Book $25.00

A Village Without Solidarity

Polish Peasantry in Years of Crisis

C. M. Hann

This historical and anthropological study of Wislok, a rural village in southern Poland, examines the nature of Polish socialism and society at grassroots level. Asserting that an authentic socialist community has not emerged to any great extent in rural Poland, Hann shows that there are major contrasts between the fate of the peasantry in Poland and elsewhere in socialist Eastern Europe. $15.95

Arms and the African

Military Influences on Africa's International Relations

edited by William J. Foltz and Henry S. Bienen

An examination by prominent Africanists of key aspects of Africa's militarization and its implications for U.S. foreign policy. Topics include Africa and the strategic calculations of the superpowers, Soviet and French involvement in Africa's military affairs, the increasingly political role of the army in South Africa, and the effect of the spread of military regimes in Africa on the international behavior of African states.

A Council on Foreign Relations Book $22.50

Due Process in the Administrative State

Jerry L. Mashaw

As procedural due process claims against federal, state, and local administrators mount in our federal courts, it becomes increasingly necessary to find an ideal of due process that can integrate substantive and procedural rights within the context of a bureaucratic public life. Mashaw argues for a new approach to due process, a "dignitary theory" both appropriate to the fundamental principles of American liberal-democratic constitutionalism and a restraint on the tendency of courts to mold administrative processes in their own image. $24.00

Theologians Under Hitler

Gerhard Kittel, Paul Althaus, and Emanuel Hirsch

Robert P. Ericksen

Who were the German Protestant theologians who welcomed the Nazis and their policies of racism and anti-Semitism? What led them to embrace a regime so inimical to the spiritual values of Christianity and the intellectual values of the university? In this provocative book, Ericksen answers these questions by analyzing the work and attitudes of three distinguished theologians who supported the rise of Hitler. $20.00

Yale

American Violence and Public Policy

edited by Lynn A. Curtis

The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, appointed in 1968 after the assassination of Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr., made a comprehensive assessment of the extent and causes of violence in America. In this new book, several highly distinguished scholars — most of them formerly associated with the Violence Commission — look at what has happened since the Commission made its policy recommendations, update the statistics, and offer their proposals for future policies.

"An important contribution to the debate over criminal justice policy, it is essential reading for anyone wishing to understand why past policies have failed, and what the remedies really are." —Charles E. Silberman $23.00

Neighborhood Services

Making Big Cities Work

John Mudd

Coordination of services is an elusive but essential good for government — a good that is rarely achieved. In a study relevant to all large urban areas as well as to federal, state, and county governments, Mudd describes how New York City developed a model for district manager cabinets that successfully improved the coordination and responsiveness of municipal services in local neighborhoods. $20.00

Radical Islam

Medieval Theology and Modern Politics

Emmanuel Sivan

In recent years radical fundamentalists have had a formidable intellectual and social impact on Sunni Islam countries such as Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon. This engrossing book by an eminent Arabist focuses on the development of Sunni Muslim fundamentalism, discussing how it rejected western values, broke with pan-Arabism, and took on an activist political position. $18.50

Yale University Press

New Haven and London

New Paperbounds

Superpower Games

Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict

Steven J. Brams

Brams shows how game theory can illuminate different aspects of superpower conflict — how deterrence works, why the arms race persists, and problems related to verifying arms-control agreements — and also suggests ways to ameliorate this conflict by modifying the rules of "superpower games."

"A book every serious student of international relations should read." —Bruce Bueno de Mesquita New in cloth ($22.50) and paper ($6.95)

The Spellbinders

Charismatic Political Leadership

Ann Ruth Willner



"A manual for potential charismatic leaders. Candidates for President . . . would do well to refer to it. Ordinary citizens would do even better to read it, so they can recognize charismatic appeals that might mislead, as well as lead, our society." —Bruce Mazlish, *The New York Times Book Review* $7.95 paper

Bureaucratic Justice

Managing Social Security Disability Claims

Jerry L. Mashaw

"An unorthodox redefinition of what the administrative law that matters is, and fresh insights into why it matters and how it develops. . . . Brilliant." —Harvey C. Mansfield, Sr., *Perspective*

"A major contribution to the ongoing debate about administrative law and mass injustice." —Lance Liebman and Richard B. Stewart, *Harvard Law Review* $9.95 paper

Get very attractive figures

SPSS® Graphics gives you great looking numbers for a great little number: less than $9,999.

What do you call a menu-driven product that takes data, aggregates it, manipulates it, and turns it into presentation-quality charts, graphs and maps? We call it SPSS Graphics, the most powerful, affordable color graphics package of its kind.

Among its many features, SPSS Graphics gives you access to over 30 basic displays, including pie, bar, line and area charts. You can combine any number of images into a single display. Or change any element of a chart to create a custom display.

SPSS Graphics also provides two- and three-dimensional maps of all states, counties, Canadian provinces and countries. Lets you generate professional text-only displays. Enables you to enter files ranging from small tables to national survey data. And allows you to use forms and menus to restructure data without leaving the program. Or you can enter data directly from SPSS-X™—the Information Analysis System that's been serving thousands of researchers and analysts for nearly 20 years.

Currently available for IBM CMS and DEC VAX computers, SPSS Graphics is compatible with a wide variety of devices. Input can be entered from many popular terminals, including the IBM PC. And output can be directed to a host of plotters, CRT's, slide makers and PC's.

High impact graphics. Interactive. At an unprecedented price. If you'd like to see how attractive SPSS Graphics can be, call or write the SPSS Marketing Department today.

SPSS Inc., 444 N. Michigan Avenue,
Chicago, IL 60611, 312/329-3500.

In Europe, contact:
SPSS Europe, B.V., 4200 AC
Gorinchem, The Netherlands, Phone:
+31183036711, TWX: 21019.



SPSS inc. PRODUCTIVITY RAISED TO THE HIGHEST POWER™

Contact SPSS Inc. concerning availability on your computer. SPSS-X and SPSS Graphics are trademarks of SPSS Inc. for its proprietary computer software.
IBM CMS, IBM PC are trademarks of International Business Machines Corporation. VAX is a trademark of Digital Equipment Corporation. © Copyright 1985, SPSS Inc.

Governments under Stress

Political Executives and Key Bureaucrats in Washington, London, and Ottawa

Colin Campbell

High-level bureaucrats in three capitals talked with Colin Campbell about their work, attitudes to government and politics, and the power they wield. Some 265 in-depth interviews serve as the basis for this revealing, sometimes surprising analysis of the day-to-day workings of government in the U.S., Britain, and Canada. Cloth $24.95, paper $14.95.

University of
Toronto Press
33 East Tupper Street, Buffalo NY 14203

New from the State University of New York Press

This book will be the focus of a panel
at the 1985 APSA conference

DISENCHANTED REALISTS

Political Science and the American Crisis, 1884-1984

Raymond Seidelman
with the assistance of Edward J. Harpham

Disenchanted Realists explores the intertwined fate of American political science and twentieth century liberal reforms. In a provocative analysis, the authors discuss the assumptions, hopes, and understandings of prominent liberal reformers.

$10.95PB. Order from SUNY, P.O. Box 6525, Ithaca, N.Y. 14850. Orders from individuals must be prepaid. Add $2 for postage/handling. NY State residents please add sales tax.

A volume in the SUNY Series in
Political Theory: Contemporary Issues
edited by John Gunnell

Announcing a new career guide...

Alternative Careers For Political Scientists

Alternative Careers for Political Scientists contains practical advice for obtaining nonacademic employment. The authors are political scientists who personally experienced and observed the employment opportunities they describe. Chapters cover the federal government executive branch, Capitol Hill, state and local government, research and consulting, interest groups and associations, and corporate public affairs, as well as a general introduction to nonacademic careers. This guide should be of interest to curriculum planners and career counselors as well as individual job seekers. The price is $5 for APSA members and $10 for nonmembers.

ORDERS MUST BE PREPAID.

Order Form

Enclosed is a check for ________ copies of **Alternative Careers for Political Scientists** at the rate of (check one):

☐ $5 for APSA members

☐ $10 for nonmembers

Bulk orders	APSA Departmental Service Member	Non-Member
5 copies	$ 20.00	$ 40.00
10 copies	$ 30.00	$ 60.00
50 copies	$ 125.00	$ 250.00
100 copies	$ 200.00	$ 400.00

Name ____

Address ____

______________________________________ Zip __________

Order from:

Career Alternatives/APSA

1527 New Hampshire Avenue NW, Washington, D.C. 20036

BROOKINGS

The New Direction in American Politics
John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, editors
Ronald Reagan's sweeping re-election reinforced electoral, institutional, and policy trends in American politics that could have far-reaching consequences—the reversal of the federal role in providing social services, the strengthening of support for the Republican party, the reinvigoration of Congressional discipline, the renaissance of national party finance and organization, the toleration of large deficits, and the development of a new strategy for national defense. This volume explores how these and other changes have given a new direction to American politics.
June 1985/c. 250 pages/$9.95 paper/$26.95 cloth

Constitutional Inequality:
The Political Fortunes of the Equal Rights Amendment
Gilbert Y. Steiner
Focusing on the complexities of accomplishing substantive policy change by constitutional amendment, Steiner examines the effects of institutions, laws, rules, lobbying strategies, and timing on the outcomes of fights over the ERA from its halcyon days in 1971–72 to its failure to win ratification. He finds that formal constitutional change to adopt an ERA requires a consensus that the abortion dispute now makes impossible.
April 1985/c. 120 pages/$8.95 paper/$22.95 cloth

Immigration—The Beleaguered Bureaucracy
Milton D. Morris
The author finds that comprehensive reform of the immigration bureaucracy is needed before today's critical immigration issues—curbing illegal immigration and managing the flow of refugees—can be dealt with satisfactorily. Morris examines the evolution, character, and performance of the immigration bureaucracy in the context of an ambiguous political commitment to limited immigration.
February 1985/150 pages/$8.95 paper/$22.95 cloth

The New Urban Reality
Paul E. Peterson, editor
This book presents an interdisciplinary collection of papers addressing how sharp declines in inner city population and employment have been affected by technological advances in transportation, communication, and manufacturing, and by the changing racial composition of central cities. The book considers these and other important factors in examining whether any set of public policies can slow or reverse the decline of America's industrial cities.
April 1985/c. 350 pages/$11.95 paper/$31.95 cloth

Assessing Tax Reform
Henry J. Aaron and Harvey Galper
The reform of the U.S. tax system is a central political issue. This book offers a concise, nontechnical evaluation to help general readers and students understand the tax reform issues Congress is now debating. The authors identify the major alternative proposals, analyze principles of taxation that can be used for judging them, and present their own program for a fair, efficient, and less complex tax structure.
April 1985/c. 175 pages/$8.95 paper/$22.95 cloth

The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 797-6258

BROOKINGS

Superpower Rivalry and Third World Radicalism

The Idea of National Liberation

S. Neil MacFarlane

In answer to such questions as what implications does the spread of national liberation have for the internal and external behavior of states formed by national liberation movements, for Soviet and Western interests, and for the structure of the international system, Neil MacFarlane offers an in-depth analysis of the idea of national liberation and places it within the context of Western and Soviet conceptions of political and social development in the non-European world.

$24.50

Energy, Minerals, and Western Security

Hanns W. Maull

The author presents a detailed conceptual framework for the discussion of economic security issues. He offers a comprehensive examination of the position of a wide range of fuel minerals—oil, gas, coal, uranium—and non-fuel minerals—metals, fertilizers—detailing the supply situation and future availability. In addition, he makes recommendations for policy changes which would, if implemented, considerably reduce the dangers of resource wars in the near future.

$35.00

The Political Economy of Global Energy

Rajendra K. Pachauri

Offering a synoptic overview of recent and current conditions in the supply and demand of energy world-wide, Pachauri traces the links between global energy developments, the world oil market, the actions and strategies of OPEC, and the changes in the international economic order. His thesis, established through empirical analysis of past trends and future prospects, is that a global approach is essential for solving the energy problems of the world.

$25.00 ***hardcover***
$8.95 ***paperback***

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PRESS
701 West 40th Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21211



PUBLICATIONS FROM THE UNITED NATIONS

ENERGY
ENERGY

ENERGY STATISTICS YEARBOOK
The *Energy Statistics Yearbook* (formerly *Yearbook of World Energy Statistics)* is a comprehensive collection of international energy statistics prepared by the Statistical Office of the United Nations. It is the twenty-sixth in a series of annual compilations which commenced under the title *World Energy Supplies in Selected Years, 1929-1950.*
E/F.84.XVII.4 $60.00

MAIN FEATURES AND TRENDS IN PETROLEUM AND MINING AGREEMENTS
Prepared by United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations
E.83.II.A.9 $13.50

ENERGY TRANSITION IN THE ECE REGION.
E.83.II.E.21 $16.50

A GUIDE TO OCEAN THERMAL ENERGY CONVERSION FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
E.83.II.A.21 $9.50

ENERGY IN THE EIGHTIES
Highlights of the Meeting of the *Ad Hoc* Group of Energy and Petroleum Experts
E.83.II.A.16 $16.50

For further titles please request a free copy of our Catalogue of International Publications

UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS
Room DC2-853, New York, N.Y. 10017
Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland

CHANGING YOUR ADDRESS?

If you are planning a move, please fill in the form below and return it to the American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Address changes should be received at the Association by the 1st of the month to be included in the monthly update of the Association mailing list.

NAME ____________________

OLD ADDRESS ____________________

____________________ Zip ________

NEW ADDRESS ____________________

____________________ Zip ________

Announcing a New Directory...

The Directory of Undergraduate Political Science Faculty contains listings for nearly 500 separate departments of political science whose highest degree offering is a B.A. Departmental name, address, and telephone number are given.

The **Directory** lists approximately 1,800 faculty members by name, with their highest degree, fields of specialization and current position. The **Directory** also contains an alphabetical faculty index.

The price is $8.00 for APSA members and $12.00 for nonmembers.

ORDERS MUST BE PREPAID.



Order Form

Enclosed is a check for ________ copies of Directory of Undergraduate Political Science Faculty—1984 at the rate of (check one):

☐ $8 for APSA members ☐ $12 for nonmembers

Name ______________________________

Address ______________________________

______________________________ Zip __________

Order from:

UNDERGRADUATE DIRECTORY / APSA

1527 New Hampshire Avenue NW, Washington, D.C. 20036

Politics and Policy

Lewis B. Hershey, Mr. Selective Service

by George Q. Flynn

"A consistently well-written analysis of the evolution of the manpower-channeling policies of the Fifties and Sixties. George Flynn convincingly explains Hershey's great skill as a bureaucrat and his vision of what the connection between the Army and the citizenry should be. The book strikes me as a contribution both to scholarship about contemporary history and to popular understanding of American government."
—James Fallows, Washington Editor,
The Atlantic Monthly

400 pp., $24.95

Helms and Hunt

The North Carolina Senate Race, 1984

by William D. Snider

"A fascinating story that should interest not only North Carolinians but aficionados of politics everywhere. . . . Jesse Helms's victory will long be a case history for students of American politics, and Mr. Snider's account will be the basic raw material for all who would learn why it happened."—Vermont Royster, *Wall Street Journal*

215 pp., $9.50 paper

Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story

Statesman of the Old Republic

by R. Kent Newmyer

"A consistently thoughtful and balanced perspective on the various aspects of Justice Story's career. . . . Newmyer's writing is simply excellent."—William E. Nelson, New York University

507 pp., $33
Studies in Legal History

Latin American Democracies

Colombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela

by John A. Peeler

An informative analysis of the establishment and maintenance of three liberal democracies in Latin America. Peeler suggests that liberal democracy, even with its imperfections, is the preferable alternative there. He also proposes ways of establishing new liberal democracies and of further democratizing existing regimes.

206 pp., $24

Policy Indicators

Links between Social Science and Public Debate

by Duncan MacRae, Jr.

MacRae analyses the ways in which experts can aid a political community in choosing public statistics for citizens to use in making policy judgments. "An original and brilliant contribution to the field. . . . MacRae has developed a self-consciously ethical approach to the topic—a considerable achievement."—Peter H. Rossi, University of Massachusetts at Amherst

430 pp., $36
Urban and Regional Policy and Development Studies

Planning with Neighborhoods

by William M. Rohe and Lauren B. Gates

"By examining a broad range of cities in terms of size and geographic location, [Rohe and Gates] go a long way toward correcting the large coastal and midwestern cities' bias of most neighborhood research. . . . This is important, fresh material for both practitioners and academics."—Robert M. Hollister, Tufts University

approx. 260 pp., $35 cloth, $12.95 paper
Urban and Regional Policy and Development Studies

available at bookstores or from publisher

The University of North Carolina Press

Post Office Box 2288, Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514

CAMBRIDGE

The Economist's View of the World

Government, Markets, & Public Policy

STEVEN E. RHOADS

In a clear, lively, and nontechnical style, Steven Rhoads, a political scientist, assesses the way in which economists view the world of public policy and shows that economics is a discipline of both "marvelous insights and troubling blindness..."

"...altogether balanced and fair...After what the author says about the good sense and rationality the economists bring to public policy, cutting through all sorts of sacred cows and sentimentalities, one begins to wonder what he is going to find *against* the economist's perspective. But he does not disappoint." —Dennis Wrong, New York University

"...how well the author understands and appreciates what economists say about the working of markets, the unwanted repercussion of blithely enacted controls, and the inaccuracies of decision-making through governmental processes." —Leland B. Yeager, University of Virginia

Cloth $39.50 Paper $12.95

Energy Policy in America Since 1945

A Study of Business-Government Relations

RICHARD H.K. VIETOR

"Professor Vietor gives us a lucid and detailed description of America's energy policy since the end of World War II. He not only presents us with an authoritative history, but he also presents a new view of the interactions between business and government under changing conditions. This book should be read by anyone interested in energy policy, business history, or business-government relations—which means everyone." —Robert B. Stobaugh, co-author of *Energy Future* and Director of the Energy Project, Harvard Business School

Studies in Economic History and Policy: The United States in the Twentieth Century $29.95

The Limits of Symbolic Reform

The New Deal and Taxation, 1933–1939

MARK H. LEFF

Mark Leff examines the gap between politics and economics, between symbol and substance in the New Deal. In viewing taxation at the intersection of economic policy and political strategy, this book helps demonstrate the constraints that limited New Deal reform. $32.50

Reactionary Modernism

Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich

JEFFREY HERF

Professor Herf shows how German nationalism and later National Socialism created what Joseph Goebbels called the "steel-like romanticism of the twentieth century." By associating technology with the Germans, with beautiful form, and with a strong state, these right-wing intellectuals reconciled Germany's strength with its romantic soul and national identity. $29.95

British Intelligence in the Second World War

Volume 3, Part 1

Editors: F.H. HINSLEY, E.E. THOMAS, C.F.G. RANSOM, and R.C. KNIGHT

"...the fuller story is only now being provided...If it does not completely overturn the accepted history of the war, it certainly compels us to revise our judgements of many important campaigns." —*Washington Post Book World*

Professor Hinsley provides the only reliable account yet published of the part played by British Intelligence in allied strategy and operations during World War II. He and his colleagues have been allowed unrestricted access to the full range of British government intelligence records and to political and military archives of the war and interwar years. Their third and final volume will be published in two parts, the first following events from the summer of 1943 to the summer of 1944. $39.50

All prices subject to change. Order from your bookstore or call our Customer Service at 1-800-431-1580 (outside New York State and Canada). MasterCard or Visa accepted.

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 32 East 57th Street, New York, New York 10022.

New supplementary texts

SOVIET POLITICS

Russia after Brezhnev

edited by **Joseph L. Nogee**

A wide-ranging and up-to-date text that takes a close look at all of the major aspects of Soviet political life in the 1980s.

254 pp.   April 1985 $27.95
ISBN 0-03-064238-8
Paper edition: $12.95
ISBN 0-03-064237-X

CUBA

Twenty-Five Years of Revolution 1959-1984

edited by **Sandor Halebsky** and **John M. Kirk**

This authoritative anthology surveys all aspects of contemporary life in Cuba and charts the successes and failures of Fidel Castro and the Cuban people.

480 pp.   April 1985 $43.95   ISBN 0-03-071637-3
Paper edition: $16.95   ISBN 0-03-071636-5

AMERICAN POLITICAL THEOLOGY

Historical Perspective and Theoretical Analysis

Charles W. Dunn

208 pp.   1984 $29.95   ISBN 0-03-071843-0
Paper edition: $12.95   ISBN 0-03-071844-9

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN POLITICAL THEORY

Revised Edition

Robert Booth Fowler and **Jeffrey R. Orenstein**

172 pp.   March 1985 $28.95
ISBN 0-03-000838-7
Paper edition: $13.95
ISBN 0-03-000839-5

Order from your local bookseller or direct from PRAEGER PUBLISHERS
521 Fifth Avenue   New York, New York 10175


SOVIET POLITICS
Russia after Brezhnev
EDITED BY JOSEPH L. NOGEE
CUBA HALEBSKY & KIRK
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF REVOLUTION
1959 TO 1984
CUBA
Edited by SANDOR HALEBSKY and JOHN M. KIRK
AMERICAN POLITICAL THEOLOGY
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN POLITICAL THEORY
Robert Booth Fowler ○ Jeffrey R. Orenstein
Revised Edition

Announcing . . .



research support for political scientists

SECOND EDITION COMPILED BY STEPHEN F. SZABO

A GUIDE TO SOURCES OF FUNDS FOR RESEARCH FELLOWSHIPS, GRANTS AND CONTRACTS.

A monograph containing detailed listings of public and private agencies that fund research fellowships, grants, and contracts. Includes section on strategic thinking about funding research and a guide to preparing research proposals.

ORDER FORM

Please send ____________ copies of ***Research Support for Political Scientists.***

Enclosed is my check for $______________ to cover the cost at $6.00 each.
ALL ORDERS MUST BE PREPAID.

Name ____

Address ____

____ Zip ___________

Return to:

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

TIMELY HARVARD PAPERBACKS

Law and Revolution

The Formation of the
Western Legal Tradition

Harold J. Berman

Winner of the 1984 SCRIBES Book Award of the American Bar Association for the best new book on a legal subject.

"A magnificent volume, broad in scope and rich in detail; this may be the most important book on law in our generation."
– *American Political Science Review*

$12.95 paper

Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century

Edited by Robert L. Benson
and Giles Constable
With Carol D. Lanham

"To paraphrase the best-known remark made during the twelfth century, it may be said of contributors and editors both that theirs is the work of giants–on the shoulders of a giant." –*American Historical Review*

$15.95 paper

Europe in the Eighteenth Century

Aristocracy and the Bourgeois Challenge

George Rudé

This is a social history of Europe in all its aspects: economic, political, diplomatic, military, colonial-expansionist. It stresses growth, interrelationships, and conflict of social classes as agents of historical change.

$8.95 paper

The Nazi Party

A Social Profile of
Members and Leaders, 1919–1945

Michael Kater

"This book should stand as the definitive work on the social composition of National Socialism for a long time." –*Choice*

$9.95 paper

A Dictionary of Marxist Thought

Edited by Tom Bottomore

"A remarkable editorial achievement . . . The book can be confidently recommended as a fair and informed account of the community of Marxist positions."
–*New York Times Book Review*

$9.95 paper

The Puritan Moment

The Coming of Revolution
in an English County

William Hunt

Awarded the Thomas J. Wilson Prize by the Board of Syndics of Harvard University Press

". . . Hunt makes important contributions to the sociopolitical history of Puritanism [and] to the ever-growing genre of English regional studies . . . a brilliant integration of social and political history."
–*American Historical Review*

Harvard Historical Studies, 102 $8.95 paper

Wars and Revolutions

Britain, 1760–1815

Ian R. Christie

"*New History of England* . . . has already established itself as a valuable and successful series . . . *Wars and Revolutions* is another excellent example, both clear and readable." –*Times Literary Supplement*

New History of England $8.95 paper

Tax Revolt

Something for Nothing in California
Enlarged Edition

David O. Sears and Jack Citrin

"This book is the first substantial study of the California tax revolt. It is well crafted and well written and has great depth and sophistication. The topic is of intense interest and importance . . . A significant work."
–Walter Dean Burnham

$9.95 paper

Harvard University Press
79 Garden Street Cambridge, MA 02138

LibertyPress
LibertyClassics



ESSAYS
MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY

By David Hume
Edited by Eugene F. Miller

Hume published his first book of essays in 1741 and never stopped working in one way or another on essays until his death in 1776.

This Liberty*Classics* edition contains the thirty-nine essays which were included under the title *Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary* in the 1777 posthumous edition of *Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects*. It also includes ten essays which were withdrawn or left unpublished by Hume for various reasons. The two most important were deemed too controversial for the religious climate of his time.

The present volume contains all of Hume's essays on political economy and on government including such well known titles as "Of the Original Contract," "That Politics May be Reduced to a Science." "Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations," and "Idea of Perfect Commonwealth."

Professor Miller has based this new edition on the edition of 1777 and has held fidelity to that text as a paramount aim. He has added editorial notes to explain Hume's many references and allusions which would be unfamiliar to most modern readers. A glossary is provided to clarify 18th Century uses of terms which might otherwise prove confusing. A listing of variant readings is also included.
650 + liii pages.
Forward, editor's note, glossary,
variant readings, index.

Hardcover	$17.00	0-86597-044-0
Softcover	$ 8.50	0-86597-045-9

Prepayment is required on all orders not for resale. We pay book rate postage on prepaid orders. Please allow 4 to 6 weeks for delivery. *All* orders from outside the United States *must* be prepaid *in U.S. dollars*. To order, or for a copy of our catalogue, write:
Liberty*Press*/Liberty*Classics*
7440 North Shadeland, Dept. O101
Indianapolis, IN 46250


THE STATE DEPARTMENT & THE STRUGGLE OVER US FOREIGN POLICY
SECRETS OF STATE
BARRY RUBIN
BEN-GURION AND THE PALESTINIAN ARABS
FROM PEACE TO WAR
SHABTAI TEVETH
Emergence of a FREE PRESS
Leonard W. Levy
THOMAS M. FRANCK
NATION AGAINST NATION
GRAVE NEW WORLD
MICHAEL LEDEEN
The Superpower Crisis of the 1980s
Rethinking the SOVIET Experience
Politics & History Since 1917
Stephen F. Cohen

Secrets Of State

The State Department and the Struggle Over U.S. Foreign Policy

BARRY RUBIN, Georgetown University.

Elucidates the conflicting roles and objectives of the White House, State Department, National Security Council, and other agencies in recent crises; examines the causes of U.S. failures abroad; assesses the performance of individual leaders; and points out the system's dangerous shortcomings.
May 1985 384 pp. $25.00

Ben-Gurion And The Palestinian Arabs

From Peace to War

SHABTAI TEVETH, Tel Aviv University.
"Tells a story without which modern Middle Eastern reality cannot be grasped. This is a fine contribution."—Abba Eban
May 1985 220 pp. $17.95

Emergence Of A Free Press

LEONARD W. LEVY,
Claremont Graduate School.

A greatly revised and enlarged edition of Levy's landmark 1960 work, *Legacy of Supression: Freedom of Speech and Press in Early American History.* "A vigorous and judicious contribution to the subject."
—*Library Journal*
1985 432 pp. $29.95

Nation Against Nation

What Happened to the U.N. Dream and What the U.S. Can Do About It

THOMAS M. FRANCK, New York University Law School.

"This valuable, comprehensive study never descends to polemics, but notes candidly the ways in which the U.S. acted unrealistically and, during the U.N.'s first decade, used the body as a foreign policy tool—showing the way for Third World nations to do the same."—*Publishers Weekly*
April 1985 384 pp. $19.95

Grave New World

The Superpower Crisis of the 1980s

MICHAEL A. LEDEEN,
Georgetown University.

"A significant contribution and by far the most lucid of recent conservative analyses of U.S.-Soviet relations."—*Library Journal.*
"Ledeen deftly explains where we stand —and why the world is cracking beneath our feet."—George Will
April 1985 221 pp. $17.95

Rethinking The Soviet Experience

Politics and History Since 1917

STEPHEN F. COHEN, Princeton University.

"Cohen is a remarkably incisive and independent analyst of Soviet Russian history and politics . . . reflective, serious, and innovative."—*Washington Post Book World*
1985 222 pp. $17.95

At better bookstores or to order direct send your check to

Oxford University Press

Box 900 • 200 Madison Avenue • New York, NY 10016

BUREAUCRACY VS. ENVIRONMENT


FORESTLANDS
PUBLIC & PRIVATE
EDITED BY
Robert T. Deacon
AND
M. Bruce Johnson
Foreword by B. DELWORTH GARDNER
PACIFIC INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH


LOCKING UP THE RANGE
FEDERAL LAND CONTROLS AND GRAZING
Gary D. Libecap
With a Foreword by Jonathan R.T. Hughes
PACIFIC INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH

FORESTLANDS

Public and Private

Edited by ROBERT T. DEACON
and M. BRUCE JOHNSON
Foreword by B. DELWORTH GARDNER

Adopted around the turn of the century, government-managed forestlands were claimed to ensure perpetual timber supplies and provide industry and community stability. However, compared with private timberlands, public lands have systematically witnessed frequent and severe timber supply problems, environmental hazards, and market instabilities.

Featuring leading scholars in economics, forest sciences, history, law, and related fields, *Forestlands* compares private/market with public/bureaucratic forest management and critically examines such topics as state and federal regulation of timberlands, timber tax and antitrust policies, wilderness and exclusive-use forestlands, capital formation, trade policies, and conservation.

"This book is an intellectual gem of rare quality and value."
–B. DELWORTH GARDNER
Professor of Agricultural Economics
University of California, Davis

280 Pages • ISBN 0-88410-391-9 Cloth • ca. $30.00
ISBN 0-88410-391-7 Paper • ca. $11.95

LOCKING UP THE RANGE

Federal Land Controls and Grazing

By GARY D. LIBECAP
Foreword by JONATHAN R.T. HUGHES

Locking Up the Range details the efforts of the Bureau of Land Management to expand its regulatory authority and attenuate the privileges held by ranchers. Libecap demonstrates that the self-interest goals of the Interior Department repeatedly blocked the assignment of private property rights to the range despite the absence of any public goods qualities. Since the land has been retained by the government, use privileges are bureaucratically assigned and are inherently uncertain due to the narrow, changing goals of the bureaucracy. The conflict between ranchers, environmentalists, and the Interior Department in the 1980s reflects these continuing past conditions and can only be permanently resolved through the recognition of clear property titles to those who use the land.

"...the argument and evidence produced by Libecap are highly convincing....This book is an excellent study."
–PUBLIC CHOICE

128 Pages • ISBN 0-88410-387-0 Paper • $8.95
ISBN 0-88410-382-X Cloth • $19.95

To order, or for a catalog of publications, please write:
PACIFIC INSTITUTE, 177 Post Street, Dept. K5
San Francisco, CA 94108

PACIFIC INSTITUTE
FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH

How to be more buttoned-up about political history.

Canarsie

The Jews and Italians of Brooklyn against Liberalism

Jonathan Rieder

"The rise of Ronald Reagan and the politics of the 1980s surprised many of the country's best-known analysts. Jonathan Rieder was in the right places at the right time—the streets and kitchens of Canarsie, Brooklyn—to understand what was actually happening (and going to happen next) in American politics."

—Richard Reeves

22 halftones, 1 map
$22.50

The American Ethos

Public Attitudes toward Capitalism and Democracy

Herbert McClosky and *John Zaller*

American political values in the 1980s are vividly defined in this comprehensive, yet concise study. The authors combine dramatic survey findings—of Americans in general and of special leadership groups—and historical material, to trace the profound changes in public attitudes toward those defining elements of the American political tradition—capitalism and democracy.

Twentieth Century Fund
$27.50

Command in War

Martin van Creveld

"Already recognized as the outstanding figure among the younger military historians, Martin van Creveld has now provided us with a brilliant new perspective on the essence of warfare, by examining in fascinating detail just how command has been exercised. Our understanding of Julius Caesar and Napoleon, of the Vietnam command and the Israeli army, is enhanced greatly by [his] fresh treatment."

—Edward N. Luttwak

$20.00
A main selection of The History Book Club.

SWEEPING THE DEPRESSION OUT
STOP BUSSING



Harold Ickes of the New Deal

His Private Life and Public Career

Graham White and *John Maze*

Interior Secretary Harold Ickes was one of the New Deal's most impressive, controversial, and enigmatic figures.

In this book, historian Graham White and psychologist John Maze reveal the relationship between Ickes' private and public sides by uncovering the psychological imperatives and conscious ideals that illuminated his sometimes illustrious, sometimes troubled career.

$20.00

Russia

The Roots of Confrontation

Robert V. Daniels

By careful examination of the historical contrasts between East and West, Daniels shows that present-day Russia's national character and international relations are not a product of Marxist revolutionary ideology, but rather can be understood only in light of the traumas and triumphs, the privations and privileges that the country has weathered from the tsarist times to the present.

"It's hard to imagine how a one-volume history of Russia could be any better than this."

—*Kirkus Reviews*

American Foreign Policy Library
$25.00

One and Inseparable

Daniel Webster and the Union

Maurice G. Baxter

"A work of superb scholarship—soundly based on original research, astonishingly well informed on political developments... a major biography of a major figure."

—David Herbert Donald

$25.00 *Belknap*

At bookstores or from
Harvard University Press
Cambridge, MA 02138

Harvard University Press

Chatham House

Publishers, Inc.

Box One, Chatham, New Jersey 07928 Telephone: (201) 635-2059

THE ELECTION OF 1984

Reports and Interpretations

Gerald M. Pomper with Ross K. Baker, Charles E. Jacob, Scott Keeter, Wilson Carey McWilliams, and Henry A. Plotkin

"*The Election of 1984* moves voting studies into new territory. The book is a bridge to an enlightening tradition, but its carefully crafted fact-filled chapters advance knowledge of a political culture in rapid transition. The analysis rises above Reagan to view the new media politics as that game will be played by candidates for years to come."

James David Barber, *Duke University*

0-934540-41-1 $8.95 *paper* 0-934540-42-X $20.00 *cloth*

VIEWS FROM THE BENCH

The Judiciary and Constitutional Politics

Mark W. Cannon and David M. O'Brien

"A treasure trove for anyone interested in public law, the judicial process, or American politics."

Walter F. Murphy, *Princeton University*

0-934540-33-0 $12.95 *paper* 0-934540-34-9 $25.00 *cloth*

THE CASE FOR BUREAUCRACY

A Public Administration Polemic. Second Edition

Charles T. Goodsell

In the new second edition, Goodsell considers the implications of the 1980s for public administration in the United States. He responds to the current attack on a professionalized public administration and offers active countermeasures to safeguard its integrity and quality.

0-934540-55-1 $11.95 *paper* *Fall* 1985

TIME, CHANCE, AND ORGANIZATIONS

Natural Selection in a Perilous Environment

Herbert Kaufman

Kaufman suggests that organizations are lucky beneficiaries of an ever changing environment that selects some for prosperity and others for extinction no matter how they strive to continue. His provocative conclusions will be of interest to all students of organization theory.

0-934540-39-X $11.95 *paper* 0-934540-40-3 $20.00 *cloth*

POLITICS IN ISRAEL

The Second Generation

Asher Arian

"Fills an important need in comparative politics for an authoritative, comprehensive, and easy to read analysis of Israeli political institutions, political behavior, and public policy. It is thoroughly modern in its approach without being pedantic; rich in factual data and illustration, intelligently and lucidly interpretated." **Gabriel A. Almond,** *Stanford University*

0-934540-37-3 $12.95 *paper* 0-934540-38-1 $25.00 *cloth*

For further information about these and forthcoming titles, contact: **Edward Artinian,** publisher, CHATHAM HOUSE PUBLISHERS, INC., Box One, Chatham, N.J. 07928. Phone: (201) 635-2059.